One of the great scandals in philosophy from around the beginning of the
20th century has been the perpetuation of the idea that there is a substantial
distinction to be made between so-called analytic and continental philosophy—
one that goes beyond issues regarding style and sociology. And, even
though none of the respective participants in the dispute admits to being able
to give the distinction any articulation that does not slip between their fingers,
the distinction remains today very real (in the stylistic and sociological sense),
wielded by both sides for diverse, abject, anti-philosophical ends (inter alia):
the perceived winning of arguments via the appeal to authority; ensuring that
one’s arguments will not be subject to wide-ranging critical scrutiny; the
maintenance of one’s image and identity as a member of a particular philosophical
club at the expense of others’ membership; the perceived entitlement
to ignore (and dismiss without reading) vast tranches of literature as some
“non-U” other. In short, I think that the belief in the viability of the distinction
is ideological in nature (in the pejorative, Marxist sense that I discuss in
Chaps. 7 and 8, and which, in a sense, is the guiding theme of this book).
One then ought to ask in the present context: why include the word “analytic”
in the title of this book? Am I not further securing the credibility of this ideology
(used to maintain the positions of power of individual philosophers
belonging to each camp) by so doing? Am I not thus indicating my desire to
engage with Islamic philosophy (depending on one’s perceived sense of tribal
belonging) in terms of the “right” or “wrong” way?
Analytic Islamic Philosophy .pdf :: Unduh