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Selected Writings of B. Schrieke

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By Dutch Scholars

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Selected Writings

of

B. Schrieke

PART ONE

"SUMUR BANDUNG"
formally, N.V. Mij Vorkink-Van Hoeve, Bandung. 1960

Toko Buku "SOEN"
Djatan Raya 147
PURWOKERTO
In her obituary notice for Professor Schrieke, Dr Lindgren wrote:

Schrieke's ethnographic and historical publications have won respect, but can only adequately evaluated by specialists in the South-East Asiatic field, and when all his unpublished work is available.3

In projecting the publication of this volume of a few selected articles in English translation and a companion volume now in preparation containing a portion of the study on the Hindu-Javanese period on which Schrieke was working at the time of his death in 1945, the editors hope thus to expand the circle of specialists able to evaluate his writings.

Schrieke was a pioneer in many respects. He had more foreign contacts than most of his colleagues in the Netherlands East Indies administration, a good deal of his work has appeared in English,3 and - more important - he was in the first rank of those who recognized the need for a scientific approach to the problem of what is nowadays called acculturation. Those who read the articles presented in this volume should bear in mind that they all were written in the 'twenties'. They have been selected both for their theoretical sociological approach and for their practical application of it. The editors are aware that some passages have been overtaken by more recent research; they have, however, not deemed it necessary to state this explicitly at every occasion. Insiders will be able to deduce it from the data of the several articles.

An historical study written in 1925 on "The Shifts in Political and Economic Power in the Indonesian Archipelago in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century" was - as the original title indicates - meant to serve as an introduction to a projected special study on the peoples of Sumatra. The study was never written;
in point of fact, however, one may consider as such the 1928 report on "The Causes and Effects of Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra", which Schrieke submitted after the communist-inspired uprisings in that area in 1926. He reported to the government on behalf of the investigation committee appointed immediately after the 'troubles'; part of the report was confidential, the actually published part starting with a summary of the first sections. This summary is given as an introductory chapter in the translated version, which contains only the first volume of the report.

The reader will notice how much criticism from a government civil servant on matters of administration was tolerated and even invited by the Netherlands East Indies government at the time. The Government Bureau for Native Affairs, which grew out of the policy of appointing experts such as Snouck Hurgronje as advisers to the administration, was as a matter of fact nothing less than an official body for checking up on civil service policy.

The Batavia Law School, in which Schrieke served as a professor from its foundation in 1924 until his appointment as Director of Education in 1929, was equally a stronghold of scholarly criticism. The address given to the Batavia Law School by Schrieke in 1928 on "The (Javanese) Native Rulers", an address containing a number of critical remarks, provides a good specimen of the sociological-historical approach which was Schrieke's forte.

"Some Remarks on Borrowing in the Development of Culture", an article originally published in 1927 in the journal of the Java Institute Djàwoè, develops the thesis Schrieke had already taken up in a paper read at the Third Pan-Pacific Science Congress on the evolutionary theories of the German and Manchester Schools of Social Anthropology.

Schrieke's general attitude may be summarized in a quotation from the report on communism on the West Coast of Sumatra:

To estimate the political significance of these grievances it is of no use to try to decide whether the conditions, as compared with the conditions elsewhere, justify them or not in our opinion. For the only aspect which is important in this connection is how the people concerned regard them.
The work of translation for this volume has been done by Miss
Ann de Leeuw, Mr J. T. Brockway, Mr James S Holmes, and
Mr A. van Marle, the last of whom has also given his assistance
in preparing the volume in its final form. The editors would like
to express their wholehearted thanks to these persons and Mme
P. Schrieke for their active cooperation.

The publication of this volume has been made possible through
a grant of the Netherlands Organization for Pure Research
(zwo) to the Royal Tropical Institute, for which the series is
being published.

Amsterdam, Autumn 1954

THE EDITORS

Notes

1. Ethel J. Lindgren, "Obituary, Bertram Johannes Otto Schrieke:
1890—1945", Man: A Monthly Record of Anthropological Science,
XLVIII (1948), article 131 (pp. 113-117).
2. Ibid., p. 115.
3. The following articles may be selected from the bibliography ac­
companying Dr Lindgren's obituary: "The Evolution of Culture in the
Pasific in Relation to the Teories of the 'Kultur-Historische' and the
'Manchester' Schools of Social Anthropology", paper presented at the
Third Pan-Pacific Science Congress, Tokyo, 1926, and published in the
Proceedings of the congress, II, 2423-2441; "Native Society in the Trans­
formation Period", paper presented at the Fourth Pan-Pacific Science
Congress, Batavia, 1929, and published in B. J. O. Schrieke, editor, The
Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilisations in the Malay Archip­
elago (Weltevreden, 1929), 237-247; "The Colonial Question", paper
presented at the International Studies Conference, Paris, 28 June—3
July, 1937, and published in the Proceedings of the conference; "The
Educational System in the Netherlands Indies", Bulletin of the Colonial
Institute (Amsterdam), II (1938), 14-24; and the book Alien Americans:
A Study of Race Relations (New York, 1936) written on the invitation
of he trustees of the Julius Rosenwald Fund. Posthumously appeared a
Report of the Scientific Work Done in the Netherlands on Behalf of the
Dutch Overseas Territories During the Period Between Approximately
1918 and 1943, published by the Werkgemeenschap van Wetenschappe­
lijke Organisaties in Nederland (Association of Scientific Organizations
in the Netherlands) and compiled by the late Dr B. J. O. Schrieke
(Amsterdam, 1948).
4. See n. 3 above.
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THE SHIFTS IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER IN THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
The following study was originally published in Tijdschrift voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen (Journal of Philology, Geography, and Ethnology Published by the Royal Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences), LXV (Batavia, 1925), 90-207, under the title "Prolegomena tot een sociologische studie over de volken van Sumatra, deel I (A. Historisch Gedeelte), Schets van de politieke en economische machtsverschuivingen in den Indischen Archipel in de 17de eeuw" (Prolegomena to a Sociological Study of the Peoples of Sumatra, Part I [A. Historical Section], Outline of the Shifts in Political and Economic Power in the Indonesian Archipelago in the Seventeenth Century).
Introduction

The more recent German and English ethnologists - in contrast to the older school, which restricted itself mainly to the logical combination of the hypothetical phases of culture to be encountered among the more primitive peoples of the present day in the construction of its theories of evolution, in general without any detailed investigation of them in the history of their own development - are giving more consideration to such peoples' own internal history and the cultural influences or tendencies from outside which have operated on them.

In this way the 'cultural history' school, or the 'Cologne school' - and to a certain extent the same thing can be said of Frobenius - has come to the determination of successive strata of civilization which with the help of the so-called form-and-quantity criterium it should be possible to distinguish in the cultures of peoples. Museum ethnologists in origin, the supporters of this school in the beginning applied such criteria to the material cultural heritage, from which in case a number of ethnographica of similar construction were encountered they would then conclude a cultural relationship. They considered them as belonging to a stratum of culture spread over various parts of the earth - agoraphobia was unknown to them - and on such a basis distinguished certain territorial spheres of culture. Later they applied the same procedure to religious and social phenomena as well. In contrast to the 'elemental ideas' of Bastian, who tried to explain everything from a similar predisposition of the whole of mankind, the emphasis was in this way placed once more on cultural transference. It was thus assumed that even though the purpose of an object used in everyday life might be changed, its adoption was not essentially different from the adoption of religious concepts (although the psychological factor in them is, after all, unmistak-
able), of myths or folk tales (the 'wandering' of the fairy tales is known well enough, but it does not seem so fundamental as the transference of religious elements), or of social institutions (which, after all, are always an integral part of the whole social structure).

Up to that time, philological and anthropological questions had hardly been taken into consideration apart from in the studies of Father Schmidt, who though he too belongs to the cultural history tendency nevertheless occupies a place of his own in it. Father Schmidt has thoroughly understood that with the mere acceptance of cultural transference one has not by any means got to the root of matters, but that the question of transference in itself makes up a problem which has to be fathomed psychologically and sociologically. The remarkable thing, however, is that the cultural history school in studying the flow of culture in areas having a documented history has not taken the trouble to test its theories by the known facts, but has ignored them completely and continued to apply its hypothetical criteria. In that respect it reveals a similarity to the Manchester school, which had all sorts of elements of ancient Egyptian culture 'wandering' by way of India, Farther India, and the islands all the way to America, without bothering itself with any analysis of the historical contacts between the peoples inhabiting the regions concerned. In both schools there has been an enviable absence of agoraphobia, a daring jump backwards to ages long past, and a negation of the history of the last two to six thousand years - which surely can also have had their influence!

In Germany and England - and in America as well, - neither of the schools has lacked in challengers, by the nature of things from among the older ethnologists, whose thought and work were so completely differently trained and directed. Therefore, and the more so as for all parties the basis was to a certain extent so little built upon factual data, the debate was destined to be unfruitful.

The Indonesian Archipelago, however, takes a highly important place in the theories of both the Cologne and the Manchester schools as a transitional region - for the English, on the route
from Egypt to America; for the German, on the route from the southeast Asian mainland to America. Furthermore it luckily has a history the course of which can be fixed with some certainty for the last two thousand years. It is a region which lends itself extraordinarily well to a study of the influence of cultural contacts: the peoples of the archipelago have been in contact with all sorts of persons from elsewhere, and within the archipelago, too, the relations between the various peoples have been many. If anywhere, then here the problem of transference can be investigated and the effects of foreign cultural influences on indigenous societies analyzed.

The aim of this study is thus in the first place to investigate the nature of those contacts for a limited part of the archipelago and to trace their effects.

For practical reasons I am beginning this work with the period for which the most records are available to us, the period beginning with the rise of Islam and ending with the stabilization of Dutch power. In that period we immediately encounter two of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of the area: Javanese expansion in the archipelago in its heyday and in its decline, through which latter the Javanese became a purely agrarian people, and the changeover of the Macassarese from a farming to a seafaring people. The tracking down of the sociological causes leading to these changes must suffice for this, the first part of the projected study.

The second part will be devoted to the period before the coming of Islam, which will have to be reconstructed from few data on the basis of the results obtained in the first part. This part will of course of necessity be more hypothetical in character. On the basis of the facts analyzed, it will then be possible to examine the problem of cultural influence and transference more closely in the third part. In that way, finally, the foundation will be laid for a more thorough-going examination of the culture of the peoples of Sumatra and the archipelago in general, and of religious phenomena among the Indonesian peoples.
Before ending this introduction I cannot fail to make mention of my gratitude for the historical studies of Tiele, De Jonge, Heeres, Colenbrander, De Haan, and Rouffaer. Their publications, especially of historical documents, have opened up the trail for me.

For historians the apology, and for others the warning, that in what follows a sociologist treads the field of history. It is only to be able to bring order in the data of ethnology that I permit myself this liberty.

*Weltevreden, June 1925*
Chapter One

1300—1500:
JAVANESE TRADE AND THE RISE OF ISLAM
IN THE ARCHIPELAGO

1

The Diversion of the Trade Route to the East

By the time of the beginning of the Crusades (1096), already, the merchants from Venice, Amalfi, Pisa, and Genoa had taken over the position of traders on the Levant earlier held by Jews and Syrians, and it was via them that Oriental goods came to central and western Europe. It was only in the thirteenth century that the trade of Marseilles and other French towns began to develop, partly as a result of the Crusades. For the Italians, especially Genoa, Venice, and Pisa, without whose cooperation the large-scale conquests in Palestine and Syria could not have been accomplished, the Crusades had this great importance\(^1\) that they were able to obtain large commercial privileges in exchange for their share in the military operations. In all the seaports there were established Italian colonies with large amounts of land, complete freedom from tolls for themselves and the right to levy tolls on others. As practical men they let out their factories and lands to the previous owners in return for a payment of a third or a fourth of what was produced and attempted above all to take care that commercial intercourse from Baghdad to the Syrian ports by way of Damascus was not disturbed. This was such a vital point for both parties, the Christians and the Moslems, that the inviolability of the trade caravans was generally recognized and plundering of them was
censured. In the Moslem states that had been the case for a long time before. The unity of the gigantic caliphate, perpetuating the age-old traditions of the previous periods of civilization, especially the Hellenistic and the Roman, had established the freedom of trade and the security of the trader so firmly that they continued to exist even after the one large state had been divided into a number of principalities. The situation was completely different at that time in southern Europe, where almost every trading centre stood alone and not infrequently let itself be enticed by envy into acts of violence resulting in retaliation. The reprisal system - as it has been called - hindered trade no small amount. It was only after the middle of the twelfth century that effective measures were taken against it.

As soon as a people participated in international trade it found itself compelled to abide honourably by the unwritten law of the inviolability of the trader, because the principle of reciprocity required it and otherwise trade would be broken off. And trade had become a necessity. That appeared time and again when it was disturbed by a crusade. When Innocent III declared the holy war against Egypt in 1213, there were more than a thousand 'Frankish' merchants in Alexandria who with the approach of hostilities were taken prisoner by the sultan. Damietta was conquered and plundered in 1219, but two years later had to be evacuated again. In the meantime all the spices had become really 'pepper dear' in the West. In 1224, however, trade was going on as usual once more. The fall of Acre in the year 1291, by which the last direct result of the Crusades was lost to the West, stirred up strong emotion in Europe. Under the guidance of the pope, it was initially decided to make preparation for a new crusade and furthermore to weaken the Saracens by forbidding all trade with them upon pain of excommunication. There was even a fleet of galleys fitted out to police the seas and to intercept all ships sailing from or to Egypt and Syria. But hardly ten years after the fall of Acre all trade relations had been re-established and the ban was in practice limited to the export of war materials and slaves. It had quickly become apparent
that once the plans for a new crusade were abandoned the papal authority was no longer enforcing the ban completely and that, in view of the fact that the route to Asia \textit{via} the Black Sea described by Pegolotti around 1340 \footnote{4} proved to be completely insufficient for the spice trade, permits were to be obtained for a price. In the year 1370 the pope lifted the ban on trade completely. It had caused a great deal of disturbance, but had not been able to prevent trade.

Profitable, peaceful trade was too well established for it not to be able to find a means of maintaining itself despite all obstacles. The history of the Oriental spice trade, too, proves this. If, as we have pointed out, the unrest accompanying the decline of the Abbasid caliphate did not disturb the most customary trade route (from the Persian Gulf \textit{via} Baghdad to the Mediterranean seaports), it certainly did not work to the benefit of trade.

The Crusades, however, were not in the least beneficial to it. After all, their results were not in the first place determined by the trade policy of the Italian merchant towns regarding the Syrian coast (which from the earliest times to the present day has been the political victim of its favourable position for international trade): the crusaders themselves had other motives for their fervour. It is true it is recorded of Godfrey of Bouillon that he closed treaties \textit{commertiorum gratia} with the Moslem towns Askalon and Damascus, but not the whole of European knighthood had an eye for such interests.\footnote{5} The Moslems, at any rate, feared them. After the conquest of southern Palestine by the 'Franks' the spice trade had taken a detour, and Ras Elba, on the Red Sea across from Jidda, had become the port for the Indian transit trade. From there it went through the desert to Cush in Upper Egypt and then down the Nile to the capital, Fostat, and on to Alexandria. It is true that already in the heyday of the Fatimites, when Egypt was the only Moslem great power in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, it had known a period of great prosperity, but it was only after the destruction of the Abbasid caliphate by the Mongol hordes in 1258 that trade was directed almost exclusively to Egypt. The great period of the state,
its third ‘golden age’ since its autonomy as a Muslim country in 868, was, then, not so much the period under Saladin and the Ayyubite Dynasty (1171-1250) as that under the Mameluke sultans (1250-1390, 1390-1517). Egypt did not owe that period of glory to its ruinous agricultural system, but — thanks to increasing needs of the prosperous Europe of the Renaissance — to the transit trade from the Indies. And thus when the Portuguese ensconced themselves in the Indian Ocean (1498), conquered Malacca, the starting point for the spice trade on the West (1511), dominated Mohammedan shipping to the Red Sea (Diu in 1513, Socotra, Goa, and so forth), and led Oriental trade around the Cape, it was the end for the Mamelukes and the independence of Egypt. Giving way before the obtruding might of the Ottomans in 1517, Egypt sank back to the position of an insignificant Turkish province. Partly because of the discovery of America in 1492, the route of world trade had been sifted. From then on the earth’s history was determined elsewhere: for Egypt, as for the Italian commercial towns, which had furthermore been worsted by the Turks at Constantinople in 1453, on the Black Sea in 1475, and in Greece, it was the beginning of a dead age.

It is difficult for us to comprehend nowadays how the profits of the fourteenth and fifteenth-century spice trade could have been the economic basis for an illustrious period of civilization, not only in Egypt, but also in a politically fragmented Italy. Becker has calculated that at that time spices of an absolute gold value of nearly £420,000 per year passed through Cairo alone. Spices — in the Middle Ages, and long afterwards even, they were the leading merchandise from the Indies. The products with which the Indies supply the European market in our times were then either unknown or little used. Tea, coffee, and tobacco, of course, were introduced in Europe only in the seventeenth century. The import of other articles is of a still more recent date. In the case of merchandise such as rice and sugar the high transport costs making their import and general use in Europe prohibitive must above all be taken into consideration. Sugar at that time belonged in the apothecary’s, and he could obtain a sufficient sup-
ply from the production in southern Europe and northern Africa. Spices, however, were a chief ingredient in apothecary and kitchen alike. The cure for all sorts of ailments was sought in mixtures of pepper, ginger, cinnamon, sugar, cloves, and especially nutmeg. Not only illnesses of the stomach and intestines, but those of the head and chest had to be cured by spices. Furthermore with the heavy fare which it was customary to indulge in, spices were considered necessary for the digestion; at least it was usual to spice food and drink much more than nowadays. It is no wonder that people regarded spices as indispensable and attached a high value to them. Tolls were levied and tributes laid in pepper. 'Pepper dear' was not a mere phrase in those days, though, for the spices had to pass through many hands before they reached Europe. Profits had to be made by the planters, the Javanese and Malay traders who took the cloves and nutmeg from the Moluccas and Banda to Java, the traders who took them from there to Malacca, the ones who took them on to the great Indian ports, the ones who then carried them to Aden or Hormuz — and then they still had not reached the Mediterranean port towns where they could be bought up by Venetians and Genoese. Add to that the high import, transit, and export tolls that had to be paid in most ports and the arbitrary measures sometimes taken by rulers and other authorities in regard to transit trade and the traders, and finally the profits enjoyed by the various European wholesalers and retailers and the duties they had to pay where they lived and in the countries to and through which they took the wares, and it is no longer surprising why, considering the scarcity of money, Eastern goods were so 'pepper dear'.

In 1306 the Venetian nobleman Marino Sanudo wrote:

Earlier the largest share of the Indian merchandise transported to the West used to make its way over Baghdad to the ports of Syria and Asia Minor; in those days both spices and other Indian products were cheaper and more abundant than nowadays. Now they are for the most part unloaded at Aden and from there transported to Alexandria; in that way a third of their value flows into the treasury of the sultan of Egypt. The profits along that route come only to the advantage of the Arab traders,
for the sultan does not allow a Christian to travel through his territory to India.

It is a typical irony of history that along with the needs of the prosperous Europe of the Renaissance, the Crusades on the one hand and the Mongol wave on the other should have been the causes of the rise of Mohammedan trade and the spread of Islam in the Far East. Not only Aden experienced another period of extraordinary prosperity after more than a thousand years; other ports lying on the new trade route also shared in that prosperity. What comes to mind first of all in this connection is the province of Gujarat to the north of Bombay, where centuries before the beginning of the Christian era, even, the commercial town Bharukaccha (Broach, the Barygaza of the Ancients) had flourished, but now in the fourteenth and later centuries Cambay, Surat, and Diu arose. It was above all the Gujarati who carried on the trade on the Indonesian Archipelago in those times, especially when partly as a result of the commercial policy of the Ming Dynasty the direct trade of the Chinese on India died out. According to Marino Sanudo in 1306 the largest share of spices and other merchandise produced by the various countries of the Indies was in those days transported to Cambay, from whence it was shipped further. This statement is confirmed by Pegolotti and in the sixth chapter of the work written in 1307 by the Armenian prince Hayton, who after a political career in the East was appointed abbot in Poitiers by Pope Clement V. The design of Hayton's book is no different from that of the books by Jordanus and Marino Sanudo — that of providing a scholarly basis for fitting out a new crusade. The merchants from Gujarat had their agencies in all the chief commercial centres of the East: at Malacca alone there lived a thousand, and three to four thousand others were constantly en route between the two places. Malacca could not have existed without Cambay, because of the wealth of its traders and the demand for the goods they brought with them, nor could Cambay without Malacca, because there was where its best wares found their market. It was only toward the end of the sixteenth cen-
tury, when entering the Gulf of Cambay became quite dangerous because of alluviation,\(^2^0\) that preference was given to Diu on the south coast of the subcontinent, where the Portuguese had in the meantime ensconced themselves, or to Surat, where the Dutch and English held their factories, as ports.

The other sources also bear witness to the commerce of the Gujarati in the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries.\(^2^1\) They carried their silks and cottons, white and dyed cloth, and beads\(^2^2\) to the gold port Sofala on the east coast of Africa.\(^2^3\) Among the things they transported to Aden were not only the spices they had obtained from the Indonesian Archipelago,\(^2^4\) but also their cotton cloth:

And the people of Cambay come with many pieces of cloth and the heap of them is so high that it seems terrifying... and it seems something impossible that so much cloth is used as these ships bring from Cambay.

Before 1500 the cornelians of Cambay also went along with the spices \textit{via} Aden, the Red Sea, and Alexandria to Europe,\(^2^5\) and to China,\(^2^6\) according to Barbosa. In earlier and in later days they carried them in the same way to Arabia and Persia and to other parts of India, and imported them along with cotton and silk fabrics into the Indonesian Archipelago as early as 1349\(^2^7\) — so that, as Barbosa says:\(^2^8\)

\ldots this place [Cambay] now has the largest amount of trade to be found in these regions; it yields so much money due to the considerable and rich merchandise loaded and unloaded here that it is amazing...

The accounts of the able Barbosa are sustained completely by what the commercial agent for the Venetian Republic in Lisbon, Lunardo da Ca' Masser, reported in 1506\(^2^9\) and the Bolognese Ludovico di Varthema wrote of his own visit to Cambay in 1503 or 1504.\(^3^0\)

Cambay had its extraordinary flowering of trade for a large part to thank to the diversion of the trade route for Eastern products in the thirteenth century to the same sea route which in the first centuries of the Christian era had linked eastern Asia with Rome. At any rate, if we compare the scarce data which the otherwise so copious Arab writers of the tenth century to the
fourteenth are able to provide us on Cambay, we cannot draw any other conclusion from them than that Gujarat in that time had lost its significance as a commercial centre. The gifted Marco Polo (1293), who had not called there himself on his journey, but like Jordanus and De' Marignolli still followed the older route from Ceylon directly to Hormuz on the Persian Gulf, is not able to tell a great deal about Gujarat either, though what he does have to say bears witness to the developing industry and trade. Cambay's reputation as a nest of pirates was by then already a thing of the past.

As we have seen, however, Sanudo in 1306 and Prince Hayton the Younger in 1307 were already calling Cambay the stapling point for Eastern products. By 1350 Ibn Battuta was praising its beautiful mosques and other buildings, and he spoke of its trade on Aden and the countless foreign traders bringing their wares to Cambay. As one might have expected under the given circumstances, from that same period of Cambay's emerging significance as an international commercial centre also dates its yielding in 1304 to what had been after 1024, but especially from 1294 on, the obtrusive might of Islam.

After a fruitless revolt against the supremacy of Delhi in 1351, Gujarat had already developed so much inward strength by half a century later that in 1403 its economic significance found expression in its position as an independent Mohammedan state, with Ahmedabad as the capital from 1411 on. Commissariat's "Brief History of the Gujarat Saltanat" bears evidence on every page of the intensity of the Mohammedan conviction of the rulers and their unabated religious zeal, and the tremendous respect enjoyed by Mohammedan religious teachers there. From the sixteenth century on, Surat was one of the fixed stations for people from the East on pilgrimage to Mecca.

After such an elaborate consideration of Cambay as the international trading centre of the East in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we may be brief regarding other important ports on the coasts of India, mentioning only in passing Dabhol, to the
south of Bombay, Calicut, on the Malabar pepper coast, where in the previous age Kollam (Quilon) had been the chief emporium and even the transshipping centre, and the Coromandel Coast, the Ma'bar of the Arab writers, from whence the kelings and the 'coastal cloth' went to the Indonesian Archipelago, with Negapattinam, Pulicat, and Masulipatnam. It was actually only later on that the Bengal trade became a factor of importance.

2

The Diverted Trade Route and the Indonesian Archipelago

The diversion of international trade over the route Europe—Alexandria—Cush—Aden—Cambay—eastern Asia had radical consequences for the Indonesian Archipelago as well. The Malay state Čriwijaya, in earlier centuries such a preponderant factor in the history of eastern Asia, was no longer of any importance. Even though, as Chou K‘ii-fei wrote in 1178, the country did not bring forth any natural products, its capital San-fo-ts‘i (Palembang) was "an important thoroughfare on the searoutes of the Foreigners on their way to and from China..." Because of its stock of expensive merchandise, Palembang in his opinion came after the Abbasid caliphate and Java as the third greatest power in the world. Palembang was in his day the regular station both for the ships going from China to the West and those on their way from the ports on the Persian Gulf and India to the Celestial Kingdom. As far as the inhabitants were concerned, the same author, who was assistant sub-prefect in the capital of Kwangsi, said of them that:

...in fighting on land or on water none surpass them in impetuosity of attack; even the Ku-lin [i.e., Kollam or Quilon on the Malabar Coast] people come after them. If some foreign ship, passing this place, should not enter here, an armed party would certainly come out and kill them to the last.

And in 1216 Chau Ju-kua writes similarly of Čriwijaya that it is:
lying in the ocean and controlling the straits through which the foreigners' sea and traffic in either direction must pass.

And it is true that in the heyday of its power the Malay state of Čriwijaya had extended its supremacy over the peninsula of Malacca, imposed its power on the Coromandel Coast, and fitted out several expeditions to Ceylon.

But enough of this: these notes must suffice for now and the consideration of such matters be deferred to the second part of this study. In the period we must treat here, the age-long struggle with Java for supremacy had been decided in favour of the latter. At one time Palembang had attempted to subject that stapling place for spices and storehouse for rice to its authority, at another eastern Java had tried to overpower the Malay key point on the artery of international trade, but from late in the thirteenth century (1286) on Palembang was a Javanese province, even though it had to be disciplined once more in 1377, after which the name San-fo-ts'i disappeared for good from the Chinese annals.48

Exactly at the turn of the fourteenth century, when a Chinese expedition had harassed those regions, Palembang had been destroyed, and the empire of Majapahit only just founded, Mohammedan traders were able to gain a foothold on northern Sumatra and make the presently Islamized state of Pase on the Straits of Malacca into their pied à terre.49 The increase in the power of the state was accompanied by an intensification of its Mohammedan convictions, as can be read in the accounts of Odorigo (circa 1323)50 and Ibn Battuta (1345-1346). The weakened Palembang, still living on former glory, continued to be of more or less importance for the spice trade up to the middle of the fourteenth century,51 although Jambi was gaining more and more importance as a pepper port. But the glory of Palembang was badly tarnished and it was not able to prevent the shift in trade.

The result was that in the course of time there came an exodus of a number of Hindu Javanese traders who had been living there up to that time but now attempted to create a new commercial centre on the artery of international trade on the penin-
sula of Malacca under a dynasty related to the Malay royal house, which had withdrawn to the highlands of Minangkabau after 1286. They were only partially successful in Singapore, so that after the great Javanese expedition of 1377—which was also intended to establish the authority of Majapahit there as well as in Pase and elsewhere— they moved their centre to the fishing village of Malacca, which considering the monsoons and the trade situation at the time enjoyed an advantageous position. At the beginning of the fifteenth century Malacca still recognized the suzerainty of Siam, from which, with the aid of China, it presently freed itself. Although Pase and above all the nearby pepper port Pidie remained places of importance for a long time afterwards, the focal point of international trade soon (around 1450) shifted from Pase to Malacca. Palembang, which had nothing of its own for export and was quickly far surpassed in economic importance by Jambi, had in the meantime become fairly insignificant for trade and towards the end of the fourteenth century was even a notorious nest of pirates. It was against them that the Javanese expedition of 1377 and the Chinese of 1415 were directed.

In Malacca, as in Pase, the Hindu Javanese traders, wrenched out of their traditional environment, came in contact with the fanatically Mohammedan Gujarati, so that they were quickly won for Islam. What Marco Polo records for Aden and Marino Sanudo for Egypt, Aden, and Cambay, according to Chinese accounts very soon held also for Malacca: there predominated there an intense Mohammedan fervour about which the Hindu ruler of Java could still complain to D'Albuquerque in 1511.

In the meantime Malacca had become the meeting place for trade from the East and the West, as Palembang had been earlier, but with the increased traffic along the new world route its significance was still greater. The Portuguese writer never tire of painting Malacca's commercial activity in glowing colours and sketching its advantageous position as the junction of the monsoon-governed trade routes. As it is put in the Hakluyt translation of D'Albuquerque's Commentaries:
... if there were another world, and another navigable route, yet all would resort to the city, for in her they would find every different sort of drugs and spices which can be mentioned in the world, by reason of the port of Malacca being more commodious for all the monsoons from Cape Comorin to the East, than any other port that exists in those parts.

Although it was a Malay dynasty that governed in Malacca, Javanese influence even so remained preponderant. According to the description Barros gives of the situation in 1511, the town consisted of two quarters, Upih and Ilir, both of which were under Javanese administrations. In Upih - where the kampong keling was also to be found - dwelt the traders from Tuban, Japara, Sundã, and Palembang and its dependencies, under the authority of the Javanese Utimutirah, the most powerful man in the town, to whose title the Portuguese calls especial attention. In Ilir dwelt the traders from Grise and its dependencies under the Javanese Tuan-ku Laskar. In rivalry between Utimutirah - who had the coastal port of eastern Java on his side - and the ruler of Malacca had grown so great that people there expected a Javanese naval attack which would place Malacca under the supremacy of Java in the same way as Palembang, Pase, and Singapore had been in 1377.

It is here the place to mention something on Javanese activities at sea. The Javanese dominated shipping on Timor and the Moluccas, from whence they and the Malays obtained spices for which after 1400 Grise was the stapling point. Barros and Barbosa, as a matter of fact, praise them as great navigators. The question here is whether in the period under consideration there was also Javanese shipping on India. In the Portuguese literature there circulates a tale brought up once more by Raffles that the Javanese shipped on Madagascar. It would seem that the tale goes back to the following even: Diogo Lopes de Sequeira, who set sail from Lisbon in April, 1508, was among
other things commissioned to investigate what truth there might be in the rumours that spices and other costly goods were to be found on the east coast of Madagascar. He discovered that the rumours had their source in the fact that a Javanese vessel laden with cloves had been driven to Madagascar in a storm.

As far as shipping on India is concerned, it is true that in Johan van Twist’s ‘General Description of the Indies’ one finds only a general mention made of “most all the nations of Asia, excepting Chinese and Japanese” as being among the traders to be encountered in Gujarat. But neither does Baldaeus mention the Javanese specifically in his ‘Accurate Description of Malabar and Coromandel’. It was Valentijn who was first to say that on the bazaar of Surat it “swarmed and kinds of people so that one could count very many Persians, Javanese, etc.” The fact that Valentijn was a fixed for people on pilgrimage to Mecca also needs to be taken account of, however. If we add to this the fact that Van Linschoten does make mention of ships from Sumatra trading on the west coast of India and that the envoys of Mataram to Goa in 1634 returned to the archipelago in a Portuguese ship, then the final impression gained is that in the heyday of Javanese sea trade direct shipping on India can have been . From the Portuguese sources, especially Barbosa and , as well, there is evidence of shipping from Sumatra to India, but not for shipping from Java. As a matter of fact in the time of Valentijn the Javanese meant by him cannot have been sea traders from eastern Java, as will become apparent later.

The Javanese shipping trade took place within the Indonesian Archipelago including Farther India, and was there very heavy. The evidence for that is to be found in abundance in the Portuguese literature and the seventeenth century documents of the Dutch Company. Rather than to cite an endless series of sources which in any case will be done justice as a matter of course later on, I should here prefer to limit myself to quoting a few characteristic descriptions of the most important Javanese commercial towns of the period, Tuban, Grise, and Japara.
The journal of the second Dutch voyage to the Indies has this to say of Tuban:

In this city dwell very many noblemen who do great trade in the buying and selling of silk, camlet, cotton cloth, and also pieces of cloth which they wear on their bodies, some of which are made there. They have ships that they call junks, which ships are laden with pepper and taken to Bali, and they exchange it for pieces of simple cotton cloth, for they are made there in quantity, and when they have exchanged their pepper there for that cloth, they carry the same to Banda, Ternate, the Philippines, and also to other surrounding islands more, and exchange the cloth in turn for mace, nutmeg, and cloves, and being laden there-with they sail home once more. The ordinary man occupies himself with fishing and tending his animals, for there is much livestock there.

In 1615 Tuban was still said to be supreme at sea.

And now the description of Japara, Grise, and Surabaya taken from the 'Account of Some Wars in the Indies':

From these places abovementioned, namely Grise, Jaratan, and Sedayu, great commerce is carried on at sea on all parts of the Indies, for they have a multitude of ships. In those places there can be a thousand and more boats of twenty, fifty, to two hundred ton, with which they steadily carry on their trade, and it must be taken into account that one never sees half the ships at home, for they sail with the monsoons. With the eastern monsoons they go to the Straits of Malacca, Sumatra Palembang, Borneo, Patani, Siam, and a hundred other places too many to tell. With the western monsoon they go to Bali, Bantam, Bima Solor, Timor, Alor, Salayar, Buton, Buru, Banggai, Mindanao, the Moluccas, Ambon, and Banda, which has now been taken from them. Also to the islands of Kai, Aru, Ceram, and other places to many to relate where they do business in bartering goods and make at least two or there hundred per cent. profit before they return home. Wherever they go, namely while they wait for the other monsoon to go back home again, they pull their junks or ships onto the beach, the which they are able to do very skilfully. First they make little huts of the sort of booth at fairs, where they bring all their merchandise and display it, so that there are Indies fairs.

The trade that takes place around Tuban occurs at Jaratan... in summary, that Jaratan and Grisé are the stapling points for the spices which come from the Moluccas and Banda; at Brondong, near Tuban, as well as in other places, there are also many junks, but most of them harbour in Jaratan.
... a populous land. For I have been in one of these cities, called Surabaya; from there over thirty thousand armed men had gone to encounter the Mataram, the emperor of Java, who wanted to besiege it, and yet one could hardly see that anyone was missing in the city, except that one saw more women than men....

At Japara there is a good sea road and good [anchorage] ground not far from the shore, which is very good, so that it is easy to bring the freight on board, and five trips can be made in place of one at Grise, for in Grise the ships lie so far from the city that one cannot see the mainmasts on the horizon.... From Japara sail for the most part large junks of two hundred ton and over, with which they carry on commerce on Malacca, Achin, Jambi, Indragiri, Palembang, and other places thereabouts, where they usually take rice, as well as Patani, Siam, and other places in that direction....

Cheribon is a place lying between Japara and Jakarta from which great commerce at sea is carried on; whereas here there are a great many small vessels of the size of twenty or thirty ton, little more or less, since with them they can easily go up and down the rivers, for the town lies up the river....

If we combine the above data with what appears regarding Javanese trade from other Dutch Company literature, then we obtain the following general picture of what was happening in the eastern Javanese area of trade in its heyday. Aside from cotton and thread and Javanese fabrics, the export products were primarily rice, salt, and other foodstuffs (salt fish, beans, and so forth) with which Sunda and the pepper ports on the east and west coasts of Sumatra were provided. These export products were traded for lacca from Pegu and, above all, pepper from Sunda, the Lampong region, Indrapura, Jambi, and Patani. The pepper not needed for home consumption then served for export to Bali, where it was exchanged for the Balinese cotton fabrics so much in demand in the Moluccas. With these, gold and silver jewelry, smaller coins, the silk and cotton cloth brought to Java by the Chinese and the Indians, Chinese porcelain, and rice (also from Bima), the traders then purchased cloves and nutmeg on Banda and in the Moluccas, and for sandalwood and wax on Timor they traded the parangs and so forth from Billiton, Karimata, and Tobungku (on eastern Celebes) which were so much in demand and were later imported there by the Portu-
gue and the Dutch Company as well. From the Lesser Sunda Islands came the *kasumba* for red dye. The spices were in turn taken along with rice to Malacca or were bought up by the Chinese (along with pepper) or the Indians — by the former in exchange for porcelain, silk, gold, silver, and above all copper coins (cashes or *keping*),\(^{100}\) by the latter in exchange for semiprecious stones, glass beads, cornelians, cotton or silk fabrics, and Coromandel batiks.

From the Chinese sources already cited it appears that this pattern of eastern Javanese trade already existed earlier than 1400; the Portuguese, as will appear below,\(^{101}\) were not able to bring any change in it. After the fifteenth century, however, the diamond trade of Tanjungpura (Matan, in southwest Borneo) seems gradually to have gone over into Chinese hands.\(^{102}\) It is clear from this picture of Javanese commercial life what a great significance the intermediary trade in pepper and spices had for the economic situation. Malacca, the Moluccas, and eastern Sumatra were dependent on Java for their supply of rice.

The quotations cited above lend support to our earlier conclusion that Javanese shipping in its heyday was limited to Indonesia including Farther India and the Philippines. This was as a matter of fact already indicated by the list of Javanese dependencies given in the *Negarakertagama* (1365).

Before considering what effect the changing of the trade route (Alexandria — the Red Sea — Aden — Cambay — eastern Asia) had on Javanese trade, it would seem best first to insert here a description of the Javanese ships, to be followed — for the satisfaction of theoreticians on race — by an anthropological sketch of the coastal Javanese of the time.

A description of the Javanese junk\(^{103}\) used in those days is to be found in the account of the first Dutch voyage to the Indies:

The same day they saw in a bay of the island of Java a ship, or junk, as they are called there, having a bowsprit; a mainmast, and a mizzen-mast with a large mizzen on it, and also a bowsprit sail; and looked at from a distance being like a herring boat, but completely different in its
sails, which were made of wood or rushes. Its shrouds and running rigging were also partly thatched wood and the hull of the ship was pinned together the way the coopers here in Holland fasten together the bottoms they make [for barrels]. It was around sixty of eight or — as others would say — only thirty-two ton in size. The deck was covered with rushes in the way the houses of peasants at home are roofed. The anchors, too, were made of wood. When these same junks sail before the wind, the spanning rope is fastened on either bow, thus the foresail on the one side and the mainsail on the other side; the sails have yards on both the lower leech and the upper...

Their galliots have much the appearance of our galleys except that they have a gallery aft and that the slaves or rowers sit only below, locked fast, and the soldiers above them on a decking in order to be able to fight the freer and better. Fore they have four bases [a sort of artillery], and altogether two masts.

On the smaller types of vessels such as outrigger proas or flying proas, reference may be made to the relevant passages in *Deerste boeck* and *Begin ende voortgangh*. In regard to the junks we also learn that they:

... are their ships with which they sail overseas to the Moluccas, Banda, Borneo, Sumatra, and Malacca... If they go to the islands of the Moluccas or Banda, they set their course along Java a mile or a mile and a half from shore, so that they would always be able to make out the land, and also because it is deeper and clearer along the coast than further out; moreover, being close to the land, in the daytime they expect the strong sea winds which can be profitted from there, then they put out all their sails until it gets calm in the evening, and after midnight the land wind comes with a fine coolness blowing them east-northeast until the wind comes from the sea again. No one steers on the rudder except the two pilots, since they always run along the coast, always know their way, and do not need any sea charts... They do not use any sea charts for they do not understand them, and not long ago (because of the instruction which the Portuguese have given them) have begun to use the Compass... Many of these ships or junks are made at Banjarmasin, a town on the island of Borneo,... and it also makes a kind of ships very big like the junks which they operate with yardsails. Very many [of the smaller type of ships] are made in Lasem..., where there is very good wood for building ships.

Ships were also built in Pasir in eastern Borneo and in Jaratan and Grise.
I dare not make any statement on the strength of the Javanese merchant fleet. If the Portuguese data on the Javanese naval attacks on Malacca and Pasuruan and so forth were absolutely reliable, one would perhaps have a criterion there. From forty to sixty junks sailed from Jaratan to obtain spices from the Moluccas. In 1609 there were fifteen hundred Javanese traders on Banda.

Let us turn to the picture of the coastal Javanese people given in the records of the first Dutch voyage to the Indies:

... Commonly wear long hair and long nails, and their teeth are filed. Are brown in hue like the Brazilians, strong and well proportioned in body, course of limb, with flat features, broad, high cheeks, large eyelids, small eyes, and little beard. Are so subjected to their rulers that they are not even stopped by death from fulfilling their command. ... are very like the Chinese in physiognomy, on the average having broad foreheads, large cheeks, and small eyes, as the Chinese also do.

4

Javanese Trade and the Diverted Trade Route

After this digression on the extent of Javanese commercial shipping we may now turn to a consideration of the effect which the growing trade after the diversion of the trade route over Malacca, Cambay, Aden, and Alexandria to the West had on the eastern Javanese trade centres, the stapling points for the spices from the Moluccas. That effect was twofold — economic and religious. Up to the fourteenth century Tuban was the port of Majapahit. Ujung Galu — the place called Jung-ya-lu, or Chung-kia-lu, by the Chinese — was a thing of the past; Tuban had taken its place. Sedayu, Lasem, and Brondong, like Changgu in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, were always of only secondary importance as trading centres. Surabaya, mentioned as early as 1365, also in later centuries remained for a long time of lesser importance as an emporium as compared to Grise and Jaratan. Up to around 1400, then, Tuban maintained a monopoly on Javanese trade. It was only with the rise of Malacca around that
date that the amount of eastern Javanese trade went soaring to the point that it could no longer be limited to Tuban. From that time dates the rise of Grise, which at the coming of the Portuguese to Malacca was, as we have said above, the stapling point for trade on the Moluccas. Japara, too, emerged then as a trading centre. But Tuban was nevertheless able to continue flourishing.

The Javanese spice trade increased steadily from the end of the thirteenth century on, and to a certain extent, even, received a new impetus in the intensified relations with China during the Mongol age$^{122}$ — which in turn were not at all marred by the relapse of China during the Ming Dynasty. The greatest stimulus, however, was the European demand filled by the Cambay traders from the fourteenth century, when the Chinese gave up carrying on direct trade with India, on. By around 1400 the change of trade to Indian hands was a settled affair and from that time dates the swift rise of Malacca, Japara, Grise, and so forth. Partly as a result of the demands of the Gujarati served by Javanese shipping, the direct trade of the Chinese on the Moluccas mentioned by Barros,$^{123}$ which judging from what can be deduced from the Chinese records of 1349, 1425-1432, and 1436 must have developed in the course of the fourteenth century and probably was continued until in the first half of the fifteenth century$^{124}$ was not able to maintain itself in the competition with the Javanese and Malay traders who were also carrying spices to Malacca$^{125}$ and was already a thing of the past long before the coming of the Portuguese in 1511. At that time the Chinese went no further than Grise, which had them to thank for its rise around 1400.$^{126}$

Apart from Sukitan,$^{127}$ Tuban was according to the Chinese accounts the only Javanese emporium of significance before 1400. Only after that do they speak of Grise and Surabaya.$^{128}$ Around 1430 the three towns together had a total population of "over a thousand families". In 1523 settled Mohammedan population of thirty thousand people was said to live in Grise alone,$^{129}$ while at the earlier date the actual population was still for a large part Hindu Javanese.$^{130}$ At the beginning of the seventeenth century Surabaya according to the Daghregister had a total po-
pulation of fifty to sixty thousand people;\textsuperscript{131} Japara, the stapling point for rice intended for Malacca, a hundred thousand, even.\textsuperscript{132} Here is perhaps the place to call attention to the largeness of the benefits which Javanese trade under the autocratic ruling regime allowed to come to the general prosperity, for to the Chinese of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Java served as the very paragon of "wealth and plenty".\textsuperscript{133} This, however, would necessarily lead me to a study of the history of Javanese taxation, a study I should prefer to save for a later occasion. For the time being, then, I may refer to my studies on the institution of per-dikan and the so-called royal ownership right\textsuperscript{134} and to Stutterheim's edition, translation, and explanation of the charter of 851 Ç, which must suffice for now. Chau Ju-kua's evidence of 1216 that "Traders are treated generously; they are not charged expenses for either harborage or board"\textsuperscript{135} shows that the market duties and tolls undoubtedly levied on imports and exports were moderate. Although the Chinese opinion on Tuban in later years is sometimes less favourable,\textsuperscript{136} Surabaya remained true to the old reputation as late as the seventeenth century. The pangeran of Surabaya - under whose authority were also Sedayu, Grise and Jaratan, Pasuruan, Panarukan, and Balambangan: thus the whole east Javanese trade area, considering the fact that Tuban's trade also "occurred" there\textsuperscript{137} - was opposed to privilege.\textsuperscript{138} Therefore, when on 3 June, 1607, he was requested by the Dutch:

That he should forbid his subjects to carry to the Portuguese any victuals and Molucca spices, considering that they, being our enemies, would otherwise be very much strengthened against us thereby. Also warned the king at the same time that we had determined in the future to prevent all trade on Malacca, whereby his people in case they should nevertheless want to trade with the Portuguese could easily come to harm...

his answer was:

that he could not help it that we were in enmity with the Portuguese and that he did not wish to be in enmity with anyone; also that he could not forbid his people to trade, as they had to support themselves by it.

In the same way we can read in the account of 'Olivier van Noort's Voyage Around the Whole Globe';\textsuperscript{139}
... the King [of Surabaya] allowed the Portuguese as well as other nations their freedom, however, because they bring great profit and prosperity in his country; nevertheless he did not take any toll or tribute from any foreigner.

In the account of the 'Journey to the East Indies Under Admiral Wybrandt van Waerwijck', it is also reported (in September, 1604) that "in Jaratan there are few taxes levied." And consequently the 'king' appears to have had no objection to permitting the Dutch to set up a factory at Grise as the Portuguese had done. They received a piece of land for it and the promise that they would not have to pay any tolls or surtaxes, but they on the other hand had to pledge themselves not to commit any acts of enmity against the Portuguese.

As we shall see, this policy agreed with that of Macassar. As the demand for commercially-grown products for the world market increased, other rulers, for example those of Bantam and Achin, saw their own advantage rather in monopoly and the raising of tolls, even in cases where they did not tend to grant monopolies to others. In any case, eastern Java benefitted a great deal from the lively commerce of the Mohammedan traders from India in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

It was also in the fourteenth century that Majapahit was able to achieve its greatest glory and furthest expansion, the memory of which has been preserved in the Pararaton and the Malay chronicles as well as the Nagarakertagama (1365). The expedition of 1377, already mentioned above, confirmed Javanese authority in the whole archipelago once more and as far as the western part of it was concerned served to place Pase and Singapore - which had arisen after the definitive destruction of the international trading centre Palembang and the empire of Criwijaya in the second half of the thirteenth century - under Javanese supremacy.

The great flowering of the eastern Javanese coastal towns was destined eventually to have a disintegrative effect, however. The coastal regents, who after all had already enjoyed a very large amount of freedom under Javanese royal sway, became
more and more assured of their own power under the influence of the growing economic importance of their provinces: they became autonomous coastal potentates more and more independent of the weak bearers of the royal dignity they were outgrowing. The struggle of the commercial towns against the agrarian interior for hegemony - an opposition also expressed in the idiom spoken - was then able to make its beginning.

This was the situation in the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the Hindu ruler of Java called in the help of the Portuguese against his refractory vassals or regents on the coast. Economic and political independence also had its own ideology, and through the regents' conversion to Islam, religion then became a new force in the process of social development. For details regarding the rise of Islam on Java, reference should be made to Het Boek van Bonang. It should be mentioned in this connection that the traders came primarily from the aristocratic classes, not from the people. Here mention need only be made of one factor in the process of Islamization left untreated in Het Boek van Bonang: when one reads over the Chinese accounts of the trading places in India and the archipelago, the Portuguese sources, or the journals of the early Dutch and English voyages, one is struck by the fact that foreigners often held more or less official position of confidence - under various titles, apparently dependent on their knowledge of languages, and so forth - as intermediaries between the authorities of the emporia and the foreign traders. In Bantam it was for a long time a keling or Gujarati, later a Chinese; in Tuban it was a Portuguese gone over to Islam; in Banjarmasin a Gujarati; in Malay Malacca a Javanese and a keling, as well as a Gujarati shahbandar. In the accounts of the rise of Mohammedan trade, however, there is already mention of Mohammedan factota to be found. In 1282, for example, the Hindu Malay ruler of Samudra in northeast Sumatra had two Moslem foreigners as mantris whom he even sent to China as envoys. In Kollam and Calicut, the state of the Hindu Samudrin on the west coast of India; and on the Coromandel Coast, Mohammedans filled the post of shahbandar in the fourteenth century.
Functionaries of this sort had such an influential position that, apparently partly to ensure the personal interests of the ruler, they were considered worthy to marry his daughters. In this way Islam was able to make its entry into such families.\textsuperscript{151}

\textit{The Political and Economic Expansion of Eastern Java}

We have already pointed out\textsuperscript{152} what an important place pepper and spices from the Moluccas held in the trade system of eastern Java. With their surplus of rice, sometimes supplemented with other rice surpluses from Bali and Bima, the eastern Javanese supplied Malacca, Palembang, Jambi, and the Moluccas, in the latter island using the rice to buy the spices which in turn were traded to Chinese and Indians at Grise along with pepper from Sunda and Jambi. The position of economic preponderance which Java thus occupied in the archipelago found its expression in the recognition of Javanese political supremacy on the part of its dependencies scattered everywhere. It goes without saying, of course, that the Javanese influence was not everywhere pronounced to the same degree: it naturally expressed itself most strongly in places where trade led to more or less permanent settlements of Javanese or even to colonies.

The western part of Borneo was such a centre in the times when the diamond trade had not yet gone over into the hands of the Chinese, for whom Patani on the east coast of Malacca had become the focal point in the Ming period. Southern Borneo was not by any means so important for Java in those days, because the only goods to be obtained there were forest products - such as dammar, dragon's blood, wax, \textit{myrobolans} for the batik industry, rattan, and wicker work - which could also be imported from elsewhere, Palembang and Timor, for example. Banjarmasin in actuality became a centre of importance only in the first part of the seventeenth century, when the amount of pepper grown was
increasing every year thanks to the Chinese\textsuperscript{153} for whom the Bantam market was insufficient or inaccessible, overwhelmed by the European demand as it was. Shipbuilding will also have played a rôle in the rise of Banjarmasin.

Western Borneo, however, supplied the diamonds ‘fished up’ by the Dyaks in Landak. We are informed on the transporting of diamonds from the interior of Borneo to the coast in the ‘Dis­course and Position of the Island of Borneo and What Occurred There in the Year 1609’,\textsuperscript{154} At that time the diamonds from Landak were all carried to Sukadana. Bloemaert learned from the \textit{kyai arya}, however:

... that it would be possible to sail to Tayan, lying on the river of Lawei, from whence a tiny river runs to Landak...\textsuperscript{155} From the abovementioned \textit{kyai arya}, as well as from diverse others from Landak, I have also learned of a place called Sadong, lying to the north of Sambas, which is under the king of Borneo [i.e., Brunei], from which place one can go overland to Landak in a day..., or to Mampawa, lying to the south of Sambas...

There is also a river near Sambas which branches off into the Landak River...\textsuperscript{156} The river Moira Landak is the best river for sailing to Landak; it is travelled by all the junks that want to go to Landak; for at the mouth is is 2 feet deep at ebb tide, but inside it is 6 or 7 fathoms deep, and that until within 8 or 9 miles of Landak; then one goes on to Landak in proas; and all of it is soft ground; and the Mampawa River is nothing extraordinary; narrow, shallow, and a hard bed, and also very dangerous because of the savages, for I have sailed close by them, but the Sambas River is deep enough... The king of Sambas makes a great effort to keep accord with the people of Landak, and spares neither trouble nor expense to bring the commerce in diamonds back to his country the way it had earlier been...\textsuperscript{157}

It is apparent from these and other sources\textsuperscript{158} that there were three routes for transporting the Landak diamonds from the interior: through Sukadana - the Tanjungpura\textsuperscript{159} of the sixteenth century and earlier, the old capital of Matan from which the Javanese gave the whole island its name, it being for them by far the most important part of the island economically, just as the Portuguese called it Borneo after Brunei, the only part familiar to them at that time, - Lawei, or Sambas. Those regions along with Landak are all four of them known from the \textit{Nagarakerta-}
As we have already mentioned, Sambas, which also had some trade of its own in gold, was in the beginning of the seventeenth century under the suzerainty of Brunei, but the possession of it was disputed by Johore. In 1522 Brunei, making use of the political confusion on Java, had conquered Lawei, but Pigafetta, who saw the navy in Brunei after it had returned, says that the ruler "had destroyed and sacked the city because it refused to obey the king of Borneo, but the king of Java Major instead".

Sukadana, which was under the rule of Surabaya in the first part of the seventeenth century, until the latter was conquered and laid waste by Mataram in 1622, was thus able to emerge as an important centre. In the Portuguese period the diamond region was still called Lawei and considered to be under Javanese authority, however. (This last even went so far that on some Portuguese maps it is to be found located on Java, just as Palembang was often not merely placed by them in the Sundanese sphere of influence and that of Bantam, but actually located on Java.) In the course of the sixteenth century Lawei or Sukadana broke more and more free from Java economically, as we have already indicated, so that Mataram was not able to gather any profit there from its conquest of 1622. That century in practice terminated the Javanese period for southwest Borneo, however, just as had already been the case for Sambas a century earlier. In the seventeenth century the name Lawei disappeared and Sukadana became a dependency of Banjarmasin, which was expanding thanks to the pepper trade.

The rise of Banjarmasin, the capital of which from 1612 on was Martapura, and its conversion to Islam in the middle of the sixteenth century would seem to have taken place under the auspices of the state of Demak, which in its attempt at following the Majapahit tradition of expansion re-established Javanese suzerainty. Banjarmasin seems then already to have had hegemony over southern and southwestern Borneo, with Kota Waringin, Sukadana, and Lawei tributary to it. This account of matters, found in the Indonesian chronicles cited, tallies with what is told
in the seventeenth-century Dutch Company documents. The recognition of Javanese suzerainty - at that time embodied in Mataram - continued up to the middle of the seventeenth century. In Chapter Three we shall become acquainted with the economic factors which were to put an end to that political dependence.

An established influence in western Java, on the east coast of Sumatra, and on the Straits of Malacca was also a vital interest for the eastern Javanese commercial centre. We have already mentioned its struggle with Palembang for a station on the world trade route, a struggle finally decided to the advantage of Java in the latter part of the thirteenth century. The same struggle was repeated with Pase and Singapore and surrounding places in 1377. At the time of the first coming of the Portuguese a Javanese sea attack on Malacca was expected, and it became a fact in 1513, after the Portuguese had been ahead of them in 1511. There was a repetition of the game several times in the course of the sixteenth century.

Sunda, too, was an element of importance to the trade of eastern Java, not only for the avoidance of a flank threat to the trade route to the Straits of Malacca, for the sake of which Mataram from the end of the sixteenth century on had to turn against Bantam (which had become independent around 1568) and later against Batavia. It was also important for the control of the Sunda Straits which assured the importation of pepper from Indrapura on the west coast of Sumatra and from Lampong. Aside from the subjugation of Sunda accomplished by eastern Java several times in earlier ages, I may here point to its conquest between 1522 and 1526 by Demak, which also had the aim of being ahead of the Portuguese who would have liked to establish a pepper monopoly there.

The expeditions of conquest against Madura, the extreme east of Java, and Bali constantly found in Javanese history were the result of similar factors: safeguarding of the sea route to the Moluccas; the trade in Balinese cloth as one of the indispensable media of exchange; in the sixteenth century the fact that the Portuguese had gained a firm footing in Panarukan. From the
middle of the fifteenth century on a religious motive was added
to such political and economic factors.

Palembang and Jambi, markets for rice and at the same time
of great importance for the trade with the Chinese and for the
buying up of pepper, were also to remain under Javanese influen­
ce for many years, as we shall see in Chapter Three below.171

And, finally, the Moluccas, where the Javanese had the spice
trade pretty much in their hands. Ambons, as the 'supply sta­
tion' on the way to the Moluccas from which at the same time
authority might be exercised over the Banda Islands, could be
called 'the key to the spice islands'.172 There, then, was the
Javanese colony Hitu,173 in later years the centre of resistance to
the monopoly policy of the Dutch Company. From there Islam
had been able to win a great deal of ground in the Moluccas
even before the arrival of the Portuguese in the Indies in 1497,
partly because the ruler of Ternate at the time was married
to a Javanese noblewoman.175 On Hitu the most important
headman, 'the king', was of Javanese descent,176 as was also the
case with some of the other four headman.

The Javanese aided the inhabitants again and again in their
resistance to the Portuguese and Dutch monopoly policies, and
they in turn looked to Java, whose suzerainty they recognized,
in their need.177 Their relations with Rajah Bukit, that is to say
Susuhunan Prapen, the perdikan chief of Giri, deserve especial
mention.178 They also went to Java to study179 and desired Java­
nese teachers for their religious instruction.180 It seems to me
that in order to demonstrate the Mohammedan Javanese influen­
cence in the Moluccas I cannot do better than to reprint here a quo­
tation from the 'Thorough Account of Ambon' written in 1621.181

Daily seek to get all the young fellows in the
Moorish school, especially the orang kayas' children,
who when they have a little knowledge of the religion
of Moordom they immediately provide with some
office, be it a modin-ship, imam, khatib, or something
else; who are called in all gatherings, yea, often
have the most say; they incite all the youths to
Moordom, and if someone falls short by failing to appear they are
able to demand a fine, so that everyone is afraid to be absent. Their
teachers are so poor that often they cannot tell an a from a b, but they are respected nevertheless when they have the title of such an office. Meanwhile they are still given lesson every day and all are considered good teachers who are maintained by the support of the orang kayas. I have known some who could not put one letter on paper; yea, there are many who cannot read at all.

Use all industry to obtain Javanese schoolmasters. They usually try to have Javanese masters to instruct their children in their study, considering the Javanese can usually all read and write. Thus when the junks are leaving they try to hold some persons to serve them as schoolmasters. When they have something still left from their load or keep with them the goods their departing fellows have left unsold, which they get rid of meanwhile at a great advantage, they have it well and completely paid for at the set time, in which they are assisted by the orang kayas, who take care that they are contented according to their wishes, caring more for them than for themselves.

What profit these schoolmasters have. As far as the profit that these same schoolmasters of the school have is concerned, it is very little, so that the profit described above usually has to suffice them; but it is so that when it is monsoon time they receive from each boy a barot, and from some a half barot, that is 5½ lb., of cloves, which they collect an then depart for Java again, so that Moordom was first introduced to them by the Javanese, and is still continuing...

Rajah Bukit in Java, whom they take to be their Pope. At Grize, or a half mile from there in the mountains which they call Bukit, lives their pope, whom they call Rajah Bukit; when the junks come from Java the orang kayas and chief priests are brought some letters from there along with certain little Javanese caps on which he writes some holy words (as they think) in recompense. When the junks depart again, they send this Rajah Bukit or pope a bahar of cloves or two, at least in as far as they are allowed by us, considering that they may not transport or ship any cloves without our knowledge and permission, in which case a pass of the quantity of such cloves is given so that they will not be taken away if they meet any ships at sea. They are extremely devoted to this pope, yea imagine that he can bring dead people to life and other such nonsense too strange to tell.

Receive letters sent them from their pope. Whenever these letters from the aforementioned pope are delivered, then they make great preparations and triumphs on both sides, Javanese as well as Ambonese. For first come all the Javanese on shore, dressed their best, with their spears, drums, and gongs, having the pope's letters in a big basin covered with an embroidered cloth, a parasol being held
SHIFTS IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER

over it. In the meantime the Ambonese who are on the beach for the
day with their guns and weapons make such a great noise and movement
with drums, gongs, bombs, and shooting, with flags and pennants, in
sum, act much more pompously than usual; they set someone on a chair,
who receives the letters and then is carried to the place they desire him.
The Ambonese now having received the letters, the bases fire from the
\textit{sampan} lying ready for this; the Ambonese answer with their firelocks.

\textit{Open letters in the}

This then having taken place, they go together, the Javanese and Ambonese, to the mosque or church,
where they open the letters and read them, at which
time also some salutes of honour are fired by bases and locks. In sum, this
pomposity being ended, everyone goes back home, so that I should like to
say hereby that they are very devoted to his Rajah Bukit, whom these
Ambonese and many Moors take to be their idol, believing that their
life and death are in his hands.

It remains for me to point out before closing this chapter that
the various Javanese commercial towns had certain areas over­
seas where at one time or another their influence was preponder­
ant. For example, Palembang — like Bangka\textsuperscript{182} — stood in a de­
pendent relationship to Japara at the beginning of the sixteenth
century, and as a result it took part in the naval attack on Malac­
ca of 1513. The Javanese stronghold on Ambon, however, was
established by Tuban,\textsuperscript{183} and as a result a Tubanese fleet of
thirteen junks with crews totalling fifteen hundred men harras­
sed the Dutch left behind on Banda in 1600.\textsuperscript{184} As a matter of
fact : 

The island of Banda is worth its size in gold and is governed in the form
of a republic, and it is a group of roguish, haughty, brave, poor beggars;
and however much income they have, they are still always in arrears;
they rely on it that everyone needs them and have a good word for no
one; nor do they have the means to protect themselves, but the disunity
among the kings round about gives them their strength; many suitors
there have been and still are: the ruler of Ternate in his time, the one of
Tuban, the one of Macassar, and also the one of Surabaya. In the time
of André Furtado, who drove the ruler from Hitu, the Portuguese thought
to subject the Bandanese, but were prevented by other events, so that
I have understood that the ruler of Tuban has said that the people of
Banda had to be brought in subjugation; in case the Portuguese or the
Dutch do not do it, he would look to it himself.\textsuperscript{185}

\textbf{Reciprocal competition made it necessary to be certain of the}

possession of Banda. In February, 1615, Tuban voiced its claim
to Banjarmasin in the same way, while Surabaya wielded supremacy over Sukadana in southwest Borneo.

The mutual jealousy of the eastern Javanese commercial towns and their aspirations for independence eventually had the effect to preventing their coalition. Directly after the capture of Malacca in 1511, even, they did not all follow the same policy, and in 1532 Grise went so far as to conclude a treaty with the conquerors from Europe. After Japara, Demak, and other places, even Grise (1613), had yielded to Mataram, Surabaya, Tuban and Madura united to resist it in 1615. But it was already too late, and they were an easy prey, Tuban giving way in 1619, Madura in 1624, and Surabaya in 1625.
Chapter Two

THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY:
JAVANESE TRADE IN THE PORTUGUESE ERA

The Nature of Portuguese Expansion

The same peculiar mixture of commercial and religious motives which had led to the Crusades and had marked the endeavours of Marino Sanudo (1306 and later) also strikes one in the Portuguese expansion from the time of Henry the Navigator (died 1460), "the first conqueror and discoverer of heathendom", on. In the new expansion, however, there was a third element to be detected, that of the lust for adventure and the ambition of the nobility which had not found any means of expression after the Crusades.

It was actually this factor and the religious factor which in the beginning were the driving forces setting the expansion of the Portuguese in motion; the conquest of Ceuta on the north coast of Africa, the important Mohammedan commercial centre from which Christian trading ships were threatened with piracy, gave the initial impetus.

The expedition againsts Ceuta, in 1415, which heralded the expansion of Portugal overseas, was not a colonial expedition, it was simply a crusade. But it exerted a decisive influence on the foreign policy of Portugal by giving that country a possession separated from its other provinces by a sea arm and by making it the champion of Christendom against the African Moors.

Portugal was forced to create a navy in order to fight the Moors and provide Ceuta with supplies. Till then a continental power, from that moment on it had maritime interests to defend, Henry the Navigator, a man of genius, enlarged the scene of struggle: he directed it towards
new routes where rich lands offered themselves for the taking. He added to the chivalric ambitions which were at the source of the struggle the search for commercial benefits.¹⁰⁶

Religious zeal, nourished in the tradition of the Crusades and the remembrance of the bitter struggle with the Moors in the Iberian Peninsula, certainly continued to be an essential motivation. The countless emigrants from the Italian commercial republics who had made their way to Spain and Portugal fanned the desire for enterprise after the capture of Ceuta.

The religious element remained a factor of significance in Spanish politics in later times as well.¹⁰⁷ For the inhabitant of the peninsula a Mohammedan was a 'Moor', an object of abhorrence. "It is worthy of comment", as one Arab author of the time writes, "that the Franks only harbour antipathy and hatred for the Mohammedans and their faith; they do not display any aversion for the heathens". Mohammed was for them the devil incarnate. Whoever spared one of his followers failed in his duty, a duty which in most cases was all the more zealously fulfilled because political and commercial interests were benefitted by it.¹⁰⁸ Thus in 1500 one sees Cabral being commissioned to inform the ruler of Calicut of the hostility the Portuguese had 'from ancient days' had toward the Mohammedans, whom they were required to rob of their ships and goods as much as possible in order to please the Lord their God. According to Barros,¹⁰⁹ Cabral was instructed first to urge the Moors and heathens to be converted — for which purpose priests were taken along, — but in case they refused to accept the Gospel and at the same time forbade trade, he was to pursue them with fire and sword, and war on them without mercy. As it is put in the letter sent along to the ruler of Calicut from King Manoel:

...we may believe that the Lord our God has not ordained such a wondrous matter as our voyage to the Indies merely for the advancement of worldly relations, but also for spiritual profit and the salvation of souls, the which we must value more highly.

And how much religious zeal inspired someone like D'Albuquerque appears from the plans he left unaccomplished at his
death: first, to divert the Nile so that Egypt, the heart of Mohammedan opposition, would become waste and void, and, second, after capturing Aden, to attack Mecca from there and destroy it forever. In this way the Crusade ideal continued its influence. For a long time the Portuguese had in mind closing an alliance with the legendary Christian ruler Prester John, whose empire was thought to lie in India; with his help they hoped to be able to bring the crusade against the Moors to a successful end in the heart of their own territory.

Two irreconcilable, envious powers, medieval Christendom and Islam, stood thus face to face, one just as exclusive in its attitude as the other. On the one hand a conglomeration of people of one faith who for ages had been in possession of an extensive and profitable trade which had been constantly increasing for the last three centuries and whose interests entailed the exclusion of other competitors; on the other hand a nation which considered it its "true heritage", "a privilege allowed them through an extraordinary blessing of God", to exterminate the mortal enemies of the faith. Consequently, as soon as the Portuguese began to compete for the monopoly of trade and attempt to drive rivals out of it, among other ways by means of treaties with native rulers, the clash could not be avoided. The seizure and burning of Mohammedan ships by the Portuguese reduced imports to Egypt, while the Portuguese themselves furthermore brought the goods on the European market via the Cape, thus not only avoiding the heavy Egyptian tolls, but at the same time breaking the Egyptian monopoly. The rulers of Gujarat and Aden turned to the sultan of Egypt, who via the famous Fra Mauro, prior of the monastery of Zion on Mount Sinai, sent a remonstrance to the pope in which he threatened to destroy the holy places and wreak vengeance on all Christians if the king of Spain did not stop forcing the Moors to accept Christianity and the king of Portugal did not abandon the voyages to the Indies. The threat was not carried out, but in 1506 and later there were fleets fitted out and pan-Islamic agitation and coalitions the ramifications of which extended as far as the Indonesian Archipelago were organ-
ized from Egypt, first by the Egyptian Mameluke sultans and later by the Turks, with the aim of ousting the trade of the Portuguese and driving them out of the area they had acquired not long before. Because of a lack of shipbuilding material, such attempts never had much effect, though the struggle was bitter. The Portuguese ships, at the outset most of them built in the Netherlands, were at that time superior both in type and armament, so that however precarious their position sometimes may have been, they were able to brave such attacks. And if their common interests made the Mohammedan nations join together and for a time overlook their quarrels with each other - Turkish conquerors versus Arabs; Malabar, the leading Indian stapling point in the previous period of trade, when the route to the West went via the Persian Gulf instead of the Red Sea, contra Cambay, its newly emerging competitor, - such alliances could not be lasting, for the antitheses were only too real, especially when the Turks attempted to exert their authority also in northern India. Nevertheless there periodically recurred a pan-Islamic expression of resistance to the dominant position held by the Portuguese, so that even Achin and Java contributed their share in it.

Such a state of affairs necessarily led to the establishment of key points for Portuguese trade in the East. After all, the lines of communication with the bases in the mother country were much longer for them than for the Chinese and Indians, who found compatriots or agents everywhere. Furthermore, the latter had not yet had to brave the competition which then began to develop: up to that time the sale of wares via Alexandria had been a certainty, while now the Portuguese were supplying the European market by their own direct importation. Thus they found the Portuguese in their way both as buyers and as sellers. As a matter of fact, the Javanese, too, had felt the need for key points for their trade, as was pointed out in the previous chapter. For the Portuguese, whose base lay so far away, the need was still greater, partly to assure them of the possibility of sanction for
obtaining the proper fulfilment of contracts. Later the Dutch also found themselves obliged to establish a 'rendezvous', discovering that the situation could change after their absence for one or more years and that only by means of such a key point could they keep in regular contact with the rulers with whom they had treaties.

In the case of the Portuguese, there was besides that the fact that the two trade competitors, they and the 'Moors', looked upon each other as mortal enemies attempting to do as much damage to each other as possible, and for them it was quite definitely a question of maintaining a monopoly which would put them in a position to set the prices on the market themselves as Egypt and the Italians before them had done. The contracts the fulfilment of which they sought to assure by means of their key points were not only of a political sort, but also economic. In order to make certain the delivery of commercial crops they like the traders were accustomed to giving advances and to making gifts or loans to authorities. As more competition arose the risk of losing the money thus invested became greater. The later history of the Dutch Company offers examples on every page of writing off such bad entries. That circumstance also gave rise to a greater need to be able to enforce the fulfilment of contracts the more the willingness to close what were in actuality impracticable agreements was stimulated by the introduction of attractive conditions, for the competition brought with it influence on the parties involved to break delivery contracts with a rival. The Dutch Company, too, was later to take part in such a policy of undermining, just as it was also to taste the bitter fruits of it. As exploitation costs rose higher and higher as the result of such mutual competition, the need to make trade safe, the desire to be able to impose the will of one's own group, in short to establish the rule of that group partly in order thus to bring down general costs, were bound to increase.
After the conquest of Malacca in 1511, the Portuguese in keeping with their principles directed their efforts against the Mohammedans there as well, as D'Albuquerque was quick to have announced to the Hindu king of Siam. Closer relations were sought with non-Mohammedan regions such as Sunda (1522) and Panarukan, while within Malacca Hindu traders were given favoured treatment. In the case of the Mohammedans in the town, the Portuguese preferred to do as much injury as possible. The result was an exodus of the Mohammedan traders, who avoided the usual trade route to the east of Sumatra and made their way along the west coast of the island, transferring their pied à terre from Malacca to Achin, which then rapidly developed as a trade centre. Some of the foreign traders also settled in Bantam in western Java, where within a few years they succeeded in establishing the power of Islam with the help of Japara (Demak), thus getting in ahead of the Portuguese before the latter could reap the profits of their contract with Sunda. From that time dates the flowering of Bantam and Achin, where the foreign Mohammedans found their markets. The Portuguese aim of crippling that trade by striking at its heart in Malacca had proved in practice to be impossible. In the meantime the old royal house of Malacca, from which the later rulers of Johore sprang, had not given up the struggle to reconquer its former territory. A part of the east coast of Sumatra, the Riauw-Lingga Archipelago, and a section of the peninsula of Malacca were still under its authority. For Java, too, the possession of Malacca, the trading centre on the world trade route, was still a goal, just as it was for Achin, which needed the trade of the Chinese and Javanese. This clash of interests between Java, Johore, and Achin enabled the Portuguese to maintain their position in Malacca, however much they may have been harassed at times.

In order to be able to acquire the indispensable Chinese trade,
Achin had to assure itself of the possession of the pepper ports, for pepper, as we have seen above, was one of the main products needed by the Chinese. It is true the Gujarati also had use for a part of it, but it was only a fairly small amount compared to that taken by the Chinese. Besides petroleum, which they used as a medicine, the Gujarati were interested in the spices carried from the Moluccas by the Javanese, camphor from Baros, gold from Minangkabau, tin from Kedah, and sandalwood from Timor. Aside from those items the chief aim of their shipping had from early times on been that of carrying on a barter trade with the Chinese. Now that Malacca was closed to them they were forced to carry on that trade elsewhere. For Achin itself as well, the Chinese trade was a vital question—Achin had need of Chinese pottery, gold, silver, coins, and so forth. This naturally led to Achinese expansion in the direction of the pepper ports on Sumatra, Pidie, and Pase on the east coast and Priaman on the west coast. Bantam, where the Chinese also went for pepper, had already made sure of the possession of Selebar in Benkulen and of Lampong for itself.

The expansion of Achin on the east coast of Sumatra inevitably led to a new source of friction with the Portuguese, who for their pepper trade also depended on that area. Since they had to give way to Achin in Pase, they saw themselves forced to obtain their pepper from the ports lying further south—Indragiri, Kampar, and Jambi—with some gold from Minangkabau, the which they were still doing at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

As has been said, Achin and Bantam were the chief ports in which the foreign Mohammedans carried on trade. And they were extremely cosmopolitan: Arabs, Persians, Turks, Abyssinians, people from Pegu, and above all Chinese and Indians were represented at the Bantam market side by side with Javanese and Malays. Turkish ships from Egypt went to Achin, and Achinese ships sailed on the Red Sea. Thus it could be described in François Pyrard's account of his voyage:

All those who go to the Indies and other places beyond the Cape of Good Hope, when they desire to go to Sumatra they only say that they
are going to Achin, for that town and port conveys the whole name and reputation of the island, as in done on Java Major with Bantam, so that talk is only of these two kings.

And thus it is not surprising that the fleet from Zeeland which visited Achin 23 August, 1601 after having put in at the island Anjouan, one of the Comoros off the east coast of Africa, in July had brought with it from there a letter of recommendation for the sultan of Achin, just as the Hollanders later in turn received an introduction from the sultan for the great Emperor Akbar when they wanted to sail to Cambay in 1602. The ruler of Achin also maintained official relations with the sea potentate of Calicut on the west coast of India and the kings of Bengal and Ceylon. The seal of the Achinese sultan, patterned on that of the first grand moguls in India, is another indication of the relation of Achin to that empire.

Achin, then, had by the middle of the sixteenth century become the chief station in the intermediary trade of the Mohammedans of western Asia and India with the Indonesian Archipelago - a fact which the Portuguese could only view with eyes of envy. Made strong by its international relations, Achin eventually proved to be invincible to their attacks. Its many attacks on Malacca (in 1537, 1539, 1547, 1568, 1573, and 1575), however much supported by Turkish and Abyssinian auxiliaries, were of just as little avail, however. Even so, Achin was able to score successes against Johore, whose predominant position on the peninsula of Malacca with its tin and pepper resources and whose links with Borneo and the spice islands were to offer a welcome object for Achinese expansion in the seventeenth century.

The Portuguese were forced to recognize that their opponents had become too strong for them to be able to enforce their own will by violence. They themselves had been weakened internally by the constant conflict between their personal interests and the king's monopoly, so that after a great number of vain attempts to maintain the artificial monopoly, the basis had to be changed. Free trade was allowed once more, with only pepper remaining
a monopoly of the state. Although trade was carried on with royal ships and by royal officials, any Portuguese merchant could have his goods transported on the ships on condition that he pay thirty per cent. to the king and that there was shipping space for five hundred ton of pepper left over on each ship. From the beginning of Philip II's reign in Portugal (1580) on, the delivery of pepper was farmed out to certain people for periods of five years at a time. The state continued to fit out the ships but no longer had any direct interest in them, for it received its fee for the farming out anyway, and it is thus easy to understand that the material sent out with time became worse and worse. As a matter of fact, the Portuguese had never been sailors and traders at heart, and even before the union with Spain their warriors and divines were having difficulty in holding the remains of the splendid expansion together. For years at a time their pioneers in the Far East were left to their fate, which fact as a matter of course had to lead to the establishment of better relations with the local inhabitants. For them the Indies had accordingly become a second homeland.

For the Portuguese and their descendants the situation is completely different from that for our burghers and the Company's trade... the larger number consider the Indies as their fatherland, no longer thinking of Portugal; they trade with it [Portugal] little or not at all, and sustain and enrich themselves from the advantages of the Indies as though they were natives and did not have any other fatherland.

It had become more than time for a change of course: not only had the policy followed caused the rise of Achin and Bantam, but even the trade on China had shifted from Malacca to Patani, which was provided with spices from the Moluccas either directly or via Johore. A revised toll policy in Malacca brought an improvement, although one tempered by the extortion to which the captains of Malacca often exposed foreign traders. However that may have been, shipping on Malacca increased once more, the Indian Mohammedans also participating in it with a view to obtaining tin. It goes without saying that this had to lead to a decrease in the importance of Achin. Once Ma-
lacca thus gradually became the stapling point for the products of the Indies and the point of concentration for trade between China and India once more, it became apparent that:

...with the conquest of Malacca the Portuguese gained a very good opportunity to maintain themselves at little expense and carry on a native trade...232

As they had the centre of commerce under their control and drew the profits from it, they could in such circumstances „leave the Indians free and unencumbered in their trade on the Moluccas, Ambon, and Banda”.233

For the Javanese, too, it was good business to come to an understanding with the Portuguese. Since their attempts to capture Malacca (in 1513, 1535, 1551, and 1574)234 had failed and Malacca was nevertheless a necessary market for rice235 and spices, the Javanese were forced to come to agreement. Along with that came the fact that as early as the middle of the sixteenth century — after the attack on Pasuruan, then still Hindu, in 1546, in which the ruler of Demak at the time was murdered — the consolidation of the Javanese governmental organization once more left much to be desired. Bantam, which had originally been under the control of Demak, had found itself growing in independence with its increasing influence. Now it sought expansion in the direction of Palembang, undoubtedly with the capture of the pepper port of Jambi in mind as a further aim. The other petty states on the coast had reluctantly acknowledged Demak’s hegemony, but, as has already been indicated,230 they still pursued their own policies whenever it proved at all possible.

It is significant that during the siege of Malacca by Japara (Demak) in 1551, it was Javanese who provided the stronghold with food. To what extent Demak was able to make its authority felt on any large scale in the interior of Java is a moot question; nor must one have any great illusion about how intensively Pajang exercised its supremacy.237 During the political discord of the last half of the sixteenth century on Java238 the pangeran of Surabaya was able to take control of the ports of eastern Java: Sedayu, Grise and Jaratan, Surabaya, and Pasuruan were obe-
dient to him, and in the years 1599 to 1601 Panarukan and Balambangan were added to the list, though without their becoming completely Islamized, a task to which Mataram was also to devote its efforts.

The rival Arosbaya, the petty state on western Madura, was more closely related to Tuban, however. The rise of Mataram dates from around 1586. It undertook an attack on Bantam in 1598, but it was not until the first years of the seventeenth century that it obtained a lasting outlet to the sea of its own with the capture of Japara.

The political confusion in the latter half of the sixteenth century had not stood in the way of a renewed flowering of trade stimulating the self-confidence of the harbour potentates, however. In fact, the Portuguese after having attempted in vain to monopolize the spices of the Moluccas for themselves had around 1565 had to allow the shipping on the spice islands to go back to the Javanese, whose market area was thus enlarged, even, over what it had earlier been. Malacca's international relations remained highly precarious, however, especially those with Achin and Johore, the two states with which competition in trade was naturally the greatest, so that time and again if conditions seemed good for it there was an attack to be feared. The discord between the surrounding rulers remained Malacca's strength. Peaceful relations were also established with Bantam for some years, for the sake of the pepper trade.

The Portuguese had been forced to give up their monopoly policy in the Moluccas, it is true. They had never had much authority on Banda; the Javanese Mohammedan centre Hitu on Ambon had proved to be too strong for them; and in 1572 they had had to abandon their fort on Ternate. Their effort to achieve exclusive control of the spices had merely been the stimulus for the expansion of the area where cloves were grown—which at their coming had consisted only of Ternate, Tidore, Makian, Batchan, and Motir—the binding of the inhabitants more closely to Java, and the intensification of Mohammedan acti-
vity and pan-Islamic movements, which last found new stimulus in the missionary propaganda of the priests. All this had unloosed forces in the Moluccas the Portuguese were not able to resist. Ternate was presently able to expand to its greatest extent.

In their first years in the East, the Portuguese in order to elude the Javanese had chosen a different route from the customary one (via eastern Java, Bali, Bima, and Banda) to the Moluccas, the one via northern Borneo. Once there was a Portuguese factory in Grise and a pied à terre in Panarukan, however, the traditional trade route was used more frequently again, partly with an eye to the sandalwood trade on Timor and Solor. In the meantime the Malay traders who had fled from Malacca because of the "evil treatment" given them by the captains of the town had settled in Macassar, where they found a suitable base for shipping on the Moluccas. As will be shown in detail in the following chapter, the Macassarese themselves did not carry on any trade worth mentioning, but the place lent itself excellently to being used as a 'chamber of supply' and was at the same time favourably situated as far as the trade on Timor was concerned. Toward the end of the sixteenth century one therefore finds the Portuguese junks usually following this route, to the formation of which the conquest of the extreme east of Java by the Mohammedans contributed its share.
Chapter Three

THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY:  
THE DOWNFALL OF JAVANESE TRADE

Pepper

In 1619, to the great displeasure of the servants of the Dutch Company working in the Indies, who felt more powerful than the English there, a treaty was signed in Europe according to which the English and the Dutch were from then on to work in consultation in order to avoid driving up prices and obstructing each other. The Batavia Daghregister, which contains the minutes of the conferences held regularly as a result of the treaty, gives an unpleasant but in every way understandable picture of their fruitlessness. It was in the nature of things impossible to make an end to the unavoidable competition between the two rivals in such a way; as a matter of fact, Coen had soon realized how he could interpret and use the treaty to the Dutch Company's advantage.259

A typical example of such consultation in the bipartite 'Council of Defense', held in pursuance of a request from the king of Jambi for help against an invasion from Achin which had been a threat for years, is to be found in the Daghregister for 1620.260 The Dutch, who had closed down their factory in Achin in 1622, had already given orders to have some ships intended for the blockade of Malacca call at Jambi. But the English, who feared measures of reprisal against their factory in Achin, felt surprised and duped by such immediate action on the part of the Dutch. Furthermore they did not have any ships available at the moment, and they were afraid that the Dutch would be able to obtain a mo-
nopoly of Jambi's pepper, or at least certain privileges, for their help and then in case the Achinese attack might fail to materialize they would make it appear as though the ships had called at Jambi on their way to Malacca without any ulterior motives. On the other hand they realized only too well that it had to be avoided at any price that the pepper of Jambi should fall to Achin. The impasse was bound to offer a fine subject for fruitless debates.

It is not therefore that I mention the question here, however, but rather because the discussions place us at the heart of the burning problems of the period. The pepper trade was after all "now as earlier the most important thing in the commerce" of the Dutch Company. The Bantam pepper market was closed to it; Banjarmasin was not yet supplying a great deal; the less significant pepper ports on the peninsula of Malacca had been destroyed by Achin. It was now feared that Achin would also:

...probably lead to her [Jambi's] total ruin and destruction, just as its vengeful nature has been sufficiently manifested in that renowned kingdom of Johore, and in Kedah, and the same in the countries of Perak and Pahang, the memory of which is almost completely extirpated and destroyed. From which it is to be deduced that the Companies would have to bow to the extortionate and monopolistic yoke of the Achinese ruler and give in completely to his whims if they wanted to have pepper, not only in Achin, but also in Tiku, Priaman, and the whole east and west coast of Sumatra. Because the Achinese know well enough that so long as we have not yet succeeded in opening up Bantam, Sumatra still has to serve us for the time being for obtaining pepper for the return ships.

Let us consider what the situation really was. As we saw in the previous chapter, Bantam and Achin were the two chief places where the international trade was concentrated. It was also there that the first fleets of the Dutch had tried to gain an advantage, but the demand for pepper was so much increased as a result that it could not be met and the prices there and elsewhere went shooting upwards. The authorities in the two places and in Patani had immediately recognized that there were extraordinary profits to be made; they used their privileged position to set the prices still higher, raise the tolls, and as much as pos-
sible monopolize pepper production. As has already been pointed out, the results were an attack by Bantam on Palembang, which had again become a more or less important market for Jambi and Tulang Bawang (Lampong) pepper; recurrent disputes between Bantam and Palembang about the possession of Tulang Bawang; controversies between Palembang and Jambi about the pepper region Tembesi and between Jambi and Indragiri or Johore in 1630 about shipping along the border river Tungkal, and thus the possession of it; the expansion of Achin on the peninsula of Malacca and the east coast of Sumatra — it still had the west coast under it as far as Selebar in Benkulen, which belonged to Bantam; and the struggle of the Dutch Company to elude the grip of the monopoly policies of Achin and Bantam.

Indeed, everything depended on the control of Jambi. Achin, which as was earlier indicated had declined in importance toward the end of the sixteenth century, had had a trade revival as a result of the coming of the European ships. When those ships began to avoid the region once again, however, a new decline followed as a matter of course. Before 1603 Achin had drawn its pepper from Pidie, Patani, the west coast of Sumatra, Kedah, Indragiri, and Jambi.

On the west coast of Sumatra pepper at that time grew only in Indrapura. According to a description given in 1616:

All the pepper that is carried from Priaman, Tiku, and the whole west coast of Sumatra grows in the land of Indrapura where a king rules named Rajah Hitam, who it is said had 30000 men under him who for their needs occupy themselves with planting pepper and rice. 2⅔ degrees further up, about 20 miles to the north of Selebar, there is a place called Menjuta located on the sea side where the river of Indrapura runs into the sea. And Indrapura lies about 18 miles landwards from Menjuta... But there is not any sea road for ships or junks here or around Indrapura. There is good ground for anchoring on the west coast roundabout the regions mentioned, but no shelter at all, so that all the pepper of Indrapura must needs be taken to Tiku, Priaman, or Selebar in proas.

As a result of the tremendous demand, the cultivation of pepper spread out to other places on the west coast as well in the course
of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{276} In order to maintain its monopoly, Achin had set a \textit{panglima} or regent in Tiku,\textsuperscript{277} Priaman, and other places, and in Tiku even had a fortress built in 1621 to keep the Malays in hand.\textsuperscript{278}

The Achinese influence on the west coast of Sumatra was, then, not to be underestimated. It is described in the \textit{Daghregister} as late as 1663:

Priaman is the chief establishment of the Achinese; those same are related to the people there and have increased from time to time, through which they are very much respected and feared by the inhabitants. ... It is one of the most populous places on the west coast, and from there one can go over the mountains to the Minangkabau country with its wealth of gold, ... but the Achinese have a lot to say there...\textsuperscript{279}

Padang was "heavily shipped on by the Achinese". In Pauh and the well-known Mohammedan centre Ulakan, too,\textsuperscript{280} their prestige was great.\textsuperscript{281} (As a matter of fact the west coast had the Achinese to thank for its conversion to Islam after the middle of the sixteenth century, at least insofar as it had not come from the east coast.)\textsuperscript{282}

In order to avoid losing the profits from the west coast pepper, the sultan of Achin attempted to force the foreign traders to come to Achin to collect it.\textsuperscript{283} Although the Dutch constantly attempted to evade the ban, Achin naturally sought to enforce it as strictly as possible. The Dutch preferred to collect the pepper on the west coast themselves, but to pay a fixed price for it in Achin in order to be free of giving present to the lords and officials of Priaman and elsewhere and to avoid price inflation.

The \textit{Daghregister} for 1625 records how much the sultan himself was involved in the customary west coast barter exchange of cotton cloth for pepper:\textsuperscript{284}

The ship \textit{Groningen} lay in Tiku, not yet having obtained more than 140 ton of pepper, the pepper there being very incommoded by the vexations of the Achinese, who first wanted to barter the royal cloth. When one of us bought a \textit{bahar},\textsuperscript{285} the seller was required to deliver a \textit{bahar} to the king for his cloth, on which there was as much lost as was gained on our cloth; besides that we had to pay the toll in cash.

The English had already had similar experiences in 1615, des-
pite the fact that at that time they had a two-year monopoly on the purchase of pepper.\textsuperscript{286} Even though the Dutch were very anxious to be able to trade freely on the west coast — the which they accordingly attempted constantly to secure by treaties in the years following, — the ruler of Achin realized well enough that he would have to stick to his demands if at all possible.

The pepper production of Pidie — mentioned as early as 1416 in the Chinese records — was after all completely insufficient. Achin obtained most of its pepper from western Sumatra.

This year [1614] more than 2000 \textit{bahar} of pepper altogether were shipped out from Achin, as the English have obtained 1500 \textit{bahar} and we 550 \textit{bahar}. At the departure of the ship \textit{'t Wapen} there was no pepper left in Achin. The king was expecting 3000 ton from Tiku and Priaman any day, most of which will fall into the hands of the English. Achin yields very little pepper itself, around 8, 9, 10, or eleven hundred \textit{bahar} annually, and did not yield even three hundred \textit{bahar} this year, because of a bad crop, but they were busy planting again.\textsuperscript{287}

Now that its trade began to decline, Achin maintained the monopoly on west coast pepper which it had to share with Bantam ever more rigorously.\textsuperscript{288} "Times are changing", is the sigh recorded in the \textit{Daghregister} for 1628\textsuperscript{289} underneath the calculation of the rise in pepper prices partly brought about because the Dutch were:

...forced... to pay such tolls or taxes the officers of the king of Achin for bringing in cloth and taking out pepper that the overhead amounts to 21 or 22 per cent. ... Times are changing: where before it was customary to carry on trade at various places free and unencumbered, without molestation, now the Achinese have so occupied the whole west coast of Sumatra and brought the inhabitants in such fear that they dare not trade with the ships.

Achin consciously attempted to secure the pepper monopoly not only through its internal policy, but also by means of expansion, and it was not without warrant that the Dutch and English imputed such an intention to it. As early as 1615 Palembang, Jambi, Indragiri, and Siak had united in a defensive alliance under Johore out of fear of Achin.\textsuperscript{290} The alliance was confirmed by several royal marriages.\textsuperscript{291} Nevertheless, an Achinese fleet with
seventeen thousand men subjugated Pahang in 1618, Kedah - which had received some help from Patani - in 1619, and Perak in 1620. On the east coast of Sumatra, Achinese authority was established in Deli (Aru) once more about the same time. The rulers of the various states were transferred to Achin, along with thousands of their subjects. The Achinese destroyed the pepper plants in the Kedah region. Johore, which had already had to endure a number of attacks in the course of the years (1567, 1570, 1582, 1613) and had been forced to shift its seat of government again and again (Bintan, Ujung Tanah, Batu Sawar, Lingga), was dealt its death blow in the beginning of the year 1623. Proud of such successes, Iskandar Muda, the ruler of Achin at the time, did not let himself be intimidated when after the truce of 1619 the Dutch and English together pressed for permission to carry on trade directly with the west coast ports, even though the treaty made between them was of course not pleasing to him, for from then on they would not attempt to supersede each other by giving large presents. He called them shameless beggars who if they wanted to have pepper would henceforth have to come and eat it out of his hand, for he would be able to force all the other pepper regions which did not yet belong to him to bring their pepper to him and to no one else.

Coen could write to the Company directors, "The Achinese can talk big, and brag and boast; in due time he will have to face up to facts." The self assuredness of Achin had good grounds, nevertheless. Patani's trade, declining partly due to the vexations put upon the Chinese traders and others there, was severely affected as a result of the destruction of the pepper regions on the Malay Peninsula. Earlier it had also drawn pepper from Jambi, as the production of Perak, Kedah, and Pahang on the peninsula was still fairly small in comparison to the demand. As a matter of fact, Patani itself had at one time supplied pepper to Achin, just as it had supplied Grise. But it had stopped such shipping when the Western large-scale buyers, the Dutch and English, came to get the pepper in Patani itself. When
from 1615 on the Dutch, too, began to obtain pepper directly from Jambi, the amount shipped to Patani became completely insufficient.

Accordingly Achin, like Patani and the Portuguese Malacca, had to depend on Jambi - from whence it had also drawn pepper in earlier times - for supplying its market. It has already been seen that the Javanese were also accustomed to obtaining pepper from there. As a matter of fact, Jambi had only pepper to thank for its importance.

It is certain [writes Coen] that almost all the pepper there has been up to now in Malacca, Johore, Patani, and Grise has come from Jambi, and besides that the Chinese have also carried a good quantity back to China as well.

Jambi was a renowned pepper port before Bantam, and can deliver around 40 or 50000 Bantam bags yearly.

Bantam itself also bought a part of its pepper from there. Portuguese, Javanese, and Chinese had up to then been the usual buyers; now Jambi offered the Dutch and English the way to elude the efforts of Achin and Bantam to achieve a monopoly. The pepper at Jambi came from Minangkabau, which exported it via the rivers of Indragiri, Kampar, and Jambi. The 'emperor' of Minangkabau was lord of the pepper and the gold. As the political situation in Indragiri was periodically confused due to the struggles of the highlanders against the petty coastal princes, only the Kampar and the Batang Hari actually came into consideration for such transport. If law and order in Jambi or the price there were not satisfactory, then the Kampar was used. In normal times in the seventeenth century the Batang Hari was used, however, though it would appear that around the end of the sixteenth century the Kampar had been favoured. Palembang obtained but little pepper from the highlands.

The pepper grows on the mountains lying in the middle of the land of Sumatra where a certain people lives called Minangkabauers, the which bring their products down various rivers and trade them to the foreigners for cloth, salt, and all necessities, to wit on the west coast to Prisman, Tiku, and other places, where the finest go, and on the east coast to
Palembang, Jambi, Indragiri, Kampar, and other places; but as it appears the river of Jambi is the best situated of any for them, the largest quantity is taken there...322

It was the Minangkabauers323 of Kamang and Tanjung, "two fortified towns"324 in Upper Jambi under the rule of four penghulus,325 who took the pepper down to Jambi. Though they were under the rule of the rajah of Pagaruyung:

...who is called emperor of the whole land of Sumatra and all the Minangkabauers, under whose dominion the whole land comes by rights, and is lord of the pepper and the gold that is to be found on both the west and east side of Sumatra...326

even so these pepper planting highlanders had "a wild and popular government".327 Accordingly it happened repeatedly that because of troubles between negeris in the interior there would be no pepper shipped to the market in Jambi. The rivalry among the planters increased with the expansion in pepper growing,328 and though because of the pepper the ruler of Jambi had to aim at good relations with the 'emperor of Pagaruyung', whose traditional prestige yet inspired the necessary respect,329 still the troubles in the interior forced him to repeated intervention. Along with this came the fact that while originally the pepper had been taken to market by the people of Minangkabau themselves, the Dutch and English presently were forced to follow the example of the 'young prince' of Jambi330 (who retailed cloth in the interior himself), and had Chinese buy up the pepper in the highlands.331 The market fees were thus lost to the ruler of Jambi.332 This, too, must have offered him a reason for expanding his influence in the interior, while the ruler of Minangkabau periodically attempted to re-establish his lost authority on the coast333 and obtain an outlet to the sea.334

Jambi was of importance only for its pepper; for its rice and salt supply it was entirely dependent on imports from elsewhere brought by the Javanese. It is true in 1636335 there were plans for extending the rice cultivation area, but the people of Minangkabau obviously preferred the more lucrative business of pepper growing, so that nothing came of the plans. Rice growing was
taken up only when it happened that the pepper prices were low and the amount of rice imported was small and its price therefore high.\textsuperscript{336} That was the case whenever the Javanese did not appear at the market. Thus, despite the large interests the Dutch and English had in Jambi, the traditional Javanese influence was able to keep alive there, even when, after 1615, the Javanese had actually lost their former importance as buyers on the pepper market.

The same thing was the case in Palembang. It is recorded\textsuperscript{337} that the Javanese in those days:

...bring in rice and other necessities [to Palembang] during the east monsoon and carry pepper back on the return to Malacca, from whence they go back once more during the monsoon for pepper, which they then sell in Batavia and for which in turn they take cloth to Mataram, thus making double voyages, whereby much pepper and a great trade in cloth falls to us, in both Malacca and Batavia. And the Javanese enjoy agreeable profits therefrom...

In the same source we are also informed on the intensity of Javanese influence in Jambi in 1642:\textsuperscript{338}

Firstly, that he, the \textit{pangeran}, and his lords of that realm had at divers times let it be known that if it should happen that the Mataram came to visit us [that is to say, the people of Jambi] here, we should have to recognize him and respect him, not being strong enough to resist such a potentate, who has more millions of souls than we thousands.\textsuperscript{339} Furthermore, as I have been informed from the side of divers Jambinese themselves, the \textit{pangerans} and lords of Jambi now more than ever are completely inclined towards Mataram, more than was the case in times gone by. On various occasions I have also understood from the king himself that he thinks the Javanese garb and tongue the excellentest and pleasantest in the world so far as he knows; consequently he has commanded all the mountain folk in Kamang, Tanjung, Kota, and other regions who in the time of his ancestors and up to this present day have following their pleasure gone dressed in the Malay fashion that henceforth when they are at Tanah Pilih [the seat of the \textit{pangeran}] and come to \textit{subat} him, that is to say to do homage, they must appear in Javanese dress...

In consideration of this it is not suprising that close contacts with Mataram were maintained by both Jambi and Palembang: \textit{340} its traditional prestige was preponderant in Jambi,\textsuperscript{341} and
its influence was even greater in Palembang, while Palembang's relations with Batavia, which for a long time did not have any factory there, were much looser, so that the Javanese trader there more freely.342

The amount of pepper Europe was able to consume in the seventeenth century was tremendous. In the year 1603 more than forty-eight thousand bags of it were shipped thither by the Dutch and English.343 The Portuguese meanwhile also still continued to supply the European market:

...for years having sold and converted their pepper in large quantities, fixing the price a little below ours...344

and although the profits345 as they were were by no means trifling, the competition drove the Dutch and English to seek further means for superseding the Portuguese.

The war with the Portuguese was after all also fought in the Indies. On both sides an attempt was made to do as much damage as possible to the other, and the Portuguese, who had been driven from the Jambi pepper market by the Dutch, attempted to get a foothold once more by assailing their rivals there. The competition of the Portuguese was so dangerous because through their Indian factories they were able to import on a large scale the cloth so in demand in the archipelago, the medium of exchange par excellence.346 The Dutch Company thus had to endeavour to undertake trade in cloth itself. Nor could it break with Achin so long as its relations with India were not sufficiently stabilized, considering the fact that it was there the Indian traders brought their cloth.347 The siege of Malacca was therefore taken up with more and more vigour in order to strike Portuguese trade at its heart. Malacca was after all for the Portuguese the link between their factories in eastern Asia and in India. Its capture would deprive them of their stronghold in the archipelago, break their lines of communication, and as a result render them powerless. For the Company the possession of Malacca would also have the advantage that the Dutch "would be able to divert the Javanese from Malacca and attract them to Batavia"348 and make
Mataram dependent on them because of the large economic interests it had in Malacca. At the same time with the control of the world trade route in the Straits of Malacca it would be possible to gain the needed preponderance over Achin and with the possession of the two strongholds Malacca and Batavia the necessary pressure could be exerted on Jambi and Palembang when required. In short, the western part of the Indonesian Archipelago would be brought under the Company's control.

The years-long blockade of Malacca, aimed at cutting off all supplies from the stronghold, had an unexpected effect on the trade of Achin. In the second half of the sixteenth century the Portuguese had once more freely admitted the Indian Mohammedans to Malacca, but because of the blockade the 'Moors' had shifted their trade to Achin. As has been seen above, aside from petroleum, Baros camphor, menyan, gold, and pepper (a great deal cheaper than Malabar pepper), they were chiefly interested in tin. As Achin now had control of the tin regions, it could easily meet such a demand. Accordingly, as was written in 1638:

These places are much shipped upon... Perak is reported to yield between 6 and 7 thousand bahar of tin yearly. Kedah less and at a higher price, but the goods traded against it there give more advantage than in Perak. People appear in Kedah every year from Bengal, Pegu, and Coromandel and carry much tin thither. In the course of time we hope to incorporate this profitable trade for the Company alone.

In the second half of the sixteenth century two powers striving for hegemony had developed on eastern Java — the commercial state of Surabaya, which dominated the coast from Sedayu to the extreme east (1601), and the agrarian state of Mataram, which after bringing Pati under its rule in a 'wedding triumph' controlled the two chief export products, rice and salt. It was in the beginning of the seventeenth century that the issue came to a decision. Mataram, the examples of Majapahit and Demak in mind, realized that if it were to make its dominion sure it would have to subjugate the seaports completely. Despite heroic resistance, first Japara, then Cheribon, Tuban (1619), Ma-
dura (1624), and Surabaya (1625), and finally the extreme east (1637, 1639: still not Mohammedanized) which had in the meantime fallen under the rule of Bali, all had to bow to the might of Mataram, reinforced by countless 'inviolables'. Bali, which had also extended its sway over Lombok and Sumbawa, was itself harassed by an expedition in 1639, as Bantam had earlier been (in 1597 or 1598). And as Bali constantly made its influence felt in the extreme east of Java, Mataram threatened an attack on the island time and again in the course of the seventeenth century, but it did not materialize although the Balinese preponderance in the extreme east continued. Grise had fallen as early as 1613, but after the withdrawal of the Mataram troops it revived once again, until it was destroyed for good along with Surabaya (1623-1625). Only the holy perdikan desa Giri was then respected, and even it was later brought in submission. The environs of Surabaya were completely laid waste, so that famine and loss of life forced the city to capitulate. Forty thousand Madurese were carried off prisoner to Java.

The economic consequences such a policy in combination with other factors had for Java will be considered in the following section. It is sufficient here to point out that countless inhabitants of the coastal centres took refuge on other shores, that the Javanese sea trade was concentrated as much as possible at Japara in order to facilitate control, and that the export trade in rice was made into a state monopoly. The other ports fell in decay after the war.

Mataram, following the traditional pattern of eastern Javanese expansion, then stabilized its relations with Palembang, Jambi, Banjarmasin, and — partly because of its own antagonism to Batavia — Malacca. It also established relations with Achin in order to cripple Surabaya, which had expected help from Batavia, Macassar and Johore, Mataram had struck at its colony Sukadana in southwestern Borneo. As we have seen, Sukadana was in that same period lost to Java economically, though Mataram nevertheless still looked upon it as a vassal state in 1661.
Now it was the turn of western Java — Batavia and Bantam, and with that in mind a settlement of eastern Javanese rice-growers was founded in the Krawang region in order to provide food for the troops of siege. But although Mataram successfully expanded into Priangan, it was rebuffed by Batavia: the susuhunan lacked the naval power to cut off imports by sea, and the Javanese, although renowned as gun founders even before the coming of the Portuguese, were not adept enough at using firearms. In an army of sixty thousand men which was to lay siege to Batavia there were only six hundred equipped with firearms.

The Dutch Company's capture of Malacca in 1641 had tremendous political consequences for the western part of the Indonesian Archipelago. In the first place the competitive power of the Portuguese was broken by it. The Dutch Company was placed in a position of strength which worked to its advantage in its rivalry with the British. Now it could also enforce its will on the petty native states. If Mataram had been able to prolong Malacca's stubborn resistance by bringing in food supplies, it had not been merely commercial advantages it sought in doing so. The embassy the susuhunan sent to Goa in 1633 shows that he saw clearly enough what consequences it would have for his realm if Malacca should be captured by the Company. At the last minute Palembang, Jambi, and Banjarmasin also aligned themselves with him against the Company, while contact was sought with Johore and Macassar as well. But it was too late. The fall of Malacca was the harbinger of the approaching end of Mataram's independence: its economic self-sufficiency was broken, as will be further illustrated below, and from then on it had to rely completely on the Company. Peace between Batavia and Mataram followed as early as 1646, and with the political collapse of the empire of Mataram before the death of Tegal Wangi (1677) when the inhabitants of the ruined port towns, the scattering Macassarese, and the freedom-loving Madurese turned against the agrarian interior, the preponderance of the Company on Java was an established fact even before the end of the seven-
teenth century, however much the economic policy of Mataram may have struggled against it with its state rice monopoly and export bans.

The Company, tired of the forcing up of tolls and market taxes and the constant giving of presents to rulers and lords, wanted to have a monopoly on pepper and to establish strongholds which would ensure it. A contract was closed with Palembang on 21 June, 1641. Jeremias van Vliet, on his way to Malacca, took still more drastic action after a hostile encounter on 5 October, 1642, with a number of Javanese ships convoying the pangeran of Palembang on his voyage back from Mataram. Van Vliet went to Palembang with his fleet of seven ships and:

...brought the king — who had conducted himself rather strangely — to reason and made a terse contract with him, fulfilled more out of respect than love.

On 6 July, 1643, Jambi, too, had to share the same fate. The aim of the contracts was to obtain a monopoly for the Company, eliminate the Chinese buyers, prevent price inflation by setting a fixed price, and impose limitations on Jambinese competition in shipping. It goes without saying that the more Jambi became dependent on Batavia economically as a result, the more it had to break loose from Mataram. The same thing was the case with Palembang, although to a lesser extent, its trade relations with Java for a long time remaining closer. Partly as a result of its dreaded bonds with Bantam (1657, 1677) and the Macassarese, partly because of a flowering of its pepper trade coupled with a decline in the trade of Jambi and Indragiri, several "disciplinary actions" (1657, 1661) and new contracts (1662, 1678) proved to be needed to assure the Company's monopoly in Palembang. In both Jambi and Palembang the severance of ties with Mataram, although delayed for a long time because of the traditional respect of the older members of the reigning houses, found expression in the titles of the rulers, who began styling themselves sultan from 1670 on.

Achin, too, had to go on under the yoke, for the Company had turned its eye to the tin regions on the peninsula of Malacca,
especially for the sake of its trade on Persia and Kedah (1642), Ujung Salang (1643), Bangeri (1645), and Perak (1650) were forced to close contracts, one after the other.\textsuperscript{398} From as early as 1647 on, in fact, 'Moorish ships' were denied the right to trade on Perak. When after long negotiations in Achin, whose only colony still left on the peninsula then was Perak, Johan Truijman in December, 1650 succeeded in closing a monopoly contract with the rajah of Perak:

...he insinuated all the inhabitant Moors to depart from there and deliver the tin they had in stock to Malacca...\textsuperscript{399}

The so-called concessions of 1638 for western Sumatra pepper\textsuperscript{400} and the privileges of 1641\textsuperscript{401} were converted into a contract in 1649.\textsuperscript{402} The privileges stipulated were confirmed once more in 1659: half of the tin production of Perak, an office in Padang for the gold trade,\textsuperscript{403} monopoly trade on the ports of Achin. Fear of English competition was one of the factors playing an important rôle in the policy pursued there.

The power of Achin was now quickly brought to an end, and in 1663 and the following years the Achinese were driven from the west coast of Sumatra by Malays and Dutch. The Company, which took the place of Achin as suzerain, was not able to enjoy its possession in quiet, however. The after-effects of Achinese influence continued to work for a long time, the monopoly policy helped to create unrest, and for Bantam, which had to share in the pepper from Indrapura, obtaining it \textit{via} Selebar, there was every reason not to let the Dutch do as they wanted unhindered. Influence from Achin and Bantam more than once led to pan-Islamic agitation and movements directed against the suzerainty of the Dutch.\textsuperscript{404} And even after it had established its authority in Bantam in 1684, new difficulties for the Company on the west coast of Sumatra were created by the transfer to Benkulen of the English — thanks to whose factory in Bantam that town had been able to maintain its competition with Batavia for so long. The state of Achin, however, was limited to the north coast of Sumatra from 1675 on.

The Company's interference with Achin had had another aim
as well.\textsuperscript{405} Company trade had originally been carried on with money, as there was no export of commercial articles from Europe worth mentioning. But there was a great deal of risk connected with the shipments of money. It was for that reason that Coen had turned his eye to the intra-Asian barter trade which as far as the Indonesian Archipelago was concerned was largely in Javanese hands. In order to be able to attract that trade to the Company it was necessary to have a supply of the medium of exchange \textit{par excellence}, the Indian fabrics, \textit{the patolas, chindais}, and so forth from Cambay, Dabhol, and elsewhere on the west coast and the 'painted cloths', the batiks from Coromandel on the east coast. The products of the archipelago could be bought with such trade goods, and the cloth could be paid for with the products. With this in mind the Dutch turned to establishing factories in India.

Earlier, when the Dutch had not yet established themselves in India and the Portuguese had control of the cloth trade, the Company had had to obtain its supply from the Mohammedan traders in Achin. After the conquest of Malacca the picture changed, however. The 'Moors' were no longer needed; in fact they had become competitors who had to be eliminated.\textsuperscript{406} After they had been driven out of Achin they shifted their activities to Bantam, from whence, under the \textit{patronage} of the English and the Danes and in the natural jealousy between the two competing towns, they spoiled Batavia's cloth trade.\textsuperscript{407} Coupled with this increase in Mohammedan influence there naturally also came an increase in the strength of Mohammedan convictions.\textsuperscript{408} If there had earlier been rejoicing in Batavia over the decline of Bantam,\textsuperscript{409} this swift revival and the increased competition resulting from it\textsuperscript{410} filled the Dutch with a concern urging to intervention. Alongside that came Bantam's competition in the west coast monopoly, its interference with Palembang and Jambi affairs, and its intervention in the solution of the Mataram problem.\textsuperscript{411} Even before the end of the seventeenth century, the greatness of Bantam was brought low, and Fort Speelwijk was to serve to bridle any possible excesses. In the course of time the
Company even had to be allowed to share in the so zealously guarded monopoly of pepper from the Lampong region. (Bantam itself produced very little pepper, even in 1639.)

"There is nothing in the world", Coen had written to the directors of the Dutch Company, "that gives man better right than might and power added to right". The right to prevent others from selling their commercial crops to competitors was, according to him, a 'natural right'. The teaching of nature and what has been done by all peoples from age to age has always been sufficient for me." Others had no rights versus the Company for what 'the Grace of God' had bestowed on it. It was required to honour treaties with them only insofar as that was in keeping with its own interests. The conduct of the Company's opponents gives evidence of a similar disposition on their part as well.

Nutmeg and Cloves

The Dutch Company also wanted to obtain a monopoly on the spices of the Moluccas, and it was highly disagreeable to them that their competitors were able to find a base for their shipping — 'smuggling trade' in the terminology of the Company — in Macassar. In 1625 they therefore turned to the ruler of Macassar — at the end of the sixteenth century still called Batara Goa, but Islamized by 1603 — with the request that he forbid his subjects to trade on the spice islands. The king, however, answered:

And so far as concerned our complaint that the Macassarese took away the cloves from us, it was not so in fact, as the Macassarese only occupied themselves with land trade; but he presumed such must have taken place by the Malays, whom he said he could hardly forbid, and that because once they were at sea they went wheresoever they would.

The king was indeed right, for even in 1636 we learn:

...that the Macassarese are the least of those who have frequented the
regions of Ambon, and the strangers going there are mostly people from Minangkabau [from Negeri Sembilan on the peninsula of Malaya], Johore, and Patani, and Javanese from Japara, Grise, Jaratan, and Bantam. Thus, in closing, if the king were shown and assured that 4 to 500 hundred lasts or koyan of rice — of which most of the wealth of the lords consists — would be purchased from him annually, our coming there would be pleasing to them and they would rather see that than that great lots of cloves arrive from which the common man has no advantage...

The same thing is also expressed in a description of Macassar in 1638:420

The Malays were held in high esteem there. They are people of great means, have their dwellings in the villages scattered amongst the Macassarese. Up to now their shipping has usually been in December, January, and February via Buton to Ambon, to which end they depart from Macassar with a large amount of cloth, rice, porcelains, but mostly reals in specie; when they leave from here they ordinarily stop in passing at Buton, where they trade as much cloth in exchange for slaves as they can comfortably take and carry, with which they then go straight through to the regions of Ambon, staying there in the clove trade till June, July, August, and September. This has taken place each year, with junks, buoyed tingans, and other proas up to 25, 30, or 40 in number, sometimes fewer and sometimes more. As we are informed — and it is believable — they have brought 1000 bahar from there to Macassar in one monsoon.

The state of affairs was also confirmed by the English merchant Sihordt, who reported:421

The ones who sail these junks [from Macassar to the Moluccas] were most of them Malays from Patani, Johore, and other places who lived in Macassar by many thousands and controlled most of the shipping in all directions; few Macassarese travel by sea to distant places, but busy themselves with proas and small ships in the places lying around Celebes.

In the beginning of the seventeenth century, then, it was still primarily the 'strangers'422 who carried on trade from Macassar, while the indigenous population occupied itself with farming. The same thing held for the Buginese from Boni.423 We have already seen424 the first beginnings of the process of development which was to follow. At the coming of the Portuguese in the beginning of the sixteenth century, when Malays from Malacca and later Johore, and Javanese controlled the spice trade, Macassar did not yet play a rôle of any importance in the Indonesian
Archipelago. As a result of the treatment they experienced in Malacca, some Malays had in the course of time emigrated to Macassar, which became a base for shipping on the Moluccas for them. The immigration of Malays increased after Achin in a number of expeditions had destroyed Johore and pretty much brought the peninsula of Malacca to submission. Finally, the Dutch Company's blockade of Malacca was also a factor. As Macassar proved to be a suitable supply station on the sea route to the Moluccas, the Philippines, Patani, China, and the Lesser Sunda Islands, the Portuguese set their course more and more via there in the latter half of the sixteenth century, and Chinese, too, began to go there. The significance of Macassar as a crossroads of trade increased still more once the Dutch made the seas further west unsafe.

As has earlier been pointed out, the crippling of the eastern Javanese seaports by Mataram also led to an exodus to other shores of Javanese traders — who for example re-established Javanese preponderance in Banjarmasin. As has also been pointed out, in the beginning of the seventeenth century the trade there was completely controlled by the Chinese and a growing demand was leading to an expansion of pepper cultivation. Now Macassar, where people were able to feel free of the Dutch Company, presently became the stapling point for the pepper from Banjarmasin, which brought a better price there than in Batavia. Banjarmasin broke loose from the grip of the monopoly policy by the simple method of murdering the Dutch traders. As the production of rice in the environment of Macassar (primarily Tello) was not sufficient to satisfy Macassar's own expanding needs as a supply station and to provide Malacca — to which Macassar had become more and more the provider of food, — rice had to be imported from Java. (It was in Java, too — as well as in Pasir, in eastern Borneo, — that the ships for Macassar were built.) The supplementary supply of rice from Java did not prove sufficient either, so that Macassar had to bring the rice granary Bima under its control.

Presently the nobility of Macassar began to take an interest in
trade. The account of Admiral van der Hagen’s voyage of 1607 tells of the prince of Tello, co-regent for the ruler of Goa:

He makes great effort to get traffic in his land, to which end he expressly keeps an agent in Banda whom he supplies every year with rice, cloth, and everything wanted there, in order to get as much mace in his land as possible and thus to attract some traders thither; he can also buy up large lots, and is able to give gifts to the Bandanese popes so that it gives him a great advantage there...

After they gave up shipping on Banda, the Portuguese went to Macassar to fill what needs they had for spices beyond those taken to them in Malacca. Since the Dutch...

...have been patrolling the shipping channels of Malacca so constantly, Macassar has increased a great deal. As regards the trade in these eastern regions as of Borneo, Java, Bali, Solor, Timor, Ambon, Molucca, and other places, Macassar is better situated than Malacca. Besides which Macassar is a logical chamber of supply for Malacca and Molucca...

The custom of the land is that no one may trade before the king has already bought first; buying large quantities of rice has to take place with the king...

The most goods which [the Portuguese] bring there are coastal and Bengal cloth, and from Macao raw silk, silk cloth, a fair quantity of gold, and other Chinese wares.

A large quantity of cloth is sold in Macassar itself, and it is carried by the Malays and the inhabitants from there to all the surrounding regions and islands, to wit, on Borneo, Mindanao, the Moluccas, Ambon, Ceram, Kai and Aru, Tanimbar, Solor, Timor, Ende [on Flores], Bima, Bali, Java, etc.

At Macassar the Portuguese obtain reals from the Moluccas, Ambon, etc., sandalwood, wax, tortoise shell brought there from Timor, Solor, and other places, cloves from the Moluccas and Ambon, rice from Macassar, diamonds and bezoar stones from Borneo, along with various other wares.

The Portuguese frigates [then still very small vessels of around forty ton] are hauled across the breakers into the river for as long as they have to winter in Macassar, and in the beginning of May they go back out to be loaded.

Around the 10th of May the ships from Macao set out richly laden, worth from 30 to 60000 reals of eight.
In the same way between the middle of May and the middle of July all the rest set out for Malacca, the Coromandel Coast, and Bengal....

Around 10 and 22 Portuguese [frigates and junks] come into Macassar each year, and sometimes they are 500 man strong in Macassar; the king there tolerates their exercising their religion on shore there...

...he [the king] lays up a large treasure each year through the coming and traffic of the Portuguese...

In sum, the Portuguese kept Macassar for their Malacca and traded there [as well as on Timor and the Moluccas] as securely as if there were not an enemy left in the Indies, because they have not once been attacked there.

According to him [the English trader Sihordt] the Portuguese in Macassar trade not much less than 5 or six hundred thousand reals of 8 each year... Macassar is increasing more and more in population and trade. The profitable clove trade attracts various nations there. The Portuguese are in high repute there...

The Macassarese gradually began to take more and more part in the trade. In the beginning the nobles would have the Portuguese also trade for their account, or would act as money-lenders; later we find Portuguese pilots on Macassarese ships. Thus the foundations were laid for Macassarese expansion, which could no longer be curbed by the weakened Ternate.

...Likewise that Macassar could bring 100000 men into the field and had 4000 guns and other sorts of weapons, but was especially well provided with blow-pipes and poisonous arrows...

The whole island of Celebes was under its suzerainty and all the surrounding, islands such as Ceram, Buru, Timor, Solor, Ende, etc. sought it to be their protector, as did Luhu, Kambelo, Lisidi [all three on Ceram], etc. In sum, everyone sought to be on good terms with the king.

The marriage bonds of Macasarese princesses with rulers elsewhere and the strong propaganda for Islam carried on from Macassar were also instrumental in expanding the power of the state.

"The shipping of the Macassarese", Governor General Hendrik Brouwer wrote to the directors of the Dutch Company on 27 December, 1634:
...has increased there extraordinarily since not long ago because of the exiled foreigners from the Malay lands such as Johore, Pahang, and Lingga as well as from Grise, Bukit [or Giri], Jaratan, Sedayu, and many other places, and this because the aforementioned Macassar treats those same foreigners very civilly...431

Macassar thus attracted "all the strange and Moorish nations" to its country because it allowed all trade "freely and openly, with good treatment, and small demands of tolls".452

The Portuguese... provide the Macassarese with European weapons of fine guns and muskets which they make available to them each year, Macao iron firearms, Japanese, Ceylonese, and other guns in quantity, contrary to the old Spanish and Portuguese strict laws of not being allowed to sell any weapons to unbelievers, under pain of the most heavy excommunication; the pope has given them dispensation from this, however. Even so the Macassarese could also get enough such arms from the English and Danes, and we see that these same Macassarese and foreigners are not only clever Indies seafarers, but also dogged and brave in offering resistance.453

Macassar's importance increased still more when the English and from 1625 on the Danes454 also established themselves there and carried on trade on the Moluccas with the natives as middle-men.

A great deal of use was made of 'bottomry' in that time. We read of it as early as in D'eerste boeck, the account of the first Dutch journey to the Indies, in the description of the trade at Achin given there. The Chinese kept:

...hirelings and purchased servants which they sent to all regions to buy up pepper and other wares, also hiring the same out on some voyages, whom they always also gave some money to take along and employ to their profit...455

The Malays and kelings are traders who give out money on interest for voyages and bottomry. The Gujarati, because they are poor, are commonly used as boat crews, and are the ones who take money on bottomry, which they often make double or triple of.456

The traders who are wealthy in general stay at home, then when some ships are ready to leave they give those going with them a sum of money to be repaid doubly, [the amount] more or less according to the length
of the voyages, of which they make an obligation, and if the voyage is
prosperously completed then the giver is paid according to the contract,
and if the drawer cannot pay the money because of some misfortune then
he must give his wife and children in pledge for the whole time until
the debt is paid, unless the ship were wrecked -- then the former loses
the money he lent...

Just as the Dutch were later to do in Batavia, the Portuguese
in Grise also gave money to the Javanese on bottomry. This is
described in the 'Memorial Drawn up by Jacob van Heemskerck
on the Way in which According to His Findings Trade Must Be
Carried On on the Javanese Coastal 'Towns and the Moluc­
cas':

Jaratan is the most excellent and best port in all Java, where almost all
the trade in spices, such as nutmeg, mace, and cloves, is done, which the
Portuguese have been very well able to help themselves to; they have
almost all the merchandise with them that the Javanese use and also
carry cashes [Chinese copper coins] with them, the which they give out
to the Javanese going on voyages bottomry to Molucca or Banda and
back, for which the receivers give guarantee in writing, and as I under­
stand from the Portuguese rarely default payment. I asked them how
they could understand the papers, which were written in Malay; if the
Javanese were treacherous they could put creditor for debtor. To which
they gave me to answer that they had, as a trifle, so that they easily

got the right answer...

The English, Danes, and others presently brought bottomry in
use at Macassar. The earlier mentioned Sihordt, for example,
had "given money in the hands of various Macassarese for the
delivery of cloves..." As had already been indicated, the Ma­
cassarese nobility participated in Portuguese enterprises itself.
How much native shipping on the Moluccas was stimulated
by the bottomry of the English and Danes appears from a
document dated 1633, however:

We are just as much amazed as His Excellency, considering the large
damage which the strangers [the Javanese, Malays, Macassarese, and
so forth who went to the Moluccas to obtain the spices on which the
Dutch Company claimed the monopoly] have endured in vessels as
well as goods, that they still keep on coming... But it is so, as His Ex­
cellency well says, that the clove-seeking Portuguese, English, Danes,
and others will spur them on to it enough; and although it is already so that they suffer some loss, still they are spurred on and encouraged from time to time by the hope of making a good voyage. We find these strangers to be usually Minangkabauers, Malays, and a few Macassarese.

It can be seen from all this that after the destruction of the eastern Javanese commercial towns by Mataram, the centre of the spice trade shifted more and more to Macassar: the trade route no longer went from the Moluccas via Grise to the Straits of Malacca, but from the Moluccas via Macassar and southern Borneo to the Straits or Bantam. Such a shift could not help having an effect on the political sympathies of the inhabitants of the Moluccas. If in the Portuguese era and even in the first decades of the seventeenth century they turned to the chief rulers of Java in their need, now they placed themselves under the protection of Macassar.

It is not necessary to bring up here the whole history of the Company’s monopoly policy in the Moluccas. It can be hunted up in the standard source publications. Whatever plans may have been brought forward in the course of the years by Coen or, after the capture of Malacca and later, by Matelieff and others regarding the admittance of a certain amount of free trade, in practice the Dutch attempted to carry through the monopoly system ever more rigorously — especially once they began incorporating the ‘native trade’, the intra-Asian trade, — in their shortsightedness blind to the fact that by undermining the purchasing power and prosperity of the people they were killing the goose with the golden eggs.

And we are so close set on our profits and earnings that we do not allow anyone to earn a penny or farthing on us...

wrote Reael, as early as 20 August, 1618.

In treaties signed with rulers who in signing them went beyond their power to fulfil them, the Dutch stipulated a monopoly on the purchase of spices at a low price; in other unilateral agreements the privilege was obtained by force. The monopoly in the far-flung archipelago had to be maintained by a handful of Dutch to whom violence seemed the only means of doing it.
What Achin had practised on the pepper coast, what the Portuguese had applied in the Moluccas, what the rulers of Ternate and Tidore were accustomed to carry on against each other — hongi expeditions were now elevated by the Dutch Company to a system. They served first of all to punish the wicked violators of the monopoly contracts for selling spices to the foreign traders and by intimidation to make trade impossible for competitors, in the second place to maintain the spice prices by limiting production (destroying plantings). Despite the violence used it was not easy to maintain the monopoly, for the foreign traders paid better, brought with them the food supply on which the inhabitants were dependent, and found a response to their propaganda for Islam in most of the people among whom the Company for political reasons attempted to make proselytes despite the stipulations against it in the contracts. The people furthermore became more and more averse to the Company — in whose monopoly they rightly saw a threat to their prosperity and traditional emoluments — because of the heavy services it demanded. The pan-Islamic propaganda against the Company was carried on from the old Mohammedan centre Hitu on Ambon and warmly supported by the expelled Bandanese who had been taken under the protection of Macassar. The systematic ruination of the Moluccas against which the people attempted to protect themselves by constant expansion in size of plantings had of itself to lead the Dutch into practically insurmountable difficulties with everyone there, their allies included.

It goes without saying that a conflict with Macassar was unavoidable. In the same way the Company continued to war with Mataram, and later intermittently with Surabaya and also with Bantam, partly in order to keep traders from there out of the Moluccas, it also maintained a state of war with Macassar, blockading it but without result. (The spices were unloaded on the east coast of Celebes and taken overland to Makassar, and the Company was powerless to prevent it.) After the Dutch had first bought up the spices on the Macassar market itself they were able on the basis of their peace treaty of 1637 so much to
intimidate the king of Macassar, impressed by the capture of Malacca in 1641 as he was, that the import of spices there was stopped for a time. It was impossible for such a situation to last.

As trade in Macassar declined by leaps and bounds, no great gifts of prophecy were needed to be able to predict that within no too long a time thing would come to a decision in Celebes. Macassar and the East India Company could not go on co-existing as equals; the conflict would eventually have to come. "It appears", as the governor general and Council of the Indies stated it in the December, 1641 letter to the Company directors, that the [ruler of] Macassar is attempting to expand his dominion more and more, so that in time, in order for it not to become too big it will need to be stopped, either by dexterity or open violence". It was to happen by open violence.

Macassar's interests in the Moluccas were too important for events there to leave it unmoved. It is not necessary to consider here the further developments in Macassar's relation to the Company politically, suffice it to point out that while the Company kept on its policy of violence in the Moluccas until the patient succumbed under the lengthy, at long last successful operation, an end finally came to the war with Macassar through its conquest by Speelman in 1669.

Also that conflict, in essence purely economic, had manifested itself in a religious form. According to Van Goens, the king of Macassar had informed the governor general:

...that he does not fight with us out of any enmity, but only because of the will of God, for the continuance of his religion and the protection of his fellow believers.

In the meantime the sailors from Macassar had already become a common phenomenon in the western part of the archipelago, and after the conquest of Macassar their fleets became all too notorious. Their influence became a factor of importance on the shores of Borneo, the east coast of Sumatra, and in Lampong and Johore, as relatives of the royal families, as traders, and as pirates. They also exerted influence on the history of Java, especially Bantam and the north coast.

For Javanese commerce the diversion of the trade route was the
death blow, following upon the combined action of the policy of the Company (in the Moluccas) and that of Mataram as it did. The first of these has already been discussed; before closing a few words should still be said on the second.

Mataram realized the danger to its independence in case it had to rely only on the Company for its imports, and for that reason it supported Malacca to the very end. Once Malacca had fallen in 1641, Sultan Agung turned to the weapon of state rice monopoly, a policy taken up again by his successor. The latter commanded:

...that no one of his subjects may voyage out of the country, but desires that everyone from elsewhere will come and seek his country, well knowing that same to be the chief chamber of supply for Batavia; and he thereby attracts everything imported by us to himself without anyone of his subjects being allowed to trade even a penny...

The "principal plan" of Susuhunan Tegal Wangi, Mangkurat I:

...is to keep his land shut off in order to force us to seek him and thereby to draw from us everything he desires...

...without allowing any rice to be delivered to us [the Dutch] or others except from here [Japara], for which the moneys or whatever it may be are then delivered to the king's treasurers and taken to his court...

In Japara is the king's rice treasury, and at present everyone must collect his needs there, for people in any other places are not allowed to sell rice under pain of death, but must ship their supply all to Japara.

The ruler of Mataram not only sought to wrest free from the grip of Batavia on his economy by establishing a state rice monopoly and forbidding the Javanese to carry on such trade on Java; he also attempted to make himself independent of the Dutch cloth trade by encouraging the growing of cotton locally. It appears that as a result of the diminished purchasing power of the people the attempt proved successful. The repeated efforts of Mataram in this period to induce the Company to recognize its supreme authority must also be considered in this light. The Company for its part took as much care as possible not to have to rely on Japara for its rice imports, among other things
having its own rice planted in the 'Jakarta jurisdiction'. The royal rice monopoly was to be a two-edged sword which was to strike a grievous blow at the last vestiges of private trade, however. And furthermore it unwittingly played into the hands of the Company in its policy to attract the 'native trade', the intra-Asian trade, to itself.

I would appear that Susuhunan Mangkurat I (1646—1677) foresaw the impending dissolution of his empire and attempted to prevent it by carrying on a reign of terror. One lord of the realm after another fell victim to the distrust of the autocrat, who in the later years of his life was undoubtedly mentally deranged. Among them was also the former 'young prince' of the old trading town Surabaya, Pangeran Pekik, father-in-low and uncle to the susuhunan, who had dwelt at the Mataram court as a prisoner of state as Pangeran Surabaya. He was, apparently rightly, suspected of intrigues against the existing regime.

Tuban, as late as 1599 the largest town on Java, in 1619 laid waste by Mataram, was still only a "hamlet"; Grise had lost its commerce; Japara was not much better off. A reaction from the impoverished coastal population could not fail to come. It manifested itself even before the death of Mangkurat I. In 1674, when the Macassarese pirates began to molest the coast of Java, the crisis had reached its summit. The four coastal regents, who had not turned over the tolls and rents for fourteen years, were pressed for payment, and they made all sorts of efforts to collect the necessary sums. The coast of eastern Java had:

...not in many years been so bare and exhausted of money as now because of the large sums which had to be yielded to the susuhunan all at once, and of other things...

Heavier tolls and taxes — despite the decline of the population in number and purchasing power, — misrule by the coastal regents, bad rice yields, and vexations at the hands of the Macassarese pirates all together finally made the cup run over: the people of the coasts lost their hope of help from the dynasty and in 1675 joined hands with the pillaging Macas-
sarese in a struggle against the agrarian interior, a reaction also aimed against the Company, whose intentions they distrusted and in whom they instinctively saw their enemy. (The distinction in idiom between the coastal populations of Palembang, Jambi, Banjarmasin, and Bantam on the one hand and that of central Java on the other—despite smaller dialectical differences within the two groups—has already been called attention to earlier.)

In the war of independence now carried on with the help of Bantam, the Madurese, and the Macassarese, religion once again played a significant rôle. At the end of the period of Majapahit, the struggle had been that of Islam contra Hindu Javanism; later, in the conflict between Demak and the principality of Pengging, it had been that of orthodoxy contra a heterodoxy in which in a certain sense the same old Hindu Javanism had found a last refuge. In the time of Sultan Agung—under whose name a writing mystically philosophical in content has been preserved for us—the study of Javanese theosophy was revived, and the belief in a dynasty wreathed in religious glory and linked to the mysterious Empress of the South Seas gained new force. The old imperial crown of Majapahit became the symbol of authority, and a genealogical relation to its Hindu Javanese royal house a sort of evidence of legitimacy. The 'seers' inherited from the Hindu Javanese past were esteemed figures at court. (Presumably the surunatas at the present-day court of Solo are the last remnant of them, and the mahesa lawung must be viewed as originally having been a Kali-Durga festival.) Mangkurat I went even further, initiating a persecution of the orthodox religious teachers, unsympathetic to him, which would seem to have cost two thousand of them their lives.

In Achin, too, in those days the spiritual matrix of Islam in the archipelago, an orthodox reaction first under the leadership of the Gujarati scholar al-Raniri and later under that of Abdurrauf of Singkel had set in after 1637 against the heretical mystical practices which had characterized the heyday of Achin under Iskandar Muda (1607-1636)—a reaction which developed into witch-hunting and religious persecution. In view of the close
spiritual ties between Achin and Java in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the similar periods of political and economic decay in both countries after 1650, it is not amazing that also on Java the reaction of the Arabistic Mohammedan coastal population under the leadership of the octogenarian panembahan perdikan, headman of the holy desa of Giri, became an element of importance in the struggle against the Javanistic Islam of the agrarian Mataram.

With an appeal to the contract of 1646, Mataram called the Company, whose direct interest indeed lay on that side, to come to its aid in its mortal struggle for existence, and in 1680 the power of Giri was broken. The dynasty of Mataram, rent by inner discord, was saved from certain downfall, but at the cost of important territorial concessions to the Company in 1677 and 1678. And from that moment on there was a change in the relation between the susuhunan and the governor general, who was now called the 'protector', presently 'grandfather' of the Javanese ruler whereas before he had been called 'brother' even by the coastal regents who had orders to place. At the same time Dutch money was declared legal currency and the Company was granted a monopoly for selling cloth and opium in the ports of Mataram, the latter partly in compliance with the strict order of the Company directors in 1676 to intensify the monopoly.

That was the end of Javanese expansion in the outlying islands. As early as 1657 a letter from the regent of Japara to Governor General Maetswijker had already stated that:

...as the susuhunan's order is to sail along the coast either to Jakarta or to any other place and the Javanese are not able to ship the goods of the susuhunan thither, the general might be helpful to us herein, for the sea is large and the Javanese cannot sail it, but we would desire servants of the general, Dutchman who are acquainted with the places whither we should like to sail, a Dutch pilot for each proa who would go with our people...

Twenty years later a comparison is made between the Javanese of Bantam and of Mataram:
... the eastern\textsuperscript{541} Javanese of Mataram, besides their great ignorance at sea, were now completely lacking in vessels of their own, even for necessary use.

It has already been pointed out that the seafaring Javanese from 1625 on had more and more gone in exodus of Bantam, Palembang, Macassar, and above all Banjarmasin, so that in the retroactive clauses of the treaty of 1646 between the Company and Mangkurat I mention could be made of "those of Banjarmasin and Kota Waringin who also are Javanese..."\textsuperscript{542} Java itself now became more and more the land of enforced market crops.

The Javanese 'expansion' of the twentieth century is of a wholly different nature, rooted in a completely different soil.
The contest between the seaports and the agrarian interior for hegemony began with the struggle of the coastal potentates against Majapahit. Demak, with its rice port Japara and its salt region Pati, was then able to take over control. The main emphasis at that time fell on the supplying of rice to the archipelago.

Pengging, which had had the leadership in the rice region at least from the last of the Majapahit period on, under Kebo Kenangga, son of Andayaningrat, rose to resist coastal domination, but was brought under the rule of Demak once more. In the meantime the 'queen of Japara' of the Portuguese accounts repeated the traditional attempts to overpower Malacca in 1551 and 1574. The rise of the realm of Pajang after 1574 — that is to say, not only territorially but also dynastically the resurgence of Pengging — signified the second, this time successful reaction of the agricultural hinterland against the coast.

If we pass in silence over the unavailing attempt made by Aria Penangkang, or Aria Jipang, the grandson of Raden Patah, against Pajang, then there remains to be mentioned the intrigues against the sultan of Pajang carried on by Sunan Kudus, with the aim of regaining the leadership for Demak. After the death of the sultan, Sunan Kudus was for a while able to have the son-in-law of the sultan, the adipati of Demak, succeed him, thus temporarily restoring the hegemony to Demak. Because of his impopularity he was not able to gain any general recognition of his authority, however, so that he finally had to subject himself to Senopati and go over to his service. As appears from the first Dutch accounts, Demak was not yet brought under the control of Mataram in 1596. The same adipati of Demak, the grandson of Sultan Demak III, thus, can-
not have been anyone else but the 'rajah of Demak' whom the Dutch met in Bantam in 1596 and who sought help from them and the Portuguese for his plans.\textsuperscript{556} It is also indicative of the man's impopularity that while Mataram, for example, did not have any standing army, or professional army at least, except for a few bodyguards, the \textit{adipati} was maintained by an army of purchased Balinese, Buginese, and Macassarese slaves.\textsuperscript{557}

The struggle between the coast (Demak, Pati, Japara) and the agrarian hinterland (Pajang, Mataram) for supremacy was also continued in the following period, that of Mataram.\textsuperscript{558} The border ran along the Gunung Kendeng.\textsuperscript{559} In the case of Mataram's domination, too, the reaction of the \textit{pasisir} did not fail to come. Pati revolted against Mataram under Pragola I, the younger brother-in-law of Senopati, but was suppressed again.\textsuperscript{560} Demak then rose in resistance to Panembahan Seda Krapyak, under the leadership of his brother Pangeran Puger.\textsuperscript{561} Some Dutch also took part in the defence of Demak against the hosts of Mataram at that time (1602).\textsuperscript{562} Pati revolted once again in the time of Sultan Agung, but was brought to order first by a 'marriage triumph' in 1624 and after that by the sword in 1627.\textsuperscript{563} Demak, too, had to be disciplined once more.\textsuperscript{564}

In the meantime there had been a shift in the centre of gravity of trade. In the last decades of the sixteenth century the Portuguese had once more left the trade on the spice islands largely to the Javanese,\textsuperscript{565} who now had to supply them as well as their usual customers, the Indians and Chinese. And besides that there came presently the tremendous demand of the English and Dutch, hardly possible to satisfy.\textsuperscript{566} The centre of gravity, then, had to shift. Now it was not the supplying of rice to the outlying islands carried on from Japara which was primary, but rather the spice trade for which Grise was the stapling point. From that time on, then, the opposition to the agrarian Mataram was led from Surabaya.\textsuperscript{567}

The struggle began already with Senopati.\textsuperscript{568} Wirasaba, Japan (Mojokerto), Kertasana, Lamongan, Grise, Sedayu, Tuban,
Lasem, Sumenep, Madiun, Kediri, Pasuruan, Malang, Blitar, Lumajang, and other places joined together under Surabaya's leadership. A prolonged war, not yet definitively settled during the reign of Panembahan Krapyak (1601-1613), was the result. It was only just before his death that Krapyak had conquered Grise and Jaratan and laid waste to them.

With the accession of Sultan Agung (1613-1646) the war between the bang wetan (eastern Java) and Mataram broke out anew. Once again the coastal towns joined together. But the struggle was already decided in substance by 1615. When Pasuruan had also fallen in 1617 and Tuban in 1619, Surabaya's fate was sealed. Madura followed in 1624, and Surabaya itself in 1625. And with that the struggle between the eastern Javanese trading area and the agrarian Mataram was decided to the advantage of the latter.
THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF COMMUNISM
ON THE WEST COAST OF SUMATRA
The following study was originally published as Chapter I, and Chapter II, Sections I and II of Rapport van de Commissie van Onderzoek ingesteld bij het Gouvernementsbesluit van 13 Februari 1927 No. 1a. (Report of the Investigation Committee Appointed Under the Government Decree of 13 February, 1927, No. 1a), Weltevreden, Landsdrukkerij, 1928.
In March, 1923, as a result of the activities of Abdul Muis on the West Coast of Sumatra, a section of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was set up at Padang. Despite its small beginnings, the section immediately began to agitate against that representative of the Sarekat Islam.\(^1\)

It is true that, after the Sarekat Islam congress held at Surabaya in October, 1921 had expelled the communists from the movement, the Communist Party Executive, acting in accordance with the policy laid down by the Communist International, had attempted to form a 'united front' together with other likely groups, such as the Sarekat Islam Trades Union, but its attempts had met with stubborn resistance from the leaders of these groups. The Sarekat Islam congress held at Madiun in March, 1923 again excluded the communists. What did it profit the members of the Sarekat Islam that the Comintern had "allowed the Communists in Java to take an active part in the work of the local workers and peasant party\(^2\) there" — as Manuilski had publicly announced at the Communist International's Fifth Congress?\(^2\)

In October, 1920 Darsono's attempted coup, designed to transfer the leadership of the Sarekat Islam to the Semarang-ers and cut the claws once and for all of the old leaders, men like Tjokroaminoto, had failed. And now even their attempts to form a united front were boycotted by the groups most closely related to them. The communist leaders, therefore, replied to this rebuff by subjecting the leaders of the Sarekat Islam movement to violent criticism and by setting up 'red' groups, later known as Sarekat Ra'jats.

In adopting these two courses the Indonesian communists were following the tactics prescribed by the Communist International. In this way they were "upholding the independent character of
the proletarian movement” as laid down by the Propositions of 1920, which had been drafted at an earlier date by Lenin himself.

The communist activity on the West Coast of Sumatra in 1923 was of the same character, taking the form of criticism of the communists' old opponent, Abdui Muis, and the setting up of Sarekat Ra’jats, which, though independent at the outset, were centralized from September, 1924 onwards in the Padang Panjang local.

The movement won but few adherents in the early stages. Its international character and irreligious attitude exercised little attraction. In the early years 'communism' was a typical symptom of malaise. The Marxist theory of increasing misery caught on best of all. The majority of the 660 members who had joined the Sarekat Ra’jats by the end of December, 1924 had been recruited from among government personnel (railroaders) dismissed in the economy drive and from among small tradesmen. They learned to lay the blame for their misfortune upon capitalism, with which the Government was being identified ever more openly. In those days expressions of nationalist feelings and attempts to achieve a synthesis of Islam and communism occurred only sporadically there, the general tendency being rather to regard both nationalism and religion as the tools of capitalism.

In the meantime there had been a communist congress at Jogjakarta in December, 1924. Doubt had arisen as to the significance of the Sarekat Ra’jats to the movement. They had 'degenerated' into a petit bourgeois movement, which after all could not serve as the substructure of the Indonesian Communist Party as the PKI congress held at Batavia in June, 1924, acting on Darsono's suggestion, had intended that they should. At the congress the party executive had argued — on the lines of the resolutions of the Communist International — that the movement should not restrict itself to the proletariat but should also be active among the peasants. The Jogja congress, on the other hand, took the view that whereas the Sarekat Ra’jats did attract dissatisfied elements, in doing so they became a hotch-potch affair which
lacked inner strength and was no longer proletarian in character. The party executive therefore wanted to concentrate all forces in the trades union movement, to let the *Sarekat Ra’jats* die out, and to educate the people in communism by providing them with courses of instruction and propagandist literature. To this the conference agreed.

As a consequence of these discussions, the general meeting between the executive of the West Coast of Sumatra local and the delegates of the local *Sarekat Ra’jats*, which took place between 5 and 11 February, 1925 at Padang Panjang, decided that the *Sarekat Ra’jats* on the West Coast should be dissolved and that their former members should, as prospective members of the PKI, be instructed in the theory of communism under the guidance of PKI groups to be set up locally. After the May, 1925 conference at Padang Panjang, these local groups were brought under the supervision of a central bureau at Padang. In the following September the organization underwent another change. The central bureau became a section and the sections sub-section. In the spring of 1926, after the departure of Sutan Said Ali, the 'section' was again transferred to Padang Panjang.

The courses met with little success in the long run — Marxist theory was difficult for the audiences to digest — and they finally petered out, those intended for propagandists included. The slogan of the class struggle found little response among the lower middle class of farmers and traders. Besides, the *adat* council³ had come into action against communist propaganda in the Padang Highlands. The movement could not hold out against this reaction, while the improved economic situation offered little chance of success to the spreading of communist ideas. In Jambi even a number of those who were later to play a great part in the insurrections of 1926 contracted 'gold fever'.

Nevertheless communist propaganda was not without its influence, as this work will show.

For the practical purposes of the colonial administration, however, all that mattered for the time being was the provocatively presumptuous, insolent, and defiant attitude many communists
adopted towards headmen, native authorities, and European
government officials, an attitude familiar in Europe from the
early days of the labour movement and the period immediately
after the First World War.

By the end of 1925 the movement had as good as faded out
everywhere on the West Coast, although the ranks of its leaders
had been reinforced by a number of individuals sent back from
other areas, chiefly from the East Coast of Sumatra and from
Achin, but also from Jambi, who had to live on their jobs in the
movement.

The leaders' embitterment increased as interest in the move­
ment waned and resistance to it grew. They began to wish for a
victory wrested, on the Louis Blanc model, by the bold action of a
wide-awake minority which would drag the masses along in its
train. "The revolutionary blood in our veins grows hotter from
day to day" — was the cry. Some already passed on to anarchist
agitation.

In the meantime the Communist International had devised and
adopted its own revolutionary doctrine. Formerly the proletar­
ian revolution had been regarded exclusively as the result of the
internal development of capitalism in any particular country.
Leninism, on the other hand, sees everything on a world-wide
scale. It sees imperialism as a whole; its different national fronts
are merely links in the same chain, together they form one great
front with England as the main bastion. It is against this front
that the united front of the world-wide revolutionary movement
must be formed and therefore — according to the new revolut­
ionary teaching — the revolution of the proletariat must be
regarded as the outcome of the clash between these two world-
wide fronts.

Where does the revolution begin? At what point is the capital­
ist front to be broken? Which link in the continuous chain of
imperialism will be the first to snap? Formerly the answer was:
there where the proletariat is in the majority and democracy
and industrialism are most highly developed. But now Stalin,
voicing the new Leninist theory of revolution, denies this, saying
instead that:
The front of capital will be broken where the chain of imperialism is weakest... It is possible therefore that the country which begins the revolution, which makes a breach in the capitalist front, may prove to be less developed from the capitalist point of view than others which are more developed but have remained, nevertheless, within the framework of capitalism. 3a

The aim of the Communist International is, as Stalin recently explained, to work directly for revolution in every country. As regards the changed attitude of the Communist International with respect to nationalist movements in the colonies, which will be outlined further on, the national question is, m Stalin's words: part and parcel of the general question of the proletarian revolution and of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 3b.

This, then, is the problem in regard to the question of the various national movements, of the possible reactionary character of these movements, that is, of course, if they are examined concretely from the point of view of the interests of the revolution and not from the formal point of view, that is, from the point of view of abstract rights. 3c

Indeed:

while imperialist oppression continues, the revolutionary character of a national movement by no means presupposes the existence of proletarian elements, of revolutionary or republican programmes, of a democratic basis...

Briefly stated:

the national movement of the oppressed countries should be evaluated not from the point of view of formal democracy but from the point of view of the actual net results obtained as shown by the general balance sheet of the struggle against imperialism, that is to say, 'not in an isolated way but on a world scale'. 3d

Moreover, in later years the policy of the Communist International shows a change of front. Although it had originally laid the emphasis on the workers' movement in the West, the disappointments of the 1919-1923 period had taught it that its prospects were not very bright in that part of the world and that its expectations of an early collapse of capitalism in Europe did not correspond with actual fact. Even the hope of organizing Russian society on communist lines had to be abandoned. After
Lenin had found himself obliged to announce the New Economic Policy in 1921, it became necessary to make one concession after another to 'capitalism'.

These experiences caused attention to be switched to the colonies, and especially to those areas on the rim of the Pacific where the movement could strike at dominant foreign capitalism in its most imperialistic form. For it was from this area that capitalism obtained its raw materials, it was here that it found its market and a field for its capital investment. If, therefore, its main artery could be severed in the East, a crisis would develop in the West which would unleash world revolution.

As Stalin says, the way to successful revolution in the West leads "via the revolutionary alliance with the movement for colonial freedom and with dependent states against imperialism". This new political orientation led to a change in the attitude towards nationalist movements in the East. The *Propositions* of the Second Congress of the Communist International had incited the colonial masses to take up "the struggle against middle class democratic tendencies in the bosom of their own people", against pan-Islamic and pan-Asian movements, which confined the fight for freedom to a struggle against European and American imperialism and which would accordingly only strengthen the power of Turkish and Japanese imperialism and of the nobility, the large landowners, and the clergy. As late as 1920 Baars had termed nationalism "the ideology of murder", a "speculation on man's lowest animal instincts" which degraded the masses, agreeing with Wijnkoop in the opinion that only the *Sarekat Islam* action came in for communist aid within the framework of the Moscow *Propositions*. All this now underwent a change. It was laid down in the resolution which the Communist International drew up in 1925 concerning the tactics to be employed in Indonesia, that the *Sarekat Ra'jats* should be transformed into a single united nationalist party with a minimum programme for all classes and a single united front against imperialism under the leadership of a class-conscious communist vanguard. There can be not doubt that it had in mind the example of the Kuomin-
tang in China. These basic ideas are worked out in detail and elucidated in the writings of Tan Malakka. The relationship between the Indonesian Communist Party and the *Sarekat Ra'jats* was not, therefore, to be that of basis and superstructure; instead they were to be two organizations, existing side by side and comprising different classes with different interests, the left wing of the *Sarekat Ra'jat* being formed by the communist vanguard, whose task it would be to keep the activities of the union on the "proper" path, that is to say, to make them serve the interests of the working class. In devising the propaganda, which was to be anti-imperialist in character, the interests of the other groups and the prejudices of the lower middle class were to be taken into account. This would still have to be done in the initial period after the 'national' revolution, when a balance would in the beginning have to be achieved, under communist hegemony, between the minority, that is to say, the working class, which would by then have taken over possession of the nationalized industries, and the nonproletarian majority, though the proletarian vanguard would not have to lose sight of the ultimate goal. It would have to ensure that leadership did not fall into the hands of the bourgeois intellectuals and carry through the revolution up to the stage when the dictatorship of the proletariat was achieved and a purely communist society had been established.

The ideas Tan Malakka indicates in a few words are given more definite expression in the Communist International's resolutions regarding China, which were drafted at a later date. In these resolutions the various stages through which the revolution must pass are described in precise detail. First of all comes the anti-imperialist national revolution; then the repulsion of the middle class right wing and the establishment of the democratic dictatorship of the lower middle class, peasants', and workers' front, after this the dictatorship of the proletariat, and finally a communist society.6

The Communist International lays the emphasis both as regards China and as regards Indonesia on action among the peasants. As in Russia, the peasants must be made to serve the interest of
the working class. This was already being said at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International held in 1924. As Stalin says:

the basic issue of Leninism is not the peasant question but the dictatorship of the proletariat, the conditions of its achievement and of its establishment... The issue is as follows: are the revolutionary potentialities which lie latent in the peasantry by virtue of the conditions determining its existence now exhausted or not; if not, are there grounds for hope that these potentialities can be made to serve the revolution of the proletariat?

In 1925, as a consequence of this change in tactics, the Indonesian Communist Party adopted a different attitude towards the nationalist groups and the intellectuals. The malicious criticism of these two groups voiced in former years was heard no more. On the contrary they were treated with toleration and in Njala the PKI was depicted as being the party which aimed to attract all those with revolutionary sympathies to its ranks, nationalists, Mohammedans, nihilists, and so forth. At the same time, from the beginning of 1926, the PKI showed renewed activity along the whole line, which activity after the campaign of strikes in the latter half of 1925 expressed itself mainly in the form of propaganda among the peasants. The immediate aim of this propaganda was revolution.

There was also a renewal of activity in Sumatra, where the movement was under the general direction of Sutan Said Ali. Little was made of the real principles of communism, and little attention paid to the regular receipt of membership contributions. The sole aim was to stir up the spirit of resistance, all existing feelings of grievance being sought out and intensified for the purpose. If this means proved ineffective, use was made of intimidation, and even of anarchist attacks, in a word, of terrorism, in order to win supporters. (Once again the illegal actions are in complete accord with the relevant tactical instructions prescribed by the Communist International.)

In 1926 agitation was carried on in the West Coast area as well, especially among the peasants and in the overpopulated and most economically backward regions in particular, by preference
among the poorest and least mentally developed elements of the population. It is true that Sutan Said Ali and his successor Abdul Hamid gelar Sutan Sinaro Perpatih were arrested at Medan on 22 May and 23 June, 1926 respectively, thereby depriving the movement of its central leadership, but the other leaders pursued the struggle with unflagging energy until the violent mood which they had worked up to the point of explosion caused them to look forward eagerly to the moment when the revolution would break out.

Tan Malakka, too, was of the opinion that the right moment had come for revolutionary action. Whereas the outbreak of armed conflict between America and Japan had previously been regarded as the proper moment for this, he was now doubtful whether this was so. In any event they could not wait for this conflict, anymore than they could wait for the social revolution in the West. Yet before the moment of revolution could dawn, the masses had to be made ready for it; first of all, they must have submitted themselves entirely to the leadership of the PKI, have proved their determination in conflicts with the authorities and have shown that they understood the minimum programme and were prepared to make sacrifices for its accomplishment. The revolution could not be built up on the overstrung moods and expectations of local leaders alone. There had first to be tangible proof of the masses' true revolutionary spirit before revolution could be contemplated.

This attitude of Tan Malakka's, which was not shared by Ali-min and Muso, gave rise to discord among the leaders. They hesitated — hesitated so long that a Revolutionary Committee finally wrested leadership from the hands of the party executive. The conflict within the PKI also made its influence felt in western Sumatra. The section leader refused to act upon the orders of the Revolutionary Committee, because these had not been issued by the party executive. The committee therefore tried to contact the sub-sections, whose leaders, again, wished to take no action without consulting their section leader. The disorganization inside the movement in western Sumatra became all the
greater when the government, taking warning from what had happened in Java and observing that something was brewing in the Minangkabau as well, decided to arrest the leaders and to tighten up police action. The result of all this was that when, on 1 January, Silungkang ultimately obeyed the order to begin a revolt, it found itself alone.

In view of what had happened in former revolutions, it can be no cause for wonder that the revolt should have been set on foot by the most criminal elements of the population. Had not Danton already said, *Dans les révolutions l'autorité reste aux scélérats*?
Chapter One

MINANGKABAU SOCIETY

The questions which we shall attempt to answer in the following pages are: in the first place, by what means and to what extent has communist propaganda succeeded in gaining a hold on the people of Minangkabau, and secondly, what are the political consequences?

1

The Penetration of Money Economy

The old negeri. Minangkabau society is composed of a number of territorial republics or negeris. The government of these negeris is formed according to tradition by councils of family chieftains. The family is based on a matriarchical system. Originally its social nature found its characteristic expression in the large adat house.

The closed goods economy which formed the society's economic foundation guaranteed that the ricefields remained common family property, to which even the few goods a man acquired by his own effort during his lifetime were surrendered on his death. Children could naturally have no individual right of inheritance in such system. Since this society was in the main self-sufficing, it had little need of a medium of exchange. What its own economy did not provide could easily be supplied by primitive barter. In some remote districts, such as Suliki and Maninjau, economic life still displays these features — or did until a short time ago.

In such a society there is only a very limited need for credit. Customary law can proclaim the inalienability of the soil and
credit is only necessary if certain social requirements must be met, requirements which cannot be disregarded if one does not wish to offend against generally accepted social norms or come into conflict with public opinion — such requirements, that is, as the repair of a dilapidated family house, a daughter's marriage, the burial of a member of the family, a penghulu's formal installation.8

In such cases pledging of the family land is permitted. This is not permissible, however, in order to satisfy economic needs, though these do not actually arise at this stage. But in proportion as the negeris' economic isolation was broken down, as the import of piece goods and the products of western industry made inroads upon the society's own domestic crafts and modern traffic opened up the rural areas, such destructive factors began to bear their influence on this 'idyllic' society.

*Obstacles to the development of an exchange economy.* Nevertheless the development of an exchange economy was hamp­ered by traditional methods of government which had been in force for years. In the first place, there was the government's monopoly of coffee growing (which later took on the more string­gent form of compulsory cultivation) to prevent the natural evolution of economic life. This artificial brake on economic de­velopment meant least to those districts which were concerned in the main with rice cultivation. But in these places another and insuperable barrier was erected, the ban on the export of rice, which removed all incentive to increase production. In the true rice growing areas the sawahs, or ricefields, were simply aban­doned, there being no reason to cultivate a surplus.

And then there was a third barrier, too, namely the closing of the route to the east. From early times Minangkabau had had two exits through which it maintained contact with the outside world. These were the harbours on the west coast, where since the latter half of the seventeenth century the Dutch East India Company had had its offices and where before that imports and exports had been supervised by Achin; and secondly, the river­ways leading eastward to Siak, Indragiri and Jambi. When,
however, in the middle of the nineteenth century, Michiels' broad plans for expansion were abandoned, the small and unruly independent states on the eastern frontier of Minangkabau were deliberately left intact in order by this means to put a check on unregulated import and export. And when later on the force of circumstances caused those states to be brought under Dutch rule, even then the roads indispensable to the development of economic activity were not constructed. The obvious and natural development of such regions as the Luhak Limapuluh Kota was wittingly sacrificed to a shortsighted policy blinded by the importance it was felt necessary to attach to the port of Padang. Up to the present (1929) this barrier to modern traffic on the route to the export harbour of Pakan Baru has still not been entirely removed, while nothing at all has been done to remove that on the route to Jambi and Kuantan. Nevertheless, even the merely partial completion of the road to Pakan Baru has caused the development of that port to increase by leaps and bounds.

In view of these serious economic obstacles and the method of production employed — together with a regular increase in the population — it is not surprising that large scale emigration was necessary, and this was given impetus in some districts, such as Talu and Lubuk Sikaping, during certain periods of government, by the increased burden of compulsory services (forced labour).

In this way the natural development of a district whose latent possibilities had long before pointed to the evolution of an exchange economy was impeded by an administration whose sincere aim — at least in its rice policy — was to maintain law and order. Care had to be taken to see that in every negeri as much paddy as possible was stored and as little as possible exported and sold. For a population amply supplied with food meant a contented and peaceful population. A former Padang Highlands commissioner ('resident') was even of the opinion that the kin-chirs, those ingenious native rice hulling mills driven by a water wheel, were harmful, since they made it easy for the paddy to be processed into granular rice, for which the export demand was greatest. This civil servant thought that if the population were
forced to stamp rice by hand, it would be more inclined to limit stamping to the quantity required for its own consumption.\textsuperscript{11} The great change did not come about until the abolition of the compulsory cultivation of coffee in 1908 and Ballot's abandonment, in 1912, of the traditional and shortsighted rice policy. But even these measures did not give rise to a money economy straightaway.

The significance of money taxation. In various districts we observe in this connection a phenomenon similar to that which had shown itself in India. Of the latter country we read:

There is one feature of this rural society which does more to determine its position in economic evolution than any other. A money system has not even yet come into complete use. Until the establishment of British revenue methods, there was no special reason why money should be used at all. Taxes were largely paid in kind. The workpeople of the village, the blacksmith, the potter, the leatherworker, were (and are still in the villages) paid by a fixed quantity of grain at harvest-time. Yarn was spun and cloth woven by the women of the village. Money in those times was only a store of value, not a medium of exchange. When by some happy accident money did come into the villages, it was promptly converted into ornaments — many Indian vernaculars have special names for necklaces made of gold coins — or otherwise hoarded. Then came the regular system of collecting the revenue in cash. Just as in England the royal demands for money formed the most powerful cause of introducing a money economy into the rural districts, so, too, has it been in India. But even now the system is incomplete. In many places rents in kind are paid. And the village craftsmen still, in many places, receive their traditional shares of grain.\textsuperscript{12}

Trade and new demands. Thus the need for money was forced on the agrarian village communities of Minangkabau, which were still for the most part economic units, from outside. It did not develop spontaneously out of the community itself. The opening of the rural areas to trade brought remote regions into contact with the outside world and made known new demands and new possibilities; yet these new demands could only be satisfied by money.

The trade in rice. If the removal of restrictions on the rice trade created the incentive to increase production — or, more accu-
rately, opened the way for this — it was the condition rather than the cause of economic evolution. The rising export figures and the decline in the import of rice, soon followed by its complete cessation, exemplified the reaction to this stimulus. The increase in the trade in and export of rice went hand in hand with a rise in its price. However, although a good price for rice and paddy can provide a stimulus to production, very high rice prices, such as those in recent years (24 shillings for second quality rice — the people’s staple food) represent a severe burden on the modest housekeeping budget of the non-producer.

The planting of commercial crops. High prices for rice are due to still another factor, however. In several places the population is beginning to neglect the difficult process of rice growing in favour of the far more lucrative cultivation of commercial crops. The effects of the abolition of the compulsory cultivation of coffee can be discerned here. A period of declining production, during which the people, glad, as it were, to be freed of a compulsion they loathed, discontinued cultivation, was followed by a period of unprecedented revival. Here we have to do with a revolution in spirit, similar to that of the early capitalist period in Europe, as indicated by Max Weber and Sombart. The ‘economic mentality’ has made its entry upon the scene.

The Revolution in Outlook: Rationalization of the Acquisitive Impulse

Korinchi. In Korinchi the new era was inaugurated by the new road which rescued the area from its isolation and which was designed to open up that principal rice granary to Sumatra. For 1923 overproduction there had been estimated at as much as 500,000 piculs. The export was a bitter disappointment. In 1923 it amounted to 52,800 piculs, in 1924 to over 54,000 in 1925 to 38,720, and in 1926 to less than 14,000. In the meantime rice prices at Sungai Penuh rose from five shillings per picul in the
dearest period (as late as 1923) to seven and a half shillings in 1924, and to between 16s 8d and 21s 8d per picul in 1926. The fantastic surplus proved to be mythical. Nowadays rice is grown practically exclusively for home consumption, all efforts being devoted in the meantime to the cultivation of coffee. According to the figures supplied by the postmaster, remittances to Korinchchi since 1925 have exceeded £ 8,250 per month. Although in 1925 quite a large part of this sum probably represented rubber earnings in Jambi, the sale of coffee will by now probably account for the lion’s share. Whereas in 1913 the export of coffee amounted to only 190 tons, more recent years yielded the following figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tons</th>
<th>Piculs</th>
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<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>. . .</td>
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<tr>
<td>1924</td>
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<td>1280 20480</td>
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<tr>
<td>1926</td>
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<td>2986 47776</td>
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with a value of approximately £ 170,000.

Previously land was regarded as virtually without value but the cultivation of coffee has now changed matters. As a result there have been boundary disputes among the village communities.

**Indrapura and Tapan.** Indrapura is also beginning to revive now that the Korinchchi road has been completed, and the region is developing rapidly. Good land is in abundant supply. Everywhere the inhabitants can be seen clearing the woods in order to lay out coffee gardens. Numerous new settlements are springing up.

This new activity, which takes the form of an extraordinary expansion in native coffee growing, is also in full swing in the Tapan district. Vast plantations can now be found where three years ago no coffee existed. Most of the gardens are very favourably situated from the economic point of view, that is to say, near a main road or waterway. Besides coffee, hevea and coconuts are also planted, the latter as a catch crop, also a little kapok. All the gardens are very new, the oldest being between five and seven years old, but the overwhelming majority only about three. The
population, still very backward in the technique of cultivation, cannot cope with vast gardens owing to shortage of labour, yet it tries by this highly extensive cultivation to cover itself against loss arising from the unsystematic and rather primitive methods employed. Here, too, it tends to neglect rice growing — its rice-fields are fairly extensive — in favour of the cultivation of commercial crops. The rice fields are still being planted, under pressure exercised by the native administration — but this is only achieved with difficulty.

Painan and Balai Selasa. Painan, on the other hand, is still fairly backward, being a narrow and rather insignificant coastal region, though here, too, as also in Balai Selasa, the population has recently gone over to the cultivation of coffee and rubber. The proa sailings to Padang have declined appreciably as a result of the motor truck traffic along the main road. Old copper coins were still in circulation in Painan (IV Kota Mudik) until a short time ago; they were also accepted by the small banks.

Muara Labuh. In thinly populated Muara Labuh, with approximately 30,000 inhabitants, the cultivation of coffee, which was begun in 1910 but did not undergo large scale expansion until 1915, is once again the dominating factor. Whereas rice was previously exported, it is now regularly imported from Alahan Panjang, imports amounting in 1925 to approximately 41,000 piculs. The inhabitants are too busily occupied cultivating coffee, of which 6,000 piculs were exported in 1925, to have time left over for rice growing. There is a high degree of absenteeism at the schools, since the children's parents live far off on their coffee and rubber clearings. Neither do the people feel much for allowing their children to receive instruction when they can always earn sufficient in coffee and rubber cultivation. They see that a coffee farmer earns more than a miserable petty official, who is, moreover, obliged to work away from his native village. For them school fees represent unproductive capital. Even the native teachers abandon their jobs for work on the coffee and rubber estates. It is very difficult to obtain applicants for the vacancies in the native schools.
Alahan Panjang. Alahan Panjang, lying high in the hills, is, however, a relatively poor area. Here, where the ricefields yield a meagre crop and the paddy remains in the fields for ten to eleven months before it can be harvested, there is a regularly recurring shortage of rice before the time comes to cut the paddy. It has therefore been long customary here for the people to go out in search of work elsewhere. Besides the wet ricefields, however, there are many clearings growing coffee, sugar cane and tobacco, also yams, maize, and bananas. Even apart from considerable migration to Jambi (1925) the high coffee prices have caused a fairly appreciable amount of silver money to circulate among the population in recent years. As a result a change over to the state of affairs prevailing in southern Sumatra is also noticeable here. Financial transactions are far more frequent than in the highlands proper, which are thickly populated and reputed to be prosperous. There, the quantity of copper money which the district banks are still obliged to accept represents a real nightmare for the bank officials, the hakims.

Lake Singkarak. The region along Lake Singkarak is probably the poorest in the whole of the West Coast. The land is barren, the rice crop meagre, while the lake itself does not even provide enough fish for the region’s home consumption. People have consequently left the area in large numbers from early times on.

Pariaman. A striking contrast is provided by Pariaman, which was, with the exception of Padang, already ten years ago far and away the most important town on the West Coast from the point of view of trade and industry. Here village credit institutions have undergone rapid development in the last few years. There is spontaneous and increasing demand on the part of the negeris for the establishment, or re-opening, of small banks. The area forms a sub-district numbering almost 200,000 inhabitants, and financial transactions are many. The district is known chiefly for its cultivation of coconuts. The people are beginning in increasing measure to process coconuts into the form of copra themselves, thereafter transporting their wares to the markets. In this way the middleman’s trade is excluded, at least for a part. Lu-
buk Basung is beginning to display a tendency to develop along the same lines.

_Talu._ The high prices fetched by coffee and rubber have also incited the people of the Ophir district to increased activity. Every man tried to make what he could out of his gardens, planting being expanded and renewed on a large scale. Everyone capable of work was enlisted to this end so that coolies found it easy to earn more than a shilling a day in return for little labour. In Kajai the standard of wages was a shilling threepence per day plus a free meal, the day's work being finished as early as ten o'clock in the morning.

_Bangkinang._ Whereas in Talu and Lubuk Sikaping it is coffee growing which occupies people's attention, in Bangkinang it is rubber. In 1925 this sub-district, with a population of only 40,000, exported 1,250 tons of native hevea rubber to Singapore _via_ Pakan Baru. Calculated on a basis of £145 per ton, this quantity represented a value of more than £180,000, or four and a half pounds per inhabitant.

_Lubuk Sikaping._ In Mapat Tunggul, in the district of Lubuk Sikaping, until about 1915 a poverty-stricken area, it is once again the cultivation of rubber which has brought about a tremendous change in the welfare of the inhabitants. Building is going on there at the moment at a pace even more furious than in Bonjol or Lubuk Sikaping itself. Houses, Medan or Singapore style, are rising up like mushrooms, for the population invests all the money not required for expanding cultivation in such building. In a matter of a few years Mapat Tunggul has suddenly become the richest area in the sub-district. Formerly people left the district for Rao to earn a little money by helping with the cultivation of rice there. Nowadays, however, the inhabitants of Rao have to come and help them with the tapping of rubber, whereas not so long ago hunting was carried on in Lubuk Sikaping as a trade, the people seeking a living by trading in forest products, the cultivation of rubber and coffee has now put an end to rice growing in forest clearings, the so-called 'shifting' cultivation.
A remarkable feature is that while in former days a large percentage of the population was driven to leave this region for Malaya owing to shortage of food, many are returning now that gardens are being opened in their native negeri.

In other areas, too, where emigration was formerly frequent, such as in Korinchi, Bangkinang, Bonjol, and Pasaman in the Ophir districts, it is now on the decline for similar reasons, employment being sought nearer home.

Other symptoms of the revolution in outlook. A remarkable symptom of the new spirit in these areas is the change in the attitude towards road building. Whereas at the time of the Lief-rinck Investigation of 1917 it appeared that the people did not understand the usefulness of such a plan, they now come forward with requests for the construction of roads for the transport of their products, offering on their own initiative voluntary contributions for the purpose, either in the form of labour or in sums of money exceeding the compensation money in lieu of compulsory services, provided they get the road or bridge they desire. This even happened in one place (Malampah) where ten years ago the population would retreat into the woods as soon as a government official appeared on the scene, and would take to its heels to escape compulsory services.

Wage labour. The growth of free wage labour is also remarkable. Although wages often take the form of a share in the product, this is merely a device whereby the employer seeks to cover himself against possible loss, for example in the case of low market prices, and to provide the worker with an incentive. Very often he simply buys back the employee's share of the product at the market price. Elsewhere one finds, for example, that the laying out of coffee gardens is paid for by providing the worker's board and paying his several taxes.

Wage labour is also found in rice growing, for example, in the district of Lubuk Sikaping, payment taking the form of a fixed sum per twenty-five pounds at harvest time, being otherwise tenpence a day plus one or two free meals. Wage labour is even beginning to be preferred to the mutual assistance of tradition,
since it has been realized that this is cheaper and speedier. Rubber tapping, too, is not paid here according to the fifty-fifty system but, preference, at a rate of fourpence to sixpence per pint depending upon the market price.

The growth of economic awareness is also witnessed by requests addressed to the agricultural consultant from many quarters for the inclusion in the journal Tani (The Farmer) of a sheet giving telegraphic market quotations of prices in Batavia and Singapore. Only a few years ago such a request would have been unthinkable.

The origins of the stimulating influence. The origins of the stimulating influence on the population, once communications had created the possibility of development, have varied considerably. In Ophir and Korinchi the European concerns in the neighbourhood provided the example, also as regards the technique of cultivation. In other places the success achieved by another negeri urged the region to emulation. Thus Chubadak, in the north along the frontiers of Tapanuli, for instance, excited the people of Sinurut to follow its example, with the result that they resumed the cultivation of coffee in the abandoned government coffee gardens in 1920. Other districts, however, urged on by a far-sighted headman, continued to keep the gardens in condition and to extend the area planted even after compulsory cultivation had been abolished. Then again, in other districts it was the initiative of a single individual which provided the stimulus. The cultivation of rubber was also frequently the result of the return of emigrants who had learned the art elsewhere. Yet even in previously backward and impoverished areas such as Mapat Tunggul or Pulau Punjung, where twelve years before the government had not dared to encourage rubber cultivation — in spite of the fact that there was a food shortage every year and the population had the greatest difficulty in paying its taxes, even when these were at the very lowest rate of assessment, — a spontaneous revolution in outlook was to be observed among the people as soon as communications were modernized. Nowadays there are people in these districts to whom a rubber transaction running into some hundreds of pounds means nothing very extraordinary.
Money transactions. There are remarkable contrasts, too, on the West Coast with regard to money transactions. We are not speaking here of backward areas like Sawah Lunto, where economic conditions offer the native population few prospects, or Buo-Lintau-Sijungjung, the market centre of Buo itself excepted. Neither are we referring to regions lying off the traffic routes, such as the sub-district of Maninjau or the mountainous areas of Suliki, where economic activity is only slightly developed, and where generally speaking the demand for money has only just begun to make itself felt. The contrast we have in mind is rather that between the predominantly rice producing areas and those where the cultivation of commercial crops is coming to the forefront; where, that is to say, commodity production takes place. In the latter areas money incomes are increasing by leaps and bounds compared with the former. But this contrast is not 'remarkable' at all in reality; it is simply logical, in spite of the trade in rice. Yet it should also be borne in mind in this respect that, although the cultivation of rice guarantees a regular livelihood — which is the reason why some rice continues to be grown even where commercial crops form the main product, — money is required to meet all those other needs rice itself cannot fill.

Such needs, for instance, as the payment of taxes and payment in lieu of compulsory services in the first place, also the purchase of clothing and such like, the satisfaction of 'social' requirements originating from tradition and of those new requirements to which the new era and the advent of trade have given rise. This explains why in recent years the cultivation of food crops and coffee or tobacco is beginning to become the normal practice, even in many areas of the rice producing highlands; why, generally speaking, there is in fact a noticeable tendency even here to neglect the cultivation of rice in favour of commercial crops. Thus in the year 1925, in those areas under the supervision of the agricultural extension service alone more than 50,000 coffee plants were planted in thirty negeris of the sub-district of Old Agam.
Increasing Flexibility in Land Tenure

This economic evolution has had great social consequences. It was inevitable that as a result land tenure should become less rigid.

_Pledging according to adat law._ As was briefly indicated above, according to adat law the land belonging to the family may not be alienated or parcelled out except, as regards the last-mentioned, in the case of the splitting up of the family. Instead of selling land one may lease it out, but this is only permitted in four or five instances, which are not always listed in the same way. Included in the various listings are the following cases:

1. To meet the cost of a family graveyard.
2. To meet the cost of the wedding festivities on the marriage of a daughter of the family.
3. To meet the cost of a _penghulu’s_ formal installation.
4. To meet the cost of paying off a debt of honour.
5. To meet the cost of preserving the family house from decay.
6. For the payment of blood money — which of course no longer arises.
7. To meet the cost of repairing washed-away ricefields belonging to the family.
8. To cover loss in the event of shipwreck (in the coastlands).

Custom had added two other cases, viz:

10. The cost of paying off debts incurred by the family as a whole.21

There are still many, however, who in theory dispute the validity of the last-mentioned case. The above-mentioned costs must be met in the first place from the sale of the self earned property of the family, before the sacred, inherited family property may be pledged.

Redemption always remains possible. Even if the pledging is followed by so-called _jual_ (transfer), redemption is not definitely
excluded, and even in that case it does not amount to sale. It is impossible with a person or family not belonging to the village. Thus it could only take place between fellow inhabitants among whom preference should be given to a kinsman or another branch of the family. Neither an individual nor a family may acquire land (or, in the case of removal elsewhere, keep land) belonging to a village other than the village of residence.

Should a stranger nevertheless purchase family property, such purchase would be null and void from the point of view of the adat.22

Land tenure in practice. The money economy has outgrown the undeveloped adat law governing debt, which was based upon the closed goods economy of the negeri. It had already been stated in the Memorandum of Van Driessche, assistant resident of Pajakumbuh, dated 13 February, 1907, that:

This customary law, which is binding on everyone, is far from being honoured or maintained nowadays. Family land and negeri land, too, is sold even in cases not permitted by the adat.23

As a result of the inquiry made into the question of the pledging law in Batipuh and X Kota in 1906-1907, it was stated that in these places the strict classical rules governing pledges were already regarded as belonging to the customs of previous times, from which the people had largely emancipated themselves. It appeared that in the sub-district of Sawah Lunto, which was poor in rice, the valid motive for the pledging of family land was recognized as being "an urgent lack of the necessities of life".

Thus the outright sale of family land, with or even without provision for redemption within a given period of time, has not been unknown for a long time now, while pledging of land for reasons falling outside those summarized above, that is to say for consumption purposes pure and simple, is, as it were, the order of the day, particularly in the so-called 'adat-conscious' areas, in this case, those mainly devoted to rice growing.

The beginning of an agrarian revolution. It is clear that we have to do here with the beginning of an agrarian revolution under the influence of the gradual penetration of a money economy. The
demand for money gives rise to an often improvident selling and pledging of land, which in its turn creates feelings of dissatisfaction among a people for which money is still an article of consumption and which has no eye for the economic process that is underway. At regular intervals they have to have money ready for taxes and for payment in lieu of compulsory services, and thus they often find themselves compelled to sell their rice at the most unfavourable moment, when the abundance after the harvest or the general supply reduce the price to a minimum. The adat or religion brings it about that oxen or buffaloes are slaughtered on various occasions — a social requirement there is no escaping — but the government, which is not prepared to make any discrimination, still demands money in payment of the slaughter tax. The native administration makes a point of reminding taxpayers of their liabilities when it can assume the presence of a certain abundance of money, and consequently demands taxes from market-goers or from those organizing a wedding feast — it is a social duty to provide festivities on the occasion of a woman’s first marriage. In this last case the administration can use as a sanction the refusal of a permit for the feast if the taxes due from those concerned and the members of their family have not been paid.²⁴

Permission is often refused those wishing to sell a cow unless at the same time they pay the income tax due from them or the sum they owe in lieu of performing statute labour. Money is needed when modern luxury demands a trip by motor car in celebration of the festivities at the end of the month of fasting, for it is a timehonoured custom to invest in new garments for this occasion, if at all possible.

This need for money leads to the pledging of family lands to which the people feel themselves bound by a more or less ‘religious’ bond. (The first step on the road toward a freer attitude on possession of land was already to be found in the division of the family property of an extensive kaum into parts which were in practice assigned permanently to certain families.)

This need for money tempts the family heads, the traditional guardians of the family property, to pledge it 'illegally', without
informing the family. Their social position makes this possible. Where the 'closed' nature of society is violated and its communal character undermined as a result of the penetration of a money economy, the position of the headmen, the genealogical *primi inter pares*,25 displays a tendency to develop in the direction of a more feudal form of authority, due also in part to governmental action. In this way they cease to be the guardians of family property and become instead the disposers of the family land.26 In those districts where, under the chaotic conditions of the present time, the old customary law fails the people, many would like nothing better than to see the government decree the inalienability of land by law. In some negeris (such as Air Dingin and Solok) all the family land has been done away with and has been transformed into self-earned land as a consequence of pledging. In those parts the process has already been completed; but practically nowhere does actual practice pay any attention to the traditional *adat* law, which is still looked upon in theory as being the legal norm and the violation of which is felt by those affected to wound the legal conscience. It amounts to a clash between ideology and reality, and there is no calling a halt to the process. If, however, a suitable outlet can be found for the energies of those threatening family land and an opportunity created for the surplus population in the areas most affected to acquire land in districts directly bordering on Minangkabau, the process might be delayed or at least slowed down. The districts we have in mind are those to which the coolies are already making a yearly exodus, Jambi and the Kuantan districts.

It is highly important that these areas should be opened up to natural immigration by the improvement, for instance, of the road connecting Sijungjung to Palembang via Pulau Punjung, Sungai Darch, Tanjung, Muara Tebo, Muara Bungo, Bangko, Surulangun, and Sarolangun (Rawas), along which wheeled traffic is already possible despite the absence of bridges.
'Capitalism'. It is understandable that the communist slogans should catch on here in the chaos of the transitional period. It was so easy for feelings of dissatisfaction to fasten on to such slogans and to find in them an apparent explanation. 'Capitalism' is blamed for everything. It was pointed out in the introduction to this study that the Marxist doctrine of crisis and the theory of increasing misery caught on at a time when small traders were naturally suffering more from the effects of the economic *malaise* than were the cultivators of food crops. It was, indeed, in the period 1921-1924 that the retail trade felt the effects of the reduction of buyers' purchasing power, more especially that of the lower middle class, the officials, shopkeepers, and so forth. In addition to the pressure of obligations incurred during the boom period, there was also a decline in the native trader's solvency with the wholesale trade and the banks. Whereas credit had been granted perhaps too liberally to this category of persons in the past, in the highlands especially, the wholesale trade had suffered such heavy losses that it was now rather chary of granting large amounts of credit. In many cases the native dealer had already pledged his fixed property to the wholesale dealer so that the People's Bank of Minangkabau could not help him, while his family often proved disinclined to pledge the family property. As a consequence many went bankrupt. But the cultivators of commercial crops also felt the pressure of the slump, primarily in the coconut growing region of Pariaman. The fall in copra prices after 1920 was so sharp that the product became almost unmarketable. The People's Bank was forced to refuse credit to that particular industry in a large number of cases.

The ordinary peasant too - so the communists instructed him - could feel the effects of capitalism: the system whereby he received advances from the buyers of his produce proved his ruin in some districts. In the districts around Padang and in Alahan
Panjang, for example, it was the rice hulling mills and the great landowners that had ruined him. Other members of the kampong were affected by inability to comply with the instalment conditions for the purchase of sewing machines, bedsteads, motor cars, and so forth.

It was said that:

...those who had pledged their ricefields or clearings as security for their debts are even worse off. The land is soon sold and if there are no buyers it brings very little in. Since the capitalists are always supported from above, the little man declines into poverty. And as the government assists the capitalists to invest their money in the village, those who as a result are plunged into misery also regard the government as their enemy.

Thus it was the effects of the penetration of money economy which opened the minds of the people to the doctrines of communism. It was 'capitalism' that created the troubles which harassed their daily lives. The government was identified with 'capitalism' and the chances were that everything would continue to get much worse. The communist leaders did not neglect to point time and again to the proletarization of the Javanese in the sugar-growing areas. Since no help was to be expected from the government, it was necessary to join together to stop this dissolution of native society. No salvation would be forthcoming from official quarters. The government with its corps of high-salaried civil servants was wealthy. And yet it still demanded taxes. It was so rich.

It had already robbed the Minangkabauer of his woods and of the mines of Sawah Lunto, making them crown property. In 1908 it had introduced taxation and in the twenty years that had passed since then it had set a crescendo pace. Two per cent, in 1908, the 'amended assessment' in 1912, four per cent, in 1914, and on top of that the slaughter tax - in spite of the fact that you already had to pay tax each year on the cattle you owned. And then, before you could sell cattle for slaughter, you first had to obtain a quittance from the village chief or the district chief to show that you had paid your taxes - which meant paying out money!

After that you had to pay again before being admitted to the
municipal cattle market - pay, although it was not even certain whether you would be able to sell your ox or not. If you did manage to sell it, you then had to collect a form stating the purchase from the municipal official - which meant paying out still more money; then, before the ox was slaughtered, it had to be passed by the food inspector - pay again; if it was approved, the slaughter tax had then to be paid - pay again; then it had to be taken to the slaughterhouse, since it was forbidden to slaughter cattle elsewhere - pay again; and finally, before the meat could be sold at the meat market, you had to pay yet again. How many times did one not have to pay tax on one single head of cattle during one's lifetime, before and after slaughter - and the outcome of all this was higher meat prices for the consumer. So difficult and so burdensome are things made for people. The little man who wants to take the often meagre yield of his patch of ground to market to earn the necessary money for essential requirements even has to pay out money from what little he has in order to be admitted to the market - he, whose object in going to the market was to earn the money he lacked.

And then the government required the payment of still further taxes, the so-called negeri money, since it no longer paid the municipal headment itself, even though they were merely its tools for collecting the taxes.

In addition there was the tax on adat houses, the tax on vehicles — for which the municipality also demanded payment of tax before entry into the town, — a stamp tax for permits to build houses, a ground tax, and finally the payment in lieu of compulsory services. And even that did not mean that a man was exempt from compulsory services. The money so raised was used for few main roads only. It had therefore been necessary for some years, aside from exemption money for night watch duties and compulsory service at water works and in villages, to provide compulsory service according to adat for the upkeep of minor roads.

And then sometimes all manner of wily stratagems were employed to make use of the compulsory services according to adat for the main roads; or you were forced to render compulsory
services for less than the normal coolie wage, even though you had already paid your acquittal money. And then finally there was the duty to perform compulsory agricultural services as often as the negeri council had been forced to decide upon, for example to cultivate trees for reforestation or to plant coffee on which the government would in time demand taxes once again.29

Much in vogue in this connection were two Malay sayings designed to expose the greed and the encroachments of the Hollanders, who, fetched in as friends, had shown themselves to be tyrants. These were Baulando meminta tanah and Lalu penja-hit, lalu kulindan, meaning something like "give them an inch and they'll take an ell".

_Baulando meminta tanah_ was the useful slogan which succeeded in sowing distrust concerning the rice fields survey30 and in spreading the belief that plans for the introduction of land rent had not yet been shelved. Should the government indeed introduce that system, the people would have lost their land for good — that was clear from the term 'land rent' itself. Had the government not already deprived the people of its waste ground by transforming it into crownlands and by instituting the Forestry Service?

The above reflects the suggestive arguments employed by the communist leaders to rouse the village population to an awareness of their grievances. We shall go into the actual facts of the case later on. For the moment it is sufficient to make clear the link connecting the penetration of a money economy with grievances against 'capitalism' and the government on the West Coast of Sumatra, which grievances it was the aim of communist propaganda to exacerbate.

5

*Individualism*

A second phenomenon accompanying the penetration of a money economy in Minangkabau is that of growing individualism. To
make this phenomenon clear we shall be obliged to refer once more to land pledging.

Land pledging. The prohibition of land transfer as decreed by adat might in theory have proved a great obstacle to the penetration of money economy. For not only would jual or gade (transfer of land) be permitted only in four of the cases cited above, but apart from that the adat surrounds such actions with the necessary restrictions as well. Jual implies that the land continue under the supervision of the waris;\(^31\) the pledging out of land, that the pledging be recognized by them (berpengaku); and hibah, or gift, that the giving occur with their knowledge (bertahu-tahu). Hence their cooperation is required: without it even the guardian of the family property is not permitted to transfer or pledge that property. Not even real estate belonging to a man's self-earned property is his to dispose of freely in this closed social system, and that rule holds even when his success is due in no wise to family capital and he has not handed his property over to the members of his family to manage.

According to Kitab Tjoerai Paparan,\(^32\) a land gift is subjected to the following restrictions:

1. All feminine and masculine waris must be in agreement; if a single one is against the gift, the idea must be dropped.
2. The giving must take place in the presence of the penghulus "who are of one 'umbrella' and one suku".
3. The giving must also take place by broad daylight and be ratified by a ceremonial meal.
4. The penghulus must enquire into the reason why absentees have not presented themselves. If any one stays away because he does not agree, or if one of those present has objections, the penghulus must leave without trying to discover why the persons in question are unwilling.

Pledging, menjual, or hibah must furthermore not occur without the knowledge of all the waris, in other words, all the waris must be convinced of the necessity of the transaction.

Pledging may also be prevented if it has not been proved that no
member of the household, of the family, of the clan, or the suku would be willing to take the land in pledge. If anyone willing to do so should be ignored, he could prevent the transfer from taking place. Furthermore, pledging demands the presence of the penghulus, who are not only required to sanction the transaction as witnesses (memachit), but also bound to refuse their services in case the transaction should occur for other reasons than one of the above four, even though both parties might be in complete agreement. If one of the members of the family should oppose the alienation, it cannot be put through by force; it may even be stopped by one or more of the members of the clan or the suku in the same way as by the penghulus.

This, then, is the theory, based on the supposition of a closed social system. How does it work out in practice? Ibratim gelar Datuk Sangguno Diradjo of Tanjung Sungayang, in Fort Van der Capellen, the indefatigable champion of the adat, complains in his Kitab Peratoeran that there are many maternal uncles, chief waris, or penghulus kaum who simply live on what they make by the arbitrary jual or pledging of the sacred family property in their charge or by the investing of the funds thus obtained in real estate on behalf of their wives and children without consulting all the waris.

In these days the inquiry of the penghulu witnesses into the reasons for pledging seldom if ever takes place: the witness is content to give his services for the sake of the pay received for being present — even in cases where he known there are some waris who have not been informed of the proposed transfer or who are unwilling that it should be made. In short, "in our day care for the sacred family property is almost entirely a thing of the past". Pledging contrary to the four cases sanctioned by adat law is quite common, those who administer family property no longer hold themselves bound by the traditional regulations; the supervision of the penghulus is no longer a guarantee that there will be no arbitrary alienation, no distinction is observed between pledging and jual, the latter being now regarded simply as sale. Behold the effects of the individualizing influence of the gradually penetrating money economy on the land tenure system.
The slackening of the family tie. This individualizing effect is also noticeable in other ways: first of all there is the slackening of the matriarchal family tie, partly the result of the relaxed severity of the land tenure restrictions and, again, partly the cause thereof.

Adat house versus one-family house. It has already been pointed out above that it was the ancient adat house which gave material expression to genealogical unity. Such adat houses are becoming more and more rare. In Sulit Air, in Solok, there are still a few very large ones — the largest of all on the West Coast, with twenty apartments, — but the fame they enjoy is due to their being so unusual. Elsewhere, especially in the newly settled and thriving areas, the one-family house is the normal type of residence, though in this connection the word family must be taken in a wider sense. As long ago as 1892 Kooreman noted that in Indrapura a man had to take his wife to a house of his own.

So there, then, the family is no longer the final subdivision of the clan but is split up into households consisting of a man, wife and children, after which the harta penchaharian (self-earned goods) become the property of the householder, and are inherited by his children.

In the highland areas where commercial crops are grown it now often happens that a man after some years of married life takes his wife to a house of his own. In regions such as Agam this does not yet frequently happen, however. It is only in areas long isolated or in areas where the male population often moves away that the laws governing hereditary property are still rigorously kept. It happens, in Kota Anau, in Solok, for instance, and in many places in Limapuluh Kota, that the woman is not supported by her husband but by her brother; for the former it is then sufficient to contribute a few present every year and a little money for marketing purposes. In other regions this is no longer observed, but in Kota Anau the men often take the road as butchers and leave the rice growing to the women and hired servants. When the men are at home, the woman provide them with food.

Laws of inheritance. Nor is there any doubt as to the disposal of
hereditary property in other places: this is left to the blood relatives in the female line; but the adat laws of inheritance as applied to acquired property display a growing recognition of a new set of laws governing intestate inheritance in place of the original rule by which property passed to the branch of the family in question or the most nearly related branches as the case might be.

In some areas it is now only possible for children to obtain control of their father's self-earned property, or a part of it, by means of a gift (hibah) from the father or a last will (umanat) of the testator on his deathbed. In many cases it is further necessary to consult the 'sister's children' expressly or allow them a part -say half - of the legacy, so as to prevent them from questioning the testator's hibah after his death, either on the ground of the traditional adat regulations or on the ground of a claim that the pretended self-earned property is really sacred family property or property acquired by means of it. Questioning the validity of a gift in this way is often a sign of resentment on the part of the sister's children, rooted in the neglect of them by the maternal uncle, the testator, during his lifetime. In this connection we may not infrequently find a certain reciprocity: if A neglects his sister's children in favour of his own children, then B, the maternal uncle of those children, neglects A's children, who are in their turn his sister's children. As a matter of fact, it has already come to be regarded as right in many districts that the sister's children should not for a moment think of contesting the claim of the children to the slight inheritance of self-earned property left them by their father as a gift, except in three cases: one of a distinct feud, one where the inheritance is very large, or one where an untrained lawyer (pokrol bambu) has interfered in the matter. The whole thing depends entirely on whether the matriarchal family tie has become sufficiently relaxed. If this is not the case, then the sister's children claim half of the legacy or at least some compensation, and for this not even a gift is required, as all can be arranged satisfactorily after mutual consultation. This by no means always depends on the geographical area, but simply upon the mutual relation of the families.
The gradual modification of the laws of inheritance is rooted in the strengthening of the bond between a man and his children at the cost of his relation to his relatives in the maternal line, a strengthening which also occurs in the highlands and particularly in those regions where the father, mother, and children live together in a home of their own. It is this gradual, natural social development, which has been going on for the last hundred years, that the influence from Mecca has been unconsciously availing itself of in the effort to make its way into the social system of Minangkabau. The process is being encouraged and hastened by the change of mentality mentioned above which has been causing self-earned property to increase.

We have already shown that interest in this direction has brought about a decrease of interest in the growing of rice. Sawahs are being converted into coffee gardens; in various places the acreage of the sacred family property is diminishing as a result of the slackening of the restrictions governing land ownership.38

There are also areas where the process has reached a still further stage and where the whole of the self-earned property devolves upon the children even where there has been no gift or will. Whereas Van Bosse wrote in 1895 that in his day the gift occurred chiefly among the Malay traders, the hadjis, and the chiefs, who were better trained than their fellows because of their association with Europeans - in short, among those in touch with the money economy, - it can be seen that the development of intestate inheritance laws has now reached a much further stage. This was already evident at the so-called 'adat meeting' held at Fort De Kock in December, 1910.

The establishment of the family, the one-family dwelling, inheritance laws, the relaxation of the rules governing land tenure, the lessening of sacred family property - all these are factors combining to slacken the matriarchical family ties. The governmental 'popular credit' system also encourages this change.

The individualizing influence of the governmental 'popular credit' system. When the 'popular credit' system was first introduced, the government made constant use of adat. Apart
from a few exceptional cases, all irregularities were punished according to the *adat*, including repeatedly reminding delinquents of their debts, the head of the family being, furthermore, held responsible for the sum owed, "as prescribed by the *adat*."

Meanwhile experience showed that the *penghulus* were not much inclined to take on the liability for the debts of the *anak buah*, the members of their group.

An it must be admitted that *menanggung* is not quite equivalent to the western conception of bail. Yet until quite recently there were many regions in which the *penghulus* stood surety for a considerable number of borrowers - sometimes as many as twentyfive. It was thought that the *adat* obliged them to do this or that the *anak buah* were not permitted to borrow without their consent.

Meanwhile it appeared that willingness to go bail did not always rest on *adat* alone. Reference to the latter was very often merely *pour le besoin de la cause*. So it happened that some years ago the *penghulus* of Negeri nan VII, near Sungai Tuak Malintang in Old Agam, requested that a *padi lumbung*, a community rice storage house, should be established, supposedly for the purpose of getting the *sawah* owners 'out of the hands of the money lenders. When asked why those in need of credit did not apply to the village bank which was a mile and a half away, the sponsors of the plan replied that the *penghulus* did not consider their *anak buah* yet ripe for financial credit. Experience showed, however, for example at Magek, that behind the appeal to the *adat* there lurked something quite different. It seems that in this particular region the object of a loan is very frequently the redeeming of *sawahs* and fish ponds pledged to the *penghulus*. This explains why formerly the *penghulus* strongly opposed a raising of the maximum loan and the admission of other persons than *penghulus* as surety in the case of debts to the *negeri* bank. The object of the appeal to the *adat* rule that the *penghulus* must be responsible for the debts of their *anak buah* was to prevent the *anak buah* from getting out of debt. The same has been noted in other *'adat-minded' areas. Until recently only *penghulus* might stand surety in Sungayang, in
Fort Van der Capellen, "as required by ancient *adat*. The object, here too, was, however, to prevent the *anak buah* from borrowing from the *negeri* bank in order to get out of their indebtedness to the *penghulus*.

This was the main reason for the decree of July, 1926 making it illegal for anyone to stand surety for more than five loans, after which it was decided that in the *negeris* where so far only *penghulus* had been eligible as guarantors, for example Negeri nan VII, in Old Agam, *waris* should now be permitted to assume that function. The next stage was that relatives of the borrower were allowed to give security for him, provided the *penghulus* agreed, for instance in Pasir Lawas, Agam. As time went on this 'privilege' was accorded to other co-villagers in the case of loans of not more than twenty-five shillings, and sometimes — though with difficulty — it could be arranged for a woman to take the liability, although there are still villages where women are entirely excluded either from borrowing or giving security. And so finally the *adat* is entirely abandoned when permission is given for anyone to give security as long as he or she is sufficiently well off or trustworthy. This custom is gradually being adopted by most banks. The abandonment of the *adat* has of course greatly influenced the amount of outstanding loans.

Here again we see how the money economy is gradually making headway and must necessarily undermine *adat* even in the regions which are *'adat-minded'*.  

*Examples of the individualizing process.* This relaxing of the matriarchical bonds, this individualizing process has still more farreaching effects: the individual is trying to free himself from the bonds entirely. Here and there persons are found who no longer feel bound to ask the *penghulu's* permission for a proposed marriage and the *penghulu* himself hesitates to demand the gift due him (half a penny in Sumani) from the couple. In other places all responsibility towards the community is considered fulfilled when a man has paid his taxes like a good citizen, and he then only wishes to be left alone.

*Connection between individualism and the economic change.*
In the preceding paragraphs we have noted the awakening of the acquisitive urge and called attention to the growing individualism. Needless to say, there is a close connection between the emergence of these two facts.

*Primitive communism.* To realize this connection we need only read the description of the primitive communism of Toraja society given by Adriani after years of experience there:

The unity of the family involves that the property of the parents cannot be divided among the children and other heirs, but that the estates must be left undivided. There is actually no question of heirs at all. One owns everything one uses or needs conjointly with the other members of the family. Nothing is therefore really a man's property; he cannot keep anything for good as his own, nor can he pass it on to another. Every member of the family has, in company with all his kinsmen, a right to the family goods, which are administered by one of the women of the family because the women always go on living in the family residence even after marriage. No one's portion is defined. If anyone is in need, he is given help from the family property. Any fine incurred by one of the family is paid from the family funds. The same with debts or other obligations. If a man costs the family a great deal because he is a spendthrift or in some way or other always lets the family pay the piper, he is made aware of the disapproval he arouses and from time to time it is pointed out to him that he has incurred great obligations to the family and cannot just proceed at his own will. But if he takes little notice of all this, he can lead an easy life at the general expense. Toraja society is too weak to eliminate had element, though such a parasite will behind his back be spoken of with disdain by his kinsmen.

Another disadvantage of this communism is that no one really looks after anything thoroughly, because it does not really belong to anyone. Tools and other objects in daily use change hands every moment and even if anyone had been given an object, another can demand it of him at any time, although that second person himself can usually not keep possession of it for long. Refusal means that one will be dubbed a miser and that is more than a Toraja can stand. The result is that nothing is properly cared for or kept in condition. Houses and household utensils scarcely ever look in good trim. Nor does anyone feel impelled to work his way up in the world. Whenever a Toraja earns a little money and does not immediately spend it, some relative asks him for it. The pattern of wisdom for him is, therefore, to buy something he needs straight away. For, if he does not the money is not much use to him. As a general rule saving is out of the question.
Property held in common, however fine this may sound, hinders all progress. Money hardly plays any part as yet in Toraja society; it is impossible to keep the possession of goods secret. Any one who owns or acquires anything beyond what his fellow villagers or kinsmen possess is immediately pestered by people asking him for it, for instance a man very much desiring to make a little store of some much-valued commodity such as salt will not try to earn more than he needs at the moment, for a relative will certainly ask him for what is left and one may not refuse the family anything.

Even young people attempting to make some money by trade will soon be obliged to give it up, for nothing supplied to members of their family is ever paid for. The only property respected is that which a man collects to take with him in his coffin. Cotton goods, brass dishes, betel boxes and the like are left in the owner's possession, provided he intends them to accompany him to the realm of the dead.40

Economic ethics of primitive communism. Later on we shall point out the desirable aspects of this primitive communism, but from the above quoted passages the seamy side thereof becomes clearly apparent. It is a curious fact that the first modification of primitive communistic ideas occurred in the tribes where slavery existed. There, as we know, the 'lords' did no work, or at least as little as possible, and the same may be said of the slaves, for it was no advantage to the latter to produce more than they and their families could consume. Hence the ever-present threat of food scarcity among these tribes. In order to stimulate the desire to work among the slaves, they were allowed some property of their own. And so arose a curious state of things in which as a result of 'communism' the 'lords' actually had nothing they could call theirs, whereas the married slaves possessed ricefields of their 'own'.47

Of course the above paradoxical statement is not entirely accurate. For although the freemen had no land of their own, still they enjoyed the usufruct of the dry fields, the ladang, they themselves laid out for as long as they worked them, and the 'lords' always retained the right to 'ask' what they wished of the slaves. Notwithstanding the above facts, it cannot be denied that it was self-interest that taught men to stimulate the self-interest of the slaves and to break down the communistic tendencies in
this connection which they were not strong enough to overcome in their own circles.48

Connection between primitive communism and production in a subsistence economy. This kind of 'communism' remains unchanged as long as the only purpose of production is consumption — as long as production is still merely for subsistence purposes. There is then no competition, no need for a market. The ethical norm current in such a situation demands that a person who manages to acquire more than others as a result of his own efforts must hand the surplus over to the community on pain of being decried as a miser.

A small farming business run on rational principles and bent on making profit is according to this way of thinking immoral.49

Social morals of primitive communism. This gives a static character to the society:

To leave things as organized by the forefathers is the sole aim of Toraja society. It is expected of the chief that he will preserve customary law and everyone is ready to assist him in that duty. The chief thus personifies the adat, deciding affairs in the same way as each of his villagers would have decided in his place, and always able to justify himself by appealing to the customary law. No one thinks about developing the society, for no one desires progress.50

Hence the individual never gets a real chance:

By living among his own close relatives a man always continues to regard himself as a dependent part of a closely interrelated group. He thinks, feels, and speaks as the whole family does; the opinion of the family is the opinion of each of its members.

The break-up of primitive communism. So we see that, if the idea of progress is to find its way into the community, the 'spirit' of the latter will have to be changed and the traditional economic and social ethics broken down, while new standards will have to make their influence felt. If production once ceases to be merely for subsistence purposes, if as in Minangkabau crops begin to be grown for the world market, then the static character of the community disappears once and for all. Men and women are stimulated to exert themselves, a feeling for responsibility arises in
them and the desire to care for something, for they realize that they themselves will enjoy the fruits of their labour. The splitting up of family property now necessarily acquires a more or less permanent character and the individual wishes to have exclusive control of the property he has acquired. A demand for inheritance rights for children is soon heard; the rules governing family property are more or less disregarded. The individual is not powerless, as he used to be, now that the need for solidarity in matters concerning blood feuds is a thing of the past. The feeling of dependence decreases, the adat house community is dissolved because it is becoming a nuisance, particularly where there are differences in financial standing. Communal feeling declines.

Social consequences of the break-up of primitive communism. Those who wish native society to 'progress', must remember that this involves a struggle against the obligatory traditionalism, which characterizes it. And that this means the social structure will be equally affected: the individual will be obliged to break loose from the traditional subjection which has so far bound him, and the age-old position of authority held by the chiefs, in so far as it is rooted in the traditional order, can no longer be maintained. In its most radical form this means the introduction of the antitraditionalism which is typical of modern Western civilization.

Every change in some single aspect of a given culture holds incalculable possibilities by virtue of the relationship which binds together all the aspects of that culture; hence every modification on one plane may bring in its train incalculable results on all conceivable other planes... Every change that strikes deep somewhere spells... a critical phase in a given culture.

On the other hand:

A community the main trend of which is individualism has for that very reason alone a character different from a community consisting of individuals living under the stress of traditionalism, and even when the consciousness of being bound by common tradition is no less strong in the former, still it possesses a specific colouring due to the relatively strong subjectivism which the individual has achieved in regard to his surroundings. As a matter of fact individualism, which presupposes a considerable amount of inner independence, is only possible where a certain
break-up has begun in the community, where there is a certain slackening of the group pressure, at least where intellectual matters are concerned, although in reality every phase of life is affected. ...Economic progress among the natives, that is to say, their approach nearer to our economic conditions, must be preceded by a certain degree of individualization in the economic sphere making independent activity and private property possible for the individual... As participation in world culture develops... a certain emancipation of the individual from the group takes place.\textsuperscript{52}

\textit{The change not yet complete.} Hence we see that this emancipation and the dislocation of the social structure, even if the onset of a 'critical phase' lurks therein, constitute simply a quite normal and natural stage in the development of society. And yet, in spite of the fact that in most parts of Minangkabau the decisive break with the traditional economic point of view has occurred, it cannot be truly said that society is entirely dominated by individualism involving 'socially unencumbered property', 'socially unrestricted self-determination' for the individual, 'personal economic responsibility for each', and 'self-interest' as guiding principles. The transition - set in motion by foreign traders in the large market places and along the railway lines - has indeed progressed rapidly during the last few years but has nevertheless been too gradual to accomplish this. The past still exerts an influence.

\textit{The new economic tendencies and religion.} The above-described antitraditional and individualistic tendencies may also be noted in the field of religion. The influences deriving from Mecca in the last century - to which we shall return presently - found a ready response among the trading population, for they gave a religious basis to the natural struggle against the \textit{adat} rules on family property by lending support to the Mohammedan law of inheritance. The principles of the religious \textit{kaum muda}, the 'modern group', have also in recent years found fertile soil in which to grow, although that 'modernism' is rooted in the mentality of the people and not in economics.\textsuperscript{53} Here, too, awaking individualism, a breaking with traditionalism, and the struggle against certain ideological expressions of earlier communal life - for example the popular religion with its superstitious practices such as ceremonial meals and the worship of saints; the rejection of the tra-
ditional books as authoritative, the demand for freedom to inquire into sources apart from traditional interpretations; the group's rationalism, its emphasis on the equality of all men, its optimistic outlook on life as contrasted with the pessimism of traditional Islam fatalistically acquiescing in the decline which began after the close of the golden age of the four righteous caliphs; its wish to adapt itself to the new way of life; its dislike for the contemplation of the mystic brotherhoods, its 'this-worldliness'.

Relation between the new economic tendencies and modernism. The relation between the social revolution and religious modernism, to which we have called attention above, must, of course, not be interpreted in the popular Marxist sense of the basis-superstructure theory according to which the change in the ideology is supposed to be due to, or to result automatically from, economic changes.

Jellinek on the relation between religion and politics in eighteenth-century America. Nor are we here dealing with a phenomenon such as the one Jellinek speaks of, when he derives the 'human rights' which played so important a rôle in the French revolution from the 'bills of rights' of the various American states in 1776 and the years immediately succeeding, which in their turn must be finally referred to the struggle for religious freedom. The old Puritan ideas and views of independence had undergone radical modifications in America in the second half of the eighteenth century, in that the freedoms and rights which the colonists had carried with them across the ocean as natural-born British subjects had become rights "accorded them not by man but by God and Nature".

The conviction that there exists a right of conscience which is quite independent of the State brings men to the point from which the inalienable rights of the individual become specialized. The pressure which the ruling powers exert on the individual's freedom of action gives rise to the view that some special human right corresponds to the various forms of pressure. And so, besides the demand for religious freedom, the freedom of the press, of speech, and of assembly and the freedom to migrate, the right of petition, freedom from arbitrary imprisonment, punishment, taxation, and the like, arises the further demand for the
participation of the individual in affairs of State which safeguards all the above institutions, and further that the State should be made an association of free and equal persons... The idea of establishing the inalienable inborn, sacred rights of the individual by law is not rooted in politics but in religion.

Levy on Calvinism and liberalism in seventeenth-century England. Jellinek’s views were restated by Hermann Levy in his Die Grundlagen des ökonomischen Liberalismus in der Geschichte der englischen Volkswirtschaft. That author indicates where the roots of economic liberalism in England may be found, as follows:

The popular conception of personal freedom, which had until the beginning of the seventeenth century been regarded primarily as that of non-interference by the State in the religious affairs of the individual, gradually became broader and was applied to politics and economics as well as to religion. But over and again it is religious liberalism which constitutes the starting point even of reflections on secular liberalism...

The cult of religious independence [was]... the precondition on which secular, and particularly politico-economic, independence was to follow... in that the quiet exercise of religion was, for the religious man of the world, the necessary condition for his existence in general.

Max Weber and Troeltsch on Calvinism and capitalism. The connection between social development and ideology in Minangkabau is also different from that which Weber and Troeltsch tell us exists between Protestantism and capitalism. They have called attention to the 'inner-worldly' asceticism of early Protestantism, which gave rise to a new conception of one's calling, created an economic mentality and placed material and economic life on an ethical foundation.

From the economic and social point of view the consequences of this conception of the "calling" were extraordinary. It raised the ordinary work of one's profession (within one's vocation) and the ardor with which secular work was prosecuted to the level of a religious duty in itself; from a mere method of providing for material needs it became an end in itself, providing scope for the exercise of faith within the labour of the "calling".

The "spirit of the calling", which does not reach out beyond the world but works in the world without "creature worship", that is, without love of the world, becomes the parent of a tireless systematically disciplined laboriousness, in which work is sought for work's sake, for the sake of the
mortification of the flesh, in which the produce of the work serves, not to be consumed in enjoyment, but to the constant reproduction of the capital employed. Since the aggressively active ethic inspired by the doctrine of predestination urges the elect to the full development of his God-given powers, and offers him this as a sign by which he may assure himself of his election, work becomes rational and systematic. In breaking down the motive of ease and enjoyment, asceticism lays the foundations of the tyranny of work over men. And from the fact that the produce of this work is in no way an end in itself, but advances the general well-being, and that all return which goes beyond an adequate provision for the needs of life is felt to be merely a stimulus to the further employment and increase of it, there results the principle of the illimitability and infinitude of work.

The correctness of this view of the connection between Calvinistic ethics and the emergence of the capitalistic spirit is not disproved by the fact that in the course of time this spirit has become emancipated from and has even opposed the ethical standpoint of the Calvinists.

Above all, the imposing but also terrible expansion of modern capitalism with its calculating coldness and soullessness, its unscrupulous greed and pitilessness, its turning to gain for gain's sake, to fierce and ruthless competition, its agonising lust of victory, its blatant satisfaction in the tyrannical power of the merchant class, has entirely loosed it from its former ethical foundation... It is, in fact, the fate of the "intra-mondane" asceticism that, having once accorded recognition to work and life in the world, while not ascribing to them an inwardly essential ethical value, it can never again get rid of the horde of spirits which swarms out upon it in overwhelming strength from that world which it at once recognises and ignores.

The new economic tendencies and modernism in Minangkabau. As already stated, in Minangkabau things are otherwise related: the new economic spirit and modernism arose quite independently of each other. Their meeting is from the sociological point of view an 'accident', though now that they have once met, they will doubtless influence each other. The modernistic tendencies arose at an earlier date from another source than the change of mentality in the field of economics and the circles in which these two new currents of thought found expression independently of each other were different. Now it has been made possible for the two
commensurate trends gradually to approach and influence each other. Indications of this are already observable.

6

New Social Differentiation

*The old and new unharmonically side by side.* Even so it would be a mistake to suppose that the social phenomena noted above are already widespread. It is characteristic of the present stage of development that the old and the new exist side by side but without being in harmony with each other, the old being found chiefly in the rice growing upland areas. Social requirements are still strongly in evidence side by side with the emerging economic needs, the modern spirit interpenetrates traditional values: we find the old system of mutual help, *tolong menolong*, but also wage labour, the need for personal freedom side by side with the feeling of solidarity, a clinging to inheritance in the matriarchal line while the sacred family property grows less and less and intestate inheritance law is introduced, compensation according to traditional standards side by side with payment according to work accomplished, economic development without elementary education, old-fashioned agrarian conditions combined with advanced mental development. It is this very condition of things which makes the position so critical: the traditional social standards are loosing their vigour while no new mainstay has come to take their place. In Matthew Arnold's words, the position is one:

\[
\text{Between two worlds — one dead,}
\]
\[
\text{The other powerless to be born}.
\]

*Wavering social standards.* It is the social standards that have begun to weaken. In the more or less static social system found in the small *adat* aristocratic republics of an earlier day everyone knew his place, but a new process of parcelling into classes is disturbing the traditional social hierarchy.

In the case of Silungkang, for example, the process became
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accentuated and accelerated. This case is by no means an isolated one, however. In other places, too, the self-consciousness of the *nouveaux riches* opposed the authority of the *penghulus*. Years ago the more broad-minded teachers of religion, who were unable to find a niche in the traditional system, often became leaders in this movement of protest. Their struggle continues to this day.

A typical instance of this is the able Hadji Bahauddin, who became the leader of the communists at Sawah Lunto, but had previously already refused to subject himself to the guardianship of the *penghulus*. We have earlier called attention to the fact that these teachers of religion - whether from our point of view they may be counted among those following the modern trend of thought or the ancient one - owed their success very largely to their promoting the inheritance laws of the *Koran*.

The *controleur* Boterhoven de Haan wrote in the memorandum left to his successor on the sub-district of Lubuk Sikaping:

It would be hard to maintain that the population is adequately represented by its *penghulu* council members. It is a long time since *adat* was the only bond known to the community. The native chiefs are unable to cover all the interests of the community (increasing exploitation of land, growing transport). Those interests are no longer confined within the *negeri*. Take the Bonjol rice trade, for instance. This is an extensive business involving the whole of the country Raja nan IV Selol and is concentrated on the markets of Kumpulan and Bonjol. The same applies to the Rao rubber trade and the Lubuk Sikaping coffee trade.

The younger generation and the intellectuals. So far we have not mentioned the younger generation, which has been to school. The better educated, the intellectuals are - differently from what we call the white collar proletariat in Europe - not, comparatively speaking, such a serious problem in Minangkabau as elsewhere. This must be ascribed to the fact that the society they belong to, not being developed to any extent along modern capitalistic lines, offers but very few opportunities to intellectual workers. Hence the latter are obliged to leave home and they prefer to do so, as they no longer feel they 'belong' in the village community. So when opportunities for employment are sufficient outside Minangkabau, the pupils who have passed through the school there
present no problem to Minangkabau. But in times of depression or when the schools turn out more young people than can be provided with work, things are different. During such periods a sulky group of malcontents is apt to arise. They generally have not enough capital to begin an independent business on their own account, nor has their school education fitted them to do so. In the densely populated areas from which they usually come there is no room for them in the agrarian sector, and, besides, on a farm they would find their fingers were all thumbs.

As James and Stap pointed out years ago, the urge to obtain a school education is strongest where arable land is scarce. Hence, if, as happened a few years ago, the regular emigration of this category of persons comes to a standstill, Minangkabau must count on a number of discontent idlers. It is therefore not surprising that during the years from 1923 to 1925 the communists found their best converts among the men discharged by the railways in order to economize, among the traders suffering from the results of the depression, and among the school-educated unemployed.

No 'intellectuals' in the communist movement in 1926. In 1926 the 'intellectuals' did not play any part worth mentioning in the communist movement, however. Apart from one young man who left school after taking a preparatory high school course, the youthful president of the sub-section for Fort Van der Capellen, who was a tool rather than a leader, it was only a few elementary school teachers who took any considerable part in it. As a matter of fact it is surprising that not more teachers joined, as they really had reason to be disgruntled. With the high price of rice, they had a hard life of it on their salaries, which had to come completely out of the government subsidy — their lives were very hard, the more so because they quite often did not receive the salaries regularly. Sometimes they were paid nothing for five or six months. If they protested, they were suspected of communist inclinations. The present inspector has put an end to this disgraceful condition of things.

Groups from which the communist leaders derived. The communist leaders derived from the following groups of socially
disillusioned and socially unbalanced persons: elementary school teachers, impoverished members of the nobility, men who had wanted to become penghulus but had failed, discontented penghulus without written appointment, ambitious members of the nobility anxious to satisfy their ambition in the popular movement, socially stranded people, people dismissed from government service, minor teachers of religion wishing to increase their importance, numerous relatives of former regional chiefs, dismissed head penghulus, and so forth.

As has already been stated, in 1926 the ordinary members of the movement were recruited from the poorest strata of the peasant population in the over-populated areas (such as Pariaman, Old Agam) and the poorest, economically most backward districts (Sawah Lunto sub-division, the territory east of Lake Singkarak).

Propagandists were often found among the barbers, Singer sewing machine agents, village pokrols (or untrained lawyers), and the like, all people in close touch with village life.

The clash between traditional and modern standards. The clash occasioned by the meeting of traditional with modern standards is also to be found among the younger generation. In response to the modern urge to provide a better future for their children than the traditional village community could offer, parents sent them to school. After having left school, these young people, owing to the knowledge they had acquired - knowledge of which the community gladly made use on occasion, - occupied a position of authority much greater than that which they would have been accorded in a normally developed society, but on the other hand they were still required to show the usual respect for the traditional authorities. 'School proud' as they were, and often rather unbalanced as a result of the awe, quite disproportionate to their educational achievements, with which they were regarded, they found it difficult to assume the respectful attitude expected of them. The authority of the adat chiefs impressed them very little, for they often saw in those men nothing but narrow illiterates whose outlook on life never reached beyond their own village. For did not the adat chiefs themselves frequently make
use of the greater worldly wisdom of the young when they desired
to get into touch with the world? But when the young people
demonstrated their point of view too openly, their attitude did
not remain unanswered.

The adat authorities then tried with might and main to make
them feel their insignificance. Furthermore, it appeared that the
mere accusation of communism was an effective means for up­
holding traditional authority, for it immediately set in motion
the whole apparatus of the government against the base innov­
ators, even if they were guilty of nothing but justifiable criti­
cism. Brought up in freedom at school, these young people found
great difficulty in adjusting themselves to the constraint laid
upon them in the village. The ideas acquired outside and fed by
newspaper reading could not be fitted into the framework of the
traditional social system, but when the older people felt the
burden of life pressing heavily upon them or when they were full
of grievances, they listened gladly to what the young people
communicated authoritatively from the 'fullness' of their su­
perior knowledge. This conflict of ideas supplies the reason why
the younger generation is dissatisfied with existing conditions
(the slogan: sama rata sama rasa — equality for all — caught
on in this case too) and why at the same time the new ideas —
newspaper ideas — found an entrance in spite of everything.
There is undoubtedly often every reason for the school-educated
to be dissatisfied with the position which the community assigns
to them and which dooms them to a place in the ranks of the
unemployed. Their grievances are often against the system of
administration — as we shall see presently — and sometimes
they object to the calibre of the heads which has frequently
made the latter tools of the native administration and caused
them to lose the respect of all the better educated — whether
practically or theoretically — who feel themselves their superiors from the point of view of modernity.
The Heads

The weakening of the position of the heads as a result of increasing government interference. As a result of this process of social development, the position of the village heads is — quite naturally — not what it once was. We will refrain from discussing the various acts of government interference which have deprived them of some of their authority, such as the instituting of the chief penghulu, the former regional organization (the lara system), the present demang system, the systematization of law, the declaration of lands as public domain which affected the people's right of disposal. The income according to adat also decreased. The popular credit system of the government has already been discussed. On the other hand the policy of the civil service on the West Coast of Sumatra has always been to strengthen the position of the adat chiefs — as in the eighteen nineties. Wherever is seemed as if the influence of the religious teachers threatened to undermine the authority of the chiefs, measures were devised by means of which the position of the latter might be re-established. One of the results of this effort on the part of the civil service was the introduction by Governor de Munnick in 1888 of penghulu registers, the object of which was to uphold the prestige of the adat chiefs by according them official recognition. When in later years these registers were apt to be laid aside and forgotten, a reminder to keep them up to date was sent periodically. Religious neutrality was in practice interpreted by the civil service as noninterference in religious affairs and support of adat law. The circular forbidding the appointment of people who had been to Mecca as regional chiefs is well known. After the agitation begun in 1894 by a religious teacher living in Mecca — one Ahmad Chatib — against matriarchical inheritance law, it was suggested that adat law should be codified in order to strengthen its authority. When this plan was abandoned on the advice of Dr Snouck Hurgronje, registers recording the adat in writing were introduced. At the large civil service con-
ference held at Fort De Kock on 16 October, 1894, in connection with the above-mentioned letter of Dr Snouck Hurgronje, it was once more emphatically stated that civil servants must not only consult the regional chiefs and the chief penghulu when questions were put to them by their superiors but that, even without such definite reason, they should keep in touch with the penghulu, who were the real heads of the people. Furthermore the Royal Decree of 22 September, 1899, no 19 was intended to support the authority of the adat chiefs. The well known circular sent by Governor Ballot on 1 October, 1912, in which sifting of the penghulu was ordered, was intended to place the chief penghulu specifically in the position of being chief of the people and to abolish the function of the penghulu suku rodi, assistant to the former, and transfer his power to the chief so as to raise the position of the penghulu. According to the said circular the penghulu, instead of the penghulu suku rodi, were:

...to receive the collector's pay for collecting taxes and after the institution of a poll tax to take the place of all or part of the statute labour, they shall be exempt from payment of this tax, and receive a fee for the collecting thereof. It will not be feasible in certain districts to put all the present penghulu in the place of penghulu suku rodi; there are negeris where there are several dozen penghulus and there are some where their number has grown to be a good two hundred...

These then were the measures intended to give prominence to the pick of the penghulu: separating the old and new penghulus into two groups, tax exemption, and collectors' pay. The sifting, certain preliminary arrangements for which had already been discussed at the adat meeting at Fort De Kock in 1910, was also considered necessary in view of the instituting of negeri councils, as it was feared that otherwise unmanageable bodies would be created. The negeri councils were also intended by Governor Ballot to serve as a means of "developing the Minangkabau negeris into organs that will consolidate native society". The 1915 reorganization and the 'negeri ordinance'. In spite of the excellent intentions that inspired them, these measures did not enhance the standing of the chiefs. This may have been the
foul part of those who carried them out, but the difficulty lurked chiefly in the character of the government system employed. Good intentions notwithstanding, the head of the native community, the chief penghulu, remained the organ of the government in the negeri, though now no longer paid by the government but by the community. The general complaint is that putting into effect government regulations demands so much of his time that he never gets a chance to attend to the interests of his community. Furthermore it has in practice proved impossible to carry out the basic idea that the main adat chief should also be the head of the community. Very often the persons concerned proved a priori unsuitable for the post; frequently they had to be dismissed for fraud. An inquiry we ourselves instituted showed that these functionaries changed very often — on an average three times in the course of ten years — and that dismissal on account of fraud or 'unsuitability' was not uncommon. The new organization also affected the standing of the chiefs of the people. The propagandistic talk of the communists, to the effect that the once so highly respected penghulus had now become simply tools of the government, found a ready response among the people concerned.

All too frequently the practical policy of the administration seems to have been aimed at — to use Stap's words — making the village ordinance merely "a convenience and support for the government" just as previously village jurisdiction by the chiefs, which still existed despite the introduction of government administration of justice, had become what Westenanek had called "a mighty instrument of government".

It may safely be assumed that practically all village decrees have been issued so far at the suggestion of civil servants, whether European or native, when it suited their official purposes...

wrote Stap in 1917, and Steinbuch declared in 1922:

The native community ordinance is now a dead letter in the many villages where social and political maturity is still far to seek.

Considering the degree of education represented by most of the chiefs, this is not surprising. It must not be supposed, how-
ever, that all civil servants have trampled the autonomy of the village communities under foot. There have been some who gave guidance instead of commands, but for all that the village council was all too frequently regarded by the government, its members, and the population as an irresponsible tool by means of which an autocratic government carried into effect modern measures considered urgent but not originating in the needs of the people as recognized by themselves.

The sifting of the penghulus. And then came the unlucky sifting of the penghulus, which violated relations that had become historic as the result of natural growth and made malcontents of those who felt offended because their dignity as penghulus was not recognized. That sifting gave rise to considerable disunity which in places such as, for instance, Kota Lawas - where Arif Fadlillah eagerly made use of it - and Silungkang supplied fertile soil for the seeds sown by the communists. Furthermore there was the clandestine interference of the native administration or of the penghulus in office in the matter of the elevation of the penghulus in Pariaman and Silungkang, which fanned the flame of discontent.

Difference in appreciation of the prestige of the penghulus. The penghulu as the tool of the government, even for collecting taxes! When matters had got to this pass, the people staying in the village surroundings in whom the new spirit mentioned above had been awakened did not find the office of penghulu very attractive, and if they desired it nevertheless, because of the title, they left the work involved to a substitute. The Silungkang penghulus were almost all wakil penghulus. This may of course be partly ascribed to the fact that the municipal chief - who was murdered on 29 December, 1926 - was rather arbitrary in the matter of granting permission for the traditional celebrations at the inauguration of penghulus, sometimes on the ground that a man wanted a festival that was above his social position, but it was not entirely due to that. In Talu it appears that recently many headmen held no festival and were therefore not really headmen at all. At the urgent request of the controleur they finally killed one bullock jointly. They begrudged the expense.
Here, again, the clash of motives can be seen. Sometimes penghulu-ship is ardently desired, because in a given social order it is the only thing that opens up for a man the possibility of making his voice heard, or because it supplies the occasion for one to give vent to one’s self-appreciation as one of the nouveaux riches in a sensational manner and give it a social background by holding an inauguration festival; and then, again, all traditional splendour is scorned because of the modern worries the function brings in its train. And so it may happen that of various candidates - a clever one, a rich one, a daring one, and a stupid one - the stupid one is selected for penghulu-ship. For the rich one is too busy with his own affairs, the clever one does not really care for the job as he wants to leave the village or settle down as a religious teacher, and the stupid one will cause the least trouble to anybody. Keeping after the members of the family to pay their taxes, and the like, is not particularly attractive, nor is bearing the brunt of the government functionaries’ bad temper. When the taxes from the villagers are not forthcoming, it is the penghulu who is repeatedly called to ‘the office’. On the other hand when the chief penghulu or one of the officials wants to see the villagers, they are called directly by the attendant, which means that the penghulu is bypassed - another instance of the decreasing of his influence. In short, the advantages involved in the dignity are not considered equal to the disadvantages attached to the function.

Of course the above does not apply everywhere in all regions, nor during every administrative period. Nor are the adat regulations regarding the claim to penghulu-ship the same everywhere. Sometimes the position is hereditary in the whole family, sometimes in a single branch of the family, sometimes it falls to the different branches in turn. Here as elsewhere the unattainable is often exceedingly attractive and the accident of birth which prevents attainment in spite of a man’s capacity frequently gives rise to discontent.

Struggle for the maintenance of traditional authority against modern influences. In other regions the new trends have prod-
duced different results in this connection. In the Solok region, for instance, many penghulus have pledged all their land in order to be in a position to keep up the ancient splendour. This has produced a sharp contrast between the economic position of the traditional headmen and that of many of their subjects. To uphold their authority the penghulus try to put the thumb screw to their subjects whenever their services are required. This they do at the occasion of loans from the village banks, collection of taxes, marriages and the like. Because of economic and social shifts these things are no longer taken without resistance, however. Where the penghulus are still well off thanks to their possessing much family property, they often try to strengthen their own prestige and bind the villagers to themselves by keeping them constantly in debt. Occasionally a penghulu renounces his high office, or rather sells it to a wealthy member of the family who endeavours by this means to achieve exemption from taxes.

The individualizing action of the money economy gradually finding its way into the village community, relaxing the rigid rules of life there and slackening the traditional bonds, has already been discussed.

The after-effects of traditionalism in the modern state of affairs. The attitude of the Solok penghulus just mentioned is easily explained. The current matriarchical system, based on undivided family property, has opened up the possibility for the surplus male population, which is no longer able to make a sufficient living from farming owing to lack of land in its own region, to find work elsewhere. And so we find that in many areas the men leave their native villages when the rice has been planted to earn the money which their own region cannot supply in foreign parts, where they stay until harvest time. When opportunities are plentiful for such emigrants, as in 1925 when in Jambi and in Kuantan rubber seemed to promise gold and in many places as much as twenty-five per cent. of the male population left home, it may even happen that crops are endangered by a shortage of hands to attend to them. But such conditions are exceptional. Nevertheless such temporary emigration is quite the rule in many
regions. Emigration often becomes more or less permanent, too, particularly in the case of small traders or of those who have, for instance, acquired land on the Malay Peninsula or have found a means of livelihood abroad. But even then the tie with the land of the emigrant's birth is not by any means entirely broken, thanks to his claim on the family property. If the self-exiled Minangkabauer feels a longing to return home, he knows, in most cases, that he will not be obliged to face the problem of earning a living immediately, because, thanks to the family property, the family will supply him with food and clothes at least for a time. It is the family property, too, which has enabled many of the younger generation of the present day to make their way in the world, owing to the fact that from it money could be supplied to pay for their education or capital to start them in business. On the other hand the family profits from the earnings of the periodic, temporary emigrants, for the family also benefits from the earthly treasure collected by its members in foreign parts.

To give an example: the surprising erection of modern houses at Bonjol was financed entirely by men who had emigrated from there and acquired rubber plantations on the Malay Peninsula. The family tie remained intact. Small traders who obtained their working capital from the family funds were required to render a detailed account of their business once a year when they returned home for the month of fasting.

Discrepancy of tendencies in present-day society. Here we find again the same clash of different tendencies in present-day society to which we called attention above. On the one hand there is the natural attachment to the joint family, which has by no means become entirely extinct, and on the other the individualizing action of trade and the modern currents of life into which even Minangkabau is being drawn - Minangkabau in the first place, one might almost say, because it was the traditional family property which has made emigration possible.

The civil service and the adat. The above analysis of the social phenomena found in Minangkabau must not lead the reader to
underestimate the significance of the *adat* as a factor in present-day society. Unquestionably the organization of the Minangkabau community even now rests on the traditional basis and Minangkabau society moves within the framework of *adat*. But this must not blind us to the fact that natural social forces are unceasingly busy undermining that basis, labouring to make that framework fall to pieces. The outer appearance of the social forms must not mislead us. The 'closed production economy', the economic foundation of the ancient customary social system, has had its day. The undivided family property is crumbling to pieces under the pressure exerted by the money economy. Land tenure is growing less certain; economic differentiation is increasing. The restrictions laid down by tradition are becoming an embarrassment.

Hence any effort to force this society back into the old grooves artificially is doomed to failure from the very outset, yet it is a fact that the political position of the *penghulu*s as a class is still dominant under the current system, although the political ideology no longer runs parallel to the actual social conditions everywhere by any means.

This society knows no other form of organization than that based on *adat*. A sound system of government will, thus, of course have to reckon with that form, without however, accepting it as a fixed quantity. Let the government, staring from the traditional, keep open the road to the evolution of political life in the direction indicated by social developments.

If this development proceeds in the old grooves, then, guided by the traditional bearers of social power it can unfold gradually and smoothly. If, on the other hand, it transgresses the ancient limits - and the symptoms would appear to suggest this - then it is wise not to endeavour to preserve the traditional artificially at the cost of the new growth. So if mention is made of 'upholding' the authority of the *penghulu*s position and 'elevating it', that means loyal recognition of the social standing of the chiefs wherever and in so far as it is real, education of the chiefs according to the requirements of the times so that instead of a static
factor in the evolutionary process they may become a dynamic
one, and guidance where short-sightedness on the part of the
penghulus themselves might undermine their position prematur­
ely. Passivity on the part of the government in regard to the
processes of social development is pernicious; the authorities
should orient themselves according to the distribution of power
in the community and the changes that are taking place in it,
and by so doing make ready during the chaos of the transition
period for the cosmos of the harmonious society of the future.

The future is not comprised in the present, not traceable from it according
to general laws; the future is not made up solely of components of older
conditions and these irrationally mixed; but the future also frequently
contains... a qualitatively new element which can not be traced to
modified combinations of all that has so far been created... Of course
every new step is preceded by a definitely preparatory stage, a certain
accumulation of acts suggesting the new development. But after this
follows a distinct breaking through in the form of a creative leap. 70
Chapter Two

THE GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNISM

1

The Attitude of the Government towards Social Development

The question must now be answered: what was the attitude of the government in regard to the process of social development sketched in the preceding - a process which had inevitably to give rise to fermentation in all strata of society? During recent years that attitude has been characterized by a lack of unity among those responsible, an effort to maintain a condition of outward quiet and, further, a view of the social system coloured by traditionalism. These three points will now be discussed one by one.

Lack of unity in policy. There was frequently a lack of unity as to policy under earlier governors. Governor Ballot already called attention to it in the memorandum left to his successor. He writes that when he first took office, the territory of the West Coast of Sumatra seemed like an archipelago: every head of a sub-division was a rajah in his own territory and ruled according to his own views, had his own ideas as to policy, and acted as he thought best. There was absolutely no continuity.

Remarks to the same general effect had earlier been made by Verkerk Pistorius (1867—1869, and 1871), Th. A. L. Kroesen (1873), and De Rooy (1890), to mention only a few well known names out of the history of the West Coast.

And so it has been of recent years as well. In neighbouring sub-districts mutually upposed systems are in force - in one an effort is being made to uphold the adat administration in the ancient style, in another the position still held in the area by the penghu-lus is entirely disregarded. Civil servants who had earnestly end-
eavoured to arrange matters in full accordance with the chiefs and give the population a real voice in public affairs were succeeded by others who, supposedly for the purpose of upholding official authority, governed by a method of issuing orders which gave rise to great discontent and made the chiefs sulkily adopt a passive attitude towards destructive currents. Each administrative period inevitably bears the personal mark of its head, but in a province such as the West Coast of Sumatra it is imperative that there should be continuity and unity in the conduct of affairs.

The effort to maintain a degree of outward quiet. We have called the second characteristic of the administrative policy of these days an effort to maintain a certain degree of outward quiet. In the introduction mention was made of the banishment of Abdul Muis in the interest of law and order. The discussions in regard to popular grievances which were to follow in an atmosphere of mutual trust — an atmosphere for which this man's presence was said to be disturbing — were not held, however, with the result that the said grievances became still more poignant in 1926-1927 and made the people susceptible to communist propaganda.

Complaints were smothered. Anybody who ignored one of the steps of the hierarchy was punished 'according to the adat' and was in danger of being summoned to appear before the district court for making false charges. This even happened to persons who had been bold enough to send a petition to the governor general.

Some civil servants misused the office of magistrate in a shocking manner. A flagrant instance of this was the conduct of a controleur in the highlands of whom the communists wrote: "May he remain long in his district. A better propaganda for communism is inconceivable."

Serious complaints against native officials were investigated insufficiently or not at all. That those complaints were often well-founded appears for example from the fact that in a single sub-district a district chief, the native officer of justice, the deputy of the latter, and an assistant chief — two of whom have
since died — had been repeatedly guilty of corruption on a considerable scale, as appeared later; that one of them had most certainly participated in marauding expeditions, as the population in general had long suspected; and that in spite of all this these men had for many years enjoyed the trust of the local government authorities. In the case of another demang — an excellent police officer for the rest, but left too much to his own devices of recent years — there were strong indications of participation in like practices. The communist reign of terror raged in his district with terrifying vigour... There are still cases sub judice against another district officer and an assistant district officer who were both charged with serious maltreatment...

Tactics of control. Is it surprising, then, that the people nurse serious grievances against the rough behaviour of the native officials who often seem to think that upholding prestige is equivalent to intimidation? Persons who dared to speak their minds frankly, to criticize situations and conditions, who lodged complaints, who were, in short, a nuisance, risked being charged with being communists, which charge was sufficient to set the whole administrative machine in motion against them. Such individuals were checked by perpetual orders to appear at 'the office', they were 'wanted', and this helped to prepare the soil for the favourable reception of the seed of communism. If they were punished by the magistrate, as sometimes happened at Fort De Kock, Padang, and Solok, the disciplinary treatment often consisted of degrading them in a most childish way — making them carry stones uphill at a run and the like. (The famous article in the penal code dealing with vagrancy and 'the neglect of statute labour' was very convenient at this juncture.) All this brought grist to the mill of the communists. When, as in the envirous of Padang, troupes were used to search for fugitive leaders, the native administration saw to it that they caught the men who had failed to perform statute labour or were behind with the payment of taxes - surely they were 'communists', were they not? - but the ones really wanted managed to keep out of the way. The 'communists' were practically outlawed. Before the rebel-
lion even the wives of the leaders were arrested in one district in order to force their husbands to come forward. In other places the taxes of those classed as 'communists' were raised. The only result of all this, however was to increase the agitation.

*Lack of means of enforcing authority.* The trouble was also partly due to the implementation of the civil service. When the armed police were converted into a constabulary the number was very greatly reduced, thanks to the pronouncement of the then Governor Whitlau that this reduction still left sufficient strength. The civil service had not enough means of enforcing authority at its disposal. This fact, too, was eagerly made use of by the communists. The fact that arbitrary measures were taken against everything that was regarded as 'communistic' proved — so it was said — how frightened they all were of communism. However, no one needed fear the police or the army, for they were just a handful of men, of whom, furthermore, many had already gone over to communism. Above we have already pointed out how the red cards of the constabulary at Sawah Lunto were exploited as a means of propaganda. At Solok — a sub-district with ten thousand inhabitants — the authorities had thirteen policemen at their disposal, and the constabulary were by no means always present on the spot, for Solok was given only what was not needed anywhere else.

*The alluring fata morgana of communism.* On the other hand the communist leaders preached an unshakable belief in the success of communism, which was to bring the remedy for all ills: no arbitrary treatment and no tax worries. The profits made by the railways and the Sawah Lunto mines would be given to the people. The large estates would be divided among the landless. The communists were standing in the breach for the interests of the common man. They themselves were suffering for him. The general confidence was fed by the light thrown on world affairs by the native newspapers and by the optimistic colouring given to the comments on the growth of the international movement passed from the headquarters to the sections, from the chief leaders to the assistant leaders, and to each other. The whole world had
already become converted to communism, so it was reported, except the sub-district in which the people addressed lived. All the roots of Dutch rule had been cut — only the one in this region was still intact.

*Intimidation and terror.* Woe to those who, when by and by the world revolution should break out, were found with no red card! Today such a card could be had for a shilling, tomorrow it would cost two, and very soon it would be impossible to procure a card for love or money! In places like Silungkang, where the people were dependent on rice imported from outside, there would be no rice available presently, when the communists were in power. When the rice merchants had become members, no one could get rice even at the market unless he could show a red card. In other districts the communists managed to persuade the shopkeepers not to sell to a man who had no red card. In South Tapanuli, where coffee growing largely depends on coolie labour from Minangkabau, the owners of the coffee plantations were forced by this method to become communists so as to avoid being boycotted by the coolies. In and about Solok non-communists were boycotted at family festivities, funerals, and weddings, and in trade. And then there was still always the ominous threat of anarchistic attacks in those places. So great was the power of the communists, so weak was the administration. When the hour had struck at last, the Russians and the Chinese would come with battleships and airplanes to help the communists.

*The communist answer to the 'fascism' of 1925.* The PKI leaders of 1925 were right. It was not necessary to fear the so-called fascism in native society because it was not backed by an ideal. Furthermore it drove many people in the direction of communism because it made no distinction between evolutionaries and revolutionaries. The men prominent in the PKI realized that the masses join up with the strongest party and that communism would always find soil as long as the causes of discontent were not removed. Hence, after the fascism of 1925 an opportunity arose for the communist terror of 1926.

*Powerlessness of the administration.* There was no properly
organized local intelligence service; apart from a few exceptional cases, the European civil servants were such that they were almost exclusively dependent on the information made available by the native administration. Such information was under the given circumstances entirely inadequate, even apart from the fact that it was sometimes confused by corruption or the moral effect of the communist-anarchist terror or that it was made to veil the truth as a result of fear of the confidential report.

It was inadequate because the traditionalism of the administration clouded the insight of the authorities. Yet a well organized intelligence service would have been useful. The other provinces - Achin and the East Coast of Sumatra - sent undesirable elements back to the West Coast, in spite of Governor Whitlau's repeated protests. Among these persons were skilled communist leaders but also men who simply had somewhat advanced opinions. Both categories were welcomed by the communists of the West Coast, who received them with open arms, supported them, and assigned them leading positions. Some of these people were men who had never been back to Minangkabau since their childhood and had scarcely any relatives left in their old home. Hence they were most grateful to avail themselves of the opportunity to make a living as so many of the socially stranded had to live on the movement. The administration had not the necessary means to keep itself informed of what these repatriated persons - who for the most part worked underground - were doing and consoled itself with the deceptive thought that, although "a watchful eye must be kept on things", the outer quiet did not conceal anything untoward. One should consult the memorandum Governor Whitlau left to his successor in office and the political report on the first six months of 1926. Much administrative work - the offices of the contrôleurs were very poorly equipped - and excessive care for tax collecting and the upkeep of roads absorbed the attention of the officials.

*Traditionalism in the outlook on administrative problems.* We have given as the third characteristic of the administrative policy followed, traditionalism in the outlook on problems of adminis-
tration. Francis Delaisi recently declared in his book entitled *Political Myths and Economic Realities* that social changes are taking place gradually while the spiritual framework of society, the political myth remains.

The intellectual world, no less than the physical world, is subject to the law of inertia. The masses interpret events of the present day by the aid of traditional conceptions. They are prone to forget the facts, which do not tally with generally accepted ideas; they bear in mind only those which concern them.

The political myth of the West Coast of Sumatra has been for a hundred years the struggle between the *adat* party and the religious party, a struggle which may, indeed, present new aspects, but nevertheless determines the view taken of administrative problems. While in a former period the stereotype was *adat* versus religion, and no one analyzed the social forces which brought about the conflict, in more recent times the slogan, *kaum muda*, that is to say, the younger generation, has been added as a powerful phrase giving a satisfactory explanation of all difficulties.

*The absorption of former 'revolutionary' tendencies by society.* The religious life also shows signs of development, however. In Rao the old conditions are still found, though even there these are the products of the period of the *padris*, but the fierce turbulence of those days has been moderated by the evolution of a society which has absorbed the erstwhile revolutionary elements. In the Lubuk Sikaping district the administration of the *padris* and that of the *adat* were reconciled in the Besar nan IX, The Big Nine, which consisted of the five lords (*datuk*) and the four gentlemen (*manku*). Sundatar has in addition to the *rajah adat* a general chief of religion, just as Rao and its dependencies, the region of the Besar nan XV, has, besides the secular head at Padang Nunang, another chief as religious head, with representatives in Rokan, on the East Coast of Sumatra, and Pakantan in Mandailing. The village of Mahat, in Suliki, shows the rudiments of this in two dignitaries above the village head, the *rajah adat* and the *rajah ibadat*, both of whom are of little practical significance any more, however. Religious offices and religious teachings have got into a rut there
which would cause great annoyance to more educated persons.

The profession of priest has fossilized into a hereditary adat position once more. When people with knowledge of the holy books come into such a district and call attention to the decay of religion or to errors that have crept in, they too are nowadays called modernists, however outmoded their erudition may be.

And yet the phenomenon is many decades old. That it has not yet penetrated to a region of this kind is simply due to the comparative isolation of the area.

About 1890 the lively propaganda of the Naqshibandiyyah Brotherhood alarmed the administration. It rained instructions: it was ordered that in the regular reports the official interest in the intensification of religious life had to be shown, and the instrument of the adat had to be set to work against the religious reformers and zealots. The community, however, absorbed this spiritual current as well.

The Naqshibandiyyah now enjoys official approval - it promotes peace and order. The first opposition of the religious modernists, whose aims in this respect ran parallel with the rigidly orthodox views of the older teachers, was antagonistic to the heretical 'innovation' of the tariqahs. New distrust - but in religiously old-fashioned Talu, Lubuk Sikaping and Rao we also find the tariqahs pining away under the pressure of the materialistic spirit of the times.

One factor which, apart from the natural dislike of the conservative section of the population for the new and unknown, lurked in all such new conflicts, was the fact that the traditional social system did not furnish a satisfactory place for the authority of the free religious dignitaries, that the prestige of the religious teachers extended beyond the adat relationship. And then there was the professional jealousy between the adat priesthood and the new element which availed itself of part of the 'voluntary offerings' prescribed by religion.

We have already dealt with the struggle against matriarchic heredity law, which began during the days of the padris and was carried on under the leadership of Ahmad Chatib at Mecca
about 1894 and then again greatly disturbed the civil authorities. The social causes and points of contact, such as the forming of one-family households, were discussed at the same time.

'Neutrality' in matters of religion,81 which in practice often expressed itself in a silent struggle against the religious teachers, drove the latter - often quite involuntarily - to assume a reserved attitude, sometimes even a hostile one, towards the authorities, who were unbelievers: an attitude which it was quite easy to rationalize from the standpoint of religion. Hence all resistance against the government easily found religious teachers who were both able and willing to attach to it the ideology desired by a religious-minded population. For instances of this we need only turn to the taxation troubles of 1908 and 1918 and the attack on Padang Panjang of 1915, although the latter was rooted simply in the easily understandable personal resentment of a single tariqah sheik.

However, all the above was put in the shade by the struggles carried on by the kaum muda and the kaum kuno82, though this conflict - which reached its high watermark in 1919 - has lost much of its virulence owing to the developments of recent years. Apart from a few die-hards on either side, the antithesis between the two religious groups had become less sharp. They have become more or less reconciled to each other, as it were, and if now and then the smouldering hostility burst a new into flame, that is due for the most part either to hidden professional jealousy of a newcomer trying to make a place for himself in the community or to the fact that some latent social conflict of long standing has come to a head.

Kaum muda became so easily acceptable as a slogan because its many-sided meaning covered every sort of modernism whether religious or political. Hence it is a grave mistake to suppose that it was only the religious kaum muda who played a part in the communist propaganda.

It was the most respected Naqshibandiyah sheik who carried on propaganda for communism on a religious footing at Chupak, in Solok.
In Muara Sipongi, in South Tapanuli, there was also an old-fashioned Naqshibandiyyah teacher who was well known on account of his knowledge of charms and performance of magic and whom the famous Mohammed of Padang Panjang used as a tool by means of which to introduce communism via a Sarekat Pandaraman. The object of the society was at first said to be to collect money so as to enable the indigent to enjoy a religious retreat characteristic of that order. Later the aim was defined as mutual aid and the support of all needy and oppressed persons. The society was to be popularized by his pupils.

In Sungai Sarik, in Pariaman, the propagandist was Sidi Dje-madi, a respected teacher of religion belonging to the Shattariyyah and known for his proficiency in secret knowledge. In Ulakan it was Labai Kadir, also a member of the Shattariyyah. At Pulau Tello the propagandist was even a supporter of the pacifist Ahmadiyyah.

In Tanah Datar the practitioners of the secret teaching of invulnerability did good business in those times of unrest. In this connection, too, the communist leaders knew how to adapt themselves to social conditions in their agitation to 'resist', only 'resist', as Semaun cried at the Sarekat Islam Congress in 1916.

Kaum muda and communism. The greatest religious teachers of the kaum muda - Hadji Rasul, Sheik Djambe', and Hadji Abdullah Ahmad - were hostile to communism. The last of these three was challenged by Hadji Muhammed Nur Ibrahim, when not yet a fugitive, to debate with him in public. Sheik Djambe' had to beg repeatedly in November, 1926 to be allowed to speak against communism in public. (After which the opinion the demang concerned had of him changed.) Hadji Abdullah Ahmad and Hadji Rasul83 tried to persuade Hadji Bahauddin of Sawah Lunto of the error of his ways, as they had previously tried to persuade Hadji Datuk Batuah. Hadji Rasul washed his hands of the school of the Sumatra Tawalib, when it proved to be going in the wrong direction. Sheik Djambe' expelled Ramaja and Muchtar (the latter not a communist) from his surau, or college, when they began mixing politics with religious instruction. Hadji Rasul was abused for his anti-communist views in the communist
newspapers, such as *Njala*, and at the communist meetings, for example at Pajakumbuh, and was also blamed for the exile of Hadji Datuk Batuah.

But the distrust felt by the native administration — and hence also by the European civil service which took its cue from it — in regard to the *kaum muda* remained as great as ever, and so no use was made of the willingness of the important religious teachers to take a stand against the communists. Sheik Ibrahim from Parabek, who was not a partyman nor even a convinced follower of *muda*, went so far as to request that his lessons in religion might be regularly supervised, so as to save him in the name of Allah from being suspected. On 3 November, 1924 he had already expelled both Sadruddin — who later became a section leader — and Rustam from his school for religious instruction because of their communistic propensities. The notes made by Sadruddin, which were seized in Benkulen, contained fierce attacks on Hadji Rasul and Sheik Ibrahim of Parabek, as well as against Sheik Djao and the *Mohammadiyyah* at Padang Panjang because of their anti-communist views. The society just mentioned had, indeed been founded by Sheik Djao as a bulwark against the threatening communistic stream. Yet for all that it was regarded with distrust by both the *adat* chiefs and the administration.

On one occasion when Sheik Djambe' gave a lecture in Pariaman on religion and was asked at the end of his talk for the meaning of a verse from the *Koran* constantly quoted by the communists in their propaganda against the Dutch rule, he was even forbidden to give an answer. And yet, as early as 1924, *Persatuan Guru Agama Islam*, the association of modernist religious teachers, had declared itself opposed to communism and stated that that doctrine could not be brought into line with Islam. Support from that quarter, thus, was not made use of. The persecution to which the teachers of religion who did not support communism were subjected, particularly in Padang Panjang, finally drove even them to keep silent and hold themselves aloof.

*Religious elements in communist propaganda.* Nor was there anything specifically modernistic in the propaganda of the commu-
nists which was religious in tone. To realize this one need only read the anonymous leaflet sent from the West Coast to a number of teachers of religion in South Tapanuli, in Jambi, and, presumably, in Minangkabau as well.

Let no one speak ill of the communists, for whosoever does that is a *kafir*, an unbeliever. There are, after all, four ways in which a man may invalidate his being Moslem: (a) by doing a thing of which he has no knowledge, (b) by not doing a thing of which he has knowledge, (c) by, lacking knowledge, being unwilling to learn from those who know, (d) by speaking ill of those who do right.

Re (a): Those who speak ill of the communists without having first become communists and without knowing anything about communism, do that of which they have no knowledge.

Re (b): Although it is well known that one should not speak ill of a thing one does not know, nevertheless people speak ill of communism and thus do not do that of which they have knowledge.

Re (c): Although people do not know what the aims of communism are, yet they are not willing to ask for information from those who know, and thus they join those who know not and yet are unwilling to learn from those who do know.

Re (d): By speaking ill of the communists, who really desire what is right, a man becomes guilty of speaking ill of those who do right.

The communists really do desire what is right, namely that religion, *adat*, and prosperity should all be improved.

1 Has not Allah said, "Do not obey the commands of the *kafir*"? And what do we do?

2 Our *adat*, which used to govern us, yea and what not, have been ruined by the government and the capitalists.

3 Now we work only for the benefit of the capitalists, not for the benefit of ourselves and our families.

In all these matters the communists seek to bring improvement. The hour has almost struck!

Whoever joins those who do right, does right himself. Whoever joins the ranks of those who do wrong or give it their approval, does wrong himself!

The communists wish to do right but are prevented from so doing by the capitalists. Whoever does not join the communists and whoever speaks ill of them are themselves capitalists.

Whoever, when the time shall have come for the fight against the Dutch, is not communist, has ranged himself on the side of the *kafirs*. Otherwise he would have become a communist. Think it over.
It is plain to see that there is nothing modernist in all this. We have here a document written after the manner of the religious teachers and intended simply as a means of inciting the people against the unbelieving government. That was the spirit which animated all propaganda. It was no use to touch on the points of difference between the *kaum muda* and *kaum kuno*, only an appeal to Mohammedan feelings as such and speculations on religious antitheses and instincts were appropriate when making propaganda. Suitable texts form the *Koran* which could be taken out of their context and twisted to suit the propagandist purpose were used to strengthen the oft-repeated argument. For has not social psychology taught us that a powerful suggestive influence is exerted by such repetition of "a simple statement of emotional facts, whether true or false"? The masses believe only what they want to believe, namely, that which accords with their wishes and desires. It was only too well known that religion was the week spot in communism and hence it was imperative to show clearly that communism and religion, communism and *adat* were one and the same.

**Identification of the Antichrist with capitalism and of communism with the Messiah.** The images selected to be used were therefore taken from familiar conceptions. The capitalists were the *Dajal* of which the religious teachers preached — the appellation applied to the eschatological figure of the Mohammedan Antichrist and a term of abuse in common parlance. This identification at the same time suggested the redemptive advent of the *Mahdi* — the Messiah. Thus the gospel of the eschatological ideal republic also was made 'communized' and incorporated in propaganda!

**The catchword 'capitalism'**. We have already called attention to the effect of the catchword 'capitalism'. Once more it is social psychology which has taught us that incomprehended foreign words are so powerful as catchwords because each of us can load them with his or her own effects. For, as Lowell remarks, "Public opinion is usually the flattering substitute for private opinions and public emotions".

That catchword 'capitalism' became even more effective when
'translated' into the Minangkabau language, as *kapi*, the Minangkabau equivalent to *kafir* or unbeliever, plus *setali*, the Dutch twenty-five cent piece. Thus two 'complexes' could react to the word *kapisetali*, namely, the feelings against the unbelievers, the *kapi*, and the feelings against the scrape-penny, the money-grubber, the skinflint *par excellence*, the tax-demanding government. It was also these complexes that the above-mentioned anonymous piece of writing sought to stimulate.89

*Modern religious schools.* We have already quoted Delaisi on the political myth as follows:

The masses interpret events of the present day by the aid of traditional conceptions. They are prone to forget the facts, which do not tally with generally accepted ideas; they bear in mind only those which concern them.

There was, indeed, some outer justification for suspecting the religious *kaum muda* of sympathy with the communists. For did not these *kaum muda* - like their Arab co-religionists on Java in the past in the struggle of the *Irshad* against the supremacy of the *sayyids* - demand the recognition of the equality of all men before Allah, on the authority of the *Koran*? And did not this sound suspiciously like the ideal of *sama rata sama rasa*, equality for all?

More important, however, was the religious teaching at the school of the *Sumatra Tawalib* at Padang Panjang. Just as the communist leaders had managed to get a hold on the students of the teacher training school, so also had they succeeded in enticing the pupils of the theological school to a course on communism. Thanks to the influence of Hadji Datuk Batuah, the school was later driven in the direction of communism. As a matter of fact the aim of the propaganda carried on in both the institutions was the same, namely, to introduce communism into the villages *via* the students.

For the rest, the school of the *Sumatra Tawalib* had been established, on the one hand, because religious education was lacking in the government schools and, on the other, because the outcome of government instruction was disappointing, since the graduates of the Dutch vernacular schools (*Hollands-Inlandse*
scholen) found it hard to obtain employment and were still always in an inferior position to the young people who had passed through the European schools. And now came the graduates of the Padang Panjang educational institution, who had already been infected during their school days with communist ideas, and the community was unable to furnish jobs for them all, in spite of the fact that the school of the Sumatra Tawalib was highly reputed because of the competent religious teachers who had taught there (the late Zainuddin Labai, Hadji Rasul) and that the system of instruction there was, as is fashionable these days, more or less adapted to modern requirement. The graduates found it hard to make a living, the little schools they established soon went downhill, payment of school fees was irregular. Quite a number of pupils did certainly come to them after leaving the government schools when these increased their fees; they tried evening and afternoon lessons for government school pupils, but the struggle for existence remained difficult. The ideas inculcated while they were at school were given a real basis in the circumstances of their lives, and 'communism' seemed to be in accordance with the spirit of the times - society was ripe for it. And so it came to pass that many former students of the school of the Sumatra Tawalib became propagandists of communism, as did also many elementary school teachers, graduates of the training school. That communist leaders like Ramaja, who had religious convictions, were more apt to belong to the kaum muda than to the old-fashioned trend of thought, is, of course, natural enough.

The political myth of the West Coast. This was, however, not the point of vantage from which the native administration and parts of the European administration looked at the state of affairs. 'The political myth' remained: distrust of the teachers of religion — although there were exceptions — and particularly of the kaum muda.

The guru ordinance of 1925. And then a remarkable thing happened. While the government was for political reasons still hesitating to declare the guru ordinance in force on the West Coast — the ordinance which merely demanded from the reli-
igious teachers that they should keep the government informed as to their activities - it was suddenly decreed in various places that a man must ask official permission for giving religious instruction. Great was the dissatisfaction among the teachers of religion, who felt very much injured because their age-old rights were ignored, particularly because some of their number who had been able to teach for years unquestioned were now refused the necessary permit on the ground that 'the penghulus' did not wish them to have it. In places where this had not been heard of within the memory of man, it appeared with equal suddenness that there existed an adat which placed the religious teachers under the tutorship of the penghulus.

The traditional apparatus of adat set in motion against religious teachers. Here, too, the lack of expert knowledge made itself felt and the native administration, the education of whose members was usually not adapted to modern needs, was given free play. The apparatus of adat was set in motion after the traditional manner against bold teachers of religion with somewhat advanced ideas who were suspected of being communists because they were kaum muda. Petty nagging, which naturally aroused embitterment among the victims, was regarded as the course of wisdom. For instance, teachers who were highly respected in their villages and whose only fault was that they belonged to the modern religious group were bothered in the following way: when they wished to give a party in connection with some domestic event such as a baby's first bath or the wedding of a sister's child, or when their pupils wanted to honour them by coming in procession to offer them a sacrificial animal, the authorities devised transgressions of adat law in order to put a stop to the festivities or disorganize them and then punish the persons concerned 'in accordance with the adat'. The most hateful thing in all this was that the people recognized the hand of the administration in it. Love for the adat was certainly not strengthened by such doings!
The grievances. As we have seen, there were grievances among people of every category — grievances which the communists systematically encouraged, brought to a head, and made conscious. There were grievances among the penghulus, who saw the respect shown them of yore, the prestige, dwindling, under the pressure of the processes of social development, their age-old ulayat rights assailed by the agrarian decree and the forestry regulations, themselves ousted from their ancient position of power by the more intensive administration of which they were often obliged to be the roughly handled tools; there were grievances among those of them who had been put in the shade by the sifting of 1915; there were grievances also among the religious teachers, who felt they had been driven into a corner; among the orang cherdek pandai, the educated people who knew themselves to be superior in knowledge and insight to most of the penghulus but did not enjoy social satisfaction in accord with their capacities; among the orang banyak, the ordinary people who because they had not yet outgrown a product economy still had to find a living out of the undivided family property but were nevertheless haunted by financial worries; among the younger generation, who, often overestimating the value of the little schooling they had had and more worldly-wise than others, felt the burden of the rigid social system in all its weight pressing upon them and the traditional framework of the community hemming them in.

Political signification of the grievances. To estimate the political significance of these grievances it is of no use to try to decide whether the conditions, as compared with the conditions elsewhere, justify them or not in our opinion. For the only aspect which is important in this connection is how the people concerned regard them.

Even if we can now prove successfully that at the beginning of the sixteenth century the peasants were not so badly off economically as their
champions insisted when describing conditions, the peasants themselves regarded their circumstances as unbearable and the terrible rebellions they organized give witness of how heavy a burden — at least in their own view — weighed upon them. We may be able to make the most detailed computations showing that the system of monopolies and capitalism of Fugger, Welser, and others meant an economic advance and did not influence the rise of wheat prices — yet Luther's contemporaries and public opinion everywhere were under the impression that the economic evils of those days were rooted in the rapacious usury of the great business houses. Not conditions themselves, but opinions regarding conditions, move men to action and cause suicide, conspiracy, or revolution.91

Kemerdekaan. For all these grievances communism offered one redemptive word, the magic word kemerdekaan! Each person who heard it could interpret the word in accord with his own desires and the fulfilment of his dearest wishes. 'Freedom':95 to one person it meant a return to past, almost legendary glory, to another freedom from tutelage, to a third freedom from statute labour and taxation, to a fourth freedom from social restrictions, to a fifth freedom to take revenge for what he considered injustice. The alluring voice of the gospel of freedom conjured up before the mind of each the fata morgana of a Utopian dreamland of his own particular kind.

But the past also has its attractions. It has the illusive charm of the 'good old days', when the troubles which harass us now were unknown. This phantasmagoric idyll too was revived by the communist leaders: capitalism, they declared, the government by unbelievers on which everyone projected his grievances, had disturbed also that idyllic condition of things.

De Man on the psychological motives of the labour movement. In a remarkable book, Hendrik de Man,96 a Belgian social-democrat whose war experiences shook his convictions, has recently analyzed the psychological motives of the labour movement and Marxism. He argues that the socialist labour movement was not the product of capitalism but "the result of the effect of capitalism on man's pre-capitalistic conceptions of morality and justice".97

This connection becomes most evident when we turn to the
very early history of the labour movement, for the first ideas held by the labour classes were defensive in character.

At the time when the factory and home industry entered upon the scene, the working classes began to feel that their position was growing worse. One of the first leaders of the movement of those days, whose writings are still extant, the radical publicist Cobbett, in 1807 explained the purpose of his life in his Political Register when he said: "I hope to live to see the day when the poor people of England will once more be as they were in my youth".

The deterioration in the position of the labourer did not mean, in most cases, a reduced income. The majority of those who became wage-earners were not the previously independent artisans or farmers, but people from the workhouses! The children of farmers, who worked in the factories as well, usually did this because they earned more there than their forefathers did on their own bit of land. The reduction of personal income took place only in the case of the one-time village artisans who had become wage-earners in the home industry system and it was those very people who evinced the least energy when the first class struggles took place, as, for instance, in England in the first half of the nineteenth century. That which on the other hand drove the factory hands to defensive war was not so much the loss of income as the loss of independence, of joy in their work, and of an assured living.

Tension between rapidly growing needs and less rapidly increasing remuneration. Another provocation was the increasing tension between rapidly growing needs and less rapidly increasing remuneration. Then there arose a feeling that the ethical and juridical basis of the new system did not accord with the traditions of the old.

The feeling of inequality and the religious expectation of improvement in conditions. This process still continues and fosters even now among the working people a state of mind characterized by the feeling that they are unjustly exploited, oppressed, that men's circumstances are unequal; by the thought of the solidarity of all labourers and the religious expectation of a better condi-
The resentment against the middle class involved in all this was caused not so much by its members being wealthy as by their being powerful. This social advantage in power is regarded as an injustice.

The resentment against privilege in power. The industrial capitalist is not only a rich man who spends a lot of money. The means of production which he possesses give him a power over the lives of his workmen. In place of the responsibility rooted in kindliness which one used to feel towards one's countrymen came a system which demanded for its own benefit a penniless proletariat and a reserve army of unemployed.

The conflict of new and old norms. This was contrary to the ethical basis of the method of production encouraged by the agricultural and artisan system, according to which anyone who wanted to work was supposed to have at his disposal the necessary tools and the opportunity to make a decent living.

The possession of economic and political power. Very soon the legal consequences of the greater political power the new class of capitalists had acquired thanks to the limited franchise began to come into evidence: they used that power for legislation which cleared out of the way all previous impediments to free disposal of property. They also controlled the courts which applied the new laws. They made the armies and other instruments of power of the state into instruments of power of their own class supremacy.

These are the facts which from the very beginning gave to the strikes, rebellions, and political movements of the European working classes the character of moral resistance to a class supremacy felt to be unjust.

The social inferiority complex. What drives the working man to join the class war is not the simple rational process which makes him recognize the profitable but a much more complex psychological fact, a fact much more deeply rooted in the emotional nature: the social inferiority complex.

According to De Man this complex is the result of a repeated or chronic frustration of the sense of self-satisfaction. The emotion which supplies this lasting associative complex of emo-
tive conceptions with energy arises from repressed consciousness, from the belittling of the 'I' in the subject's own opinion. That feeling produces resentment towards real or imagined causes of the belittling and endeavours to find expression in acts of the will which put an end to the condition and free the subject from his lack of self-respect. This social inferiority complex manifests itself less and less as psychological submission and more and more as an urge towards freedom.

The same phenomena on the West Coast of Sumatra. The parallelism to be traced between the above psychological development and that observed on the West Coast of Sumatra is not far to be sought: here too a disharmonious relation between old standards and new and, arising from that, a sense of impotence, a growing feeling of inferiority, a longing for the old freedom — which, although, objectively considered, it was far from 'freedom', satisfied the sense of justice at that time, — a harking back to the old system of justice, a craving for freedom!

The case of Sawah Lunto. The case of Sawah Lunto is a typical one in this connection. It is impossible to find out at this date whether or not the opening of the coal mines was accompanied by actions contrary to the previous agreement: the government did certainly buy the ulayat rights several times, and between 1905 and 1914 compensation was undoubtedly paid for sawahs, though it was slight. But this is not the main point, nor is the disturbance of the psychological relation between the farmers and their land, which becomes increasingly intensive as land grows scarcer and thus all the more valuable considering the current method of production. Nor can the dissatisfaction on account of the mines at Sawah Lunto be explained by reference to trouble caused the surrounding population for years by runaway chain gang workers, who often terrorized the country around in organized bands.

The discontent aroused by the government plant at Sawah Lunto - a 'socialized' industry even though the socialism is 'state socialism' - is not confined to the immediate neighbourhood, but has spread all over the West Coast. It is rooted in other psychological
factors. The mining industry in the catch phrase of the communist leaders - which reflects their feelings pregnantly - *harus dikitakan,* 'must be made mine'. This phrase gives voice to the sentiment that all men have an equal right to the satisfaction of certain needs. "The land is ours and will always be ours, but other people walk off with the benefits of it." And one can repeat over and over again that the profits derived from Sawah Lunto benefit the people at large and that the native population living in the neighbourhood enjoys economic advantages such as it never had before, and all on account of the mining industry; one can even point out that the profits are uncertain, that the mines are worked at a loss, that the coal does not sell ... but the people do not believe a word of it all. Do they not see trains loaded with coal starting off for Emmahaven every day? And the business increases.

And even if personal confidence in the speaker makes the population accept his statement, there still remains the discord between the traditional view of justice and the new order, the feeling of inequality before the law. "Whose are the fine houses and the large salaries? Who are obliged to content themselves with subordinate positions?" Here again the smarting inferiority complex, fed by the feeling that one cannot take the exploitation in hand oneself, expresses itself in resistance and actions which - since the development of a 'complex' presupposes a hindrance that impedes the fulfilment of a wish - become sublimated images of action under a phantasmagorical, ideal system of justice.

Typical in this connection is the effect of a speech in which a district official tried to refute the objections raised by the population against the granting of an exploration permit that had been applied for. The future mining industry - this was the perspective which the official with the best intentions conjured up - would bring prosperity to the poor village. The men would no longer need to go elsewhere to make a living for they could find work in the mines, and their wives would be able to earn money as *ayahs* in the town which would soon be built - one had only to think of Sawah Lunto!
So that’s all we are good for — coolies and ayahs! Would it not be better for us to keep for our descendants what was left us by our forefathers until we ourselves can take the exploitation in hand?

The significance of communist propaganda on the West Coast of Sumatra. It is this discord between the traditional standard of justice and the present-day order, this sense of inequality before the law, this feeling of inferiority - in connection with the administration of justice, the forestry service, education, public life, and official relations - which is being fostered, brought to a head, and made conscious on the West Coast by communism, which has also created, notwithstanding all mutual grievances, a feeling of negative solidarity in resisting the undue pressure of the present system of justice. The metaphor of the sapu lidi, the bundle of sticks, each stick of which was incapable of doing anything alone, but which as a united whole was able to sweep, has taken hold of the popular imagination. After all, the inferiority complex has given nourishment to a growing consciousness which may now be termed one of the characteristic traits of native society. That is the lasting result of communist propaganda to which any policy with regard to Minangkabau will have to be adjusted.
THE NATIVE RULERS
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THE NATIVE RULERS

It is since the events at the end of 1926 and the beginning of 1927 in particular that the problem of the native rulers, their influence on the people, and their place in the administrative system of the Netherlands Indies has invited attention in the press and the People's Council. The relevant discussion, in which feeling has often run high, have been dominated by three themes, namely "People's Chiefs or Government Chiefs", "Let the Regents in Java Remain People's Chiefs", and "The Position of Intellectuals in the Present System". On 17 February, 1927 the Civil Service Department submitted an 'Explanatory Memorandum from the office of the Administrative Affairs of the Outer Provinces' concerning government policy. I believe that it might be rather illuminating to remove these questions from the troubled sphere of political struggle and argument and to try with you today to subject the meaning and scope of the concept of 'People's Chiefs', in this country in particular, to systematic scrutiny.

The history of the social evolution of western Europe has, with all its local variations, caused us to distinguish between a number of different types of political organization, some of which are also met with in the history of other parts of the world. These types, which we shall now briefly describe, are themselves, of course, 'superhistorical', being abstractions from reality. They are simply norms for judging historical fact in all its multi-coloured diversity.

The first type we have in mind is the primitive usually genealogical, agrarian 'community', organized on the lines of an association and possessing its own economy. A small, homogeneous
group of equals, it turns for leadership to the heads of its families, one of whom personifies the group's unity, as a *primus inter pares*. There is no question of command, of the imposition of will. Its natural internal discipline is founded upon unanimous agreement after ample mutual consultation. The communal character of the society forces mutual respect upon its members. To the outside world it expresses itself as solidarity. The only authority is that of the group spirit, the only sanction that of public opinion and his common veneration of ancestors. The ruling spirit is one of conservatism — to leave everything as the ancestors have 'established' it. The communal character predominates. There is hardly any room for the development of individuality. Territory, labour, interests, traditions, customs, opinions, ideology, endeavours, and recreation, all are communal. The essential characteristic of this type of organization is its static nature, the essential condition for the preservation of the communal character its limited size, which in turn is determined by the system of production followed. If the group expands, it threatens to disintegrate. Either the malcontents secede and form a group of their own, which group ultimately severs the last remaining ties with the mother community, or the group dissolves into smaller groups which display only a loose coherence.

The second type we wish to discuss is known as the 'kingdom' in all its variegated forms and phases of development. It is an organization either of authority or of power, depending on whether the wider union absorbing the heterogeneous local groups is, or is not yet, borne by a new group spirit of higher order; that is to say, whether or not the *mechanical* union has developed into an *organic* whole. In each case the ruling authority has to make up the deficiencies of either the group spirit or the spirit of the various local groups.

According to prevailing theory the origin of the kingdom is based on conquest. This introduces a new element into the small, hitherto autonomous, 'natural' community: the imposition of will from outside. The genealogical group, or, in the case of
settlement in one place and relatively dense population, the territorially organized group, becomes a subordinate part of a larger whole. An attempt can be made to withdraw from the latter and to follow an independent course, as far as this is possible, but nevertheless the essential characteristic of the kingdom is still the tendency — however imperfectly realized in practice — towards the subordination of its component parts to a single objective, the will of the ruler, even though this must necessarily be adapted in greater or lesser degree to prevailing conditions. Here lies the core of the power conflict between the kind and the local notables, a conflict which is only solved by the rise of the 'state'.

The situation is otherwise if conquest is followed by actual occupation. If conquest merely amounts to incorporation into a wider union in which the groups composing the union preserve in the main their identity, a local ruling class can maintain its traditional position within its own group relatively unimpaired. In this case, the king is merely a primus inter pares. "Sire, nous sommes vos sujets, mais avec nos privilèges!" Should occupation follow, however, there are two possible developments. Either the local ruling class mingle with the new rulers, in which case it derives its authority from the new ruling class, or it is of necessity relegated to an inferior position: it loses its essential social function and in time its traditional social significance as well.

The kingdom unites a number of coordinated or subordinated peoples under the authority of the king. The still primitive condition of the roads and means of transport precludes very close contact between the central authority and the various territories, whose institutions are thus able for the most part to remain intact. Obligations to the kingdom are usually limited to paying homage at court from time to time, offering tribute, and rendering military service in time of war.

A change comes about in the character of the leaders of the primitive communities: henceforth they have not only to act as intermediaries for the will of the central authority — if, that is to say, the latter has not already entirely eliminated them — but the support of the central authority opens a possibility for them
to advance from being *primi inter pares* to being ruling notables, in so far as they are capable of this. The opportunity has been created for the rise of a primitive aristocracy, if, that is, the superior will of the central authority does not assert itself too coercively, but leaves room for the development of an autonomous local authority.

Should the kingdom comprise a number of smaller principalities, it displays a tendency to tighten dynastic links by marriage alliances.

Another means of establishing the authority of the central government, one already met with in ancient Babylon, China, and Egypt, is the appointment of the king's confidential agents as governors or vassals in the different territories. This opens a way to the very highest offices for deserving *ministeriales*, even — indeed often — for those of humblest origin. Yet neither does the *ministeriales* system escape decentralization. For out of these *hominies novi* there develops in turn an hereditary professional nobility which intermarries with the ancient nobility, or which seeks, in its turn, to free itself from the central government. Their success, too, is determined by the aptitude they show for exercising and exploiting their function in the given social constellation.

A third method of binding the territories to the central authority is the creation of a hired guard of praetors whose purpose it is to make the king independent of the aid of his vassals. Here again, however, the result is that the guard seeks power for itself. Therefore, neither the creation of an officialdom nor the formation of a hired army provides in itself the solution to the struggle between the kind and the aristocracy.

Two classes thus begin to become clearly distinguishable in the kingdom: an active and a passive one, a ruling class composed of the king and the aristocracy, who, although their interests are mutually antagonistic, are, in principle, originally as one in their attitude towards the people, and a class of subjects, the *misera obediens plebs*. This social structure can survive for centuries, although the composition of the upper class undergoes repeated change — as witnessed also in western Europe. Old families die out, are exterminated, are driven out by *hominies novi*: but the
social structure remains. Whether observed from close by or from a wider viewpoint, the interests of the ruling class predominate, even though a personal factor in its relationship to its subjects, a certain patriarchal intimacy, is preserved — which, however, does not stand in the way of personal whims of favour or displeasure. The interests of the ruling class predominate, but in the exercise of government lie already the germs of an administration, in class interests the germs of the promotion of the general good.

After the kingdom we may mention the 'state' as the third type of political organization, in which the state prevents the disruption of the component parts of the kingdom and makes the local notables more effective in its service. Kings sometimes managed to achieve this by seeking support for their authority in certain social classes, with whose help the supremacy of the aristocracy was broken. But by so doing, they aroused forces which, in the West, in the form of the democratic nation, were eventually to limit the range of absolute monarchy.

By then, however, the ruler state has given way to the welfare state: the interests of the monarch, who was himself the state, have had to yield to those of both king and people, until the people themselves acquire sovereignty.

As long as a Naturalwirtschaft, or goods economy, predominates, the eventual feudal disintegration of the kingdom is inevitable, partly because of the absence of communications. The most formidable weapon the king can employ to protect his position against the provincial nobles is at best the principle of divide and rule: the isolation of the insubordinate in order to be able to restore his shaken prestige by physical force.

This ebb and flow in the division of power, this fluctuation between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies has often been essentially a question of personalities. Under weak rulers the dissolution of the kingdom into its aristocratic divisions was marked, whereas under strong rulers monarchical discipline flourished...²

This cycle persists until a money economy, which makes possible a centralization of authority, puts an end to it.
Under a primitive goods economy the national treasury is able to profit little from the revenues of the more remote territories. These are used on the spot by the local rulers, who remain petty princes aspiring to independence. The king's treasury, which has to depend principally upon the income from the royal domains, is accordingly in a state of chronic decline. Yet it is indispensable, even under the feudal system, for the maintenance of the king's authority and power. The central authority is dependent upon its own local creatures, noble or otherwise, who exercise immediate control over the economic foundations on which domination rests. The money economy, which makes it possible to pay salaries to removable state officials, to strengthen the finances of the state, and also to maintain an independent hiring army - together with improvements in road communications and changes in the technique of war, - provides the indispensable condition for the king's emancipation, however. The summoning of the knights and the local auxiliary troops is no longer necessary. The ascendancy of the local nobles is thereby broken, while they lose once and for all the economic basis of that ascendancy, the machinery of their power, and their monopoly of the organs of administration, which always tended to become hereditary. Although still privileged in the beginning, the aristocracy become citizens. Their characteristic task as a class of warriors, which was the essential feature of their social pre-eminence, has come to an end, and they do not, as a class, create a new task for themselves of equal order. Socially atrophied, the nobility hardens more and more into a caste. Insofar as they eventually become capitalist landowners, they form an economic class in company with others. As officers in an officer corps composed of heterogeneous elements, they transmit to the corps what remains to them of the traditions, ideals, and standards of the age of chivalry. Even their appointments in the machinery of government, which they originally secure by virtue of the force of historical continuity, have eventually to be shared with, or handed over to, others as the state changes in character and its various organs demand the employment of a different, technically expert staff.
We need not digress here on the subject of the democratic nation,\textsuperscript{3} which is so far unknown to the history of the East. Its rise is, indeed, intimately bound up with the evolution of modern capitalism, which provided other classes with a chance of developing in social significance, broke, in principle, the supremacy and the monopoly of the feudal aristocracy, and created a new social \textit{élite} to replace the old, socially a trophied \textit{élite} of the aristocracy. Just as in feudal society the social structure makes demands upon the leaders which differ in nature from those fulfilled by the \textit{primi inter pares} in primitive society organized on the lines of an association, capitalist society requires of its economic, intellectual, and political leaders quite different social qualities than those possessed by the feudal aristocracy. The character of the bureaucracy also undergoes radical transformation in the long run as a result of changes in social relationships. The idea of 'society' takes the place of the absolutism which gave it birth.

And then we have still made no mention of changes in the type of this new \textit{élite} as compared with the wholesale traders of former centuries, changes brought about by industrialization and later by the formation of companies, trusts, cartels, and so forth. Faced with structural change, the former leaders, who were the embodiment of outmoded forms of organization, are obliged to adapt themselves, if they can, or otherwise be trampled under foot.

The intellectuals now assume great social significance, not only in parliamentary life as professional politicians, for the filling of posts in the ever more bureaucratic party machines and for the manning of the government organs and the branches of increasingly differentiated government activity, but also in business and commercial life, as leading technicians and administrators, and in independent professions, and so on.

Historical reality, however, is not so schematic as this description of types makes it appear; it is richer and more complicated. Despite the frequent occurrence of rude shocks, a gradual transition can be discerned. We can also see in the event of structural
change, the survival of atavism, ossified traditional values which have their origin in the past but continue more or less to influence society, until the latter ultimately becomes aware of its actual worth (or lack of worth) and of the emptiness of the forms it assumes.

The first type of political organization we have discussed, the primitive community organized on the lines of an association, is also to be found in the Indonesian Archipelago. It is delineated most sharply and clearly in the writings of Adriani and Kruyt on the subject of the Torajas. Toraja society is based on parental law, but the same is found in the matriarchal Minangkabau society and among the patriarchal Gayos.

The task of the chief was completely that of a leader and the manner in which it was conceived can best be described as compromise today, tomorrow, and the day after. There was no question of compulsion; everyone's personality remained intact... The chiefs could do nothing that was not in accordance with the customary law. To leave things as organized by the forefathers is the sole aim of Toraja society. It is expected of the chief that he will preserve customary law and everyone is ready to assist him in that duty. The chief thus personifies the adat, deciding affairs in the same way as each of his villagers would have decided in his place, and always able to justify himself by appealing to the customary law. No one thinks of developing the society, for no one desires progress ...

As guardians of the adat, the chiefs were as good as substitutes for the ancestors. They were responsible for the observance and preservation of ancestral customs. For this reason the Torajas are fully prepared to abide by the will of their chiefs, for by this means they are relieved of their personal responsibility to the customary law. But the chief's decision must be wholly in keeping with the ideas of his villagers, otherwise he will immediately lose his influence, and therefore no chief will risk taking a decision against the wishes of his fellow villagers.

The Toraja chiefs were heads of villages inhabited by families. It is thoroughly characteristic of them that no one of them could — to use the Toraja expression — 'hold' an entire tribe. It may, however, come about that in ... a complex of [three or four] villages related by inter marriage, the chief of one of them stands out above the other chiefs by reason of seniority, ability, force of personality, generosity, and help-
fulness, while also being closely related to them, of course. In this case he is often consulted by the other village chiefs, so that it can be said that nothing happens in the three or four villages concerned, that is to say, in half the tribe, without his knowledge, or in other words, that he is as good as the chief of the four villages, or of half the tribe. This, however, is the most any Toraja chief has ever 'held'... [It did not, in any case, alter the character of his function.]

The villages... were situated at fairly large distances from one another and this was also one of the reasons for their rather large degree of independence and the relatively slight traffic between them. There were only two social classes, the freemen and the slaves. The slaves were the property of the family. The head of the family had direct command over them, while the younger members of the family, it goes without saying, also asserted their authority over them as far as they dared. But, for the rest, one man was as good as another in the village community, no one called himself the master of his fellow villager. The only criterion determining a person's position, superior or inferior, was the generation to which he belonged.

There was never any question of hereditary succession in the case of the Toraja chiefs. Other things being equal, of any two men considered for the position of future chief, the one whose father had been chief before him would have a slight advantage over the other; but that is all.

The office of chief was a position of honour in the full sense of the word... For chiefs who did much for the inhabitants of villages who lacked a strong leader and often found themselves in great straits, the villagers would lay out ricefields to repay them for the trouble they had taken. A chief usually received assistance with the cultivation of his own fields in proportion to the extent to which he had succeeded in making himself indispensable to his fellow villagers. A class of chiefs has never existed among the Torajas. Every free man could be chosen as chief. Even a man who had become an inhabitant of another village through marriage could become the chief of that village, should he be considered the most suitable man for the job.

The qualities this social élite had to possess, besides a knowledge of the adat, were first and foremost hospitality, audacity (including readiness to accept responsibility), eloquence, dexterity, and also pliability, the tact to respect the dignity of others.

We observe from this that in the primitive community organized on the lines of an association property does not determine social position, but that prestige and influence result from qualities that the community appreciates, that is to say, those which are social-
ly important in such a milieu. Social prestige results in turn in economic advantages, as we have seen.

In the case of some peoples of the archipelago displaying this type of social structure, the office of chief is hereditary in a given family or family group. (This often goes hand in hand with land disposal rights.) Birth, in this case, therefore determines social status and affords certain privileges. A slight degree of social differentiation develops, though there is so far no exercise of authority. Leadership in war — which is always temporary — is not necessarily associated with the office of chieftain, neither is the priesthood. As long as the administration of justice amounts, in principle, to negotiation between the parties, to ordeal or retribution, and to a family or group verdict, this, too, is no source of social distinction. Thus, in this case, also, we can hardly talk of a separate chieftain class.

Such hereditary succession in the office of chieftain does not in itself bring about any change in the social organization of the community. Here, too, the chief is not a ruler. That is not to say that the germs of command are absent in a community of this structure — we have already discerned that element where slaves were found — yet the group spirit checks its development among the members of the tribe, quite apart from the respect that is felt for the older generation. When there is imposition of will, it is due to the influence of factors outside the community.

Adriani gives a few characteristic examples of this. In the years preceding the occupation of the Toraja region by the Dutch, the To Pebato tribe had fourteen villages and consequently fourteen village chiefs. The To Pebato were being greatly harassed at the time by the To Napu, who extorted contributions from them in all manner of ways.

Among the fourteen To Pebato chiefs there was only one bold enough to tackle the To Napu; of three of the others it could be said that they were able to see that To Napu tyranny did not become too excessive, while the rest were a timid set who kept on good terms with To Napu by conceding all their demands.

The one courageous chief was Ta Rama. But even he abused
his power by tyrannizing his own fellow villages. Under pretext of wishing to prevent a recurrence of crimes, he required them to pay three or four times the fine allowed him by the customary law. He oppressed them in all manner of ways. He took away their breeding stock, suddenly promulgated all kinds of prohibitive regulations — in a word, he was a real tyrant. But as he was the only one who could keep the To Napu out of his village, many sought his protection, so that his village became larger than the other Pebato villages.

Another example was of a chief of a village at the mouth of the River Poso who received a piece of meat from a deer slain by one of the villagers. They feared a mad rush for power in their chief and threatening to remove elsewhere; then the chief could be 'head of his own house'. And when, shortly after this, the same man made known his plan to levy a toll on the vessels passing up and down the River Poso, the villagers gradually left, one after another, so that his house was left standing alone. This man's plans of domination had been inspired by the proximity of the Dutch settlement, which made him feel secure against all resistance.

As soon as the primitive village community becomes lastingly absorbed into a larger group, something else is required of the village chief, the exercise of authority backed up by a superior will existing outside the community.

This is analyzed the most keenly by Snouck Hurgronje in a comparison of the Achinese village chief with the Gayo family chief. Although something patriarchal still clings to the Achinese village chief, who is known as the father of the gampong, or village, this is much more so in the case of the Gayo family chief. In addition to this the latter's competence extends further and covers far more important matters than that of the Achinese village chief. The last-mentioned finds himself instantly restricted by his mukim chiefs and is completely subordinate to his regional chief. He cannot deal with important gampong affairs without the co-
operation of his superiors. The Gayo chief, on the other hand, does practically everything on his own and only requires the cooperation of another chief if the interests of the latter's anak buah, his subjects, are involved. He has no one over him. Under his supreme direction come not only the regulation of all community interests and the settlement of all disputes, but also the trial of all offences, including the gravest, incurring the death penalty, all without orders from above and without appeal.

All the same the personal power of the Gayo chief is slight, in many respects slighter than that of the Achinese village chief. The latter, who for his own community is also the representative of far higher authorities, can, with their backing, induce the inhabitants of his gampong to accept many things they by no means like. The Gayo chief can only do those things with which he can be sure the leading kin group members will concur. Any decision contrary to their will would simply be ignored.

The primus inter pares, head of the primitive community organized on the lines of an association, is only recognized by his fellow villagers - who are always jealous of their freedom - as long as they believe him to speak with the voice of the adat. His refusal to abide by the will of the majority simply leads to the appointment of a new chief. Within the limits determined by the adat, he enjoys a certain prestige - as long, that is, as he fulfills the social demands set by his function - yet he enjoys no authority.

This explains the difficulty experienced by the administration in such districts with regard to the 'people's chiefs' it recognized. They were not obeyed; they could not give orders. And in this respect it matters little whether such areas are simply brought under direct rule or formed into autonomous districts. The village chief's task remains just as difficult. For the prestige he derives from the adat is insufficient for the promotion of interests lying outside the realm of tradition. If he exercises authority, the sanction for that authority resides outside himself and the community. Experience has shown that as a rule the old chiefs are useless in their new function.

The administration has in some cases appointed its own chiefs,
but the people remain jealous of their traditional freedom. Elections have been introduced — here I will remain silent about government influence on the result of the elections, of adjustments of the results, again on the part of the administration, and of bribery or pressure exercised by the candidates — but all the same the man 'chosen' to be chief is no 'people's chief', although he may at times be so styled. His power is not based on tradition. It has not grown organically. He is an official. The same is the case with the so-called 'adat district chief', who likewise is no 'people's chief'. In the event of his proving incapable, he is immediately dismissed, whether he was originally an adat chief or not. In practice he is and remains essentially the instrument of the overruling will of the administration, the same as many another 'independent' prince, the same as the demang, a local official, although on paper the Civil Service Department denies the latter 'authoritative power' as well. Whether he is head of an autonomous community or not, under the administrative system at present in force the 'adat district chief' maintains the closest contact with the autocratic administration, which sets the pace.

The age-old self-sufficiency, the 'autonomy' handed down from the past, has been brought to an end. The chief's new functions result from the enforced amalgamation of the community into a larger union, which imposes its own arbitrary demands. These functions can, it is true, become rooted in society in the long run, but they have not done so up to the present, while the coercive initiative still originates from outside.9

This is also the reason why it has not been possible so far to create a new hereditary aristocracy in such districts. The social structure provides no room for it. In those places where local exercise of authority has existed from of old, this has inevitably changed in the course of time for the same reason. Compared with former times the difference between the world of thought inside and outside the community is now too great. Western leadership determines the norms, imposes the demands. In all cases these intermediaries are first and foremost the instruments
of a superior will existing outside the community. That is their actual function in practice.

The second type of political organization we mentioned was the 'kingdom', which according to current theory owes its origin to conquest. How is the emergence of the rule of authority to be explained in this case?

The will to power, stifled in the community itself by the supremacy of the group spirit, can only express itself in the treatment of aliens. The subjection of the latter to the power of the conqueror, together with the significance of his success for his own group, forms the basis of the conqueror's prestige among his people. The mass of the people, hesitant to accept responsibility itself, has a need to be subordinated and gladly follows the admired leader, as long, that is, as he is able to keep it under the spell of his superiority and to maintain and develop, in normal circumstances, the success he achieved in times of emergency. His prestige acquires thereby a new basis. The pressure of the masses increases the respect felt for the leader and as a result his confidence in himself, which again, in its turn, stimulates confidence and tractability in the masses. Authority once accepted grows automatically, even beyond its original orbit. If it becomes stabilized by virtue of the passage of time, the power of habit accomplishes the rest. The new element has become part of the society: a new structure has been established. Then, as long as in the opinion of the public the rulers do not fail in the essentials of their social function, their authority is maintained.

In the archipelago we find this type represented, for example, in the small Malay coastal princedoms of former and more recent times, many of which turned towards Java in previous centuries, their rulers coming periodically to pay homage to the Javanese princes and bringing them offerings, upeti. Further, these rulers often deliberately copied Javanese institutions in their own countries in order to identify themselves with the supreme rulers and to acquire new lustre from them. A curious fact is that the ruling families are often of mixed blood. They have intermarried
with Javanese or Buginese elements. Some are even of Arab descent, just as some regent families on Java are also of Arab or even Chinese origin.

The Malay princelings’ own authority became weaker the further one penetrated inland. Law in the primitive subject communities usually followed its traditional course. In some cases, however, it was forced out of existence. Elsewhere the legal structure underwent a modification. The chief’s ancient right of disposal continued to exist as of old but was henceforth interpreted as derived from the mark of favour, the *karunia*, of the ruling prince. If intervention became rather more active, a certain link was forged with the central government by means of *ministeriales*, whose task it was to collect the taxes, or by the appointment of chiefs from whose new authority the primitive communities withdrew as far as they could. Here we note the emergence of a new element, which brings with it social prestige, individual status, and certain privileges, namely, official office.

The history of the archipelago shows, however, that loosely constructed kingdoms of this kind are not based exclusively on conquest. Sometimes they resulted from the debtor bondage in which the more wordly-wise inhabitants of the coastal districts succeeded in keeping the backward peoples of the interior, who were dependent upon them for certain products; this again resulted in the long run in the imposition of will coupled with the exercise of authority. That authority sometimes originated because the dispensation of justice between tribes or communities required organizing. Sometimes disputes arose between primitive communities which had come into contact with one another, which disputes they could not settle alone. They therefore sought an arbiter, whom they found among the potentates of the coastal families, regarded by them as beings of a higher order. The latter thus enjoyed an authority often coloured by magic, although this did not lead at once to the exercise of authority. All the same the opportunity for it had been created for suitable individuals, given the appropriate social constellation. The mystical-magical element in kingship, springing from mythological ways of
thought, is another powerful factor for the maintenance of
prestige. Finally, under conditions of chronic political unrest the
rule of authority could develop in certain areas by reason of the
fact that small landowners placed themselves under the protec­
tion of the larger landowners and thus fell into the position of
praedial serfs. They then became equivalent to those in debt
peonage. Here we see the property element giving rise to the
formation of social classes and the exercise of authority.

It is, however, on Java that the kingdom based on conquest is
found in its most characteristic form during the course of the
centuries. Take, for example, the Empire of Mataram in the
days of Sultan Agung (1613-1646), the crowning achievement of
the politics of expansion already set on foot by his ancestors. In
it Sultan Agung transformed the greater part of Java, which
during the disintegration of the sixteenth century had known
only a certain hegemony exercised by Demak and later by Pa­
jang, into a more solid unit once again. Yet the component parts
of the kingdom display a loose coherence.11

It is not until the days of his successor Mangkurat I (1646—
1677) that we find an energetic attempt to put the idea of the
'state' into practice.

Whereas Agung caused the subjected autochthonous princes to
remain at the court and had them bind themselves to him through
marriage alliances, in order to keep them within reach under his
supervision - in other words, the independent landed aristocracy
was forced to become a court nobility, — Amangkurat I brought
them all to his court and, afterwards, did not rest until he had
destroyed every one and all those associated with them. He
placed the administration of the provinces in the hands of
ministeriales, whom he constantly replaced in order to nip in the
bud any aspirations to independence.

He made money taxation the norm in order that the central
government should profit from the revenues of the provinces, but
when even this measure failed to produce adequate funds, he
farmed the provincial revenues out to his ministeriales in exchan-
ge for a fixed annual sum. He did the same with the import and export duties, which he brought under a separate department. Foreign trade became a state monopoly.

Here, too, the attempt to form a state out of a society based on a goods economy and with an underdeveloped system of communications failed, as it had done everywhere else. It ended in a débâcle, leaving the Dutch East India Company in command of a large part of Java. But when the Company took over control, an autochthonous aristocracy no longer existed.

The regents it encountered were ministeriales, bearing the titles of kyai, tumenggung, ngabehi, rangga, and kentol according to their respective rank. The noble titles of pangeran and raden were reserved to the members of the royal family and the autochthonous aristocracy against whom Amangkurat I's fury had raged with such radical effect. But the authority these ministeriales had over the people did not suffer as a result, even though their function was not hereditary. It grew out of the social structure.

From the very beginning, however, the Company showed a tendency to recognize the principle of heredity. It aspired to ally the interests of the regent families with itself. Yet it was not able to maintain this policy, notably because the sale of offices in the eighteenth century presented an obstacle. Neither did it leave the regents' authority intact. The compulsory cultivation it had introduced automatically led to interference in the internal affairs of the regencies and to inspection of the native plantations and the regents' management by superintendents (ex-soldiers) whose courtesy and good manners often left everything to be desired. Whether the regents signed a deed of alliance, as did those on the northeast coast of Java, or received a certificate of appointment, as in Priangan, it made no difference to their actual position. The Company's attitude came to be determined more and more by economic considerations and the significance of its 'barrier' policy towards Mataram fell steadily into the background. The Company never had any clear idea of its own constitutional position or of that of the regents — it simply did whatever its commercial interests seemed to prescribe. It was
only when plans for a revision of the system came up for consider­ation that it began to theorize. And then the various legal constructions were designed to serve the particular goal in mind. They were of no importance in daily practice.

Daendels crippled the power of the regents still further, placing them under the direct authority of the prefects, introducing his superintendents everywhere, making the regents state officials and treating them as such, and giving them a place in the general hierarchy. Raffles, the English lieutenant governor of Java who succeeded Daendels, went still further. He divested the regents of all political influence, reducing them to mere police officers. They were not permitted to have anything to do with the land rent. Neither Daendels nor Raffles would admit the principle of heredity. When the Dutch commissioners general began their work in Java in 1816, after the end of British rule, the position was such that the superintendents had also taken over the functions of the police, and "practically everywhere the regents were treated with contempt, being excluded from all share in the govern­ment". This was at the time the mood generally prevalent, a mood typical of periods in which real authority has only just established itself, when a new system of colonial rule has been wrested from the hands of tradition. The slogan of the day was Raffles' dictum: "come into direct contact with the people". This was the outcome of the humanitarian principles which had begun to blow over from Europe towards the close of the eighteenth century, the "new philosophy of philanthropy" against which Nederburgh had fulminated in 1802, but by which Raffles too had felt himself impelled, when his Dutch adviser Mun­tinghe had exhorted him to adopt a practical financial policy. These liberal or humanitarian ideas exercised so powerful an influence on public opinion that from henceforth every proposal had to be defended as being in 'the interests of the people' — the culture system as well.

"The idea prevailed almost everywhere among the European officials that the regents could be considered as superfluous cog-wheels in the administration...", as Van der Capellen pointed
out.\textsuperscript{14} This, for him, was going too far. Although care had been taken to ensure that the regents did not recover their former influence, he wished, like Raffles, to retain them for the time being, for political reasons — their influence had to be exploited. Therefore Van der Capellen in 1820 framed a regulation on the subject, which, however, brought about no change in prevailing ideas.\textsuperscript{15}

Consequently in 1823 he even transferred some European officials as a punishment, but as early as 1827\textsuperscript{16} it was once again necessary to recommend the residents (the erstwhile prefects), "most earnestly and with all emphasis, to treat the regents and other native headmen graciously and with distinction on all occasions". Again, during a tour of inspection in 1834, Baud punished a number of European officials who had failed in this respect.\textsuperscript{17} In 1837\textsuperscript{18} it was even judged necessary to record the demand in the \textit{Staatsblad}, the promotion of European officials being made subject to compliance with the provision concerned. In 1859 a confidential cabinet circular was once again required to remind the officials to observe the rules of courtesy toward the regents. But in 1893\textsuperscript{19} even the regent of Demak, so highly esteemed at the time, is still found complaining about the "humiliations" which the native officials, both high and low, had to suffer at the hands of the European administration, and the \textit{controleur} De Groot\textsuperscript{20} asks for a proper regulation, "for at the moment it is left to the pleasure of the European officials whether or not they treat the native headmen with deference". He requests a regulation, not a confidential cabinet circular, saying, "It is remarkable how little attention European officials pay to the government's cabinet circulars".\textsuperscript{21}

Meanwhile, since the appointment of Van den Bosch the government had come to adopt different views. The reasons for this were the Java War (1825-1830) and the introduction of the culture system (1830), for which Van den Bosch considered he would need the regents' help and influence. He therefore promised, in the name of the king, to restore them to their 'for-
mer position', a promise which, acting on Van den Bosch's instruction, Baud repeated during his tour Java in 1834.

The Constitutional Regulation of 1836 consequently left the native population under the leadership and direct authority of their own rulers, as far as conditions permitted, and this principle was maintained in the new Constitutional Regulation passed as al law in 1854. The peculiar position of the regents found further expression in that regulation in the recognition, within certain limits, of hereditary right. The government had wanted to go further in this matter, but the objections brought forward in the Netherlands parliament resulted in the imposition of certain restrictions. On the occasion in question the minister admitted that the principle of heredity was an innovation which found no support in the Javanese adat. The intention was precisely to render the position of the regents more secure than it had been under the Javanese princes. Van den Bosch and Baud had already testified to this effect.

Here, then, we have come to the guiding principle of our colonial policy, which is to leave the native population under the leadership of its own rulers, a principle which has been recognized by conservative statesmen, but also by liberals such as Fransen van de Putte. The instructions issued to successive governors general have emphasized it yet again. Nevertheless we have observed an uninterrupted series of complaints in the course of the nineteenth century regarding the regents' diminished prestige. Viewed in the light of the lessons of practical experience, this principle of government had all the appearance of being a mere slogan, at best a piece of self-delusion.

Let us now try to get at the real meaning behind this mystification. Historical inquiry is, indeed, always the best cure for illusions regarding the 'good old days'.

At a given moment the Company was placed in control — and later in possession — of certain areas. We have already seen that it still looked upon itself as a commercial body, even though circumstances forced more and more sovereign power upon it. It
was, however, far too busily occupied with the promotion of its trading interests to become aware of its true position. It remained an alien body in reality existing beyond the pale of Javanese society. Consequently it could leave that society a large measure of autonomy. It was interested solely in the products, not in the population. It made contacts with the regents for opportunist reasons but its interests - and its interest - did not range beyond the products. On account of those products its interference was gradually intensified. It began to appoint regents, in Priangan it stationed superintendents, and so forth, but there was no real question of political fusion between the Company and Javanese society. The Company remained an alien body.

Daendels is the first to fuse or, more accurately, to unite the various heterogeneuous elements into a single union under a Dutch canopy. With this the mechanical state of the Dutch East Indies comes into being. As result the upper class in the native society automatically loses what up to that time had constituted the essential factor determining its position. Its function — and with it its social status — has changed.

Inevitably the regents, who had so far been left alone, become officials. By means of an improved system of roads the territory is transformed into a unit. The regents are placed under the orders of autocratic residents. Raffles goes even further in this direction. The residents acquire still greater powers; the competence of the regents is still further curtailed. The distances from point to point and the means of communication available do not permit the centralization envisaged. As a consequence the authority of the residents waxes still further. And when afterwards the commissioners general commence their inquiry, it appears the the regents are, in fact, regarded as superfluous. Van der Capellen's paper instructions are of as little avail in attempting to counteract this as were those of later times. The autocratic authority of the residents will tolerate no second autocracy alongside it; neither can it afford to do so. The mechanical state is maintained. The regents do not fulfil the demands set by the new, more energetic government administration. They
cannot keep pace with it. There is a growing conviction that supervision is necessary.

Then Van den Bosch creates the culture system and Baud carries it through, although both consider it a makeshift. Its sole motivation is the depleted finances of the mother country which must be restored by 'favourable balances'. The interests of the Indies do not enter into the picture. The culture system is the wish of the administration of the absolutist state of the Dutch East Indies, which imposes it in the name of the government in the Netherlands. In order to carry the scheme through, the administration considers it necessary to respect the native professional nobility, but in such a system the regents themselves can be nothing other than the performers of a task imposed on them from above. Whether they like it or not, they become plantation overseers. They are tools without a will of their own, and their fitness for office is judged accordingly. This is the source of the continual conflict between the residents, who are responsible for putting the system into practice, and the administration, which is still under the spell of its illusions. The history of the Company's intervention is now repeated in the context of the new state order. The culture system must be as productive as possible. Accordingly supervision is tightened up, including supervision of the regents' behaviour towards the people, which still displays many atavistic features. And once again the question arises whether the regents are really necessary, whether their emoluments are not ridiculously high in proportion to the actual services they render, whether one could not make do with the patis, the regents' head assistants.

Then, about the year 1850, the opinion gains ground in Holland that things are going wrong in the Indies. The advocates of 'free labour' demand personal freedom, freedom of work, and the free disposal of land for the Javanese. The culture system will have to make way, they say, for private enterprise. In justifying its policy the government linked the culture system and the preservation of the regents' traditional position indissolubly together.
The liberals of the 'colonial opposition' now increasingly oppose this latter policy, owing to an inherited dislike of the feudal class, and also of the policy of government interference in economic affairs. A demand is made that a check should be put on the extortions suffered by the Javanese at the hands of his own rulers.30 'Philanthropic' ideas begin to play an ever larger part in the conscience of the people.

The government resists the pressure of private capital and in doing so is obliged to appeal to the interests of the Javanese, who would doubtlessly be exploited by private enterprise. The culture system, it avers, defends his interests! Philanthropic ideas spread to the Indies and in their turn they, too, influence the estimate of the regents. Holding fast to its 'principles', the government in 1859 considers itself called upon to react to this in a confidential cabinet circular:31

Further, consequent upon the tendency ever more apparent of late among Europeans in general, and therefore also among some officials,32 to fail to treat native princes, regents, notables, and their relations with that distinction to which they are in all respects entitled, which tendency, as far as officials are concerned, has been remarked chiefly among those who have only recently finished their studies and who, still imbued with recollections of their recent past, are not able to adapt themselves at once to the unfamiliar environment of their new office, often receiving and imparting as a result impressions which it is better timely to check, civil servants in positions of authority are recommended in all earnest to observe Article 66 of the governor general's instructions, which reads: "The governor general shall ensure that both the native population and its heads be treated leniently. He shall preserve, as far as is possible, the prestige of the influential native families and seek to associate them ever more closely with the Netherlands administration. Officials who act contrary to this principle, and who treat the native princes and heads in a scornful and improper fashion, will be dismissed from the civil service."

The Constitutional Regulation of 1854 is a compromise between the two schools of thought. The first school of thought, that of the government and Baud,33 holds that the Netherlands Indies form an 'exploitation province', a possession, which besides providing for the welfare of the native population must also continue to furnish the Netherlands with that material profit which was
the aim of conquest. To guarantee this profit by peaceful means it is necessary to preserve the existing social structure and therefore to leave the native population as far as possible under the direct rule of its own heads, continuing to have it governed in accordance with its ancestral institutions and customs. The second school of thought is that of the liberal opposition, which is humanitarian but instigated at the same time by political and economic ideals, and which postulates as the aim of Netherlands government in the Indies the welfare of the native peoples. The former seeks support for its ideals in the native rulers, the latter in the people, whom it seeks to protect from their rulers. The necessity of the latter is also admitted by the government, just as Van den Bosch, too, had recognized it earlier.34

The dualism which resulted from this compromise dominates administrative policy in the ensuing years. Policy halts between two opinions; but in proportion as liberal ideas gain ground with the change in the spirit of the age, the absolutist state of the Netherlands Indies makes way for the welfare state, which still remains, however, under autocratic rule. The favourable balances — that is to say, the surpluses made over to the mother country — come to an end and the interests of the native population — as conceived by a paternal administration — are promoted. The administration is to protect the native — from his own heads and from the private businessmen. The familiar antithesis between the government official and the private businessman dates from this time. Naturally this trend of thought is also reflected in policy regarding the headmen and their position as officials. As time goes on they become increasingly 'de-feudalized'. The emancipation of the people is applauded.35 Years ago a regent once said:

Formerly the principal matters in which the small man felt himself to be the servant of his master, the regent, were religion, justice, and bondage. The first is now neglected by many regents; the second they are obliged to share with others, while it is, moreover, subject to the European administration's supervision; all that still remained for a few years was the third — in its entirety. By reason of the rendering of services the members of the desa, the village, were the abdis, the servants,
of the regents and headmen. The latter could still dispose of their services; but not so you Europeans. 'They felt we were their masters. By the abolition of these compulsory services, the last close link between master and slave has been broken.30

The abolition in 1867 of the apanages, which Van den Bosch had revived, and the remuneration of native officials in money, the final abolition in 1882 of the compulsory services to officials, the panchen services, which had already been curtailed on several occasions previously, the prohibition of compulsory deliveries of rice at disproportionate prices, the improved organization of the compulsory services rendered to the administration, the suppression of the percentages on cultures, the termination of the culture system, the dwindling of the regents' pomp and ceremony and the restriction of the homage paid to them were all products of the liberal trend of thought which made increasing headway in the second half of the nineteenth century,37 drawing the government along in its wake.

The government was repeatedly made aware in the process that the situation it had regarded as stationary was actually subject to change, though it did not fully realize the consequences. The privileges it abolished 'no longer accorded with the times'. The office of regent was purged of its atavistic features, the regent becoming more and more of an official and ceasing to be a dignitary. Moreover, greater efficiency in a number of respects had inevitably to be demanded in the execution of the task laid upon him. The office changed in character throughout the whole administrative system. Whereas in former times the residents had shown themselves desirous of administering without the regents, even though the government had wanted to make use of the regents' authority in the Dutch interest, now their actual function became no more than that of a minor cog in the official machinery, according as the absolutist state of the Netherlands Indies was gradually transformed into the bureaucratically governed welfare state of the Netherlands Indies. Moreover, the tenfold increase in the population and the increase in size of administrative districts still further undermined what re-
mained from the feudal era of the patriarchal element in the native community. Neither did the native administration avoid being swept up in the general course of events. It was obliged to surrender ever more of its personal features, and become coldly official. Insofar as the office of regent still bore its own characteristic stamp, it was due, apart from the regent's knowledge of his own people, to the peculiar structure of native society, in which the differentiation between a working class, middle class, intellectual class, and so forth, typical of western European society, was lacking. Heredity played a rôle of secondary importance here. It would be interesting to produce figures showing how many regent families existing at the beginning of the nineteenth century — it would not even be necessary to go back as far as the days of the Company — have succeeded in enduring to the present day. Such an investigation would show that despite the government's principe admitting the right of heredity in the function of regent, homines novi infiltrate time and time again and succeed by the second generation in completely adapting themselves to the style of living of the older professional nobility. As colonial minister, Pahud\(^{38}\) had to defend the Constitutional Regulation in the Dutch parliament and in doing so he followed the same course as two of his predecessors, J. van den Bosch and J. C. Baud. As governor general, he had to put the Regulation into force. And yet we find a contributor to the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië stating that: "It is remarkable that the suspension of regents has been most frequent since the principle of heredity was incorporated in the law."\(^{39}\) Some of the factors obstructing the preservation of the principle had already been foreseen by Van den Bosch\(^{40}\) and Baud:

This is, at the moment, very often difficult, even unworkable, because the sons of the native rulers have no opportunity to acquire the accomplishments which are indispensable to the native official. They often grow up in idleness and ignorance and when the time comes for them to be assimilated into the corps of officials the government is not infrequently placed before the alternative of either appointing a useless servant or deviating from a salutary principle.\(^{41}\)
As early as 1845 Minister Baud had for this reason already entered into correspondence with the then governor general, "regarding the establishment in Java of training institutes for the sons of the Javanese heads". But it was not until 1879 and 1880 that such schools were founded; moreover, even by 1893 the instruction they afforded had still not assumed the character of vocational training. Despite the government's positive instructions to the effect, in practice it was still not ascertained on appointment whether the new regents possessed a diploma or not. The maintenance of the unpaid clerk system, the magang system, so undermining for the character, was preferred. This prejudice against vocational training was in part a reflection of the eternal controversy regarding education by practical experience versus education by instruction, which does not appear to have been fought out to an end in other places either. But on the other hand it also demonstrates the slight value set upon native officials in the general framework of the administrative system which we observed earlier. Even with the change in aim of colonial policy and the rise of the Netherlands Indies welfare state, the regents merely remain "a sort of dignified interpreters".

In 1893 the Second Chamber discovered that the prestige of the native rulers in Java was no longer what it had been. An exchange of letters took place on the subject between the government in the Netherlands and the Indies administration, the latter seeking the advice of a number of different persons. The counsel of one of them, that of the regent of Demak, R.M. A. A. Hadiningrat, who was at the time very highly thought of in government circles both in the Hague and Batavia, was published in 1899. In his opinion, the new principles of colonial policy, which necessarily brought the European administration into direct contact with the population, caused ever higher demands to be set upon the European officials in the way of general education, and:

...since, in general, the native heads remained at their former level of education, this, too, provided a reason why native officials were no longer consulted, a fact which could naturally do no other than undermine their standing and prestige.
According to him an improvement could only be expected if the native officials were to be equipped first of all with "education and new ways of thought".48

The training was improved but was still far from being made general; besides, it was always behind the times.

The early years of the twentieth century saw, in the Dutch East Indies as elsewhere, the commencement of the imperialist era. Once again the task of administration was given a new direction, once again it became dualistic in character. In addition to the opening up of the country, complete assimilation of the Indies into the world community, into the production system run according to Western standards, free admission of capital, and unhampered introduction of Western methods, the administration is also required to promote the interests of the native population, which means government intervention. The latter must, in the first place, set itself the negative goal of seeing that the people do not lose by contact with Western production, but must also have the positive aims of educating them both to prosperity and the ability to handle their own affairs.49

In this manner the task of government becomes ever more complicated and varied. The state of the Netherlands Indies still retains its mechanical character. On account of its function in international life the Western government sets the tempo and the standards, and given the existing system, the position of the native administration continues to be a very subordinate one. For this reason the present emancipation cannot signify genuine liberation. All the same, the introduction of the councils is symptomatic of a change in the relationship between the native administration and the people which presupposes or renders inevitable a new orientation of the system of government. From the historical, sociological, and psychological point of view a new type of social élite is required for this purpose.50

With the appearance of modern trends in society the everyday task of administration also undergoes change, though it seems at the moment that under the influence of these trends the traditional antagonism between the European and the native ad-
ministrations and that between the European administration and private enterprise are beginning to diminish.

What is the real nature of these modern trends? As we saw at the beginning of this address, the evolution of modern capitalism has made possible the rise of new social classes. First of all there is the working class. The history of England up to 1848 and of Germany between 1871 and 1890, for instance, demonstrates the serious disturbances in the established order to which the birth of a labour movement can give rise. The business and intellectual classes also had to put up a fight against the rigid class structure of feudal society to win a footing for themselves.

The course the struggle has taken in the different countries has varied according to their social structure. In England, where the process was more gradual, there was no antagonism between the ancient aristocracy and the new middle class which grew up from the seventeenth century onwards. Neither, generally speaking, did an intellectual class displaying an individual character of its own develop there, as it did in Germany. In France, however, there was an evident joining of forces between the capitalist bourgeoisie and the intellectuals against the ancien régime, both having taken 'liberty and equality' as their slogan.

In Japan the rise of capitalism did not give rise to disturbance, because the new capitalists originated from among the old feudal aristocracy. In Russia, on the other hand, there was originally some antagonism between an emergent industrial capitalism and the feudal classes. There, however, the rise of the labour movement brought about a rapprochement between the two groups. Eventually, though, the intellectual class, although liberal in origin, felt itself the more attracted to the working class the more the czarist regime denied it a sufficient social task.

The evolution of the intellectual class in Russia is too remarkable to pass over without a further word on the subject. Actually it was not a separate and distinct social class, but an intermediate layer between other classes, a zwischenständische Gesellschaftsschicht. It was not so much an economic as an ethical social
group. It was recruited from various classes, the landed nobility, the different levels of the bureaucracy, the officer corps, the liberal professions, and the working class. Thus the various strata of the population were all represented in its ranks and it consequently sought to promote the interests of all levels of the population. But the composition of this group of intellectuals underwent a change in the course of time. Up to the eighteen sixties it bore the stamp of the aristocracy, the officer corps, and the higher ranks of the bureaucracy. It was joined later on by other ranks, the upper layer of the urban bourgeoisie, the professions, authors, publicists, and the like, who formed its leaders until the eighteen nineties. During that period the group's influence continued to be limited to a relatively small circle and found no echo among the masses, for which its ideas were too visionary, too fantastic. It was first and foremost an ideological group, a Gesinnungsgemeinschaft, yet its aim was nevertheless social reform. Like the French idealists of an earlier period, it had a tendency to design utopias entirely divorced from reality, since its members were unable to test their ideas out by means of satisfactory practical work in society. But then, towards the end of the nineteenth century, its basis was broadened by the rise of the labour movement. It assumed a Marxist bent. Leadership fell increasingly into the hands of the petite bourgeoisie, even, in some places, of the proletariat. Thus the group's structure underwent another change, bringing it into touch with the masses. This was the situation at the outbreak of world war in 1914.53

The large-scale development of capitalism, which in the Netherlands Indies set in at the beginning of the present century, coincided with the emergence of what is usually referred to as the 'ethical trend' in colonial policy. Its principal achievement can be said to be the extensive expansion of education in behalf of the native. The question of the social results of that education did not as yet attract attention. Students leaving school were absorbed into the wide field of government activity, which was becoming ever more extensive and differentiated, and into the
world of private business with its varied demands for personnel. Thus in the Indies, too, capitalism created a means of existence for an intellectual class, bearing the stamp of an education which was, by virtue of its origins, still liberal in character. And here, too, the history of western Europe is beginning to repeat itself, though as elsewhere modelled according to the local pattern of society. I shall not talk here about the signs, becoming ever more distinct since 1918, of a rising labour movement, which, from time to time, is already displaying Luddite and Chartist traits. Neither shall I mention the rising class of small-scale businessmen. Here we are only concerned with the intellectuals among whom — as must a priori be expected of such a class — live the ideals of 'liberty and equality'. A typical phenomenon in this respect is the fact that the more promising descendant of the 'ancient' priyayi, or noble, families, whose hereditary rights are to some extent guaranteed by the Constitutional Regulation, tend more and more to turn away from the idea of a career in the native civil service. This phenomenon is not entirely new, as is sometimes thought nowadays; it was already attracting the government's attention a decade ago. The grounds for the dislike do not lie primarily in the rate of remuneration; it is due in the main to the nature of the administrative system as such and the spirit that pervades it. Consequently such people prefer to turn to the liberal professions or to other branches of service which are freer of the old traditions and afford a better approach toward the ideal of equality. They attain thereby the social level of the highest class in the European colonial society, although, with things as they are at present in colonial society, they are not as a rule admitted into that class. On the other hand, the professional nobility does not usually deny them the jus con
nubii, whatever their origins may be.

The presence of the Europeans has given rise to different standards of social assessment.

My address has come to its end. It is not the place here to draw political conclusions from our observations. It was, indeed, pre-
ciscely our aim to remove the problem from the sphere of political strife. But I may, perhaps, be permitted one remark, since it concerns a matter of interest to education. It is clear that a great task has been assigned to the Batavia Law School with regard to the future political development of these regions. It would bear witness to a shortsightness utterly fatal in its consequences, if the students leaving the Medical School and the School of Technology were to be regarded as of greater importance to society here in this country than our alumni, and if educational policy were to be determined by such a view.

_Caveant Consules!_
Excursus

THE POSITION OF THE REGENTS FROM THE DAYS OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF 1854

As a consequence of the Macassarese and Madurese invasions of eastern and northern Java and the disunity among the sons of Mangkurat I, the Dutch East India Company was forced to interfere in the internal affairs of the empire of Mataram. The result was that in return for its help the Company was placed in charge of the government of several provinces and harbours. The regents it encountered there were the 'farmers' of the provinces who also attended, among other things, to matters of foreign trade. In the beginning the Company merely wished to be assured of the supply of the products it required, and its interests stopped short at that. It could therefore leave the regents' position as good as intact, and did that also to ensure their loyalty and to use them as a counterbalance to influence of Mataram. It was not averse to their emancipation from Mataram. For the time being the Company required nothing more. Besides, political and economic conditions did not permit anything other than decentralization. Nor was the Company from the outset disinclined to binding the interests of the regent families to itself. But this was not in order to promote their authority over the people. That authority had been just as powerful in the past, in the absence of hereditary right; it did not originate from the hereditary nature of the office, but from the structure of society. The regents were, after all, nothing other than ministeriales. They bore the titles of kyai, tumenggung, ngabehi, rangga, and kentol according to their respective rank. The noble titles of pangeran and raden were restricted to the members of the royal family and of the autochthonous aristocracy, who were attacked
so violently by Mangkurat I. The abuse of the titles dates from a later period.  

Let us now trace the later development of the Company's policy with regard to the native rulers.

In order to understand the matter properly we must recall that apart from the state of Jakarta, which it had "conquered by force of arms", the Company came into possession in 1677 of West Priangan, in 1678 of the town and territories of Semarang, in 1705-1706 of Cheribon, East Priangan, and of the territories of Sumenep and Pamekasan on the island of Madura, among other places; on Madura it had been making its influence felt since as early as the period 1681-1690. In 1743 the remainder of the island of Madura was added to its possessions together with other acquisitions, also Surabaya with its dependent regencies, Rembang, and Japara; the remaining coastal districts between Cheribon and Semarang, a strip six hundred rods broad along the shore, and similar strips along the banks of all the rivers flowing into the sea; and finally, the extreme east of the island of Java, which, however, was not actually annexed until 1767 and 1768. To these were added Malang and Bangil in 1771. In the meantime, the formal 'cession and surrender' of the entire Empire of Mataram had taken place, which empire had shortly afterwards, in 1755 and 1757, been split up into the territories of Surakarta and Jogjakarta and that of the Mangkunegara (1792 and 1796). Kedu, Pajitan, Grobogan, Blora, Jipang, Japan, and Wirasaba were not ceded until 1812, during the period of the English interregnum, and Banyumas, Bagelen, Madiun, and Kediri not until after the Java War, in 1830.

Up to the time of Daendels' governor-generalship (1808-1811), a difference existed between the regents of the northeast coast of Java and those in Priangan as regards their relationship to the Company. The former signed a deed of alliance, referred to by Daendels as a 'contract' — which, however, merely contained a summary of obligations, — and had to meet the so-called quotas.
The regents of Priangan received a certificate of appointment and had to see to deliveries. Daendels put an end to this distinction. However, he maintained the so-called 'Priangan system', which the Company had inaugurated, as did also the English interim government. Even after the introduction of land rent in other areas, the system remained unaltered in principle, until 1871. (Van den Bosch's culture system of 1830 was inspired by it.) In the main the Priangan system amounted to the following: the government levied no taxation in Priangan, but the population there was obliged to cultivate and deliver supplies of coffee to the government at a price the government itself fixed; the native regents received no salary but were authorized to raise taxes from the population on condition that they paid the salaries of the subordinate native heads.7

In the days of the Company, the disparity between the legal position of the regents of the northeast coast of Java and of those of Priangan, to which disparity Daendels put an end, did not however make any practical difference in the government's attitude towards the regents nor in the way in which they were treated by government officials. In what follows I shall, however, be speaking primarily of the regents of Priangan,8 concerning whom De Haan has collected such an abundance of information in his standard work Priangan.

Initially, trade remained the prime object — the Company wanted products. If the delivery of the products was irregular, the procedure was to 'exhort' the regents to deliver. It was not long, however, before stronger language was being used.

The Javanese heads, who, in spite of earnest recommendations and satisfactory payment, [remain disinclined] to collect in the animals and bamboo required, must be told in severe terms that they are liable by virtue of the Company's sovereignty to provide those services they had been obliged to render under the Javanese kings without, in those days, receiving anything in return.9

Whereas the prices paid for products were originally fixed by negotiation with the regents, these were soon being determined by the government alone and forced on the regents as a unilateral
regulation. The government decided what and how much had to be delivered and the regents had to see that everything was done as required.

The compulsory cultures which resulted from this procedure soon called for inspection and improvement and were therefore subjected to supervision. Tours of inspection were made for the purpose. The Company took upon itself more and more the allure of a sovereign power. At periodic intervals the regents were obliged to come and pay their respects at Batavia. Moreover, disputes between the regents themselves induced the Company to intervene and settle matters. It hesitated all the same to punish regents for neglect of their duties. For whereas economic motives forced the Company to interfere within the province of the regents’ authority, political considerations caused it to abstain. The more the Company’s authority established itself (1705), however, the more economic interests secured the upper hand. For that matter, the Company’s local officials already allowed themselves to go further in dealing with the native heads than the government in Batavia dared. From December, 1704 onwards the Priangan regents received certificates of appointment, but their instructions remained vague. In those days the regents were in practice only dimly aware of their subordination to a sovereign, supervising power. Gradually, however, their powers were curtailed. They were no longer permitted to appoint the district chiefs themselves, even though they had to provide their salaries. Van Imhoff concerned himself with the internal administration of the regencies. First the resident of Cheribon and later the government interfered energetically even with the reserved right of the regents to administer justice, so that nothing remained, for instance, of their judicial powers in penal affairs. They were treated more and more as officials. With the requisitioning of compulsory deliveries of coffee at a greatly reduced price determined by the Company, the government’s voice had, indeed, already become more commanding. In 1726 the native heads were forbidden “most strictly, on pain of being put in chains” to uproot coffee bushes “since they were rooted on
Company land which they have in their possession only by virtue of the Company’s good will until further notice, and whose usufruct they enjoy”. The decline in cultivation, which resulted from the reduction in price, was attributed to the extortions of the native rulers. The appointment of European overseers was therefore considered. When, a few years later, a surplus was feared, the native rulers were then compelled to destroy the coffee bushes and to switch over to the cultivation of pepper instead. In 1789 they were issued with instructions for cultivation and overseers carried out inspections to see that those instructions were adhered to, their income being made partly dependent upon the output of coffee. In the meantime the regents were falling ever more deeply into the Company’s debt, in part because of the system of advances. In 1800 they were informed of ”the government’s legitimate displeasure” at the small coffee crop, which was attributed to carelessness in plucking, collection, and delivery. The regent of Chianjur was threatened with the government’s wrath if he failed to do his best ”to make good the past by energetic action”. The regents were made responsible and threatened with punishment in the event of failure. Regents were now on repeated occasions even dismissed. Supervision and inspection were intensified. Action had to taken against extortionist practices on the part of the regents. With the introduction of annual inspections the expressions of dissatisfaction and serious reprimands became more frequent. The Priangan regents were entirely dependent upon the commissioner for native affairs, whom they:

are used from childhood to respecting as their God and whom they obey blindly while he is in office, never uttering a word against him... The slavish subjection of the native regents to the commissioner is only too well known.

They were often obliged to suffer the grossest discourtesies. Moreover, fines were imposed upon them ”for their omissions” (which fines found their way into the commissioner’s pocket) in order ”to keep them under a bond of obedience which was reasonable and absolutely essential”.
A commissioner can prove anything by means of the Javanese, for their fate lies in his hands. It depends chiefly on him whether an ordinary headman is promoted to the rank of regent or whether a regent shall be subjected to lifelong banishment or pine away in chains.

The number of European overseers (usually ex-soldiers with the rank of sergeant) was increased and their income made entirely dependent upon the production of coffee in their area. It goes without saying that these men, too, often interfered quite freely in the affairs of the regents, even though they were officially their subordinates. The instruction of 1789, meanwhile, went as far as to make the overseers responsible for the general supervision of the regents' official conduct. Arbitrary action on their part against lower native officials, without consultation of the regents themselves, was far from uncommon.

The government was not much given to theorizing about the actual nature of its position. It wanted, as far as possible, to remain simply a merchant and to involve itself as little as it could with administrative affairs. It preferred to regard even the compulsory cultivation and delivery of coffee in Priangan as a commercial transaction. As late as 1802 Commissioner Nederburgh stated that its further activities in that region were to be confined to "supervision and inspection" of the regents' doings, "contenting itself with the benefits of trade". However, during the governor-generalship of Van Imhoff (1742-1750) it was said, that the produce supplied to the Company by the northeast coast of Java represented a substitute for the former capitation tax. Even after the rule of Daendels, who regarded the deliveries and quotas as a tax in the form of labour and equated them to compulsory services rendered to the government, opinion remained vague as to their true character. It was only in 1793, when plans came up for bringing about reforms in the Company system, that people began to theorize. That theorizing from the very outset lacked all relation to historical fact, and its proponents used it merely to give a legal foundation to their own proposals for reform or for preserving the old system. People
theorized about the Javanese land tenure system without possessing even the most elementary knowledge of the subject. Men like Engelhard, who prompted Nederburgh from behind the scenes, forgot in the process what they had themselves written only a short while before, even forgot their own daily conduct; they produced only those archival documents which could serve to substantiate their 'theoretical' views.

Thus in 1726 the Company had, for instance, termed itself "the lawful master and owner" and the regents "the vassals who enjoy the usufruct of their regencies only by virtue of the Company's favour until further notice" but whom it did not wish to "restrict in the effective government and jurisdiction of their territories and subjects" (1712). Yet at the same time the Company regarded them now as "the Company's subjects and allies", now (and preferably) as the suppliers of compulsory products, which they chose on other occasions to regard as a vassal's 'tribute'. At the end of the eighteenth century there were some, Nederburgh, for instance, who doubted if the Company was really "their legal master and sovereign in the strictest sense of the word", concluding from the regents' rights and authority that "they could in no wise be regarded as equivalent to the servants and officials of the Company, but were rather the true sovereign rulers of their lands". Muntinghe entertained the same fiction as late as 1821. Nevertheless, for more than a century the government had made the regents subordinate to an official, subjected them to its own jurisdiction, appointed and dismissed them at its pleasure, supplied them with instructions, and set limits upon their traditional powers.

Indeed the subsequent hesitation equally about the legal character of the compulsory cultures — whether they were to be regarded as a commercial transaction, compulsory service rendered to the government, taxation in kind, feudal dues, or rent on land according to civil law - constituted no difficulty whatsoever when the government came to determine its practical attitude towards the regents. It had no need of any theory - it had only its own interests in mind. It acted as the circumstances seemed to demand,
or permit, desiring to remain a merchant yet being forced by circumstances to assume the trappings of a sovereign, whether it would or no. It was, in reality, two things in one, without being aware of the fact.

Although minors under the tutelage of guardians often succeeded their fathers in the office of regent, the government by no means regarded itself bound to observe the principle of heredity. Thus, in 1770, in the matter of succession on Madura, which island was at the time of the greatest importance politically, it declared that "there is no right of succession, the Company having a free choice in the matter". In 1780 it was of the opinion that "the rule of survivorship is alien, unnecessary, and inappropriate in the regencies". In the second half of the eighteenth century succession was, for that matter, all too subject to the saly of office, the evil which radically undermined the whole Company system.

It is said of the regents of the northeast coast of Java at the end of the eighteenth century that they paid the governor for their appointment and that "it took them many long years before they had repaid the debt so contracted". According to Dirk van Hogendorp the supreme regent of Semarang at the time had paid the governor fifty thousand Dutch dollars for this appointment, as a result of which all his predecessor's children were excluded from the succession. In his memorandum of 15 April, 1805, Nicolaas Engelhard writes:

When I accepted office [as governor of the northeast coast of Java], I was given no peace with all the requests now for this district chief's post, now for that, one offering a hundred Dutch dollars, the other two hundred, five hundred, and up to a thousand, and so on; and this habit, I was assured, had been introduced many years ago.

Of the regents Engelhard says that his predecessor Van Reede had appointed sixteen, receiving in return:

fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five thousand dollars, according to what His Excellency was able to attain, and besides this His Excellency always managed by some pretext or other to arrange matters so that whenever there was a vacancy in a regency he could always obtain double the amount, that is to say, not fifteen, twenty or twenty-five thousand dollars,
but thirty, forty, or fifty, on the occasion of the transfer of a regent from one regency to another or of the promotion of the sub-regent to the position of supreme regent.

Daendels states bluntly that "the regents were appointed by the governor in return for payments ranging from ten to twenty thousand piastres". These sums had of course to be exacted from the people, yet in his memorandum of October, 1802, Van IJsseldijk, though being Van Hogendorp's keenest supporter in the administration of the time and disapproving the fact that the appointment of a regent should be so costly for the inhabitants of the northeast coast of Java, was of the opinion that:

there was no question of abolishing the practice in its entirety, for the common man should not be made too independent and thereby encouraged to abuse his freedom.

The attitude of the administration itself to the regents was wholly determined by the prevailing circumstances. The line of conduct adopted by the officials, on the other hand, displayed more continuity, insofar as their number was such as to permit active intervention and laxity on their part did not prevent it; also insofar as the disturbed political situation admitted such action, though their intervention did not exactly reinforce the regents' independence.

In times of supposed danger, such as during the days of the revolution in Europe or of the Cheribon riots, or when a sudden attack by the English was feared, the government felt it should respect the regents; at other times, however, it adopted a different attitude. All the same, in his function as an official, a commissioner, Engelhard, who had imprinted in Nederburgh the idea that the Priangan regents were the "sovereign rulers of their territories and peoples", had in the same period severely curtailed the power and competence of the regents, without considering it necessary to give any justification for his action. The government, however, still had in mind the idea or making use of the regents as a barrier against the influence of the principalities, until Daendels and Raffles removed all cause for fear of that nature.
In the report of 5 December, 1818, that is to say, after the Daendels and Raffles periods, Van Lawick and Van de Graaff write:

In every regency there is a European official who according to his title should only be an inspector of the coffee plantations, but who in fact is the man who governs the regency with the regent.  

The title of contrôleur was not used until 1827.  

As regards Daendels' relationship with the regents it can be said that pursuant to the wishes of the government in the Netherlands, and also in order to obtain more light on the matter and to prevent serious mistakes, he instructed the commissioner to collect and hand over within a period of six months replies from the respective overseers to twenty-one questions, which replies were to be as complete as possible and also verified by the commissioner himself, while they were to make clear the manner in which the state could derive greater profit from Priangan. Here we note that these questions made no single reference to the position of the native rulers, the services they were to receive, and so on, whereas according to the instructions Daendels had received, "the most suitable means of subjecting to definite regulations the incomes the regents enjoy according to the custom of the country were to be devised in consultation with the regents themselves". In consultation with the regents! - while in point of fact the questions were submitted to the overseers alone and afterwards to the governors of other districts in Java. Even in the days of the Company it had long been unusual to allow the regents a hearing on proposed regulations, for instance as regards the settlement of the price to be paid for products, as regards their judicial functions, the internal administration of the regencies, and similar matters.

Daendels did, however, consult the regents of the northeast coast of Java, where he found authority to be in the hands of an almost independent governor whose field of office extended from the frontiers of Cheribon to the eastern tip of Java, and whose arbitrary example was taken as a model by the residents serving under him.
He abolished the offices of governor and placed the residents, who had up to that time been subordinate to the governor, under the immediate control of the governor general. He then conferred together with the regents at Semarang in 1808, writing on the discussions as follows:

And however difficult and distressing it may be to carry out any negotiations with the timorous Javanese, even, indeed, with the most considerable and enlightened among them, and to get them to talk about matters, even when this is solely to serve their own interests and lighten their burdens, I have nevertheless finally succeeded — after having exercised the necessary patience for more than one month — in obtaining sufficient information from each regent individually, both as regards their complaints and objections and as regards their revenues and expenditures, and have subsequently been able to form a plan of improvement which is entirely satisfactory to every one of them, which will relieve the ordinary Javanese from his heaviest burdens and bring a considerable sum extra into the government's treasury.27

It is easy to imagine the difficulty of consultations aimed at persuading the regents to undergo a painful bloodletting, easy, too, to visualize the regents' 'satisfaction'. Daendels' will was law. Limits were also imposed on the regents' pomp and ceremony.

Having in this manner sufficiently preserved the authority of the native regents in the eyes of the ordinary Javanese, I have nevertheless made them completely subordinate and subservient to the aims of the government.

That is to say, taking advantage of the favourable impression the institution of a monarchy in Holland had made upon the minds of the Javanese nobles and the greater respect and trust they display towards the government on that account, I have deemed it necessary to do away with the ideas they still harboured to the effect that they exercised a certain independent and autonomous government over their subjects in order to make room for their complete submission to the royal government, which they respect, knowing it to be now set over them. Having flattered and excited their ambition to this end, by conferring upon them the title of 'the king's servants' and granting them the right to use the state seal with the name of their respective regency underneath it in all public affairs, I have, on the other hand, declared the so-called contracts concluded between the former government and themselves, which contracts they regarded as the sole basis of their obligations, null and void, and have borne in upon them that just as they could, in their quality as
officials of the king, lay claim to great privileges, so, too, in their quality as His Majesty's subjects, they were called upon to show unconditional obedience to the orders of the government, not only to those of the governor general himself, but also to the orders of all those who were placed above them in rank and authority.

In order to lend the necessary force to such words Daendels did not hesitate to sign many a notice of dismissal with a flourish of the pen and to introduce large-scale changes in the grouping of the regencies, by amalgamation and so on. The provision making the regents responsible for the supervision of the Mohammedan religion also dates from Daendels, he having borrowed the idea from Napoleon's Concordat.

It was in this manner that, in 1808, Daendels completely transformed the regents into officials. He ordered that the native regents, "both those of the uplands of Jakarta and Priangan and those of Java and Cheribon", should as from 1 January, 1809 "make use of the state seal in their official dealings". When the government of the northeast coast of Java was organized, the regents "were treated as officials of His Majesty the King of Holland and made responsible for carrying out the orders of the prefects". They were issued with a somewhat detailed set of instructions. Daendels would not hear of flattering the regents. On the analogy of the regents of Madura, who had a real military function, they were accorded military rank, thereby acquiring a definite position in the general hierarchy of officials. It was the commissioners general who finally had them swear an oath of allegiance. Their settlement of ranks and titles was based on Daendels' scheme.

The lower native heads also received their government appointments as state officials from Daendels and could only be dismissed by the governor general. So far, however, the regents were granted no fixed salary, while the salaries of the lesser heads continued to come out of the regents' pockets; Daendels maintained the principle of "a tenth part of the rice crop and other incomes of the regent authorized by ancient custom, insofar as these were fair and equitable". He did not, however,
trouble himself with the principle of the hereditary right of certain families to the office of regent. The Dutch government agreed to the measures taken by Daendels. Thus a letter from the minister of naval and colonial affairs dated 24 July, 1809 reads:

...it is to be hoped above all that the regents, who appear to be very pleased [with the arrangement], are sincere in their expressions of devotion and subordination. Whatever their attitude may be, would not be advisable to abandon the vigilance and the strict control which their simulating nature has so far caused us to adopt.

In the margin opposite these words, Daendels added a note to the effect that "Your Excellency can set his mind at rest on this score; I am taking especial care to appoint good prefects".

Raffles' policy followed the same line, that of restricting the power of the regents. He, too, considered the possibility of making the regents salaried officials, but saw no chance of doing so for the time being. The payment of emoluments in the form of land was all he was able to achieve, but that still did not put an end to the rendering of services as was his intention. However, as the result of the introduction of the system of land rent, with its own staff of officials, the regents ceased to be the persons around whom everything revolved, through whose mediation planting was decided upon, matters arranged, and payments made. Their influence was now restricted to the native police. Raffles hoped to bring the European administration into direct contact with the people to the exclusion of the heads. It was this policy of the British governor's, among other things, which his adversaries, Secretary General Blagrave and Major General Gillespie, opposed. At first his Dutch adviser Muntinghe also regarded such an undermining of the traditional authority of the heads as too radical. The directors of the Company associated themselves with the sentiments of Raffles' accusers on this point, but no fundamental alteration was made in the system. Raffles dismissed Blagrave from his post, while Gillespie resigned.

In 1813 Raffles stated that:

The Regent himself may, in like manner, be retained as a public officer at the Residence of the European authority, and under his immediate...
orders. The arrangement of this nature may be considered a political mode of employing many persons of influence, and now in authority, who otherwise require to be pensioned, and who would not experience, under these circumstances, the disgust that might follow a removal from office. It will evidently be prudent, not to abolish the rank, title, or state of the present Native Chiefs.

Thus the regent continued to exercise:

...a general superintendence over the police of the districts, and this great and salutary change will be effected without hurting the feelings natural to this class of men, whilst they will cease to possess any real power; and the lower class, removed from their oppressions, will gradually relinquish those habits of deference and submission, to which they have so long been accustomed.

Further investigation confirmed Raffles in his convictions: his views were in his opinion supported by the customary law of Java. According to him it was certain that the real ownership of the land was vested in the prince:

...that between the Sovereign and the cultivator there exists no actual right, and that the several intermediate officers, whether at the heads of districts, divisions, or towns, were nominated by the chief authority, removable at his pleasure, and possessing so little right of inheritance, that the descendants of men high in office were, in a few generations, found in poverty among the lower class of society.

Moreover, Raffles considered his interference with the power of the regents justified in the interests of the people, quite apart from the financial interests of the state treasury. In his instructions to Hopkins, he decreed that:

The Regents are, in future, to be considered as the chief native officers in their respective districts; but it will be obvious, that by the new arrangement they must be effectually deprived of all political or other undue influence: and as the tranquillity of the country is an essential and necessary object in establishing the new order, it is presumed they may be most advantageously employed in the department of police, while it must not be forgotten, that the watchful attention of the Resident must ever be directed to their conduct in the execution of this duty.

In 1817 the commissioners general also pursued this policy of restricting the regents’ power. On 14 October, 1817 Van der Capellen wrote as follows to Falck:
The regents, who were formerly despots of the same order as the rulers of the Confederation of the Rhine under Napoleon, and who have now been reduced to the position of dependence upon more regulated incomes as ordinary officials, are naturally dissatisfied with their new status and would gladly recover their former influence. The government must, however, make it its duty to be continually on the watch against this.\(^{30}\)

Nevertheless, like Raffles, the commissioners general wished to retain the regents for the time being. By the decree of 5 January, 1819,\(^{40}\) however, they forbade them on pain of dismissal to pursue any trade, either directly or indirectly. They abolished the official holding of land by all native regents, heads, and pensioners, and granted them a money salary.\(^{41}\)

The former measure was taken much against the wishes of the regents, who regarded their authority over the population reduced as a result of it. Daendels had taken no action on proposals to the same effect; Raffles had not dared to put them into practice. In 1832, however, Van den Bosch revised this decision, in connection with his policy regarding the native heads, and it was not until the days of Van de Putte's ministry that the abolition was again brought into effect; and it was not made absolute until 1887.

Very shortly\(^{12}\) after the dissolution of the commission general, the position of the native heads as officials was defined more precisely in the well known *Reglement op de verplichtingen, titels en rangen der Regenten op het eiland Java*,\(^{43}\) a regulation on Daendels' model, which the high commission had already had in mind\(^{44}\) and which survived unchanged in substance in later regulations.\(^{45}\)

The Inspectorate of Rural Revenue had in fact informed the government in a report of 1818\(^{46}\) that the residents regarded the regents as superfluous, "and treated them accordingly, failing to take advantage of their services, as otherwise should and could be done", but that, on the contrary, "the high native officials were left to their fate, even being excluded from taking part in the native administration".

The inspectorate did not agree with this; it wished that "use
should still be made of the regents' influence"; "regarding this influence as still useful and necessary". It "took as its principle that the regents and native heads should be retained for the time being". Accordingly it also wanted the services due to be rendered to them, the *panchen* services, to be preserved, provided they were properly regulated and limited. For since Daendels had determined the extent of those services, "the authority of, and the respect for, these high officials had been much diminished". The inspectorate therefore proposed to the commissioners general that the residents should be reminded by secret government instructions that:

...it is the government's desire that use should be made of the high native officials, that they should be regarded and treated by the residents, not according to the latter's personal conviction as to whether they should not continue to exist, but in accordance with the government's declared views with regard to these persons. If the residents observe this desire, and if they give prominence to the fact that so far the regents and principal native heads have been useful people, that they must accordingly be treated as such and made use of, it will be possible for the government to come to a decision with greater confidence than is possible at present, in cases in which the residents denounce the regents subordinate to them for showing indifference, or as being guilty of neglect of their duties as officials, or of oppressing their peoples.

As has already been remarked, the 1820 regulation was not drawn up until after the dissolution of the commission general and nothing came of the proposed secret instructions. One need not have entertained any illusions, moreover, about the observance of such instructions, given the attitude prevailing among the residents. For in his letter of 18 May, 1820 addressed to the minister in elucidation of the proposed regulation Governor General Van der Capellen himself wrote:

I had observed during my last journey through Java that most of the residents had succumbed to ideas concerning the basis on which the native regents should be treated and the view which should be taken of them which were utterly mistaken and exceedingly harmful to the national interest; this failing had already come to light during the first inspection carried out by the commissioners general in the year 1817; they had, however, flattered themselves that the discussions held on the matter at the time
and especially the specific instructions issued later on in connection with the regulation on the civil service and the financial administration to the effect that use should be made of the regents and other native officials would have the desired result, as regards the first mentioned, and that it would not be necessary to give more definite instructions on the matter.

Van der Capellen therefore framed a regulation based on Daendels’ *Instructie voor de respectieve regenten in het voormalig gouvernement van Java’s Noordkust* and his *Règlement van bestuur voor de Cheribonsche landen*. But no government has so far succeeded in altering the opinions of its officials by instructions on paper, for it is those opinions which inevitably determine the manner in which such instructions are carried out. Many of the instructions even of a man of Daendels’ calibre existed only on paper. And the application of Raffles’ ruling on land rent varied considerably from residency to residency. What then was to come in practice of Van der Capellen’s regulation on the duties, titles, and ranks of the regents, when he himself writes that:

...the regents were treated practically everywhere with scorn and excluded from any share in the government, and practically everywhere the European officials regarded the regents as superfluous cogs in the government machinery.

Such was the mood prevailing at the time. Thus in a letter addressed to the later commissioner general and governor general, Van den Bosch, Van Sevenhoven writes:

We have learned from Daendels, and also from the English, that there is no need to fear the Javanese princes or the regents, and I assure you that a good government can make the whole of Java subservient to its interests.

In his well-known report, Muntinghe writes in the same spirit, dissuading the commissioners general from a reversion to the Company’s system and advising them to continue Raffles’ policy:

It is by no means becoming for us to sing the praises of the short-lived British administration on Java. The relationship in which this reporter stood towards that administration prevents us from doing so in the first place, yet permit us to say this of it, that all the acts of that administration were intended to strengthen the European authority and, by removing all the dangerous and harmful influences of the Mohammedan
administration, to bring it into direct contact with the mass of the native population. We are of the opinion that, viewed from this standpoint, no measures of the said administration have been more efficacious and more fortunate in their results than those taken against the recalcitrant court of Jogjakarta... It was from that moment onwards that the European administration obtained for the first time true mastery over Java, yet from that moment onwards, too, the two princes of Java have only continued to exist by virtue of the administration's goodwill and of the principles of justice and humanity. Both will stand or fall, according as Your Excellency chooses. The regents of the coastal districts have been deprived of all support and the population freed from their grasp.

The idea of suppressing the principalities, an idea to which even Governor General Van der Capellen had given expression during a visit to the principalities in 1822, and also that of abolishing the post of regent, constantly recur during this period.

Thus was the mood of the time, a mood characteristic of periods in which real authority has only just been established, a new system of colonial rule wrested from the hands of conservatism. The slogan of the day was to come into direct contact with the people themselves in order to protect them against the extortions of their heads. It represented the humanitarian principles which had blown over from Europe toward the end of the eighteenth century, the "new philosophy of philanthropy" against which Nederburgh had already fulminated, and on which in 1834 Van den Bosch had poured his scorn, but by which Raffles had felt himself impelled when Muntinghe had exhorted him to adopt a practical financial policy. It was that spirit which gave birth to the measures now taken to increase the officials' knowledge of languages. Such liberal or humanitarian ideas exercised so powerful an influence on public opinion that henceforth every proposal had to be defended as being in the interests of the people. This was so even in the case of the culture system.

The growing authority of the residents, which had been increased for the sake of 'protecting the people', caused them to become more autocratic; as we saw, they bypassed the regents 'with scorn'. Van der Capellen's paper regulation was meant to keep this in check. The success it achieved is made clear to
us by a government decree of 1827. In it the residents on Java were informed:

... that in all circumstances, but especially at the present time [the Java War was in progress], the commissioner general wishes to recommend them most earnestly and with all possible emphasis always to treat the regents and other native heads in their residencies with courtesy and to deal with them, and see that they are dealt with, with that respect to which each of them according to this status and function, can lay claim, this being a matter of the highest importance for the maintenance of peace and order and for the cultivation of good feeling both among the heads themselves and among their subjects.

But this instruction, too, had no effect. In 1837 European officials had once again to be reminded to treat the native officials mildly and with patience. And so it goes on.

By this time the Java War was over and the culture system had already been introduced, both being reasons for the administration to wish to strengthen the position of the regents. The former event had caused it to guarantee various regent that their office would remain hereditary in their families, while the regents authority was regarded as indispensable for the introduction of the culture system. According to the report on his activities in the Indies during the years 1830 to 1833, it seemed to Commissioner General Van den Bosch:

...that the heads, and the regents in particular, were not always treated with the respect and justice which they could rightfully claim, and that their hereditary rights were not always respected; the government's proper interest, however, demands that the upper class should be bound to it.

It was thought possible that the people could, as it were, be won over by protecting them against their heads, by taking action against the latter's so-called oppression and by inspiring in them a spirit of independence in their attitude towards their heads. But this view was mistaken, it seems.

In my opinion, therefore, we must ally the heads to ourselves by every appropriate means, and this I have tried to do by respecting their hereditary rights wherever possible, by seeing that they are treated with due deference, with kindness even, by lending them cautious aid when they were in monetary difficulties, by granting them the ownership of land when they wanted it, and finally by treating them in general in such a
manner that they have reason to feel more content under our administra­tion than under that of their own princes.

The more we show respect for the family rights of the heads, the more they will cling to us, for it is precisely the preservation of these rights which they cannot hope for under their own princes and on which, as a matter of fact, they lay so much store.69

Baud, too, paid homage to these principles, not only in his function as governor general but also as minister. All the same, the hereditary rights of the regents were still not established in the Constitutional Regulation of 1836. Baud became the champion of the principle when the Constitutional Regulation of 185461 came up for debate.

He believed that the only practical policy in the Indies, apart from wise and just government in general, was to awaken the vitality which the higher classes at present lack, and by associating them as intimately as possible with the continuance of our rule, to convince them that, should our rule collapse, their own social position would be endangered. There is no more powerful means of achieving this than by guaranteeing the principal heads that their social privileges will remain hereditary in their families. Should this be done, the Netherlands would be able to hold the Netherlands East Indies by peaceful means for many years to come.

For Minister Pahud as well this was the sole motive supporting the principle of heredity. He denied that it concealed the idea of raising up a barrier against the principalities and admitted that the principle did not originate from the Javanese adat. The Dutch government, however, regarded it "as the conditio sine qua non of a peaceful and strong government".62

Its attitude was based on the conception of the Indies as conquered territory which besides continuing to provide for the welfare of the native population had also to continue to supply the Netherlands with the material benefits which had been the aim of conquest, all of which was to be accomplished by peaceful means. In order to reach this the status quo had to be preserved as far as possible: it was necessary that the native population should continue to be governed in accordance with its ancestral institutions and customs ("insofar as they do not conflict with the immutable precepts of justice"), that it should be left as far as was practical under the immediate leadership of its own heads
(without prejudice to the necessary precautions against abuse and neglect), and that the devotion of the heads to the Netherlands administration should be maintained and confirmed. Everything, that is to say, was to remain as it was.

This briefly sums up the views of Van den Bosch and Pahud. Although the 'colonial opposition' did not agree with this objective of colonial policy, and although the Constitutional Regulation represents a compromise between the two schools of thought, the principle of heredity as such met with little, or, at least, with no fundamental, opposition from the liberals.\textsuperscript{63} It was simply regarded as undesirable to lay down the principle in so many words in the Constitutional Regulation — out of opportunist considerations. When, however, the minister toned down the wording of the article in question, there was no longer any objection to the principle. It was honoured later on by progressive statesmen such as Fransen van de Putte, and included in the instructions issued to the governor general. I have explained the contradiction between the government's principle and the actual situation in further detail in my address.\textsuperscript{64}
SOME REMARKS ON BORROWING
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURE
The following study was originally published in
Djawa, Tijdschrift van het Java Instituut (Java, Journal of the Java institute), VII (Surakarta, 1927), 89—96, under the title "Eenige opmerkingen over ontleening in de cultuur-ontwikkeling" (Some Remarks on Borrowing in the Development of Culture).
SOME REMARKS ON BORROWING
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURE

Early ethnology regarded all human culture as essentially one. Bastian and others of his school considered this the best explanation of the similarities found to exist between otherwise dissimilar peoples in different parts of the world in respect to institutions and customs. Certain geographical provinces could indeed be distinguished, they admitted, in which this universal culture acquired specific characteristics of its own traceable to the effect upon it of physical conditions; the products of cultural and material development were not the same among all peoples, of course; but this did not detract from the fact that all those expressions of culture sprang forth spontaneously from the one fundamental human nature which was everywhere and at all times identical. Differences in cultural equipment, they said, were to be regarded rather as phases in the evolution of humanity; all that was needed to reveal the history of the development of mankind was to arrange these stages in their proper order.

In their view, therefore, the original nature of man must be regarded as the primary explanatory hypothesis; only when borrowing can be proved to be an indubitable historical fact, only then may we accept borrowing as a basis for explaining similarity of culture elements.

Continuing along the same lines as Ratzel, Schurtz, and Frobenius, the 'cultural history' school of Graebner and his colleagues represented the opposite attitude. The starting point remained the same: similarity in the cultural equipment of the most dissimilar peoples. But, in view of the actually uninterrupted contact between the peoples and the limited originality of the human mind, this school was more inclined to consider borrow-
ing as the primary explanation. They assumed that from a given centre, the place where they originated, these types of cultures spread in circles, now larger, now smaller, overlapping each other entirely or in part. This might make it possible to distinguish different layers in the cultural equipment of a given people—layers characterized by elements belonging to a particular cultural circle. The cultural history school, then, indicated the method and the means whereby the cultural layer might be determined.

It is not my intention to give a critical analysis of these two explanatory hypotheses in the following. That would take us too far afield. My plan is only to make a few comments on one of the many questions that arise in this connection. The hypothesis of the school of cultural history is based on the assumption that the part played by a people in the adoption of certain cultural elements is a passive one, that the cultural equipment of a people can be mechanically analyzed into layers and that this is all that can be said in the matter, and that for all the different cultural elements diffusion is equally possible.

Let us begin with the last axiom. Obviously the simplest means by which different peoples contact each other is trade, and particularly trade in its most primitive form—what is known as silent trade, in the course of which the parties concerned do not even set eyes on each other. One party deposits his products on a certain spot in the forest or somewhere else and hides hurriedly; the other party takes the products away, puts his own wares in their place, and also disappears.

In this manner elements of cultural equipment on the material plane pass from one people to another without there being any question of mutual influence of any other kind or of spiritual contact. This condition of things is also characteristic of some higher forms of trade. We know, for instance, that an exchange of goods is common on a large scale among primitive peoples. It is a well-known fact that various commodities pass from tribe to tribe right across Africa and in this way may travel immense distances.

A typical instance of this may be found in the cowries from the
Maldive Islands, which are used as 'money' even as far afield as western Africa. Ages ago they were already taken by Arab traders as ballast in their ships to the east coast of Africa, where they could begin the trek straight across the continent. But even in the case of the foreign trade who settles for a shorter or longer period among a certain people, even there it is clear that the various cultural elements do not all spread to the same extent. We know, for instance, that the Javanese have traded for ages on the Molucca Islands and Banda. It was their habit to bring their ships up on the shore and settle down for several months, waiting for a favourable wind to take them back to eastern Java. Many took to themselves a wife *pro tempore* from among the daughters of the region and there were some who even settled there for good. They fetched Papuan slaves there and the scented bark called *masoi* and used as *jamu* (a medicine) — both of which commodities were imported from New Guinea, chiefly by people from Goram, — also *kulit lawaung* (another medicine) from Ambon and Ceram, and finally cloves and nutmeg.

They brought with them swords of iron from Tobungku in eastern Celebes, axes from Billiton or Karimata, coarse textiles from Bali, Indian cloths and beads, Chinese porcelain, sago, peanuts, salt, rice, Java sugar, common batiks, and so forth. In short, even at the beginning of the seventeenth century the condition was such that all material cultural equipment found in the Moluccas was imported from abroad; yet there was no question of any direct influence being exerted upon the real society except perhaps in northern Ambon (Hitu). Scarcely a trace of Hindu Javanism is to be found there. The penetration of Islam is ascribed rather to an indirect factor about which we shall speak presently. Thus we find that material elements of culture were being influenced, also by the absorption of non-Javanese elements, albeit these were introduced via de Javanese, and we may assume that tales and myths and so forth were being imported, but local native society pursued its own course of development in its own way. Yet even with respect to the latter, contacts with the world outside were, as we shall see, matters of essential,
though indirect importance: the demand of the world market for spices produced social changes of no small significance. And it should be remembered that spices were in demand not only in the archipelago but also in China, India, Persia, Arabia, Europe, and elsewhere for ages before the West was in a position even to contemplate sailing to eastern Asia.

The closed products economy was a thing of the past and a kind of primitive trade economy gradually took its place, as more and more exclusive attention came to be paid to the cultivation of commercial crops and it became increasingly necessary to rely for food chiefly on commodities imported from abroad. Life became more and more centred in trade. The primitive genealogical communities were obliged to make way for miniature coastal states, which busied themselves with the exploitation of a 'hinterland' that grew more and more extensive as years went by. Or, in cases such as that of Banda, where this gradually became impossible because of the political balance of power in that archipelago and an ever-expanding commerce gave birth in the course of time to a trading class, the power of money destroyed the autocratic authority of the coastal potentates and the traditional aristocratic class prejudices, the remains of the genealogical period. Individualism, though indeed not yet fully developed, had thoroughly disturbed the communalism which characterized the primitive societies.

This same phenomenon manifested itself in other parts of the archipelago. Was it not the cultivation of pepper which brought about a complete change in the original conditions in various places? Sometimes, in areas where it depended on slave labour, it promoted the slave trade, in other places it was the cause of more autocratic institutions being introduced. In short: it meant a complete change not only in an economic sense, but in a social sense as well. The expansion of trade, which could not but bring about a change in the mentality of the people and in their conception of the purpose of life, also created the possibility of transition to a new outlook on life, a new religion. The rise of Mohammedanism in the archipelago must be viewed in the
light of the above: it was able to find its way in along the trade routes.

We dealt just now with Javanese influence in the Moluccas. Elsewhere, too — even in places where this influence could manifest itself more intensively, as in Palembang, Jambi, southern Borneo — it is obvious that the various cultural elements did not all spread to an equal extent. There are evidences of Javanese influence on the language, for even now a Javanese dialect is spoken on the coast; on the customs current among noble families; on the titles used by persons of rank; on law books, on literature, on dress... But the people, their social organization, and their actual ideas of justice remained unaffected.

A change in the social structure, a shifting of power in the community is found to result rather from indirect contact between the peoples. A typical example of this is southern Celebes, which country was purely agrarian until in the sixteenth century. Then, because the trade route was diverted — as a result of contemporary political conditions in the archipelago, it became an intermediate station on the way to the Moluccas and Timor. At first all the trade at Macassar was in the hands of foreigners, who settled there and to whom the local princes and nobles sold rice. But soon the latter began to take part in commerce, first by bottomry and then by fitting out ships, until gradually the whole people, first the Macassarese and later the Buginese, became successful navigators first under the guidance of foreigners, and later independently.

The political changes which took place in the seventeenth century and the diverting of the trade route produced the very opposite result in the case of eastern Java, the whilom centre of trade in the archipelago. But this I have explained in detail elsewhere.

As a matter of fact a given cultural element does not fulfil the same function in different societies, any more than similar elements produce the same effect. A piece of fabric and a loom both belong to the material attributes of culture, but the former is
purely for consumption, merely a thing to be worn either as clothing or as ornament, while the latter is productive, bears fruit, stimulates a form of native industry, adds a living element to native civilization. To a certain extent a piece of fabric can do this too. For centuries Indian weaving has striven to produce particular kinds of cloth for particular Indonesian markets and with this object in view has made use of Indonesian decorative motifs so as to increase sales, and, in the same way, Indonesian weavers have chosen in the practice of their art to imitate Indian motifs which were apparently popular. The native weaving industry was not killed by the large quantity of Indian textiles imported.

That danger first threatened in the seventeenth century, when the import took place on an enormous scale and the competition between the Indian, Portuguese, Dutch, and English traders forced down the prices. But when the monopolistic policy of the Dutch East India Company drove up the prices too high and the purchasing power of the population diminished, the cultivation of cotton increased once more and home industry was taken up again. It was not until the days of nineteenth-century mass production in Western industry, improved methods of transport, and the salt monopoly, that some branches of native industry received a death blow (iron and salt), while others were reduced to a desperate condition (copper, weaving, pottery, and so forth).

From this we see how greatly economic factors affect the adoption of foreign elements even in the field of material culture.

The preceding remarks were partly meant to show that a culture is not entirely passive in respect to the adoption of foreign elements. There are factors which make acceptance of the latter possible and factors which stand in the way of it. The same phenomenon may be observed in the case of a man's mental attitude towards the outer world. It is a well-known fact that we do not absorb everything that we might potentially observe — only certain impressions become ours consciously or unconsciously.
The human mind selects, and what it selects is determined by the relation between that which is observed and that which is already present. A man's originality is determined by his capacity to combine heterogeneous elements. "There is nothing new under the sun"; the new is the combination of the known. An invention is not created out of nothing, it is rooted in the old. But even then, if a novelty is to gain currency in spite of the conservatism of the human mind, the times must be ripe, that is, the factors needed to make its acceptance possible must be present.

It is a well-known fact that inventions which might have proved of essential significance to the development of industrial technology were ignored for centuries because the conditions necessary for the growth of such industry had not yet presented themselves. Take the power of steam: it was known among the ancients but the knowledge remained unproductive until the eighteenth century, when it became possible to use steam as the motive power for mechanical labour. There are cases known to history of inventions being allowed to go to waste in this way — purposely sometimes — and then having to be rediscovered years later because then circumstances, mental and social, were ripe. Large-scale industry could not develop until large markets could be counted on, the necessary capital for the establishment of big undertakings became available, the production of coal and iron had increased, the manufacture of coke had become known, and the development of a banking and credit system had ensured that capital could be made productive.

But enough on this subject. We see that from a sociological standpoint the fact of an invention being made is less important than the application thereof. It is the same in the history of culture: the part played by the inventor in the community which puts his discovery to practical use is often played by one people in respect to another.

An inventor cannot foresee the economic and social effects that will flow from the application of his invention (as for instance in the case of the 'industrial revolution' in the West and its result on the whole social system and mentality) and in the same way it
is impossible to realize *a priori* what will be the cross-fertilization to result from the contact of one people with another.

For the history of cultural development it is therefore of secondary importance to trace cultural elements back to the land of their origin, as does the cultural history school. To do so has a certain value, of course, but it would be absurd to limit ethnological study to that. Such a course would leave the living facts out of consideration. What use is it to us to know where a given type of bow was first invented, when the bow has fulfilled such different functions in the lives of different peoples?

Of what use is it to know where a certain type of house originated, when we continue to ignore the interaction between the housing of a people and its economical and social system? The most important factor will always be the application made of different cultural elements in a given society and the part these elements play in the development of the social life thereof.

Is it really possible, then, after these experiences, to hold to the opinion that a culture can be mechanically divided into different layers, while we often find foreign influences producing farreaching results, even outside their own sphere? The truth is that a culture forms an organic whole, which cannot be split up into different parts as if these components had no relation to each other. An element from without which has been able to find its way in because it found in the culture a congenial substratum is gradually moulded into a living part of the organism by the process of absorption and in its turn that part sets its mark upon the whole.

Viewed from this standpoint the study of Javanese culture takes on a new aspect.

There was a time when the ancient culture of the archipelago, and particularly that of Java, was generally regarded as an outpost of Hindu culture, and not independent. For was not all civilization brought by the Hindus? Then Kern and Brandes adduced philological reasons for assuming that various cultural elements formed part of an original Indonesian civilization. In
the first place there was the wet-field cultivation of rice. We will not go into the question of whether the arguments brought forward were absolutely convincing or whether perhaps after all the wet ricefield method was not introduced by Hindus or other foreigners in very early times. Probably technical improvements were in some cases imported - the sickle, the paddle wheel for irrigation, manure, the plough; the occurrence of wet ricefields in certain areas must also be ascribed to influence from abroad, not to mention the fact that the larger irrigation system could only have been the fruit of a higher type of development than the Indonesians must have represented when they immigrated.

But now M.B. Smits has pointed out\(^2\) that all phases of irrigated rice cultivation are found in Sumatra even at the present day and that these depend on certain economic conditions. Intensification of agriculture such as is represented by a matured form of sawah cultivation can only develop with a certain density of population. First man tries extension and only when that is no longer feasible is intensification of agricultural methods resorted to. We find, then, the following interplay of factors: on the one hand for mankind as consumer it is true that only a certain development of economic life provides the possibility for a specific mass of people to satisfy their needs; on the other hand, however, mankind as producer can subject natural forces to its purposes better - up to a point - the greater the manpower it has at its disposal. Each stage in the development of the labour process has its own capacity for employing men and hence makes a certain density of population possible. If the population increases beyond this maximum capacity, some way out of the difficulty has to be sought for, perhaps by means of emigration, perhaps by revision of the current methods for work, perhaps as the result of the emergence of factors which push the population density back by force\(^3\) within the limits of the given conditions.

From the above it becomes clear that the question as to whether sawah cultivation was introduced by the Hindus or not takes on a different aspect in more than one respect when studied in the
light of such considerations, and that this problem cannot be solved any more by purely philological methods.

The same may be said with regard to another cultural element considered by Brandes to belong to primitive Javanese civilization, namely, the gamelan. Kunst's studies have thrown an entirely new light on this problem. If it is ever to be solved it will have to be through the efforts not only of linguists, but of historians, archeologists, and musicologists as well.

The problem of the originality or otherwise of batik work—which Brandes has pronounced primitive Javanese, also on purely linguistic grounds—has grown more complicated than ever during the last few decades. It was Rouffaer who called attention to the fact that this art is practised nowhere in the archipelago except on Java and Madura. "Not on Bali, not in the Lampong region, not in Palembang, not in southeastern or southwestern Borneo—all places that once were in close contact with eastern Java, Bantam, or central Java."

Let us note in this connection that for many centuries Java exported textile goods to the above regions as a medium of exchange for the pepper it needed from there. Chinese silk growing and weaving had there found its way in as a home industry but not batiking. An excellent example this of the selective process mentioned above.

On the other hand all kinds of garments had for centuries been made all along the coast of Coromandel and in some parts in the south of the land of the kelings with the aid of wax.

Historically and technically speaking, this [the coast of India] is the country of mass production and mass export—i.e. to the Indonesian Archipelago, notably—of the 'coastal clothlets' or 'painted cloth' in the days of the East India Company, and the Portuguese pintados even in the sixteenth century, that is to say, of the cotton garments dyed by the aid of wax and corresponding to Javanese batiks.

From the historical date he had himself collected Rouffaer concluded that the Javanese had learned to batik from:

these same kelings and Tamils, who from the beginning of our era until about 1500 A.D. never ceased to take over to the east and especially to
Java — chiefly via Masulipatnam, Pulicat and Negapattinam — their religion, their sacred language, their script, architecture, and further Indian culture.

I myself should not like to subscribe to all the conclusions drawn by the learned and well-read author from the few and casual historical data available to him, but I too consider it not improbable that the idea on which the art of batiking is based was, indeed, borrowed from the people of southern India. But that seems all that can be said. We have here a case similar to that of stone architecture: the beginnings of the art are certainly traceable to Indian influence, but later it followed an independent course of development. In India batiking had for ages been a matter of mass production, whereas in Java it was at first, influenced by the Javanese social structure, in aristocratic art. Very closely connected with this fact is the refinement undergone by the whole process in its new surroundings. Later on the production of batiks, which had previously taken place exclusively within the oikos of the great, was done on a larger scale and partly with a view to commerce. The princes and nobles, as we saw above, in those days acted as intermediaries between the traders and, as time went on, began fitting out ships themselves. Finally, however, the development of commerce gave rise to a separate trading class which increased production without changing the technique or the labour organization. The latter only happened as a result of competition with Western factory-made goods. But none of this alters the fact that the batik industry had received a new stimulus as early as at the end of the seventeenth century, when, as we have already said the monopolistic policy of the Company began raising the prices of the Indian textiles it imported.

The wayang, which Brandes also classifies original Javanese, is a different matter. After Hazeu had traced a connection between the wayang and primitive Javanese ancestor worship, certain German scholars of the present century (Pischel, Lüders, and others) tried to prove that it was borrowed from an Indian shad-
ow play regarding which the old books supply but scant information and which is still performed here and there in remote parts of the interior. The resemblance between the two lies in their technique (projection of shadows on a screen) and their repertoire (stories from the Mahabharata and the Ramayana). But how different they are in other respects! In the first place the puppets: yonder coarse, roughly made figures; here delicate works of art! And how different the significance of the show to the people! Here it is part of their way of life; there it is merely a boorish show. And what a strongly distinctive cachet the tales have obtained in Java after having become intimately interwoven with the native myths so as to form an organic whole. It is true that an earlier generation, which studied the problem in the light of the data available in its day and treated the question from a somewhat too exclusively philological standpoint, occasionally overestimated the importance of the native elements in the lakons, or Javanese plays, whereas the archeologists have since shown us that certain elements which were taken to be 'corruptions' by the modern Javanese were just as old as the ancient Javanese translations or versions of the Indian epics and correspond to popular tradition in India; on the other hand it is equally true that these foreign tales have acquired an aroma of their own and have become united into a single whole with elements which are, also from the view of ritual, indubitably native in origin. And although Rassers may have exaggerated a little in his sociologically orientated wayang studies and himself become obsessed to a certain extent by his mythological theme, yet this much is certain: the lakons bear the impress of the Javanese spirit.

We find here something analogous to the change which took place in the idea of the mystic union between God and man, with its terminology derived from a foreign system of mystical contemplation - the kawula gusti mystic thought introduced by the Mohammedans, - when, having originated in an alien religious milieu, it was transplanted into the syncretistic Javanese psyche. The dualism (as in the inherent antithesis of servant-Lord) which, owing to their origin, naturally characterized these spe-
culations was lost in the all-conquering concept of the unity of all that is, and resolved in pre-Moslem pantheism.

This ecstatic realization of unity may perhaps have reproduced, in accordance with the traditional formulation, even the restrictions by which Arabian-Mohammedan mysticism (without ever losing sight of the problems, set in this connection by Moslem dogmatism) tried to escape the final consequences... but in practice it ignored them. With the ecstatic sense of unity, which according to its psychic content and as the highest, saving secret of life was a pre-Mohammedan possession of the Javanese, their minds associated merely the various terms, mental and emotional complexes which Arabian-Persian mysticism supplied. Hence, too, the predilection for the extreme pantheism of the 'heretical' Seh Siti Jenar, which outvies all positive religion and yet clothes itself in Moslem terms and wishes to be interpreted as the true Islam.

In the light of all the above the question of origin certainly becomes of secondary importance for the history of culture.
ASS Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (Journal of Social Science and Social Policy)

BEFEO Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême Orient (Bulletin of the French School of the Far East)

BHG Berigten van het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht (Communications of the Historical Society at Utrecht)

BI Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal, Land- en Volkenkunde (Contributions to the Philology, Geography, and Ethnology of the Netherlands East Indies Published by the Royal Institute for Philology, Geography, and Ethnology)

IV Isaac Commelin, editor, Begin ende voortgangh van de Vereenigde Nederlantsche Geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie, bevatende de voornaemste reysen, bij de inwooneree der selver provinciën derwaerts gedaen... (Beginning and Progress of the United Dutch Chartered Company, Containing the Principal Voyages Made Thither by Inhabitants of Those Same Provinces...). Two volumes, Amsterdam, 1646


IG De Indische Gids (The Indies Guide)

J(BB)RAS Journal of the (Bombay Branch of the) Royal Asiatic Society

KHG Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht (Chronicle of the Historical Society at Utrecht)

KS Koloniale Studiën (Colonial Studies)

KT Koloniaal Tijdschrift (Colonial Journal)

TBB Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur (Civil Service Journal)

TBG Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen (Journal of Indonesian Philology, Geography, and Ethnology Published by the Royal Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences)

TNI Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië (Netherlands East Indies Journal)

TP T'oung Pao: Archives pour servir à l'étude de l'histoire, des langues, de la géographie et de l'ethnographie de l'Asie orientale (T'oung Pao: Archives for the Study of the History, Philology, Geography, and Ethnology of Eastern Asia)

VBG Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen (Proceedings of the Royal Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences)

VMKAW Verslagen en Mededelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen (Reports and Communications of the [Dutch] Royal Academy of Sciences)
SHIFTS IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER

1 On this correlation of religious and commercial interests the book by Marino Sanudo is very interesting: see Kunstmann, "Studien über Marino Sanudo den Älteren", Abhandlungen der Historischen Classe der königlichen Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Munich), III, ii (1853), 732 f. (to be cited as Kunstmann).

2 Schaubé, Handelsgeschichte der romanischen Völker des Mittelmeergebietes bis zum Ende der Kreuzzüge (1906; Volume III in the series Handbuch der mittelalterlichen und neueren Geschichte, edited by Von Below and Meinecke), 753.

3 Cf. Marino Sanudo in Kunstmann, 718.

4 Yule, Cathay (1866), II, 279—308; Krause, "Die Epoche der Mongolen" (see below, n. 6), 27 f. Cf. Rubruquis, Carpini, Hayton père et fils, De Monte Corvino, De' Marignolli, Jordanus, et al.

5 De Goeje, "Internationaal handelsverkeer in de middeleeuwen" (International Trade Relations in the Middle Ages), VMKAW, Literature Division, Series Four, IX, 263—264.

6 Cf. De Mandeville, Travels (edited by Halliwell, 1866), 37—38; Hayton. From the latter half of the fourteenth century on, the collapse of the Mongol Empire also helped to stimulate trade via the Red Sea: Cordier, TP, XXI, 483, 486; Krause, "Die Epoche der Mongolen", Mitteilungen des Seminars für orientalische Sprachen (Berlin), XXVI—XXVII (1924), 7, 12, 39.

7 Tiele, "De vestiging der Portugeezen in Indië" (The Coming of the Portuguese to the Indies), G, 1875, Part Three (to be cited as Tiele, G, 1875), 236, following L. da Ca' Masser; Tiele, "Affonso d'Albuquerque in het Oosten" (Affonso D'Albuquerque in the East), G, 1876, Part Three (to be cited as Tiele, G, 1876), 407—408.

8 These notes on the economic history of Moslem Egypt must suffice here for further detail see the masterly works of C. H. Becker, "Ägypten im Mittelalter" and "Grundlinien der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Aegyptens in den ersten Jahrhunderten des Islam", in his Islamstudien, I (1924). 146 f., 201 f.

9 Islamstudien, 214, 186.


11 Cf. Heyd, II, Supplement I.

12 Tiele gives various examples: "De Portugeezen op weg naar Indië" (The Portuguese on their Way to the Indies), G, 1873, Part Three (to be cited as Tiele, G, 1873), 205; cf. De Goeje, 247—248, following Heyd.
13 On Marino Sanudo (circa 1260—1338) see under Sanuto in the Encyclopædia Britannica. His Liber secretorum in Bongars, Gesta Dei per Francos (Hanover, 1611), II, 1—288, is not available to me here. Cf. Kunstmann, and Yule, Cathay, II.

14 See Rouffaer, BKI, Series Six, VI (to be cited as Rouffaer), 579. Cf. also especially Marco Polo (edited by Yule, 1875), II, 434 (describing the situation circa 1293); Marino Sanudo, 435—436 (1306); Ibn Battuta, II, 177 (circa 1350); Rockhill, TP, XVI, 607 f.; Ivan Hallberg, L’extrême Orient dans la littérature et la cartographie de l’Occident des XIIIe, XIVe, et XVe siècles: Etude sur l’histoire de la géographie (Gothenburg, 1906; Volume VIII, series 4, Göteborgs Kungliga Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-samhälles Handlingar), 8 under Aden.


16 Yule, Cathay, I, cxxxi; Hallberg, 101 under Cambaet; L. de Backer, L’extrême Orient au moyen-âge (1877), 131.

17 There are various editions available, among others one by De Backer.


19 Ramusio, I, 328; Het Boek van Bonang (The Book of Bonang; edited by Schrieke, 1916; to be cited as Bonang), 6—7; Barros (1777), IV, Part One, 318—319.

20 On Cambay then and later in its political history see the articles by Tiele in G for 1873 to 1879; Barros, IV, Part One, 539 f.; Hallberg, 403 f.; De Backer, 403 f., under Combaech; Terpstra, De opkomst der westerkwartieren van de Oost-Indische Compagnie (The Rise of the Western Quarters of the Dutch East India Company; 1918), especially 50, 185 f., 205, 203 f., 282; Aalbers, Rijcklof van Goens (1918), 68—106; Van Twist, Generale beschrijvinghe vanvnd Indien (General Description of the Indies; Batavia, 1638), reprinted in B & V, 9 f., 11 f., 59, 66—67. See further Moreland, India at the Death of Akbar (1920); Smith, Akbar (1917); Moreland, From Akbar to Aurangzeb (1923); St. Lane & Poole, Mediaeval India (Twelfth edition, 1917); Sarkar, Studies in Mughal India, (Calcutta, 1919); Sarkar, History of Aurangzib (four volumes, Calcutta, 1912—1919); Sarkar, Mughal Administration (Calcutta, 1920); Van Linschoten (edited by Kern), I, 41 f. and cf. 112 f.; Rawlinson, British Beginnings in Western India (Oxford, 1920); and William Foster’s publications on the English factories in India (1911, 1912, 1923). For older literature see Terpstra and Rawlinson. See also Purchas, IV, 433; Hakluyt, V, 380, 491, VI, 26 f.

21 For the accounts written by Niccolò de’ Conti (circa 1432 and 1438) and Athanasius Nikitin (circa 1470), see Rouffaer, 648 f., or R. H. Major (Winter Jones), India in the Fifteenth Century (Hakluyt Series, Volume XXVII, 1857).
22 Rouffaer, 593 f., following Barbosa (1516). On Barbosa and his book in its various editions see Rouffaer, 145 f. and especially 173 f. The text has since 1918 also been available in the Hakluyt series. Other known Gujarati export articles were opium and indigo. On the trade of the Gujarati see Barbosa in Colleccão de Noticias, II, No. Seven (1813), 250 f., 261, 267 f., 278 f., et al.

23 Rouffaer, 570.

24 Ibid., 577.

25 Ibid., 596, 607, 612; cf. also Heyd, II, 500, and Barbosa, 311 f.

26 Rockhill, TP, XV.

27 Ibid., XVI, 124, 126, 256, 271 (Rau-mai cotton cloth and patolas).

28 See Rouffaer & Juynboll, Batik-kunst (The Art of Batiking), 349.

29 Rouffaer, 565—566.

30 Ibid., 664. See M. S. Commissariat, "A Brief History of the Gujarat Saltanat", JBRAS, XXV, 277 f., XXVI, 122 f., which is based on indigenous sources. Cf. also Rockhill, TP, XVI, 459.

31 Cf. Rouffaer, 646.

32 Cf. also Chau Ju-kua (edited by Hirth and Rockhill, 1912), 92.

33 Rouffaer, 644; cf. De Jonge, De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië (The Rise of Dutch Authority in the East Indies; 1864 f.; to be cited as De Jonge), II, 67.

34 In the edition of Defrémery and Sanguinetti, IV, 53—57; cf. Barros.

35 See also Pegolotti (circa 1340).

36 See Benjamin of Tudela; Jordanus; Chau Ju-kua; Marco Polo; Ibn Battuta, IV, 99; De' Marignoli, cf. Heyd, II, 147 f., 619 f., 499 f.; Odorigo, Rockhill; Hallberg, 153 f.; Barbosa, 348 f.; De Jonge, II, 22.

37 See Heyd, II, 499.

38 See also Ferrand, Relations des

39 Cf. Terpstra, De vestiging van de Nederlanders aan de kust van Ko-

40 On Bengal see Mookerji, Indian Shipping (1912), 213—223.
voyages, "Malaka, le Maláyu et Maláyur" (Journal Asiatique, XI, ix-x [1912]), and L'empire Sumatranais de Čriwijaya (1922); Rouffaer, "Was Malakka emporium voor 1400 a.d., genaamd Malayur?" (Was Malacca an Emporium Called Malayur Before 1400 a.d.?), BKI, LXXVII (1921);

TP, XII, 502 f.

42 Chau Ju-kua, 23.

43 Cf. Rockhill, TP, XV.

44 Chau Ju-kua, 23—24.

45 For the reputation of the people of Quilon, see Heyd, II, 499.

46 Chau Ju-kua, 63.

47 Ibid., 62.

48 Ibid., 63.

49 Bonang, I—3.

50 Ibid., 3 n. 3. Cf. Yule, Cathay, I, 86; Odoric de Porderone (edited by Cordier, in Recueil de voyages, X, 1891). See also TP, XX, 301, XXI, 387.

51 Marco Polo; Ibn Battuta. Cf. the Chinese account of 1349 in Rockhill, TP, XVI.

52 Pararaton (second edition; Volume LXII of VBG), 165 f., 146 f.

53 Cf. Varthema; Barboza, 371.

54 Rockhill, TP, XVI, 137, 140.

55 Besides them Barros attributes the Islamization to Persians as well.

This is not surprising, for Persians had settled in Cambay in large numbers from early times on: see Van Twist, "Generale beschrijvinghe van Indien", in B & V, II 41. Even in the days of Ibn Battuta, Persian scholars were to be encountered in Pase, IV, 230. Cf. also Bonang, 7, 29, 57 & n. 1; Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch Indië (Encyclopedia of the Netherlands East Indies; second edition), II, 169; TBG, XXXVIII, 219, XLIX, 583; Hoesein Djadjadiningrat, Critische beschouwing van de Sadjarah Banten: Bijdragen ter kenschetsing van de Javaansche geschiedschrijving (Critical Appraissment of the Sadjarah Banten: Contributions to the Characterization of Javanese Historiography; Haarlem, 1913; to be cited as Djadjadiningrat, Sadjarah Banten), 289; D'eerste boeck, 74, 77, III, 120; Tiele, "Het Oosten voor de komst der Portugeezen in Indië" (The East Before the Arrival of the Portuguese in the Indies) G, 1874, Part III (to be cited as Tiele, G, 1874), 227 f.

56 See e.g. Barros (edition 1777), II, Part Two, 1 f. (Dec. II, Liv. VI, Cap. 1); Barbosa in Rouffaer, 622; De Jonge, II, 115.


58 Cf. ibid., 22.

59 See also Janssen's edition of Godinho de Eredia's book (1882) and the original maps reproduced there.


61 Bonang, 33.

62 Barros, II, Part One, 403 f., Part Two, 22, 52 f.
63 On Malay shipping see Part Two of this study. [See above, pp. v-vi. Editorial note]

64 Barbosa, in Rouffaer, 624; Pigafetta, II, 163.

65 Barros, III, Part One, 577, 579. So expressly stated as early as 1492 on the globe of Martin Behaim: see Tiele, G, 1874, p. 227. Cf. Barbosa; Heyd, II, 644 f., 603 f., 499. See also Rockhill, TP, XVI, 238 (1349); Chau Ju-kua, 77 (1216), 81 (1178); Conti, in Major, 17; Hallberg, 65 f. under Bandan, 449 under Sandai, cf. under Java.

66 Barros, III, Part One, 606.

67 Ibid., II, 10.

68 In Rouffaer, 193; Collecção de Noticias, 371—372.


70 Barros, II, Part One, 394.

71 Cf. Tiele, G, 1875, p. 231, G, 1876, p. 409, "De Europeërs" in den Maleisischen Archipel" (The Europeans in the Malay Archipelago), EKI, (this series to be cited as Tiele, "Europeërs", plus series number and volume), Series Four, I, 332.

72 "Generale beschrijvinghe van Indien", B & V, II.

73 B & V, II, 6, 29.

74 Naauwkeurige Beschrijvinghe van Malabar en Choromandel (Accurate Description of Malabar and Coromandel; Amsterdam, 1672), 2 f.


76 I, 48. He does mention traders from Java in his description of Goa, however: I, 120.

77 KHG, 1853, p. 31.

78 See e.g. Rouffaer, 618.

79 See below, § 9.

80 Tweede boeck (1601), folio 16 recto; Bonang, 26—27.

81 See Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, V, 209; De Jonge, II, 452, 469, 527; Rouffaer & Juynboll, Batik-kunst, Appendix IV, xix; "Eerste schipvaerd", in B & V, 99 f., 74; KHG, 1871, pp. 533, 591, et al. This also occurred in Balambangan, nearby Balambangan (i.e., on Bali: see D'eerste boeck, 189 and Rouffaer's n. 2) there "...lay a hamlet of around sixty houses whose inhabitants largely occupied themselves with weaving cotton cloth of various colours and workings, which they are very artful in and supply the surrounding islands with, so that a fair trade is carried on with that same..." ("Eerste schipvaerd", in B & V, I, 97) "...to the Moluccas, Ambon, Banda, as well as Java, Bantam, Sunda, and Sumatra..." (D'eerste boeck, 190, cf. 198, 199 f.). In Panarukan and Balambangan "Some women there also weave cloth which in the Javanese tongue is called canjorin..." ("Eerste schipvaerd", in B & V, I, 62). "There are also some cotton fabrics which are taken to Bantam to be exchanged for Chinese merchandise..."

(ibid) On Bantam itself, see D'eerste boeck, 129; Purchas, II, 442.

82 See also Historiale Beschrijvinghe van de reyse ... van ... J. C.
Neck ende W. van Warwijk (Historical Description ... of the Voyage ... of ...; Amsterdam, 1619), folio 13 recto, and 13 verso-14 recto.

83 De Jonge, IV, 58
84 "Verhaal van eenige oorlogen in Indië" (Account of Some Wars in the Indies; 1622), in KHG, 1871, pp. 497 f.
85 For the location of Jaratan see Bonang, 25, and "Eerste schipvaerd", in B & V, I, 63: "... the city Jaratan lies on a pretty river with a very good harbour where the ships coming from the Moluccas and sailing to Bantam usually obtain fresh supplies; it is also surrounded by a thick wall and on the west side of the river lies the city of Grise." Cf. De Jonge, II, 409: "From these two cities there is taken to Bantam and other places much salt, which in turn is carried from there to Baros, Priaman, Jambi, where it is exchanged for pepper ..." On this salt processing in earlier times, see Chau Ju-kua (1216), 77, 84; Rockhill, TP, XVI, 238.
86 "On these sea roads come also the junks which come from the Molucca Islands and take in some salt until they have a full cargo, for from Juana to Pati there are many salt pans everywhere ..." (D’eerste boeck, 102).
87 "On Mindanao, so people say, there is a large amount of gold, which the Javanese and other traders buy up there with cotton cloth..." (KHG, 1871, p. 599; cf. Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, III, 24).
88 KHG, 1871, pp. 532—533.
89 De Jonge, II, 451.
90 Ibid., II, 409; Purchas, III, 510.
91 KHG, 1871, p. 534.
92 Ibid., 543.
94 KHG, 1871, p. 544. On the trade carried on by Bantam, see above all D’eerste boeck, 118 f.: from Macassar, rice; from Sumbawa, rice, cotton, fabrics (p. 198); Balambangan, coconut oil (also fabrics, *maja keling*: pp. 100—101); (Panarukan, *chabai*: p. 146); Grise and Jaratan, salt (also salt fish and other foodstuffs: KHG, 1871, p. 533); Japara, *gula java* (and rice); Jakarta, *gula java*, wax; Krawang, wax, dried fish (p. 164); Kari-mata, iron; Perak, tin, lead; Ujung Salang, tin, lead; Banjarmasin, wax, dried fish, resin; Timor, wax (and sandalwood: p. 150); Palembang, wax; Baros, benzoin (p. 148; Purchas, III, 504), camphor (p 149); Tulang Bawang (Lampong), lacca (see below, n. 96 — actually from Pegu: p. 148 n. 9, cf. p. 123); Priaman, Indragiri, and Jambi (cf. p. 165, pepper, cotton, tortoise shell; Bali, cotton, fabrics; Juana, salt; Pati, salt. On the trade on Achin cf. Purchas, II, 322.
95 E.g. De Jonge, II, 201 n. 2, 448 f., 409, 452 (on the route Grise
96 Purchas, III, 510, et al.
97 Red dye, the lakha mentioned as early as the document of 851 Ç, translated by W. F. Stutterheim, "Een oorkonde op koper uit het Singasari sche" (An Inscription on Copper from Singasari), TBG, L.XV, 208-281.
98 See below, Chapter Three.
100 For the tremendous export to Java of Chinese copper coins, which remained the currency there until deep in Company times (cf. D'eerste boeck; De Jonge, II, 335), see Rockhill, TP, XV, XVI, 240, 244; Chau Jukua, 81 n. 16, 78. The Chinese authorities attempted in vain to combat the drainage — which led to a shortage of money in their own country — by drastic measures. In the seventeenth century the Company supplied Borneo (among other places) with the coins, which it bought up on Java and got rid of at a profit. In Spain they were even imitated: Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, IV, 417, cf. III, 12; Purchas, III, 507.
101 See below, Chapter Two.
102 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, IV, 111—112, 76.
103 The junk, or jwing, is indeed an Indonesian vessel: see D'eerste boeck, 71 n. 3, and the letterpress to Plate Twenty-Eight facing p. 133. Cf. Barbosa: "...large ships with three or four masts called junks going in the direction of Malacca and Sumatra and to many other ports..." (Colleccão de Noticiass, 366, 371), from which, as well as from a comment in the journals (cf. D'eerste boeck, 133) it becomes apparent that the Dutch did not see the larger type on their first voyage to the Indies. As a matter of fact, they did not call at Japara, the port for the big ships. The ships sailing to the Moluccas were as a rule small, however. See also Pigafetta (edited by Robertson), II, 39; Yule, Cathay, II, 417 f. As a comparison, the Chinese ships which ordinarily came to Bantam would appear not to have been able to carry more than fifty ton (D'eerste boeck, 122); they usually transported an excessive number of people (De Jonge, V, 115; cf. Marco Polo). The four ships with which the Dutch undertook
their first voyage to the Indies had a size of 460, 460, 260, and 50 ton. For the tonnage of the Dutch Company fleet in the Indies in 1684 see IG, 1901, p. 636 n.; for that of the large Portuguese fleet of 1606 see Matelieff's journal in B & V, II, 39-40. Among the Portuguese ships sailing to the Indies at that time there were some of 1400 ton; however, see De Lannoy & Van der Linden, Histoire de l'expansion coloniale des peuples européens: Portugais et Espagnes (1907; to be cited as De Lannoy & Van der Linden) 123 f.; Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, V, 158 n. 163, 187, 202; H. Lopes de Mendonça, Estudos sobre navios Portugueses nos seculos XV e XVI (Memorias da Academia Real das Sciencias de Lisboa, Second Division, New Series, VI, Part Two, 1892), 119 f. They usually carried on the trade within the archipelago with small ships — fusts and proas (De Lannoy & Van der Linden, 126—127; KHG, 1871, pp. 527, 523; Danvers, The Portuguese in India, I, 409). The Gujarati ships trading on Achin at that time did not have a capacity larger than 150 or 200 ton (Van Heemskerck's navigation journal in B & V, I, 27). In KHG, 1871, p. 540 mention is made of a Javanese junk of 400 ton; as a rule, however, the Javanese sailed in small vessels: L. C. D. van Dijk, Neerland's vroegste betrekkingen met Borneo, den Solo-archipel, Cambodja, Siam en Cochinchina (Holland's Earliest Relations with Borneo, the Solor Archipelago, Cambodia, Siam, and Cochin China; 1862; to be cited as Van Dijk), 31. In 1610 the Trade's Increase of 1100 ton was the biggest merchantman yet built in England: Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Five, I, 266.

104 The writer later adds to this description: "... for they have two rudders, one on each side, and a pole in the middle which is fastened onto the ship with ropes underneath and aft; and all their ships and junks have suchlike rudders. Which ships have a bowsprit fore and some of them a foremost along with it, with a mainmast and a mizzen, and from fore to aft an upper deck like a house whereunder they sit protected from rain, dew, and the heat of the sun. There they have a cabin only for the captain or skipper of the junk, and there is no squaresail fore except the bowsprit sail. Below, it is all divided in little sections where they stow the goods securely. People can go on the ships from both sides and they have their fireplaces in those openings ..." ("Eerste schipvaerd", in B & V, I, 77; cf. D'eerste boeck, 130 f. & nn.).

105 "Eerste schipvaerd", in B & V, I, 37.

106 Cf. B & V, II, 53 (Matelieff's journal on Jakarta). These galliots were little seafaring, only serviceable for troop transport in expeditions.

107 Ibid., I, 77.

108 Pp. 130 f.; cf. 169, 57, and Plates Twenty-Seven and Twenty-Eight.

109 I, loc. cit.

110 D'eerste boeck, 131, 132.

111 Van Dijk, 33; Olivier van Noort's journal in B & V, I, 52.

112 See above, p. 20 for further material.
113 De Jonge, II, 404.

114 Ibid., II, 164, 409.

115 "Oost-Indische voyagie onder den Admiraal W. Verhoeven", in B & V, II, 50.


117. "One sees the Javanese rarely but that they are always chewing betel and areca mixed with chalk, from which their mouths become completely blood red, and their teeth black..." (D'eerste boeck, 115, cf. 137). "Concerning their stature, they are medium in height, but strong of constitution, tough of nature, and brown of skin, with completely black, ugly, and broken teeth, so that there are many who have silver and gold teeth in their mouths, the which they can pu out and in..." (Van der Does's journal, in De Jonge, II, 333). "These people of Java are very short in stature [cf. Barbosa] and are a plucky, agile people in build... The females are usually short; the cause is understood to be that they have conversation with the men so young, for when a maiden is twelve or thirteen years old, she is old enough; yea, they are used at a lesser age; they sleep together from childhood on... It is a people of all hues, but for the most part rather swarthy..." (H. Jzn Craen's diary, in De Jonge, II, 180). Cf. also Van Goens, in BKI, IV, 356; De Jonge, IV, 313.

118 B & V, I, 62; see also Barbosa, in Ramusio, I, 319; Collecção de Noticias, 376.

119 Bonang, 20—28.

120 Chau Ju-kua, 66 n. 19, 84.

121 Nagarakertagama, 17 : 5.

122 See Rockhill, TP, XV, 429 f.; cf. Krause, "Die Epoche der Mongolen" (see above, n. 6), 19.

123 III, Part One, 577.

124. Rockhill, TP, XVI.

125 And later to Bantam. See D'eerste boeck, passim, and the other journals of the early Dutch voyages. Cf. this passage from the account of Olivier van Noort's voyage: "The 28th Do [28 January, 1601], they stood before the town of Jaratan, located on the island of Java, where they learned that there would not be any spices available as they had already been shipped to Bantam because of the attraction of the Dutch ships..." (B & V, I, 52).

126 Bonang, 24—35.

127 Unless the Sultan of the Chinese (Chau Ju-kua, 82) was the same as Sukadana, or Surabaya. Sukadana is still the old kampung of Surabaya lying closest to the Ujung, where most of the Arab traders live. The name of Sukadana, the capital and trading centre of Matan in southwest Borneo in the beginning of the seventeenth century, and until 1622 a tributary state of Surabaya, may have been borrowed from there. P'u-Kia-lung as a name for Java and along with that its identification as Pekalongan can..."
only be defended by assuming that Pekalongan had the most significance as an emporium at the time of the Sung Dynasty. The name was maintained in Chinese literature later by tradition, in the same way as Jung-ja-lu or Chung-kia-lu, and Ho-ling. Chau Ju-kua says that Shō-p’ō (eastern Java) "...which is also called P’u-Kia-lung ..." (p. 75) is "... referred to as Su-ki-tan..." (p. 78), and even that "... Su-ki-tan is identical with Shō-p’ō..." (p. 83). Actually Sukitan was "... a branch of the Shō-p’ō country..." (p. 82).

129 *Bonang*, 25.
131 Derkhanregister (Journal) 1624—1629, 148.
132. Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Five, I, 279; cf. Van Goens, in *BKI*, IV, 350. For a description of the commercial towns in that time see the data already cited above, pp. 19 ff. For Surabaya cf. also the passages from the "Verhaal van eenige oorlogen in Indië" (1622): the ruler of Mataram "...had about 70 thousand men around Surabaya to lay siege to the town when I was there, and the people of the town went out to encounter him to stop him at a river; as they were more than 30 thousand strong, they were able to prevent the crossing..." (*KHG*, 1871, pp. 536—537; see also the quotation on p. 21 above).
134. *TBJ*, LVIII & LIX.
135 P. 83.
137 De Jonge, II, 450 f.
139 "Schipvaerd Oliviers van Noort om den geheelen aerd-kloot" (Voyage of Olivier van Noort Around the Whole Globe), in *B & V*, I, 53.
140 "Oost-Indische reyse onder den Admirael Wybrandt van Waerwijk", in *B & V*, I, 55.
141 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VI, 220.
142 Pp. 165 f., cf. 150 f.
143 For example the Pase Chronicle, the *Sejarah Melayu*, and the Banjarmasin Chronicle: *TBJ*, XXIV, 281.
144 Pp. 16—18.
145 See Section B, the sociological section of the first part of this study. [See above, pp. v—vi. Editorial note]
146 Brandes, *TBJ*, XLII, 497.
147 Rouffaer, 190, 127 n.; Barbosa (1516); Rouffaer, 119 f., 122.
148 Cf. Van Goens, in *BKI*, IV, 357.
149 *Bonang*, 28—39, 10—15. The journals of the Dutch voyages also contain interesting data on the marriage of Mohammedan traders with native women: see Van Neck’s journal, in *B & V*, I, 25 for the Moluccas; *De eerste boeck*, 121, 122 for Bantam; etc.
150 Cf. above, p. 20.
152 See above, p. 22.
154 "Discours ende ghelegenheit van het Eylandt Borneo ende 't gene daer ghevallen is int Jaer 1609" (Discourse and Position of the Island of Borneo and What Happend There in the Year 1609), made by S. B. (Samuel Bloemart, Bloemaert, or Blommert), in B d V, II, 98 f.
155 Ibid., 90.
156 Ibid., 100.
157 Ibid., 105.
159 Cuvaug, 16 f.
161 In the translation by J. A. Robertson (1906), II, 37.
163 Cf. also Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, III, 68 n.
164 1530: ibid., 12—13, VIII, 111—112. In the seventeenth century a part of the diamonds still went with Malay merchants to Johore and more to Pahang, a part to Brunei or Banjarmasin for trans-shipment, a part to Batavia or Bantam. Grise was thus pushed completely into the background in the trade (Van Dijk, 148, 187, 15, 17, 51, 132). The fact that Islam apparently made its entry in Sukadana only toward the end of the sixteenth century (Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VIII, 76), while the process of Islamization took place in the Maluccas around the middle of the fifteenth century and in Banjarmasin before the middle of the sixteenth, would itself seem to indicate a decrease in Javanese trade in those centuries.
165 The Banjarmasin Chronicle in TBG, XXIV, 264 f.
166 Van Dijk, 34 n. 3, 190 n. 30, 32, 25, 24, 36; Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Five, II, 239 f., Series Four, VIII 76 n. 3.
167 See above, p. 16.
168 See above, p. 17.
169 See above, p. 18.
170 Djajadiringrat, Sadjarah Banten, 182 f.
171 See below, § 8.
172 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VI, 227.
173 Cuvaug, 27; Rumphius, in BKI, Series Seven, X, Part One, 16; Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VI, 147.
174 *Bonang*, 34—35; Rouffaer, 118.
175 Barros, Ill, Part One, 582.
177 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, IV, 397, 400.
178 *KHG*, 1871, p. 361; *Bonang*, 25; Van Dijk, 178—179 n. 3; Rumphius, in *BKI*, Series Seven, X, Part One, 10, 67, 110.
179 Rumphius, in *BKI*, Series Seven, X, Part One, 16.
180 *KHG*, 1871, p. 360.
181 Ibid., pp. 348 f. Quotation pp. 360 f.
182 Van Dijk, 86.
184 De Jonge, II, 466.
185 Matelieff, in De Jonge, 322—323.
186 De Jonge, IV, 29; Van Dijk, 356.
187 Cf. e.g. De Jonge, II, 451.
188 Cf. above, pp. 27 f.
189 Barbosa (1516), in Rouffaer, 127 n.
190 De Jonge, IV, 58, 65.
191 Van Dijk, 174; De Jonge, II, 338 f., IV, 314, cf. xiii n. 3.
192 Cf. Van Goens in *BKI*, IV, 332, 356. See also the Appendix below.
194 Heyd, II, 508 f. See also the translation of Manoel de Faria y Sousa's *Asia Portuguesa* by Danvers in his *The Portuguese in India* (Two volumes, 1894); Zimmermann, *Die europäischen Kolonien*, I (1896); De Lannoy & Van der Linden, 35.
195 From the time of the invasions of the Mongols in eastern Europe (1237) on that hankering for adventure inspired many people elsewhere as well to journeys of discovery, including religious ones. One has only to think of the Franciscans and Dominicans who travelled to central and eastern Asia and the Indies (De Monte Corvino, Carpini, Rubruquis, Jordanus, De' Marignoli, Friar Odorigo, and so forth), of people such as the Polos, Nicolet de Conti, Schiltberger, Von Boldensele, and so on.
196 De Lannoy & Van der Linden, 28.
199 I, Part One, 384.
200 On Portuguese missionary activity in India see also the introduction to De Jonge's edition of Baldaeus (1917).
201 See Krause, "Die Epoche der Mongolen", 40 ff., and the bibliography on p. 49 there.
202 Barros, II, Part One, 92.
203 De Lannoy & Van der Linden, 58—59; Heyd, II, 520.
204 Tiele, G., 1875, 236; De Lannoy & Van der Linden, 121 ff., cf. 58; TP, XII 489 ff.; JRAS, 1921, pp. 1—28, 545—562; 1922, pp. 1—18.
208 Leupe, BKI, Series Four, II, 378—380; Djajadiningrat, "Critisch overzicht van de in Maleïsche werken vervatte gegevens over de geschiedenis van het Soeltanaat van Atjeh" (Critical Survey of the Data on the History of the Achinese Sultanate in Malay Works), BKI, LXV, 177.
210 Cf. Dagregister 1665, 336.
211 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, V, 199.
212 Ibid., I, 333, 362, 383, 385, 337, 345, 351.
215 Ibid., V, 204—205.
216 Ibid., VI, 171.
217 Ibid., III, 38, 60, 64, 66, IV, 303 n., 426.
218 Voyage de François Pyrard (Paris, 1619), II, 167.
219 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VI, 184; De Jonge, II, 485.
220 De Jonge, II, 256.
221 Ibid., III, 169, 278, 291; Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VI, 214.
222 Rouffaer, BKI, Series Seven, V, 349; cf. BKI, Series Seven, VI, 52; LXV, 176.
223 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, IV, 425.
224 Ibid., III, 37, 64—66, IV, 302, 427, 431, 433; Djajadiningrat, BKI, LXV, 154 f.
228 De Jonge, II, 154—155, 244; Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, III, 66—67, IV, 300, VI, 178 f.
229 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, IV, 298—300, V, 171, 177, VI, 149.
230 Ibid., IV, 451.
231 Ibid., 298, 300.
232 Coen, in RHG, 1853, p. 118, cf. 98. For Malacca in this period see
also Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, III, 27; Godenho de Ercdia (edited by L. Janssen, 1882); BHG, 1859, pp. 289 f., cf. 308 f., 223 f., 341; Matelief's voyage in B & V, II, 41, 29, 75—76; Hakluyt, see index-under Malacca.

233 Cf. Tiele & Heeres, I, 226.
235 Ibid., IV, 323.
236 See above, the end of Chapter One, p. 36.
237 See the Appendix below, pp. 80—82.
238 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, IV, 332.
239 De Jonge, II, 410—452; Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VI, 162, VIII, 69.
3, VI, 162.
241 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VI, 194.
242 Ibid., 193.
244 Tiele, Europërs", Series Four, IV, 451, 432, V, 169—175.
245 Ibid., IV, 176, V, 152.
246 Bonnay, 19.
248 Ibid., 53.
249 Ibid., 22 f., cf. I, 408, IV, 412.
250 Ibid., IV, 340, 397, 401.
251 Ibid., 403, 405, 435, 437 n., 439, 453, V, 190.
252 Ibid., IV, 445 f.
253 Ibid., V, 161.
254 Ibid., I, 391, 408, V, 184.
256 Ibid., IV, 413, 417—418.
257 See below, § 9.
259 Ibid., Series Five, II, 250, 272, 277, 283.
261 Dagregister 1625, 202.
262 Ibid., 199.
263 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VI, 218, 164, 174, 185, 216, 205 n.
3, 211 n. 2.
264 Cf. Ibid., Series Five, II, 241 f., 306 f.
265 Tiele & Heeres, II, 320.
266 Ibid., II, 363.
267 Dagregister 1636, 83, 1637, 49, 52, 1647, 32—37, 1648, 32; IG, 1905.
Part Two, 1599.
270 See also KHG, 1871, pp. 106, 116.
271 See above, p. 45.
272 De Jonge, III, 152—153; Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VIII, 89.
273 On the pepper ports see also De Jonge, II, 501; KHG, 1871, pp. 565 f., 614 f.
275 Tiele & Heeres, I, 167—168. See also Cornelis Buysero te Bantam, 1616—1618 (edited by IJzerman), 25.
276 See e.g. Dagregister 1624—1629, 245, 288, 330; Tiele & Heeres, III, 487, II, 304—305; Heeres, "Corpus diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum", BKI, Series Seven, III (to be cited as Heeres, "Corpus"), 345, 551; J. Cauw's report dated 1665, in IG, 1904, Part Two, 1268 f., etc.
277 Tiele & Heeres, II, 357.
279 Dagregister 1663, 701—702. On the degree of Achinese influence on the west coast, see also Dagregister 1664, 48—49 and 1661, 413.
280 TBG, LVI, 281 f., LIX, 263.
281 IG, 1904, Part Two, 1273, 1270, 1277.
282 Cf. also Van Ronkel in BKI, LXXV, 370 f.
285 1 bahar = 3 picul = 6 bags = 375 pounds Amsterdam.
287 Dagregister 1625, 129. Cf. ibid., 70; Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VI, 86; Cornelis Buysero, 25.
288 Cornelis Buysero, 25.
289 Dagregister 1628, 341.
292 Djajadiningrat, BKI, LXV, 179.
293 Dagregister 1624, 28, 57, 122.
294 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Five, II, 246—247, 301 f.
295 Ibid., Series Four, IV, 426—429, V, 167 f.; Tiele & Heeres, I, 59;
De Jonge, III, 91; Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Five, I, 303, 305 n. 5.
297 Cf. ibid., 300—301.
298 Ibid., 245.
301 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VI, 179.
302 Ibid., V, 188.
303 De Jonge, III, 153.
304 Ibid., III, 9, 152, 153.
305 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VI, 214.
307 Ibid., Series Five, I, 353.
308 Tiele & Heeres, II, 221.
309 De Jonge, III, 153, 203.
310 See above, n. 85 on p. 246.
311 Tiele & Heeres, III, 121.
312 See Purchas, III, 510; cf. Coen, I, 74 (Japara).
313 Coen, I, 204.
314 Ibid., I, 177; cf. Album Kern, 271.
315 Coen, I, 175; cf. Purchas, III, 506, II, 439; Matelieff's discourse (1607) in B & V, II, 75.
316 Cf. De Jonge, IV, 59 f.
318 Ibid., 247; Tiele & Heeres, III, 121. Cf. Dagregister 1626, 28, 57, 1664, 265, 534 f., 1665, 246, 1643, 11.
319 De Jonge, II, 501; Van Linschoten.
320 Dagregister 1632, 111, 1637, 235; Tiele & Heeres, II, 320. For products exported from Palembang see Heeres, "Corpus", 347, cf. 384; Tiele & Heeres, II, xxiv.
321 As we have already seen (above, p. 51), this pepper in reality went first to Indrapura.
322 Coen, I, 177—178; cf. passim.
324 Dagregister 1663, 195.
325 Ibid., 138, 195.
326 Ibid., 195, cf. 1647, 33, 35, 1664, 54, 1665, 258. I shall consider the Malay state (cf. above, pp. 15 f.) in the second part of this study. [See above, pp. v—vi. Editorial note]
327 Coen, I, 178.
328 Dagregister 1640, 109, 166, 232.
329 Dagregister 1664, 54, cf. 1647, 35, 1636, 43.
330 In Jambi, as in Johore, Macassar, Bantam, Surabaya, Cheribon, Palembang, Indragiri, and so forth, there was usually a diarchy of an 'old' and a 'young' ruler.
331 Daghregister 1636, 6—7, 1637, 233—235, 1638, 112, 1638, 143, 320, 1647, 33; Heeres, "Corpus", 175, 410; Tiele & Heeres, III, 165.
332 Daghregister 1638, 320.
333 See above, pp. 15—16.
335 Daghregister 1636, 191.
336 Daghregister 1635, 156, cf. 1643, 11. See also Tiele & Heeres, III, 121; Van Goens, in BKI, IV, 173.
337 Tiele & Heeres, III, 345.
338 Ibid., III, 114—115.
339 This must be exaggerated. On the population of Mataram in the period see Daghregister 1631—1633, 37; Van Goens, in BKI, IV, 319, 360 (1655).
340 De Jonge, VI, 24; Daghregister 1644, 49—51, 61, 1656, 31, 33, 34, 1660, 208, 227; De Jonge, V, 104, 256; Tiele & Heeres, II, 330, 361—362; De Jonge, II, 110, 113, 174; Daghregister 1668, 88; Tiele & Heeres, II, lxxiv f.
341 De Jonge, V, 257.
342 Cf. MacLeod, "De Oost-Indische Compagnie op Sumatra in de 17de eeuw" (The Dutch East India Company on Sumatra in the Seventeenth Century; to be cited as MacLeod), IG, 1903, Part Two, 1915, 1914; Daghregister 1636, 190, 1637, 189, 1640—1641, 64.
343 De Jonge, III, 21.
344 Ibid., III, 361.
345 MacLeod, IG, 1903, Part Two, 1255—1256.
346 Coen, I, 204, et al.
348 Van Dijk, 281.
349 See above, pp. 36, 45 f. Cf. De Jonge, V, 247; Tiele & Heeres, II, lxxiv—lxxv, III, 345, xli—xliii; Coen, III, 931.
350 Tiele & Heeres, II, 307—308.
351 See above, p. 45.
352 De Jonge, VIII, 141; De Haan, Priangan, III, §§ 1381 f.
353 Tiele & Heeres, II, 260.
354 Cf. ibid., II, 396.
355 Practically this was still the situation in 1615: De Jonge, IV, 57 f. See also Van Goens, in BKI, IV, 357, cf. 352. Cf. above, pp. 21—22, 47, and the Appendix below, pp. 80—82.
356 Daghregister 1644, 61, 67, 68, 76, 91.
357 De Haan, Priangan, III, 33 f.
359 Van Goens, in BKI, IV, 176; De Jonge, VI, 51.
360 See Daghregister 1631, 36, 1633, 182, 1636, 95, 145.
361 Daghregister 1624, 51—52.
364 Djajadiningrat, Sadjarah Banten, 182.
365 Cf. Daghregister 1659, 141, et al.
367 De Jonge, V, 88, 98; Daghregister 1625, 148.
368 Babad Tanah Djawi (Tale of the Land of Java; edited by Meinsma; to be cited as Djawi), 248; cf. Djajadiningrat, Sadjarah Banten, 101.
369 Daghregister 1624—1629, 47, 68, 91.
370 Ibid., 148.
371 De Jonge, V, 52, 88, 94. Other migrations are those of the inhabitants of Pajang to Mataram in 1613 (De Jonge, IV, 89—90), Sumedang (ibid., V, 99; De Haan, Priangan, III, § 76), Javanese from the Pasuruan region who in the later half of the sixteenth century were made slaves (abdi) in Bantam (D'eerste boeck, 128), eastern Javanese to the Krawang regions to cultivate rice (cf. Van Goens, in BKI, IV, 175; De Jonge, V, 205; De Haan, Priangan, III, §§ 101, 106, 107, 277), the Javanese of Surabaya (Daghregister 1641, 384), and from Wirasaba to Banyumas (De Haan, Priangan, III, §§ 75, 268).
372 See below, § 9.
373 De Jonge, V, 114, 107, 100, 278.
374 Tiele & Heeres, I, 169; Tiele, "Europeers", Series Five, II, 244.
375 Ibid., II, 225.
376 De Jonge, V, 32, 50-52.
377 Above, pp. 30 f.
379 Cf. above, p. 32.
380 De Jonge, VI, 35, 71, 73 n., 90-91, 217 f.
381 See Barbosa.
382 D'eerste boeck, 106, 115, 117-118.
383 See also Van Goens, in BKI, IV.
384 KHG, 1853, p. 31.
385 Cf. MacLeod, IG, 1903, Part Two, 1262.
386 De Jonge, V, 248, 287; Van Dijk, 105.
387 See the Appendix, below, pp. 80-82.
388 Daghregister 1642, 173.
389 Heeres, "Corpus", 347-348, 380 f. and the sources cited there.
390 Ibid., 407 f., cf. 156, 14, 291.
391 See above, p. 56; cf. Tiele & Heeres, III, 165 n. 3.
392 Daghregister 1681, 595—602; IG, 1905, Part Two, 1604; IG, 1907,
Part One, 620 f.
393 IG, 1905, Part Two, 1282, 1591.
394 Cf. Daghrerister 1681, 480; IG, 1905, Part Two, 1600.
395 Daghrerister 1663, 139, 145, 159, cf. 1664, 54, 534; see also IG, 1905, Part Two, 1600.
396 Brandes, TBG, XLII, 493.
397 Daghrerister 1670, 221, 1671, 278.
399 IG, 1904, Part One, 627, 632.
400 Tiele & Heeres, II, 337. lxvii; MacLeod, IG, 1903, Part Two, 1919 f.
401 Heeres, "Corpus", 345.
402 Ibid, 529.
403 On the Company's gold trade see Verbeek, IG, 1886, Part Two, 1293; MacLeod, IG, 1905, Part Two, 138 f., 484 f.; IG, 1906, Part One, 805, 1438, 1442, 1449. Before the Company took over the exploitation of the Salida gold mine in 1670, and afterwards as well, it bought gold from natives. In 1665, when it had a monopoly, the total amount transported to the west coast was estimated at five hundred pounds, (IG, 1904, Part Two, 1268). In 1669, gold to the value of around £ 20,000 was shipped out from the west coast. It was bought up for sixteen reals per tael of a good one-and-a-half reals in weight (IG, 1905, Part One, 142), in Indragiri for 17 to 19 reals per tael (ibid., Part Two, 1271; cf. De Jonge, IV, 61). From Indragiri, whence the gold from Minangkabau also was shipped, there were 639 tael shipped out in 1666 and 1668 tael in 1673 (IG, 1905, Part Two, 1588). The Company's own exploitation of mines yielded practically nothing except disappointments, despite the advice of a great number of experts. The gold brought to the west coast by the natives came from Kota Tengah (IG, 1904, Part One, 1270) or from the highlands via Pauh. The turbulent political situation there proved repeatedly to be a hindrance to regular trade, however. The Company, incidentally, in this case, also, followed the route of the 'Moors' and traded the gold to India.
404 IG, 1905, Part One, 135; Daghrerister 1670—1671, 96 f., et al.
405 Van Goens, in BKI, 164 f.
406 Tiele & Heeres, III, xlv—xlvi; Van Goens, in BKI, IV, 164 f.
408 De Jonge, VI, 90, 124, 211, cf. V, 94.
409 Ibid., VI, 75.
410 Ibid., VI, 120, 124, 130, cf. lxvii f., lxvvi f.; De Haan, Priangan, III, 238 f.
411 See below, § 9.
412 Cf. IG, 1901, Part One, 350, 480, 619.
413 Daghrerister 1632, 17, 20.
415 The philosophy of law forming the basis for these elements was,
as is well known, later to be more precisely formulated by Hobbes (De
cive, I, § 4) and Spinoza (Tractatus theologico-politicus, XVI, § 3;
Ethica, IV, § 37; Tractatus politicus, II, § 8, VII, § 16), whose statements
are of course to be understood within the framework of his ethics: see
Windebrand, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (Sevenths edition),
I, 23 f.; P. Barth, Geschichte der Erziehung (Third edition), 393;
Nor was it unknown in early India: see A. Hillebrandt, Altindische Politik
(1923; Volume VII of the series Die Herdflamme), 30–32. In Tiele's
introduction to Tiele & Heeres, I, it can be seen that others did not at
all share Coen's principles in this regard, but his views remained the
leading ones, also after his death. They make up in fact the characteristic
ideology for such a period of expansion. The appeal to the 'teachings of
[human] nature' which remains the same everywhere and at all times,
and to history was of course already to be found in the works of Ma-
chiavelli (Discorsi, I, 39, 58, III, 9, 43; cf. Il principe, 3, 17, 18; Discorsi,
III, 42), whose views were widely disseminated in the sixteenth and
seventeenth century: see Ad. Gerber, Niccolo Machiavelli: Die Hand-
Jahrhundert (Gotha, 1912). Charles V studied Il principe industriously;
his courtiers and his son read it; Catherine de Medici and Christine of
Sweden admired it; Henry III and Henry IV were carrying it when they
were murdered; Charles IX knew it like the Bible. Richelieu consulted i t;
Pope Sixtus V made an epitome of it; and it enjoyed no less interest at
the English court. Napoleon I expressed his admiration for it; Frederick
the Great, who wrote an anti-Machiavel in his youth, showed himself to
be a grateful disciple in later life. Marlowe and Shakespeare were equally
influenced by Machiavelli as Hobbes and Spinoza: cf. R. Montuori, "Il
principe del Machiavelli e la politica di Hobbes", Rivieta filosofica, 1905,
No One, 101–113; E. Meyer, Machiavelli and the Elizabethan Drama
(Berlin, 1897). The assumption that Coen had come directly or indirectly
in contact with Marchiavelli's doctrines, perhaps in his Italian period, is
an obvious one. As Coen considered his conflict with the English from
the point of view natural self-defence, influence from the side of Albericus
Gentilis, De jure belli libri tres (London, 1589–1591) is not a priori im-
possible. See further on this point: Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften, IV
(1925), 340 f., 730 f.; Mohr, Geschichte und Litteratur der Staatswissen-
schaften, III (1858), 379–407, 519–591. For Luther's position see
Troeltsch, op cit., I (third edition, 1923), 523, 702; cf. Troeltsch, "Das
stoisch-christliche Naturrecht und das moderne Naturrecht", Historische
Zeitschrift, 1911 (also in Verhandlungen des I. deutschen Soziologen-
tages, 1911). Natural law for Grotius is something completely different: see his
De jure belli et pacis, I, Part One, § 10, and his Inleidinghe tot de Hol-
landsche RechtsgeheerdeHEYDT (Haarlem, 1641), 4 (Jurisprudence of Hol-
land, (1926), 5, 7).

416 Coen, I, 280, 199 f., 439, 484, 523 f., 544, 581; Tiele & Heeres, I, xxxv f., xlii.

417 "Oost-Indische reyse onder den Admirael Steven van der Hagen", in B & V, II, 82.

418 Tiele & Heeres, II, 86.

419 Ibid., II, 289.

420 Ibid., II, 336.

421 Dagregister 1625, 125.

422 See — even then — "Oost-Indische reyse onder den Admirael Wybrandt van Waerwijk", in B & V, I, 35; cf. Dagregister 1624, 78; KHG, 1871, p. 522.

423 Van Dijk, 23, 39 n. 1.

424 See above, p. 48.

425 Dagregister 1625, 199.

426 KHG, 1871, pp. 522, 527; Dagregister 1625, 125.

427 See above, p. 60.

428 Van Dijk, 53.

429 See above, p. 31.

430 Van Dijk, 9.

431 Ibid., 48, 28 n., 15, 16, 125; cf. also e.g. Dagregister 1633, 186.

432 Van Dijk, 62 f.

433 Dagregister 1625, 180.

434 Van Dijk, 33.

435 De Jonge, V, 45.

436 "Oost-Indische reyse onder den Admirael Steven van der Hagen" in B & V, II, 82.


438 Tiele & Heeres, II, 87 n. (1625).

439 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VIII, 76 n. 3; cf. Dagregister 1625, 179.

440 KHG, 1871, p. 523.

441 Dagregister 1625, 124—126.

442 Tiele & Heeres, II, 182 (1631).

443 Ibid., II, 308, 332, 360, 253.

444 Ibid., III, 334, 341.

445 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VI, 216 f.

446 Tiele & Heeres, II, 352, 257, 393, cf. also III, 10 n.

447 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VIII, 58.


Seven, X, Part One, 107 108, 267; De Jonge, III, 322.
449 Van Dijk, 33; *Dagregister 1663*, 30—31.
450 Van Dijk, 96 f. n.
452 Tiele & Heeres, II, xlvi; cf. "Oost-Indische reyse onder den Ad-
miraal Steven van der Hagen", in *B & V*, II, 80.
453 Tiele & Heeres, II, 261. *Cf. ibid.*, III, 41, 368; *Dagregister 1624—
1629*, 257.
454 Tiele & Heeres, II, 114.
455 P. 125.
460 *Dagregister 1624—1629*, 256—257.
461 *Cf. Tiele & Heeres*, III, 341, 367.
464 See De Jonge, III, Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VIII, Series
Five, I, II; Tiele & Heeres, I, II, III; the *Dagregisters*; *et al.*
465 Tiele & Heeres, I, xxxv.
467 Tiele, "Europeërs", Series Four, VI, 201.
469 *Cf. Tiele & Heeres*, II, 57, 76, 143, 186 f., *et al.*
473 Tiele & Heeres, II, 100, 105.
475 *Dagregister 1624—1629*, 79; Tiele & Heeres, II, 17, 18, 30.
476 Tiele & Heeres, II, 344; Rumphius, in *BKI*, Series Seven, X, Part
One, 80, 89.
477 Tiele & Heeres, II, 326, 344.
479 *Cf. Dagregister 1624—1629*, 125.
480 Tiele & Heeres, III, 183, 191, 247.
482 Heeres, in *ibid.*, III, xxiv.
483 Rumphius, in *BKI*, Series Seven, X, Part One, 189 f., Part Two,
52 f., *cf. 36*.
484 Stapel, *Het Bongaais verdrag* (The Bongko Treaty; 1922) covers
the material in detail.
486 In *BKI*, IV, 142.
487 De Jonge, VI, 149.
488 See above, p. 58—59. Cf. De Jonge, VI, 182, cxxi, cix, 253; Tiele & Heeres, III, xli f.
489 Fiscal considerations and the examples of pepper monopolies in Achin and Bantam will undoubtedly also have been of influence in the decision, and quite probably the Company's monopoly as well. It is worthy of mention that Van Goens considered Mangkurat I's economic policy one of wisdom and prudence in state affairs: BKI, IV, 366. Indeed, Coen, with the example of Malacca in mind, had similar plans for Batavia. Since Batavia did not lie on the world trade route as Malacca did, however, his principles could not be carried out in practice: KHG, 1853, p. 97. Earlier, even, in 1622, Sultan Agung had attempted to exert pressure on Batavia by means of a policy of state rice monopoly: Coen, III, 931. Now Cheribon also fell under the monopoly, however: Daghregister 1653, 27, 1659, 141, cf. 1653—1654, 15. See also De Haan, Priangan, III, 33 f., 259.
490 Daghregister 1641, 361.
491 Cf. De Jonge, VI, xlvi, V, 107; more detailed in TBG, LXVIII, 427 f.
492 Van Goens, in BKI, IV, 366—367.
493 Ibid., 175.
494 Ibid., 367.
495 Ibid., 350.
496 Daghregister 1641, 361, 1661, 251.
498 Daghregister 1677, 93.
499 Daghregister 1689, 412. Thus Mataram claimed the proceeds of the tolls at Batavia (Daghregister 1668, 192) as well as of the poli taxes at Palembang (De Jonge, VI, 174). See also De Haan, Priangan, III, § 35 (p. 20).
500 Cf. e.g. Daghregister 1653, 64, 1657, 199, et al.
501 Cf. Daghregister 1659, 209.
502 See above, pp. 59 f.
503 Djawi, 245, 247, 258, 259, 280.
505 Daghregister 1647—1648, 97; De Jonge, VI, 81; Daghregister 1659, 79.
506 Tiele, "Europërs", Series Four, VI, 145.
507 Daghregister 1679, 546.
508 Daghregister 1663, 457 f., 465 f.
509 Daghregister 1675, 163, 244.
510 See the Appendix, below, pp. 80—82.
511 Daghregister 1674, 81, 93, 98, 117 f., 129, 160.
512 Ibid., 113, 128, 93, 81.
513 Ibid., 117—118, 172.
514 Daghregister 1663, 442; cf. Daghregister 1625, 182, 257, and De


516 *De Jonge*, VII, 141.

517 *Daghregister 1674*, 184, 332, 348, *et al.*


520 See *Daghregister 1677*, 300, *cf. Dagh* 1676, 274.

521 *De Haan, Priangan*, III, 226.

522 *Bonang*, 60 n. 2; *Een Javaansche primbon uit de zestiende eeuw* (A Javanese Sixteenth Century Student’s Notebook; edited by H. Kraemer, Leiden, 1921, University of Leiden dissertation; to be cited as *Primbon*), 68.

523 *De Jonge*, VI, 33 n., 34 n., 90, *cf. Dagh*.

524 *Cf. ibid.*, VI, 176; Wilken, *Verspreide Geschriften* (Collected Writings; edited by Van Ossenbruggen), III, 271—273. I hope later to be able to treat the Ratu Kidul figure in detail. For the moment see the few scattered comments in my contribution to the *Indische boek der zee* (The Indie’s Book of the Sea; Batavia, 1925).

525 *Djawi*, 190, 143, 170, 218, 258.

526 *TBG*, LX, 179 n. 2; *De Jonge*, VII, 249; *Daghregister 1678*, 748.

527 *Ajars*: *cf. Primbon*, 58 n. 2.

528 *De Jonge*, V, 49.

529 Van Goens, in *BKI*, IV, 367, 337.


531 *Primbon*, 22; *Bonang*, 5 & n. 6.


533 *Cf. De Haan, Priangan*, III, 223 f.

534 *Djawi*, 381, 478.

535 *Daghregister 1677*, 434.


537 *Daghregister 1677*, 433.

538 *De Jonge*, VI, 160.

539 *Daghregister 1677*, 198.

540 *Daghregister 1677*, 436.

541 On this expression see *De Haan, Priangan*, II, 174 (Appendix XVI, 16, n. 4), 6 (Appendix I, 10, n. 2).

542 *De Jonge*, V, 287; *cf. Daghregister 1665*, 340. Their influence was to spread deep into Borneo. See Franssen Herderschee, *IG*, 1906, pp. 392—


393 n. 2.

543 See above, pp. 27 f.

544 See above, § 4. Cheribon, too, owed its rise to the increased demand for rice in the archipelago from the fifteenth century on: De Haan, Priangan, III, 33 (§ 57.). The rice demand increased in proportion to the demand for pepper and Moluccas spices: if the pepper and spice demand increased the amount of planting on the one hand, on the other the raising of sugar and the planting of groundnuts. All these things together were able in time to lead to an expansion of rice growing on Java and an increase in population there. The rise of Cheribon is very closely linked with the rise of Bantam, to which it supplied rice, as it was later to do to Batavia.

In this study I have not considered the question to what extent the rise of Mataram is to be viewed as the expansion of the population of the interior of central Java (rapidly growing thanks to the favourable economic conditions under which the cultivation of rice could be carried on: cf. Van Goens, in BKL, IV, 352) toward the still sparsely settled coastal region — to what extent, thus, for example Mataram's conflict with Surabaya and its allies was in essence a population problem, in the same way as the revolt of Trunajaya was merely a chapter in the periodical drainage of surplus population from barren Madura to eastern Java, a surplus to which a peaceful outlet was opened only in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Bali's periodical control of eastern Java (see above, p. 60) and Lombok should also be seen in this light.

Pekalongan, Tegal, Batang, Sumber, and Wiradesa, later of greater importance, were still of little size of significance in the beginning of the seventeenth century; De Jonge, IV, 288, 291 f. The same was the case at Semarang, which rose to prominence only after the middle time with Semarang, which rose to prominence only after the middle of the seventeenth century, when it superseded Japara. Kendal was then a large city (Coen, I, 24), the seat of the most important Mataram official, the governor and admiral of the seashore on behalf of Mataram...

"... the governor and admiral of the seashore on behalf of Mataram..." (cf. e.g. ibid., III, 849, I, 707). Japara, Demak, Pati, and Kudus were the leading towns (ibid., II, 24). The last-mentioned town was in 1620 a century earlier Pemalang had governed by a "queen" (ibid., III, 301). A century earlier Pemalang had governed by a "queen" (ibid., III, 301). A century earlier Pemalang had governed by a "queen" (ibid., III, 801). A century earlier Pemalang had governed by a "queen" (ibid., III, 801). A century earlier Pemalang had governed by a "queen" (ibid., III, 801).
545 Djawi, 56.
546 Ratu Kali Nyamat of Djawi; cf. Djajadiningrat, Sadjarah Banten, 117.
547 Cf. above, p. 31.
548 According to Djawi the first ruler of Demak.
549 Brandes, TBG, XLIII, 488.
550 Djawi, 82, 85.

551 The adipati was probably a son of Sunan Prawata, who had served as amengkwiegara, or co-regent, during the reign of his father, Sultan Trenggana or Sultan Demak III, and after his death in 1546, also under Ratu Kali Nyamat. Sunan Prawata was murdered, however, at the instigation of his cousin, Aria Penangsang, whose father Sunan Prawata had killed although he was his own uncle: Djawi, 74—81.

552 Ibid., 165—166.
553 Ibid., 173.
554 Ibid., 182, 199.
555 D'eerste boeck, 103.
556 See IG, 1890, p. 1320; Purchas, II, 477, 440; D'eerste boeck, 80; Djajadiningrat, Sadjarah Banten, 149 f.

557 Djawi, 170.

558 On the agrarian nature of Mataram see Coen, I, 74 (cf. De Jonge, IV, 23), where Sultan Agung (1613—1646) says: "I am not a merchant, as those [rulers] of Bantam and Surabaya...", and goes on: "The afore­sald Mataram has his residence about five or six days journey from Japara, in the interior, where there are divers large, populous towns, and the land is excellently abundant in rice and other victuals; all the rice that is carried along the whole coast of Java to Malacca, Johore, Ambon, and Banda is usually loaded from here..." (cf. Coen, I, 24; De Jonge, V, 44—45, 35, 31, IV, 294, 296 f.; Van Goens, in BKI, IV, 310—311, 312). 

559 Cf.: "Of his incomes, the one the emperor gains the most from is from the rice which grows abundantly in his country, for every year several hundreds of junkes are laden with rice, and with salt, oil, sugar, onion, leek, cotton thread... as well..." (De Jonge, IV, 59). Pajang (Pengging), to which region from the time of Mangkurat II on the kraton was once more removed (at Kartasura: Djawi, 366), is more centrally located than the Mataram crownlands (Van Goens, in BK1, IV, 319, 352, 353) in regard to the five populous rice provinces (De Jonge, VII, 222 f., 226) of south-central Java (cf. Brandes, TBG, XXXVII, 423 f.). Pengging had the hegemony of the rice region in the beginning of the sixteenth century, after that Pajang, and after Mataram Kartasura again from the last decade of the century on. In 1615 — before the conquest of eastern Java (Tuban, Surabaya, Grise, etc.), thus — the naval power of the Mataram Javanese was according not of much significance (De Jonge, IV, 35, 62, 307; cf. Coen, I, 119). The prestige of Mataram was already established by the time the Dutch arrived in Bantam in 1596 (D'eerste boeck, 103;
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559 Djawo, 203, 211—213.
560 Ibid., 178, 182, 203—208. For a personal element in this struggle between Pati and Senopati, cf. Coen, IV, 600.
561 Djawo, 213—216.
562 De Jonge, I, 268 f., 510 f.
563 Ibid., IV, 59, V, 38, 39, 41, 114; Daghregister 1624—1629, 50, 90;
564 Djawo, 242.
565 See above, p. 47.
566 See e.g. above, n. 125 on p. 249.
567 Mataram attempted to turn back the clock of history. It asked (Coen, I, 211) whether Japara "...would not be suitable for a rendezvous, to which was answered that as the regions of Japara were abundant in rice and all sorts of victuals, the staple of trade had tended to be there and all sorts of victuals, the staple of trade had tended to be there in earlier times, as can also be seen in Portuguese history; that in those days no other king nor place but Japara was greatly renowned, and all other places on Java were under vow to him..." Mataram succeeded in its design, but only after destroying the trade area completely.
568 Djawo, 182.
570 Coen, I, 24, cf. 23.
571 Djawo, 219—221, 224—237; De Jonge, IV, 28, 58.
572 De Jonge, IV, 65; Djawo, 231.
573 See above, p. 48; cf. Djawo, 234.
574 Coen, I, 552, IV, 600.
575 See above, p. 48; cf. Djawo, 236.
576 See above, pp. 72 f., for later happenings.

COMMUNISM ON THE WEST COAST OF SUMATRA

1 The Sarekat Islam was a Moslem society set up before the First World War to protect the interests of Javanese merchants which
developed into a political movement. [Editorial note]
2 I.e. the Sarekat Islam.
3 I.e. the body of traditional institutions.
3a J. Stalin, Foundations of Leninism (New York, 1932), 33—34. [Editorial note]
3b Ibid., 76. [Editorial note]
3c Ibid., 77. [Editorial note]
3d Ibid., 78. [Editorial note]
4 Baars en Wijnkoop: two Dutch communists. [Editorial note]
5 The Indonesian Communist Party did not carry out this order of the
Communist International and Tan Malakka in the period 1925—1926.
6 These general principles obviously tie up with an idea of Marx's in the
period when the youthful illusions he had acquired under the influence of
Louis Blanc had been shaken by the events of 1848—1849; that is to say,
before he and Engels had devised the theory of organic revolution of their
riper age, after 1870 and the disillusionment of the First International. This
idea is to be found expressed in his Enthüllungen über den Kommunisten-
Prozess zu Köln (1885), Appendix IX, 75 f.; cf. The Class Struggles in
France, 1848—50 (edited by Engels; 1924), 70—72, 181 f., and also the
editor's Introduction. The tactics indicated above were also prescribed for
India by the Communist M. N. Roy in La libération nationale des Indes
(1927).
7 I.e. The Flame, an Indonesian communist periodical. [Editorial note]
8 Penghulu: the word means chieftain, and is often, but not always used
9 I.e. the fifty kota valley: kota = village. [Editorial note]
10 Pakan Baru already has a direct KPM (Royal Packet Navigation
Company) service twice a week to Singapore and is also regularly visited
by two Chinese steamers. Customs revenue amounted to £15,500 in 1924
and £50,000 in 1925. The Stannum Mining Company found itself obliged
to provide its own ferry service on the Bangkinang — Pakan Baru road,
since until a short time ago it was quite common for forty-odd Ford cars
to be waiting on each side of the river for their turn to cross, which meant
a delay of three to four hours. Nowadays there is a ferry for motor
vehicles.
11 TBB, L (1916), 186—187; LI (1916), 69—70.
12 Henry Dodwell, "Economic Transition in India", The Economic
Journal, V (1910), 615. See also R. Mukerjee, The Foundations of Indian
Economics (1916), 4—10; Th. Morison, The Economic Transition in India
(1911; second imprint, 1916), 153 f.; Robertson Scott, Foundations of
Japan (1922), 65—66; Matsuyo Takizawa, The Penetration of Money
Economy in Japan and Its Effects upon Social and Political Institutions
(New York, 1927).
13 On 1 July, 1925 the price of first quality rice at Sungai Penuh was between 15s and 15s 10d. At the time Korinchi's rice stocks were estimated at 400,000 piculs and the area of rice fields under cultivation at 17,300 acres. Trial cuts between 1919 and 1921 indicated an average paddy crop of 60 picul per bahu (= 1¾ acres).

14 During the recent pilgrimage season (1926—1927) seven hundred people (one per cent. of the total population) set off for Mecca. The subdivision possesses a hundred motor cars. In September, 1926 the number of cars passing along the Korinchi road amounted to about 1100.

15 The area under coffee is put at 10,000 bahu, of which half is productive.

16 In the future Ujung Tanjung will probably have to replace Muara Sakai as the port of lading; since 1 January, 1927 the KPM line has been serving the latter port, which is now the export harbour for Tapan, Indrapura, and Korinchi. If the overland route to Benkulen via Lunang and Lubuk Penang is improved, Mukomuko will probably be added to these. At the moment exports (coffee, rubber, and resin), representing native production in the main, amount to 8,000 picul as against an import of 2,000 picul (petroleum, gasoline, sugar). In view of the irregularity of sea transport and the risk involved, part of the coffee is sent by lorry from Korinchi to Padang direct.

17 There are traditional ties between the sub-districts of Balai Selasa and Kambang on the one hand and Sungai Pagu (Pasir Talong) in Muara Labuh on the other.

18 Native teaching experiences the same difficulties in Korinchi and e.g. in Kuantan.

19 Mention should also be made of the practice of producers of taking their goods to the market themselves instead of waiting for the buyer to call, thus improving their bargaining position and avoiding the so-called 'consumer's rent'. The rationalization of trade is, however, making inroads on the 'idyllic' community element in the traditional system of buying and selling, though the tanwar menuwar, or system of fixing prices in mutual rivalry, has by no means been abolished.

20 In this connection we recall that in 1919 or 1920 communist propaganda recruited its followers in the main from the poorest layers of the foodcrop growing population, especially in overpopulated places such as Old Agam and Pariaman, in economically backward areas such as Sawah, or in those places where, owing to the breaking up of large estates as in the country around Padang, and where the shortage of money was most acute.

21 Even in early times private traders' debts were recognized as family
debts if incurred in the presence of the adat authority of commercial affairs.

22 Even in districts where the adat does firmly apply, like Fort Van der Capellen, the pledging of land to the inhabitants of surrounding villages does occur in practice (e.g. in Sungai Tarab).

23 The allusion is to the surrender of land in Pangkalan Kota Baru and XII Kota Kampar before these areas were brought under direct Dutch rule.

24 Recently the government expressly forbade this by circular: *Bijblad tot het Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië* (Supplement to the Gazette of the Netherlands East Indies! to be cited as *Bijblad*), no. 11477. In the *Bataviasch Nieuwsblad* of 29 September, 1927, no 294, Dr Boris Rapschinsky cites some particulars from a report in the journal of the Moscow Communist Academy *Sovjetskoye Stroityel'stvo* on an exchange of ideas among the Academy’s members concerning a lecture delivered by a representative of the People’s Commissariat for Justice on conditions in the country. The writer quotes among other things the statement that in Smolensk the authorities forbid the registration of a peasant’s marriage if his taxes have not been paid.

25 See Schrieke, KS, XI (1927), Part One, 94—96. The germ of this in the form of village jurisdiction and *ulayat* rights (rights connected with areas of disposal), etc., already lay dormant in their traditional positon. This does not alter the fact, however, that the tendencies are traversed by wholly contrasting ones.

26 Cf. also V. Ernst, *Die Entstehung des niederen Adels* (1916); *Die Entstehung des Grundeigentums* (1926).

27 The same applied for cinnamon and other items.

Part One, 169.

The terrible example of the Javanese, whom the people of Minangkabau associate with contract coolies and forced labourers, was especially effective. It was made use of for propaganda purposes in Jambi and Palembang as well. It was even referred to by old-fashioned religious scribes of blameless reputation and by conservative representatives of the adat party. For these people the concept of the 'capitalist' is identified with the danger of losing landed property and the prospect for the native landowner of ending up as a coolie. In Jambi the idea was that the decline in rubber prices was a government stratagem to enable the rubber gardens to be bought up cheaply, after which the only possibility left open to the inhabitants of Jambi would be to become tapping-coolies! In Palembang it was said that: "...the native land on Java has fallen into the hands of the commercial companies owing to the fault of the government. The native administration has acted as an accessory in this. The people are reduced to misery; they no longer have any gardens, ricefields, or clearings and can only work as coolies on the plantations. There is nothing left for their children and grandchildren but to sign on as contract coolies, and for their wives but to become prostitutes."

29 It was pointed out that in Fort Van der Capellen, the controleur, Nijdam, instigated the use of compulsory services for the building and repair of community houses, thinking that this would be a means of reinforcing the adat.

30 This had caused tax assessments to undergo a sudden sharp rise in the preceding years, especially in Fort Van der Capellen.

31 Literally heirs: here, members of a family as seen from the point of view of participation in the sacred hereditary property. [Editorial note]

32 Kitab Tjoerai Paparan, 207 (see below, n. 34).

33 The members of the family can be forced to pledgeing by the penghulus only in the cases referred to and only if the necessary funds cannot be obtained in some other way.

34 See his works Kitab Tjoerai Paparan 'Adat Lembaga Alam Minangkabau (Fort De Kock, 1919), Kitab Peratoeran Hoekoem Adat Minangkabau (Fort De Kock, 1924).

35 Ibid., 99—100, 106—107; see also Kitab Tjoerai Paparan 'Adat, 199: "As most penghulus will no longer concern themselves with the care of sacred family property, there are many stupid children and sister's children who have become the victims of this unwillingness, because the property has been squandered long since by some uncle or great-uncle."

36 Kitab Peratoeran, 105—106; Kitab Tjoerai Paparan 'Adat, 199—200.

In the latter work Datuk Sanggumo Diradjo once more calls pertinent attention (179—180) to the fact that if the payment of the adat charges due the penghulus and waris is insufficient in a case of alienation, the latter must give their consent freely and cannot be forced to do so.
37 This fact has been noted in a series of observations: E. Francis, "Korte beschrijving van het Nederlandsche grondgebied ter Westkust van Sumatra 1837: Geschiedenis, wetten en gebruiken der Maleische bevolking wonende langs de stranden en in de Padangsche bovenlanden" (Brief Description of the Dutch Territory on the West Coast of Sumatra in 1837: History, Laws, and Customs of the Malay Population Dwelling Along the Shores and in the Padang Highlands), TNI, II (1839), Part One, 100 f., 131 f.; J. van der Linden, "Het Inlandsch bestuur in het Gouvernement van Sumatra's Westkust" (The Native Administration in the Province of the Province of the West Coast of Sumatra), TBE, IV (1855), 257—284; A. W. P. Verkerk Pistorius, "Het Maleische gezin en het erfrecht in de Padangsche Bovenlanden" (The Malay Family and the Law of Inheritance in the Padang Highlands), TNI, Third Series, HI (1869), Part Two, 172 f.; A. W. P. Verkerk Pistorius, Studien über de inlandsche huishouding in de Padangsche Bovenlanden (Studies on Native Economy in the Padang Highlands; Zaltbommel, 1871); Th. A. I. Kroesen, "Het inlandsch bestuur ter Sumatra's Westkust" (The Native Administration on the West Coast of Sumatra), TNI, New Series, II (1873), Part Two, 81—109, 208—230; G. A. Wilken, "Over de verwantschap en het huwelijk en erfrecht bij de volken van het Maleische ras" (On Kinship and Marriage and Inheritance Law among the Malay Peoples), IG, V (1883), 656—764; J. van Bosse, Eenige beschouwingen omtrent de oorzaken van den achteruitgang van de koffiecultuur ter Sumatra's Westkust benevens eenige opmerkingen omtrent de economische en politieke toestanden aldaar (...The Causes for the Decline of Coffee Growing on the West Coast of Sumatra... and the Economic and Political Conditions There), I (The Hague, 1895); D. G. Stibbe, "Beschrijving der onderafdeeling Alahan-Pandjang" (Description of the Sub-District Alahan Panjang), TBB, XXI (1901), 218—242, 293—322, 496—526, XXII (1902), 324—344; G. de Waal van Anckenveen, articles in Adatrechtbundel (Papers on Adat Law), I (The Hague, 1910), 80—128; W. J. Kroon, "Een bijdrage tot de kennis van Sumatra's Westkust, inzonderheid van de Minangkabausche inzettingen" (A Contribution to the Knowledge of the West Coast of Sumatra, Especially of Minangkabau Institutions), TBB, XXXVI (1919), 1—16, 152—163; "Verordening van een vergadering over herziening van het adatrecht te Fort De Kock (1911)" (Minutes of a Meeting for the Revision of Adat Law Held at Fort De Kock, 24 December, 1910), Adatrechtbundel, VI (The Hague, 1913), 207—220; C. van Vollenhoven, Het adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indië (The Adat Law of the Netherlands East Indies), I (Leiden, 1918), sche schiereiland (The Minangkabau States on the Malay Peninsula), de bibliografie van de huidige godsdienstige beweging ter Sumatra's
Religious Movement on the West Coast of Sumatra), TBG, LIX (1919—1921), 249—325.

38 Remarkable too is the gradual modification of the laws regarding sacred family property. In the old days in Solok, for instance, this property was distributed among the sister's children, and these kemana-kaans were allowed to keep two-thirds of the yield and were obliged to hand over one-third to the family storage-house (lumbung). The seriousness with which this last duty is regarded has now also already diminished. The same may be said of the claims of the members of the family domiciled elsewhere; these are frequently simply ignored nowadays. The reason given for this is that those who do not work the fields have no right to claim any part of what they yield.

39 See report of the first financial year (1915) of Vereeniging Volksbank Munangkabau (Minangkabau People's Bank Society; 1916), 8.

40 Redemption of savaks is one of the most common reasons for asking for credit from the People's Bank or a negeri bank, notably in Agam and Fort Van der Capellen.

41 In other places such as, for instance, Atar, Fort Van der Cappelen, the establishment of a negeri bank in a daughter settlement was opposed, because the people wished to keep the latter dependent on the mother negeri.


43 There are, however, small banks, not only in Pariaman, but also in Agam (at Tengah Kota Sarik, Kota Panjang, Batu Bajolang) and Fort Van der Capellen (Pasir Lawas, Galogadang), where the majority of borrowers are women, mostly for doing small business. Moreover, it is a fact that the banks chiefly used by women have less trouble than the others with delayed payments. Prolonged absence from home on the part of the men promotes this.

44 Adriani, "Korte Schets van het Toradja-volk" (Short Sketch of the Torajas), Verzamelde Geschriften (Collected Writings), III (1931), 36—37.

45 See also Kruijt, "De Slavernij in Posso" (Slavery in Poso, Onze Eeuw (1911), 77; Adriani, "Over het karakter der Toradja's en hunne Eeuw" (On the Character of the Torajas and Their Administration rechtspraak" (The Bare's Speaking Torajas) I, (1921), found, as for instance in Neuhaus's Deutsch Neu-Guinea (1911), III, 93.

47 Kruijt, l.c., 72, 80. Nieuwenhuis, Quer durch Borneo, I, 65, 95 records something similar in regard to the Dyaks.

48 Such married slaves had households of their own and each worked his own ricefield. They were no longer sent out for every little job and only went to help their masters with the general work in the fields; or if
they were required for some special job they had to present themselves. Such slave families sometimes had a few buffaloes — whereas the buffaloes of the free men, like their slaves, were common kin group property — as well as goats and pigs which they had generally bought for rice.

49 Nor was the merchant highly regarded in the West at first.


51 "The emancipation from economic traditionalism appears, no doubt, to be a factor which would greatly strengthen the tendency to doubt the sanctity of the religious tradition, as of all authorities": Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (tr. Talcott Parsons; second edition, 1950), 36.


56 E. Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (first edition, 1931; quotation from II, 609); *Protestantism and Progress* (1912; quotations from pp. 139—157, 139, 140). See also Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic...* (cf. n. 51 above); cf. the résumé of his views in *ASS*, XXXI (1910), 584 f.

57 A sociological accident is "an event which takes place as the inevitable result of the present constitution of a given social institution but is not involved in the conception of such an institution nor inherent in it" (Sombart).

58 It is interesting to note that the authority of the chiefs is least in those regions which enjoy a certain degree of wealth and where the process of individualization is promoted by the regular emigration of many of the inhabitants. Two such places are Kota Lawas and Kota Anau, which both happen to be well known on account of their butchers. Anau, which both happen to be well known on account of their butchers. Anau, which both happen to be well known on account of their butchers. Those inhabitants of Kota Anau who have experience of the world very largely belong to the well-to-do class and are ('therefore') reputed troublesome and quarrelsome.


60 The very undesirable habit of discharging the young men and retaining the services of persons old enough to be eligible for a pension is also found here. This course is perhaps convenient from the service point of view, but for the community it is most deleterious.

61 Of course there were also the confirmed criminals, who played an important part in the agitation of 1926 and finally took matters entirely
into their own hands during the rebellion. See P. Szend, "Die Krise des mittel-europäischen Revolution", ASS, XLVII (1920—1921), 361.


63 The article in the negeri ordinance regarding b-members has in practice remained a dead letter, except in Fort Van der Capellen. [The negeri ordinance of 1914 for the West Coast cf Sumatra, as amended in 1918 (Staatsblad, 1914, no 774; 1918, no 667) provided for two categories of local council members: (a) heads and notables, and (b) other members duly appointed at the request of the local inhabitants. Editorial note]

64 Of the total number of village council members 75% are illiterate. This percentage fluctuates between 60 and 85 in the various sub-districts.

65 See among others the circulars issued on 7 and 11 January, 1911 by Governor Ballot.

66 Published in Adatrechtsbundel, I.

67 Cf. Frijlink, "Een nieuwe koers" (A New Course), TBB, XLVIII (1915), 157 f.


69 A typical parallel is found in the sumptuary laws of the aristocratic society of the sixteenth century, which were intended to keep the community in the traditional harnass.

70 Vierkandt, Der Dualismus im modernen Weltbild (1923), 52; cf. Vierkandt, Gessellschaftslehre (1923), 436 f., 440.

71 Corruption among the penghulu kapala was mentioned earlier. In Pariaman criminality increased very rapidly, because the wages of the coolies did not keep pace with the sharp rise in the price of rice but also because practically no effort was made to check the spread of gambling.

72 The agitator speculates on the common mental phenomenon that it is easier to gain agreement to negative pronouncements than to positive ones. If I say the government is bad, I may count on a more numerous following than when I myself try to get recognition for a government program of my own by means of propaganda": G. Schultze-Pfaelzer, Propaganda, Agitation, Reklame (1923), 59.

73 Cf. the letter of the district chief of Pariangan dated 14 October, 1926, no 37, confidential.

74 Cf. Curt Geyer, Der Radikalismus in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (1923), 70 f., the chapter entitled "Milieu und Radikalismus", 4: "Radikalismus und Obrigkeitsstaat". The daily newspaper Sinar Sumatra (Light of Sumatra) has repeatedly called attention to the results of the policy pursued in the fight against 'communism': nos 208 and 232 (1926). The policy was the result of the need felt by the civil to battle with an evil and a danger the presence of which it suspected while the
legal measures it could adopt were inadequate. But even without the legislation which was passed at the end of 1925 and in the beginning of 1926 the agitation would inevitably have been carried on 'illegally'. The chief flaw in the method followed was — from a political standpoint and quite apart from the fact that results did not achieve the desired object — that no distinction, or not enough distinction, was made between evolutionaries and revolutionaries. Elsewhere an effort was made to wait "until it was possible to bring charges of serious offences". Conviction on the ground of venal misdemeanours — so it was argued — would simply supply grist to the mill of the 'popular leaders'.

75 Here, too, as in the labour movement in western Europe, the highly suggestive idea of great numbers was made use of: a handful of (capitalist) Europeans were contrasted with the countless masses of natives.

76 "One of the tactics employed systematically by the anti-capitalists in dealing with the masses was to arouse panic. The anarchis of Russian nihilist attack is a weapon taken from the arsenal of mass psychology. Its aim is to spread fear, the terror which disorganizes the enemy and makes him weak. There are also symbolic objects, one of which is to destroy a system metaphorically in representative personalities": Michels, "Psychologie der antikapitalistischen Massenbewegungen", *Grunderz der Sozialökonomik*, IX, Part One, 342.

77 In some places the civil service succeeded in having them placed on probation.


80 Padris: A sect of religious revolutionaries striving after the abolition of the *adat* and all Minangkabau popular customs contradictory to Islam. The doctrine of the Prophet according to them had to be imposed upon the people — if need be by means of violence. The movement, stimulated by hadjis who had witnessed the reforms of the Wahhabits in Mecca, was suppressed by the *adat* party with the help of the Dutch (1821—1839).

[Editorial note]


82 An analysis of this may be found in Schrieke, "Bijdrage tot de bibliografie van de huidige godsdienstige beweging ter Sumatra's Westkust", *TBG* LIX (1919—1921). On the *kaum muda* movement in its earliest phase the reader should consult the report by Dr van Ronkel. See above, pp. 126—129.

83 Thus also the communication from the resident of Sumatra's West Coast, dated 20 February, 1924, no 108, confidential.

84 The leaders possessed little handwritten compendiums of *Koran* and *hadith* (sayings and deeds of the Prophet) quotations.


87 The traditional descriptions of the tremendous powers of the Antichrist (Dajal) must not be interpreted literally, for they convey a prophecy of the immense power of capitalism.

88 We have the war to thank for a whole series of studies in this field in which are analyzed both the war psychosis and — especially — the war propaganda of the various nations: secrets, methods, and effect. See amongst others H. D. Lasswell in *Bibliography of Recent Literature on International Propaganda* (Publications of the American Sociological Society, XXXI, 1926).

89 "The necessity of explaining these problems, viz the basic principles of a rigid socialist social philosophy, to great masses of the people who lacked all preconceived ideas except that of immediate repression, compelled their popularization, their formulation in a few easily understood axioms which by constant repetition, that is, by an appeal to faith, could be impressed upon the masses. The sovereign power of the slogan is the other important basis of radicalism which is required for socialist propaganda... The vague emotional world and the unstable will of the radical masses clutch at such slogans and see in them an expression of that indefinable something which moves them without finding clear definition": Curt Geyer, *Der Radikalismus in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung* (1923), 40—41, 42—43. Cf. H. Sultan "Zur Soziologie des modernen Parteiensystems"; *ASS*, LVI (1926), 124—125; Alfred Meusel, "Der Radikalismus", *Kölner Vierteljahresschriften für Soziologie*, IV (1924), 46; A. Fischer, "Psychologie der Gesellschaft", in Kafka, *Handbuch der vergleichenden Psychologie*, II (1922), 419; Roffenstein, "Zur Psychologie der politischen Meinung", *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, III (1927), 405—406.


91 Cf. above, pp. 126—129.

92 The following data are taken from an official report.

93 "The Agrarian Decree for the first time gave legal form to the principle that all land not in private ownership is State land": Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, 179. [Editorial note]

94 Bauer, *Die öffentliche Meinung* (1914), 63—64.

95 Cf. P. Szende, *ASS*, XLVII (1919—1920), 352 f.; Alfred Meusel,
"Die Abtrünnigen", *Kölner Vierteljahreshefte für Soziologie*, III (1923), 167. See above, n. 89.

96 *Zur Psychologie des Socialismus* (Jena, 1927). There is also a French edition of this work. See also G. Briefs in "Das gewerbliche Proletariat:", *Grundrisse der Sozialökonomik*, IX, Part One, 176 f.; Michels, "Psychologie der antikapitalistischen Massenbewegungen", *ibid.*, IX, Part One, 241 f.


99 As a result of greatly increased pledging, many people on the West Coast of Sumatra have lost any real, lasting basis for a practically independent living which spelled stability also in an ideological sense, quite apart from the special, almost religious tie which bound the peasant to his hereditary land.


101 Before the eighteenth century the artisan class managed, with the assistance of the Church, to retard the technical improvement of the methods of production on the ground that the latter was contrary to the socio-ethical standards of the times.


104 Briefs, *l.c.*, 179: "When from measuring and comparing one’s own circumstances with those of others, discrimination and consciousness of solidarity develops, this in its turn sharpens the sense of differences to the point of becoming a critical attitude and a keen watchfulness in reference to all social events and conditions. To think there is something wrong with things belongs to the essential consciousness of the proletariat."

105 See also *ibid.*, 181, 178. Compare with this analysis the sociologically oriented *Individualpsychologie* of Alfred Adler — for instance, in his latest book *Menschenkenntnis* (1926) — who notes constant disharmony between social feeling and the struggle for individual power. Adler too, assumes an inferiority complex which already is manifest in the young child. He says: "A little child feels weak and inferior as compared with adults and older children and out of this feeling grows immediately a craving for power."

106 Netherlands East Indies Government Decrees, 15 March, 1892, no 1, 20 August, 1898, no 45; Regulations of the *Directeur van Onderwijs, Eeredienst en Nijverheid* (Netherlands East Indies Director of Education, Religion, and Trades), 29 August, 1898, no 14349, 22 September, 1899, no 16326.
107 This also violates the traditional sense of justice. Hence the pro-
paganda of the communists against the 'capitalist' railways, which had 
robbed the peasants of their land and the shopkeepers (pedlars) and 
bandy drivers along the road of their living, for instance in Pariaman and 
Padang Panjang.

108 See above, p. 106, regarding 'mixed' farming.

109 This rising sense of 'we' is in remarkable contrast to the old 
conception which saw a stranger in everyone not a fellow-villager. 
Compare the solidarity between labourers of which mention was made 
above, p. 163. In that case, too, the idea that there are common interests 
at stake has provoked a feeling of solidarity for resisting a common 
danger.

110 Cf. Geiger in Die Masse und ihre Aktion (1926); Vleugels, Kölnische 
Vierteljahreshefte für Soziologie, VI (1926), 168 f.

111 Georg Adler, Die Bedeutung des Illusionen für Politik und soziales 
Leben (1904).

THE NATIVE RULERS

1 The bibliography given in the Dutch original has been incorporated in 
the notes. [Editorial note]

2 Fritz Kern, "Vom Herrenstaat zum Wohlfahrtstaat", Schmötlers 
Jahrbuch, LII (1929), 396.

3 The mechanical state has acquired an organic character. It depends 
upon a new group spirit: the national spirit.

4 Here we find the combination of the concepts of legal order, political 
orGANIZATION, and religion, so typical of primitive sentiment.

5 N. Adriani, Versameldte Geschriften (Collected Writings), II, 101—103.

6 Ibid., II, 90—93, 104—105.

7 Het Gajoland en zijne bewoners (The Gayo Country and Its Inhabit-
ants; 1903), 88—89.

8 In Achin people are grouped in mukim according to which mosque 
they should attend. A mukim may consist of several villages, more or 
less like parishes in the West. [Editorial note]

9 See B. Schrieke, "Het probleem der Bestuursorganisatie ter Sumatra's 
Westkust" (The Problem of Administrative Organization on the West 
Coast of Sumatra), KS, XI (1927), Part One, 94 f., with bibliography; 
Thurnwald, Die Gemeinde der 

Cf. Snouck Hurgronje, Gajoland, 81—90; Thurnwald, Die Gemeinde der 

Cf. above, pp. 121—122; L. Adam, De auto-

Bakaro (1921), 55, cf. 223 f. Cf. above, pp. 121—122; L. Adam, De auto-

nomie van het IndoneSische dorp (The Autonomy of the Indonesian 

k ° 

Village; 1924); B. J. Haga, IndoneSische en Indische democratie (Indone-

sian and Indian Democracy; 1924). Both Adam (86 f.) and Haga (145 f.) 
have observed this phenomenon but without explaining it sociologically. 
They regard it as undesirable but fail to realize that it is inherent in the 
present system.
10 Cf. TBG, XLV (1902), 169; Cense, De Kroniek van Bandjermasin (The Chronicle of Banjermasin; 1928).

11 Sultan Agung was the great-grandson of Pamanahan, a ministerialis of the sultan of Pajang, who had handed Mataram over to him as a reward for his good services. The history of Java is full of homines novi. The same can be remarked on the other islands, for example Bali. The social structure is stable but there is constant change in the composition of the upper class. At the end of the sixteenth century, the age of chivalry (the memory of which is kept alive in the wayang plays, and so forth) had already passed on Java. The traditions survived only in the jousting game, of which Van Goens gives us a lively description. On Bali the age of chivalry still persisted in the nineteenth century.

12 See the Excursus, below, pp. 201—221.

13 TNI, New Series, III (1865), Part One, 117.

14 Ibid.

15 Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië (Gazette of the Netherlands East Indies), 1820, no 22; cf. TNI, New Series, III (1865), Part One, 194 f.

16 Ibid., New Series, III (1865), Part One, 126.

17 Ibid., New Series, IV (1866), Part One, 2, 23.

18 Ibid., New Series, III (1865), Part One, 105 f.

19 TBB, XVII (1899), 374, 381.

20 IG, XV (1893), 1928.

21 Ibid., 1930. Cf. for a later period: KT, III (1914), 70, 217; Bijblad tot het Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië (Supplement to the Gazette of the Gazette of the Netherlands East Indies; to be cited as Bijblad), nos 6061, 6118, 6396, 7029, 7939. See furthermore articles by Snouck Hurgronje and Van Helsdingen mentioned in note 44 below, and "Nota betreffende de verhoudingen tusschen het Europese en het Inlandsch bestuur op Java en Madoera door een Regent" (Memorandum on the Relations Between the European and Native Administrations on Java and Madura, by a Regent), IG, XI (1889), 1521—1524.

22 Cf. D. J. Mackay, De handhaving van het Europeesche gezag en de hervorming van het regtswezen onder het bestuur van den Gouverneur-General Mr H. W. Daendels over Java en Onderkoorigheden (1808—1811) (The Maintenance of European Power and the Reform of the Judicial System During the Term of Office of Mr H. W. Daendels as Governor General of Java and Dependencies, 1808—1811; 1861).

23 Its social standing within its own society also suffers as a result of this.

24 Cf. also TNI, New Series, III (1865), Part One, 244.

25 On the matter of the residents' jealousy of the authority of the regents, see Van der Capellen's letter of May, 1820, Baud's speech in the Netherlands parliament (Second Chamber) on August 2, 1854, and the debates in the Chamber on the article concerning heredity in the
Constitutional Regulation, in Keuchenius (cf. n. 33 below).

26 Cf. also TNI, New Series, IV (1866), Part One, 259, 423 f.; ibid., New Series, IV (1866), Part Two, 102—103; ibid., New Series, III (1865), Part One, 245; ibid., New Series, III (1865), Part Two, 40 f., 51 f. (esp. 95), cf. 126, 198 f., 208 f., 495—499.

27 In 1834 Baud writes as follows in regard to his tour of inspection through Java: "The population [of Priangan] is peaceful and tractable and it organizes all the work required of it entirely according to the adat or native institutions, since the native headmen here are the government's principal instruments, whose influence has not been diminished by European intervention or by the reforming spirit to the same extent as elsewhere." This means in other words that the Priangan system was a direct extension of the 'compulsary cultivation' of the days of the Company, which system both Daendels and Raffles had left intact. Such compulsory cultivation had never been known on the north­east coast of Java. As a result of the maintenance of the Priangan system relations in the district preserved aniquated forms for a longer period than was the case elsewhere. "For this reason, therefore, the administration is able to go further in the control of the population in these parts than it can elsewhere, because the certainty exists that the unpleasant features which that control may possess are tempered, as far as possible, by a fair arrangement and distribution conforming with local customs. The regents do not seem to be very enthusiastic about the cultivation of indigo and tea, which has been introduced here; the opinion of the population in this matter cannot, however, be ascertained with any certainty from the regent's accounts, because the latter's pecuniary interests are involved." (TNI, New Series, IV [1866], Part One, 4). S. van Deventer adds the note: "Applying this argument to the regents and headmen of the other residencies whose pecuniary interests were involved in the expansion of the plantations, one would also have to regard these men as unqualified to express an opinion regarding the culture system in the name of the population!" Cf. TNI, New Series, IV (1866), 161; ibid., New Series, III (1865), Part Two, 277, 279, 293. Cf. H.C. van der Wyck, Onze koloniale staatkunde (Our Colonial Policy; 1865), 18.

28 TNI, New Series, III (1865), Part One, 193 f., 130, 137; ibid., New Series, III (1865), Part Two, 476 f.; Bijblad, nos 118, 123, 124. The family government by the upper ten families, which Van den Bosch regarded as an asset, was also sometimes less appreciated by the European administration. Cf. Van Helsdingen, KT I (1912), 196 f.; IG, XIV (1892), 683 f.


30 Cf. "Misbruiken in de administratie op Java" (Administrative Abuses
on Java), TNI, XIII (1851), Part Two, 246 f.; ibid., XVI (1954), Part One, 35 f.; ibid., XXII (1860), Part Two, 258 f., 393 f. The Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië was the organ of the 'colonial opposition.'

31 Confidential cabinet circular no 284, dated 1 December, 1859.

32 One notices here the distinction made between officials and private persons, though the 'confidential' circular will doubtless have been intended for the former.


34 Yet the original policy regarding the island of Madura, whereby European officials had to avoid as far as possible all interference with extortionist and other practices of the native heads there, was more consistent, even though Van den Bosch admitted that the 'princes' at that time were really only 'regents'. See E. de Waal, Onze Indische Financiën (Our Indies Finances), V (1882), 133. Nor as regards the manchawegara (the provincial area of native principalities on Java) did the government at this juncture desire to take legal proceedings against extortion: TNI, New Series, IV (1866), Part One, 225. For that matter, Van den Bosch himself railed against 'protection' of the people. See the quotation in Merkus, Blik op het bestuur van Nederlandsch-Indië onder den Gouverneur-Generaal Js van den Bosch in (The Administration of the Governor General Js van den Bosch in the Netherlands East Indies Reviewed...; 1835), 112; cf. also TNI, New Series, III (1865), Part Two, 119, 124. Meanwhile, the causal connection between the 'extortions' practised by native officials and the inadequacy of their remuneration, which Baud had already noted in 1834, was overlooked for many years: see TNI, New Series, IV (1866), Part One, 12; cf. ibid., New Series, III (1865), Part Two, 319.

35 E. de Waal, op. cit., I (1876), 260 f. For the effects of 'liberal' policy see also L. Adam, op. cit., 94—95. As a class, the professional nobility now entirely lacks an economic foundation, in contrast to the 'socially atrophied' aristocracy of western Europe, insofar as the latter remained large-scale landowners.

36 TBB, II (1889), 40.

37 Cf. TNI, XXII (1860), Part Two, 258 f.
38 J. van den Bosch was colonial minister from 1834 to 1840, J. C. Baud from 1840 to 1848, and C. F. Pahud from 1849 to 1855, the latter then being governor general from 1856 to 1861.

39 TNI, New Series, IV (1866), 381.

40 "Although generally speaking the native rulers possess many good qualities, their intellectual development is by no means on a level usually met with among the upper classes in a civilized society. They must therefore be discreetly guided and when they abuse their authority, as they are often inclined to, this must be prudently counteracted... These rulers are not infrequently found to be extremely indolent." If Van den Bosch and Baud were of this opinion, one does not need to ask what came in practice of the European administration's recognition of the regent's distinctive position, if its experience tallied with this judgement.

41 Memorie van Toelichting (Explanatory Memorandum to Parliament) of 1853 regarding the draft Constitutional Regulation, Keuchenius, Handelingen, II, 175 f.

42 M. S. Koster, "De opleiding der Inlandsche administratieve en rechterlijke ambtenaren op Java en Madoera" (The Training of Native Civil Servants and Judicial Officials on Java and Madura), Indisch Genootschap, Verslagen der Algemeene Vergaderingen (Minutes of the General Meetings of the Indies Society), 1904, pp. 1 f.

43 In 1882, however, Governor General Van Rees considered the natives, including even the most distinguished among them, unfit, on the whole, to receive a more or less 'academic' education. In 1778 Minister Sprenger van Eijk wrote: "In circumstances as they are, it can be assumed that the native officials-to-be can best equip themselves for the service of their country by means of practical experience."

44 Cf. IG, XIV (1892), 683; TBB, XXXI (1906), 184, 381; Bijblad, no 5556. See also 'Boeka', "De Hoofden op Java" (The Headmen on Java), IG, XXVI (1904), esp. 516 f. Cf. also the essay by the then regent of Tuban, R. T. Koesoemo Dikdo, TBB, XXIV (1903), 10 f. and Snouck Hurgronje, "Inlandsche Bestuursambtenaren, vooral op Java" (Native Civil Servants, Especially on Java), Verspreide Geschriften, IV, Part Two, 149 f.; Van Helsdingen, KT, I (1912), 182 f.; C. J. Hasselman, "De moderne richting in de koloniale staatkunde en hare beteekenis voor het Nederlandsche volk" (The Modern Trend in Colonial Policy and its Significance for the People of the Netherlands), Indisch Genootschap, Verslagen der Algemeene Vergaderingen, 1908—1909, pp. 107 f.

45 "Brieven van een Wedono-Pensioen (1891—1892)" (Letters from a Pensioned Indonesian District Officer), in Snouck Hurgronje, Verspreide Geschriften, IV, Part One, 248.

46 TBB, XVII (1899), 367 f.

47 "Now, owing to this great difference in education, the native officials recede into the background. On the whole they are not much
better than the performers of given orders, than mandurs, overseers.” (ibid., 370). "The instruction given at the schools [for headmen] is of such a nature that those who have received it may indeed be very suitable for the job of village chief or clerk, but are not always able to answer to the exacting demands at present made upon district officials. This is why there are increasing complaints about the standard of native officials. The critic is on an entirely different level of education; the fact that the demands become daily more exacting is often lost sight of..." (ibid., 373).

48 R. M. A. A. Hadi Ningrat notes in his advice (1893): "I made this same proposition to the former director of civil service, Levyssohn Norman, in 1871, when, being employed by this department under the direction of that honourable gentleman, I was given the task of submitting a memorandum on the matters in question. On receiving my memorandum, the honourable gentleman declared that my head was in the clouds.” Cf. Bijblad, nos 5556, 8579, 9765.

49 KS, XI (1927), Part One, 100. The above paragraph is based on Meyer Ranneft’s view.

50 See above, pp. 175, 194 and further pp. 198—199.

51 See above, p. 175.


53 Dr Hans-Jürgen Seraphim, "Geistige und ökonomische Grundlagen des Bolschewismus", Schmollers Jahrbuch, LII (1928), 417 f.; Brutzkus, Agrarentwicklung und Agrarrevolution in Russland (Berlin, 1926); Seraphim, "Zur Organisation der russischen Industrie", ASS, LIII (1925), 763 f.; Seraphim, Treibende Kräfte der Handelspolitik in zarischen und bolschewistischen Russland (Berlin, 1926); Martow-Dan, Die Geschichte der russischen Sozialdemokratie (Berlin, 1926); Nötzel, Die soziale Bewegung in Russland (1923); N. Buhnoff, "Der Geist des volkstümlichen russischen Sozialismus", ASS, LV (1926) 365; K. Kramar, Die russische Krise (1925); Seraphim, "Versuch einer Systematisierung der russischen Nationalökonomie", ASS, LVII (1927), 730; Schriffin, "Zur Genesis der sozialökonomischen Ideologien in der russischen Wirtschaftswissenschaft", ASS, LV (1926), 730.

54 In this respect compare the analysis above, pp. 161-166. I cannot here go into the function of the intellectuals in political development in general. Of all the different classes they show the least consistency as regards policy, due in part to their individualism. Schumpeter (op. cit., 72) calls them "the rootless, headstrong, emotional intellectuals, at the mercy of every impulse and utterly 'unself-sufficient'". The rôle they have played in the political history of western Europe answers to this description. Here I also leave out of consideration the question whether we should not
regard the present intellectual movement in Indonesia as the expression of a given generation rather than as a class phenomenon. And there are other questions of a similar order.

55 The School of Technology was established in 1920, the Law School in 1924, the Medical School in 1927. [Editorial note]

EXCURSUS: THE POSITION OF THE REGENTS

1 See F. de Haan, Priangan: De Preanger-Regentschappen onder het Nederlandsch Bestuur tot 1811 (The Regencies of Priangan under Dutch Rule up to 1811; to be cited as De Haan, Priangan), III, §§ 369-375, 382-383, 403 for the Company's motives in intervening on the northeast coast of Java.

2 There was no cession of these areas prior to the contract of 5 October, 1705 (see J. K. J. de Jonge, ed., De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië [The Rise of Dutch Authority in the East Indies; to be cited as De Jonge], VIII, 261 f., 284; cf. De Haan, Priangan, III, § 550). The unpaid quotas date back to this contract (ibid., III, § 610).

3 At the same time this promoted the regents' aspirations to independence. See De Jonge, VII, 50. Cf. also De Haan, Priangan, III, §§ 504-510, 527, 588.

4 See BK I, I (1851), 397-401, 293. Cf. the Company's attitude to Priangan, Cheribon, and Madura prior to 1705.

5 Cf. TNI, XV (1853), Part Two, 258.

6 See De Haan, Priangan, IV, § 1881.

7 Cf. TNI, XX (1858), Part Two, 58 f.

8 As regards the regents of the northeast coast of Java see BK I, I (1852), 293, 397-401, cf. also 321, 326, 336-337, 345-352, 353, 362 f., 369-381, 412-417, 422, 434; Rothenbuhler, "Rapport van den staat en gesteldheid van het Landschap Surabaya" (Report on the Condition and Situation of the Residency of Surabaya), VBG, XLII (1891), 13 f.; De Jonge, X, 57, 96, 105 f., 186, 204, 233, 304, 317, 321, etc., IX, 253; Nederburgh, Verhandeling over de vragen ... (Consideration of the Questions ...; 1802), 183, 193.

9 De Haan, Priangan, III, § 614.


11 Ibid., III, §§ 583, 698, 527, 1055 f., IV, §§ 1998 f.

12 Ibid., III, §§ 700 f.

13 Ibid., IV, §§ 2395-2428.

14 The regents of the northeast coast of Java had to swear an oath of allegiance and obedience.

15 De Haan, Priangan, III, §§ 836, 841.

16 Ibid., §§ 884, 1258 f., IV, §§ 1857 f., 1979 f.

17 Ibid., III, §§ 905 f., 918, 1038 f., IV, § 1861.

20 De Jonge, XI, 121, 446.
21 De Haan, Priangan, IV, §§ 1974 f., 1857, 1862.
23 Engelhard, op. cit., 42.
24 De Haan, Priangan, IV, § 2659.
25 *Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië* (Gazette of the Netherlands East Indies, to be cited as *Staatsblad*), 1827, no 109.
26 Here, too, we confine ourselves to the facts, since a great part of Daendels' reorganizations existed on paper only. See De Haan, Priangan, IV, §§ 2581, 2638 f., cf. 2653, 2775, 2836, 2847.
27 Van Deventer, *TNI* (1863), Part Two, 409 f.
28 J. A. van der Chijs, ed., *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek* (Book of Edicts of the Netherlands East Indies), XV, 161, art. 7.
29 Ibid., XV, 292.
30 *TNI*, XXIII (1861), Part One, 275.
31 See Engelhard, *op cit.*, 36. Indeed, the fact that Nederburgh insisted so strongly that the principle of heredity should be observed when appointing regents shows that this principle was not being observed even before Daendels time. See Nederburgh, *op cit.*, 81—32, 190 f.; cf. Van Hogendorp, *op cit.*, 16 f.
32 Rothenbuhler (see *VBG*, XLI [1891], advised Raffles, on 6 August, 1812, to rid himself entirely of the regents. See Levysson Norman, *De Britsche heerschappij over Java en Onderhoorigheden* (The British Rule over Java and Dependencies; 1857), 123 n.
33 Ibid.: *TNI*, New Series, II (1864), Part One, 210 f., 175, 279. Raffles interfered as well in the administration of justice and also in the relation-
ship between the regents and lesser heads.

34 "Minute Recorded by the Honourable the Lieutenant Governor of Java, on the 14th June 1813", in *Substance of a Minute Recorded by the Honourable Thomas Stamford Raffles... on the 11th February 1814...* (1814), 264.

35 Ibid., 271.

36 Raffles also argued in his defence against Gillespie's attacks that by far the larger number of regents had no hereditary authority. "The regents retain their title and rank, in short, everything except their direct political influence... The European resident is the pivot of the whole system, whereas formerly he was almost entirely deprived of any supervision over the native...": Levysohn Norman, *op. cit.*, 307—308.


40 *Staatsblad*, 1819, no 11.

41 *TNI*, New Series, III (1865), cart Two, 257.


43 Ibid., 1820, no 22 (Regulation Governing the Duties, Titles, and Ranks of the Regents on the Island of Java).

44 Cf. *TNI*, New Series, I (1863), Part Two, 283 (letter from the com-
missioners general, dated 16 March, 1818).

45 Staatsblad, 1859, no 102; 1867, no 114; 1886, no 244; 1907, no 192.

Cf. Staatsblad, 1848, no 17; Bijblad, no 3749, etc.

46 No 13 (19 December, 1818).

47 Staatsblad, 1819, no 16, § 6.

48 (Instructions for the Respective Regents in the Former Gubernatorial Area of the Northeast Coast of Java; 1808).

49 (Administrative Regulation for the Cheribon Regions; 1809).

50 Van der Kemp, BKL, XLVI (1896), 535 f. Cf. TNI, New Series, I (1863), Part Two, 290 f. for examples of the dismissal of regents in the period (letter from the commissioners general dated 16 March, 1818); D. van Hogendorp, Berigt, 17, as regards feeling among the officials in the period before Daendels. See also P. de Haan Pzn, Schetsen aangaande de landelijke administratie van Java (Sketches on the Rural Administration of Java; 1829; cf. TNI, New Series, III [1865], Part One, 223); A. de Wilde, De Priangan Regimenten op Java gelegen (The Priangan Regencies on Java; 1830), 195 f.; cf. TNI, XVI (1854), Part One, 41.

51 No 65 (14 July, 1817).

52 Cf. Van der Kemp, BKL, XLVI (1896), 303, 387 f.; BKL, XLVII (1897), f., esp. 10, 23—24, 39 f., 45 f.; Louw, De Java-oorlog van 1825—30 (The Java War...), I (1894), 5 f. (the Van Sevenhoven proposal regarding Paku Buwono VI) 18 f., 74 f.

53 Cf. also Van der Capellen’s letter in TNI, New Series, II (1865), Part One, 117 f. and Van den Bosch’s memorandum (1834) in BKL, XI (1864), 399. See further TNI, XIII (1851), Part Two, 262 f., XIV (1852), Part One, 297 f.

54 De Haan, Priangan, IV, § 2539.

55 Staatsblad, 1820, no 22; 1824, no 13.

56 Staatsblad, 1827, no 15; TNI, New Series, III (1865), Part One, 126.

57 Staatsblad, 1837, nos 20, 30.

58 See also Louw, Java-oorlog, II, 234 f.; cf. however, II, 565 n. 1, IV, 236.

59 BKL, XI (1864), 295.

60 On 14 January, 1831, Governor General Van den Bosch wrote to the members of the Council of the Indies as follows: "it is of such great importance that peace should be preserved on Java that all appropriate means to this end should be employed... The authority and influence of the people’s regents, in particular, can be made to serve this purpose. It cannot be gainsaid that too little attention has been given to this in recent years... The possession of this island can only be assured on the basis of a firmly established aristocracy, by means of whose authority alone a population of some millions can be made to submit to our rule. Therefore we must not only bind that aristocracy to ourselves as closely as we can, but must also provide them with the means of serving our interests. Admirable though
the aim may be, the protection of the common man from oppression by the upper class has been the basis of the former political principle to which our greater security has been sacrificed." *(TNI, New Series, III [1865], Part Two, 24—27, 70—71).

61 F. Mijer, *Jean Christien Baud geschetst* (Sketch of J. C. Baud; 1878), 653; H. R. van Delden, *Over de erfelijkheid der Regenten op Java* (On the Hereditary Position of the Regents on Java; 1862). *Cf.* also De Haan, *Priangan*, IV, §§ 1985, 2545; *TNI, XV* (1853), Part One, 150 f. At an earlier date Van den Bosch himself was of another opinion: see *TNI, XX* (1858), Part Two, 330, 368 (1827).


63 *Cf.* also *Beschouwingen omtrent het bestuur van Nederlandsch-Indië naarmate aanleiding van het Voorloopig Verslag van de Commissie van Rapporteurs van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal nopens het ontwerp van wet tot vaststelling van het Reglement op het beleid der Regering van Nederlandsch-Indië* (Observations on the Administration of the Netherlands East Indies, in Connection with the Interim Report of the Committee of Reporters of the Second Chamber of Parliament Regarding the Draft Constitutional Regulation of the Netherlands East Indies; 1853), 49 f. See also *TNI, XV* (1853), Part One, 150: "The colonial minister has included in the Constitutional Regulation a principle regarding the native regents on Java which has always been warmly advocated and defended by Mr. J. C. Baud but which is otherwise supported only by very few. I am certain that of all the European officials employed in the civil service not one in twenty will be found to side with Mr. Baud..." *Cf.* further *TNI, XIV* (1825), Part One, 297 f.; Jonkheer J. P. Cornets de Groot van Kraaijenburg, former councillor of the Indies, *Aantekeningen op het ontwerp van het wet tot vaststelling van een Reglement op het beleid der regering van Nederlandsch Indië* (Remarks on the Draft Constitutional Regulation for the Government of the Netherlands East Indies, 1853); 'Een Oud Oost-Indisch Ambtenaar' (A Former East Indies Official), *Antwoord op de Aantekeningen van den heer Cornets de Groot...* (Reply to the Remarks of Mr. Cornets de Groot..., 1853); *TNI, XX* (1858), Part One, 236, XVII (1855), Part Two, 76 f., XVI (1854), Part Two, 36, 115, 264 f., 406, XVI (1854), Part One, 38 f., XVII (1855), Part Two, 402, XX (1858), Part Two, 330, etc. As regards the principle of heredity *cf.* further the circular of 29 November,
1913, no 2744, Bijblad, no 8579 (Cf. KT, III (1914), 217; IG, XXXVI (1914), 256, 352; Brinks, KT, V (1916), 1041 ff, cf. 1027 and 753 ff.; IG, XXXIV (1912), 311 f.; Bijblad, no 9765.

64 See above, pp. 191—196.

BORROWING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURE

1 Selection of this same kind may be noted in respect to foreign cultural elements. Take, for instance, the way in which tantric magic was accepted in the archipelago owing to the conceptions held by the natives as to the structure of the world.

2 "De ontwikkeling van den natten rijstbouw" (The Development of Wet-Field Rice Growing), Teysmannia, XXVII (1916), 469 ff.

3 See J. van Gelderen, "Bevolkingsdichtheid en landbouw op Java (met een aanhangsel)" (Population Density and Agriculture on Java: With an Appendix), KS, VI (1922), Part Two, 225—247.


5 G üst i = Lord; ka wula = servant, man. [Editorial note]
GLOSSARY
Weights and measures given in metric or earlier Dutch units and sums given in florins by Schrieke have here and elsewhere in the volume been converted to their British equivalents.
GLOSSARY

adat: customary law.
adipati: noble title sometimes awarded to regents.
anak buah: people under charge of headman or chief.
ayah: Indonesian nurse or womanservant to European family.
bahar: measure of weight, three picul or six bags, equivalent to 360-600 lb.
bahu: measure of land, equivalent to 1 1/8 acres.
Çaka (Ç): Hindu era, 1 Ç = 78 A.D.
canjorin: kind of cloth from eastern Java with white and blue stripes.
cash: lead coin from China circulating in southeast Asia, one thousandth of tael, in Indonesian also kepìng.
chabai: long pepper (Piper longum).
chikdai: Indian flowered silk fabric made by tie-and-dye process.
contreleur: European civil servant of next to lowest rank in Netherlands East Indies.
datuk: distinguished title.
demang: Indonesian low-ranking civil servant in Netherlands East Indies with police authority.
gade [or gadoi]: transfer of land for cash sum with retention of option to recover the land by payment of equivalent sum.
gamelan: set of percussion instruments making up a Javanese orchestra.
gampong: village (cf. kampong).
gula jawa: 'Java sugar', of the palm Arenga saccharifera.
guru: (religious) teacher.
hongi expedition: expedition sent out by Dutch East India Company to seize islands to destroy plantings.
ibadat: religious duties.
imam: most important person officiating in a mosque.
kafir: unbeliever, non-Moslem.
kampong: non-European quarter of town, more usually village.
kaum: (family) group.
kaum lono: 'the old-fashioned group', people of conservative (religious) tendencies.
kaum muda: 'the young group', people of modernist (religious) tendencies.
keling: foreign(er), especially Callînggalese, (person) from the Coromandel Coast.
kentot: Javanese courtesy title.
khatib: reader in mosque, chief mosque official after imam.
kota: village, more usually town.
koyan: large measure of weight, some thirty to forty picul, equivalent to 3000—5000 lb.
kyai: 'grandfather', religious teacher or leader.
kyai arya: courtesy title.
ladang: high land used for dry-field farming.
lakon: (classical Javanese) play.
lumbung: storage-house.
mahesa lanung: 'beautiful buffalo', not used for work and destined for sacrifice, sometimes depicted as bearing Durga on its back.
maja: sort of fruit.
mantri [or menteri, cf. mandarin]: (high) official, minister.
menyan: benzoin.
mobin: mosque official performing functions of crier and circumciser.
myrobolan: dried astringent fruit of *Terminalia Bellerica* Roxb. used in tannery and dyeing.
negeri: regional community on genealogical or territorial basis.
ngabehi: 'who orders all', official title sometimes awarded to regents.
oikos: term used by Weber, organization of specialized unfree labour in workshops of lords.
orang banyak: 'the many', the ordinary people.
orang cherdek pandai: 'the educated people', intelligentsia.
orang kaya: 'rich man', patrician or nobleman.
pemehahan: 'object of devout reverence', exalted title of, among others, the ruler-priest of Giri.
pangeran: governor; more usually prince, title of member of ruling family.
parang: hatchet.
pasek: border region, here northern coastal area of Java.
patola: kind of figured Gujarati cloth woven of silk threads of various colours.
penghulu: local chief.
penghulu kopala: head penghulu.
perdikan: granted freedom from certain taxes and services and required to fulfil certain religious duties such as caring for holy graves.
raden: noble title on Java.
rangga: lesser official on western Java.
ratu: ruler or his consort.
sampan: small boat of Chinese pattern.
sarakat [or serikat]: association.
sawah: irrigated ricefield.
sayyid: descendant of Mohammed through Fatimah and Ali.
shahbandar: water bailiff, harbour master.
suku: kinship group.
**GLOSSARY**

suranata: corps of religious functionaries in service of susuhunan of Surakarta.
susuhunan: Javanese royal title.
tael: measure of weight, especially for precious wares, equivalent to around 1 1/3 oz; monetary unit, equivalent to about 6s 8d.
tariqah [or tarikat]: Moslem mystic brotherhood.
tingan: transport proa with double rudder.
tumenggung: noble title sometimes awarded to regents.
ulayat rights: rights of disposition (over land).
wakil: deputy.
waris: heir, here member of clan; member of family group holding property in common.
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