In South Korea, policy tools and priorities are set at the national level
and are controlled through both budget allocations and audits conducted on an
annual basis. I look at the degree to which local officials adapt their budget allocations
to address local rather than national concerns in securing better air quality,
using three different theoretical models: principal-agent, representative bureaucracy,
and democratic responsiveness. I raise questions about the degree of control a
unitary state can exercise over local problems and how this is reflected in local
policy choices, especially in areas where the national government?s zone of
indifference is large, such as environmental policy. Panel data across 5 years
(2007 to 2012) and from 9 geographically and socioeconomically diverse areas
within South Korea indicates that local officials respond to local environmental
conditions by allocating more resources when needed. I discuss the implications
for autonomy in a local policy space.
