ABSTRAK
Tujuan utama dari penelitian ini adalah menguji hubungan simultan antara nilaiperusahaan, praktek corporate govenance, dan struktur kepemilikan dengan 114perusahaan yang terbuka di Bursa Efek Jakarta pada tahun 2003. Variabel strukturkepemilikan adalah Cash flow rights, wedge (control rights - cash flow rights),persentase kepemilikan blockholders oleh pihak asing namun diduga sebenarnyaorang Indonesia (atau disingkat Asing Tapi Indonesia, (ASTINDO)). Nilai perusahaanakan diukur dengan proksi Tobin?s Q dan praktek corporate governance diukurdengan corporate governance index (CGI) yang dikembangkan oleh Arsjah (2005).Karena hubungan endogen antar variabel, metode two stage least squares dipakai.

Hasil menunjukkan bahwa praktek corporate governance tidak berpengaruhsignifikan kepada nilai perusahaan, tetapi nilai perusahaan menjadi prediktor positifuntuk praktek corporate governance. Hasil ini menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan yangmempunyai nilai perusahaan yang tinggi memilih praktek corporate governance yangbaik untuk meningkatkan nilai perusahaan. Namun, perusahaan belum tentu dapatmemberi signal tentang kualitas perusahaan dengan menerapkan praktek corporategovernance yang baik. Hasil ini mungkin terjadi karena implementasi praktekcorporate governance merupakan hal yang baru di indonesia dan karena pasar masihsulit mencerminkan pengaruh praktek corporate governance kepada nilai perusahaansebab kekurangan informasi yang memadai tentang praktek corporate governance.

Ketika wedge perusahaan tinggi, pengaruh praktek corporate governance kepadanilai perusahaan melemah. 'Wedge adalah variabel yang mengukur insentif pemegangsaham mayoritas akhir untuk mengekspropriasi pemegang saham minoritas. Dengandemikian dapat disimpulkan bahwa efektivitas praktek corporate governancedipengaruhi oleh insentif untuk melakukan ekspropriasi dari pemegang sahampengendali akhir.

Struktur kepemilikan dan nilai perusahaan tidak mempunyai hubungan sistematik.Hasil ini mendukung bahwa struktur kepemilikan ditentukan secara endogen,sehingga struktur kepemilikan tersebar maupun terkonsentrasi masing-masingmembawa masalah keagenan, tetapi sekaligus memberikan kuntungan yang dapatmenjadi kompensasi masalah keagenan masing-masing.

ASTINDO dalam struktur kepemilikan perusahaan ternyata tidak menguranginilai perusahaan atau tidak mengekspropriasi kekayaan pemegang saham minoritas.Tetapi persentase kepemilikan ASTINDO berpengaruh negatif kepada praktekcorporate governance. Tidak terdapat perbedaan pengaruh dari kepemilikanASTINDO dan kepemilikan blockholders benar-benar asing (BLOCKA) kepada nilaiperusahaan dan praktek corporate goverance. Dengan asumsi ASTINDO diukur dengan benar, hasil tersebut meragukan argumen bahwa kepemilikan BLOCKA berpengaruh positif kepada kinerja perusahaan dan praktek corporate governance.

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Abstract
The primary objective of this study is to test simultaneous relationships among thevalue of the firm, the practice of corporate govemanee, and the ownership structure ona sample of 114 companies quoted in the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) for the year 2003. The ovmership structure variables include cash flow rights, wedge (controlrights - cash-flow rights), and percent of ownership by foreign bloclcholders that presumably are Indonesian blockholders (FBIB). The value of the firm is measured byproxy of Tobin's Q and the practice of corporate governance is measured by corporategovemance index (CGI) developed by Arsjah (2005). Because of the endogeneity among the variables, the two stage least squares are employed.The study finds that practice of corporate govemance fails to affect value of thefirm, but value of the firm is a positive predictor of practice of corporate governance.These results suggest that highly valued firms adopt the practice of the good corporategovemance because they believe that the practice of the good corporate governancewill further raise fimr value. However, adopting the practice of good corporate governance may not translate to higher fimi value. This may due to the fact thatimplementation of the practice of the corporate govemance is something new in Indonesia and that market may have difficulty in reflecting the effects of the practice ofthecorporategovemanceonthevalueofthefirmbecauseofthelackofproper information.Further, the influence ofthe practice ofthe corporate governance on the value ofthe firm becomes less, when the wedge of the firm becomes higher. Wedge is the variable that estimates incentives of ultimate majority shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Therefore, I conclude that effectiveness of the practice of the corporate govemance is influenced by the expropriation incentives of the ultimate majority shareholders.Ownership structure and the value of the firm have no systematic relation. This result supports that the ownership structure of a firm is the endogenous outcome of decisions. In other words, ownership structure is chosen so as to maximize the value ofthe firm, and that greater diffuseness in ownership, although it makes the agencyproblemmoresevere,conveyscompensatingadvantagesonfirmsthatchoosetorelyon a difiiise ownership structure.FBIB does not extract private benefits for themselves or do not expropriate thewealth of the minority shareholders. But, percent of ownership by FBIB has negative effectsonthepracticeofthecorporategovernance.Thereisno differencebetweentheinfluence of percent of ownership by foreign bloekholders and of percent of ownership by PBIB on the value of the firm and the practice of the corporate governance.Assuming that percent of ownership by FBIB are accurately measured, this result casts some doubt on the argument that ownership by foreign bloclcholders has positive effects on the performance and the practice of the corporate governance.