# Talukder Maniruzzaman's Contribution to Political Studies in Bangladesh

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## Abstract

Professor Talukder Maniruzzaman (1938-2019) was a noted Bangladeshi Muslim political scientist who breathed his last at a Dhaka hospital on December 29, 2019. Maniruzzaman was one of the few early Bangladeshi academics whose research in political science has significantly contributed to the discourse on political theory, governance, and state-society relations, especially within South Asia. This article aims to present and review his contribution to political science research in Bangladesh. Maniruzzaman's studies largely investigated the interconnections of colonialism, nationalism, and post-colonial state frameworks in Bangladesh and adjacent areas. His thesis critically examined the influence of colonial legacies on the contemporary political scene, highlighting the enduring nature of authoritarian governance and socio-economic disparities originating from colonial control. Maniruzzaman was particularly recognized for his examination of political instability and state repression in post-independence South Asia, contending that the inadequacy of political institutions in newly-established governments frequently arises from the absence of inclusive state-building processes. Maniruzzaman's work explored the interplay between political movements, national identity, and democratic ambitions.

**Keywords:** Talukder Maniruzzaman, Bangladeshi Muslim political scientist, political science

## Introduction

This article examines academic Talukder Maniruzzaman's contribution to political science in Bangladesh. Maniruzzaman's groundbreaking research yielded essential insights into the historical, social, and institutional challenges that define the nation's political environment, establishing a foundational framework for comprehending the intricacies of state-building, democracy, and governance in post-colonial South Asia. His work has been essential in contesting dominant political narratives and fostering more nuanced discourse regarding political instability, the influence of the political elite, and the necessity for inclusive, equitable development in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh is a South Asian country, which emerged as an independent nation-state in 1971 through a bloody war of liberation with Pakistan. Pakistan was granted independence by the British, with India, in 1947. Bangladesh was then identified as East Pakistan (officially in Pakistan's first Constitution in 1956).[1] Except for a brief period in 1905-1912, the area, what is now Bangladesh, was a part of the Presidency of Bengal under British rule.[2]

The University of Dhaka was the first university to be established in what is now Bangladesh, under British rule in 1921.[3] At the university level, studies in political science in Bangladesh began in the Department of Politics and Economics of the University of Dhaka in 1921.[4] The independent Department of Political Science started its academic functions in 1938 and has since played a pioneering role in political science studies in Bangladesh.

No other universities were established in what is now Bangladesh during British rule. The University of Rajshahi was founded in 1953, when Bangladesh was part of Pakistan, and its and the Political Science

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[1] Islam 2022

[2] Ludden 2012

[3] Maksud 2017

[4] Department of Political Science n.d.

Department started academic activities—teaching and research—in 1963.[5] The University of Chittagong was established in 1966 and its Department of Political Science founded in 1968.[6] Studies in political science at Jahangirnagar University began in 1972, after Bangladesh's independence, offering courses on politics and governance as subsidiary ones to students of arts and other social science disciplines. The Jahangirnagar University was established just before independence, in 1970, and Government and Politics as a full-fledged department was established at this university in 1976.[7]

These four universities—University of Dhaka, University of Rajshahi, University of Chittagong, and Jahangirnagar University—have played a leading role in the study of political science in Bangladesh. Two other specialised universities—Bangladesh Agricultural University and Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology—were also established in the Pakistani period, in 1961 and 1962, respectively.[8] However, these universities have had reasonably little focus on studies in political science.

Since Bangladesh's independence in 1971, more than 40 new public universities and around 100 private universities have been established in the country. While the public universities were established in different parts of the country, most of the private universities are located in Dhaka, Bangladesh's capital city. Both public and private universities have contributed to the study of political science in Bangladesh. Students at undergraduate and graduate levels study various courses of political science covering political theories and thoughts, political issues and problems at the national and international level, comparative politics and governments, Bangladeshi politics, international politics, and area studies. Students also undertake research in political

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[5] Message of Chairman n.d.
[6] History and Discoveries n.d.
[7] Jahangirnagar University n.d.
[8] Morris-Jones 1978

science in Master of Philosophy (M. Phil.) and Doctorate of Philosophy (PhD) courses.

In addition to these universities, a large number of students throughout Bangladesh undertake studies in political science at more than 2,000 colleges (both public and private) affiliated to the National University, which was established in 1992.[9] Students at these colleges also read political science at undergraduate and graduate levels. However, it is a striking feature of higher education in Bangladesh that colleges under the National University do not offer M. Phil. or PhD programmes. The National University has no on-campus undergraduate and graduate students: a few of its institutes only offer courses on-campus, though on a limited scale, leading to M. Phil. and PhD degrees. National University graduates who are interested in pursuing higher studies such as M. Phil. and PhD usually get enrolled in other public universities.

In 1975, Professor Morris-Jones of the University of London visited the departments of political science at the Bangladeshi universities. He spoke with many teachers and students at each of the Universities of Dhaka, Rajshahi, and Chittagong. Morris-Jones produced a significant report on teaching, research, departmental organisation, and institutional relations regarding studies in political science in Bangladesh's universities.[10]

Five decades ago, Morris-Jones[11] observed that the Bangladeshi universities were by and large teaching-based rather than research-based. The entirety of the university teachers' working time, as Morris-Jones continued, was devoted to teaching.[12] This frustrating feature of the Bangladeshi universities still exists today. Bangladeshi universities, including the University of Dhaka, were modelled after the British universities. Even Philip Joseph Hartog, formerly academic registrar of the

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[9] Message from the Vice-Chancellor n.d.
[10] Morris-Jones 1978
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.

University of London, was appointed as the first Vice-Chancellor, to model the University of Dhaka after the University of London.[13]

Over the last three decades, there has been a mushrooming of universities in Bangladesh. However, both teaching and research in general in the country have been well below par. The academic research at Bangladeshi universities has gradually been declining, and in post-independence Bangladesh, this decline has been even sharper in all areas of academic research, including the study of political science.

Yet teaching and research are not isolated activities. Lack of research leads to poor teaching; lack of research affects teaching itself. Morris-Jones aptly argued:

> Teaching can be termed as a form of communicating knowledge, while research is a form of expanding knowledge. The improvement of teaching requires the expansion of knowledge. The academic profession in the highest seat of learning is thus adequately engaged in the expansion, communication and preservation of knowledge and understanding. Teaching as such is only a part of the communication of knowledge which in turn is only part of the whole complex of scholarly activities. The suggestion of improving teaching without expanding knowledge may, therefore, seem to be putting the cart before the horse.[14]

The reasons for the limited quality and quantity of research in Bangladesh are no mystery: the universities do not give teachers adequate budgets or facilities (such as laboratories, libraries, or research assistance) for research as universities in other countries do. Moreover, if college teachers do research at their own expense, there is hardly any recognition, value, or reward for such research: research work or even an M. Phil. or a PhD degree gets a college teacher nothing as of right in Bangladesh. While in the West, particularly in the United States, a common slogan is 'publish

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[13] Hartog 1949; Maksud 2016
[14] Morris-Jones 1978

or perish', as publication is linked to salary or promotion. In Bangladesh, at least in case of college teachers, the reality is different: college teachers under the National University are not required to undertake any research or publication for salary and promotion.

Despite this dismal picture, Franda has reported that a number of Bangladeshi political scientists, whether teaching in Bangladesh or overseas, have produced seminal scholarly work.[15] Professor Talukder Maniruzzaman was one of these leading figures.

**Picture 1. Talukder Maniruzzaman (Photo Credit: Abu Taib Ahmed, Prothom Alo English)**



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
[15] Franda 1982a

## Maniruzzaman the Man: A Brief Biography

Professor Talukder Maniruzzaman was born on July 1, 1938, in a village named Tarakandi in Sirajganj, a north-central district in Rajshahi Division, Bangladesh. His father, Abdul Mazid Talukder, was a schoolteacher, and his mother, Begum Fatemazzohra, was a homemaker. His childhood was spent in his village, studying at Tarakandi Primary School until Standard VI. He was then admitted to Sirajganj High School and passed his Secondary School Certificate with distinction, placing fifth on the merit list. He attended Class XI-XII at Jagannath College, Dhaka and passed his Higher Secondary Certificate, also with distinction and placing first on the merit list. He was admitted to the University of Dhaka to read political science in 1956. He secured a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in Political Science in 1959, and was top of his class with a First Class First.

tManiruzzaman then received a Master of Arts in Political Science in 1960, with a Second Class result. There were unproven allegations that Maniruzzaman had failed to obtain First Class Honours in his Master's examinations because Professor K. J. Newman, then-Chair of the Political Science Department, had refused to allow it. This was called the 'Newman affair' at Dhaka University.

Between the late 1950s and early 1960s, East Pakistan in general and the University of Dhaka, in particular, were politically tumultuous: the Bengali nationalist movement in East Pakistan was rapidly growing, and the teachers and students of Dhaka University were its chief architects. The University of Dhaka was the epicentre of student movements in East Pakistan against General Mohammad Ayub Khan's military dictatorship. Demonstrations for the restoration of democracy, organised by the progressive elements and especially the left-wing student organisations, were a frequent occurrence. The pro-dictatorship National Students Federation (NSF) was used to suppress these movements. Dr. Mizanur Rahman Shelley, then a political science student and subsequently, a faculty member at the University of Dhaka, recollected:

Professor Newman, a political scientist of German origin, had for many years, been the Chair of the Political Science Department at Dhaka University. Newman supported the military Government. So, he helped the NSF but disfavoured those students who belonged to or espoused anti-Ayub Government student politics and movements. The defeat of the NSF, for the first time, in the S. M. Hall elections of 1959, by the Student Force-led coalition of the Students League and Students Union, opposing the military Government, seemed to have displeased Newman. Talukder Maniruzzaman had been elected Vice-President as a Student Force candidate. Thus his failure to obtain First Class in the MA examinations in 1960 was rumoured to have been related to Newman's disfavour of his politics. The allegations against Newman galvanised student opposition. By the late autumn of 1960, Student Force activists, led by Moudud Ahmed, who was the classmate of Talukder Maniruzzaman and later became a Barrister, author of several political science books and Vice-President of Bangladesh, started agitation against Newman, shouting slogans demanding 'justice for Talukder Maniruzzaman.' Besieged by the agitation of a large segment of the students, Newman garnered support from NSF.[16]

Eminent economist Professor Rehman Sobhan, then a young faculty member in the Economics Department at the University of Dhaka, in his memoir *Untranquil Recollections: The Years of Fulfilment*, claims to have been a witness to this story. He has narrated that NSF leaders and activists attacked Moudud and his associates, resulting in severe bodily injury. The incident was publicised in the mass media, where the Newman-NSF connection was highlighted. East Pakistan Governor Lt. General Azam Khan used his ex-officio authority as Chancellor of the University to appoint an Inquiry Commission (known as the Asir Commission), headed by Justice Asir, a renowned judge of the Dhaka High Court. The latter, in

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[16] Shelley 2019

his report, recommended Newman's removal from the University, which was acted upon and led to his return to Germany.[17]

Nevertheless, in 1961, Maniruzzaman was awarded the prestigious Commonwealth Scholarship to pursue higher study in Canada. In 1966, he obtained a PhD in political science at Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. After returning to Bangladesh, he joined the University of Rajshahi as a Senior Lecturer to teach political science. He soon married his student, U. A. B. Razia Akter Banu, the same year. He later served as Professor and Chairman of Political Science at this university.

Maniruzzaman joined the University of Dhaka in 1974 and taught Political Science until his retirement in 2006. He served as Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Dhaka. In 2006, the Government of Bangladesh inducted him as National Professor. He was a Nuffield Fellow at the University of London, 1978-1979, and a Visiting Fellow for six months at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, in 1981. He was also a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Washington DC, and was awarded the National Bicentennial Medal by the US Government. He was a founder member of the Board of Governors of the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies and also a guest scholar at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1988-1989. He was an advisory editor of the Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and contributed its section on politics in Bangladesh. He breathed his last at a Dhaka hospital on December 29, 2019, and was buried at his ancestral graveyard in Gazipur. His wife, Dr. Banu, was also a political scientist and a Professor of Political Science at the University of Dhaka, and passed away in December 2011. Dr. Banu's book, *Islam in Bangladesh*, has been widely read.[18]

Maniruzzaman authored several internationally-acclaimed books and peer-reviewed journal articles on various issues and the problems of

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[17] Sobhan 2016
[18] Banu 1991

the relationship among the military, politics and security. His books include *The Politics of Development: The Case of Pakistan (1947-1958)*, *Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh*, *The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath*, *Group Interests and Political Changes: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh*, *The Security of Small States in the Third World*, *Military Withdrawal from Politics: A Comparative Study*, *Politics and Security of Bangladesh*, *Japan's Security Policy for the Twenty-First Century*, and *Bangladesher Rajniti: Songkot o Bisleshon* (The Politics of Bangladesh: Crisis and Analysis).

## Reviewing Maniruzzaman's Contribution to Political Studies

Maniruzzaman was a profound authority on Bangladesh's political history, military politics and security studies. He wrote his doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Professor Khalid bin Sayeed, the famous Pakistani political scientist and a leading authority on Pakistan's political history and political system, who died in 2011. Maniruzzaman's dissertation culminated in his first book, *The Politics of Development: The Case of Pakistan (1947-1958)*. The book is a critical re-examination of the first decade of Pakistan's history and politics. It begins with a conceptual and theoretical discussion of political development, which was mostly developed by American political scientists in the 1960s, such as Almond and Coleman,[19] Shils,[20] LaPalombara,[21] Weiner,[22] Pye,[23] Huntington,[24] and others.

The American model of political development was, by and large, developed in the context of America's highly-institutionalised and industrialised society and developed political culture. Maniruzzaman applied this model to his study of Pakistan, which was a typical example of

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[19] Almond and Coleman 1960
[20] Shils 1960
[21] LaPalombara 1963
[22] Weiner 1965
[23] Pye 1965, 1966
[24] Huntington 1965

the Third World countries marked by social conservatism, political authoritarianism, and economic underdevelopment.[25] Thus, Maniruzzaman's study suffered from the absence of a universal political model to be equally applied to both developed and underdeveloped societies. However, he made a holistic and crucial effort of analysing Pakistan's failure of accomplishing its state-building and nation-building tasks, at least in its first formative years. This book is therefore significant for a deeper understanding of the country's later political development. Eventually, the failure of national integration in the 1950s produced the collapse of the country in 1971 in East Pakistan's war of liberation to become an independent Bangladesh.

Pakistan was created in 1947 based on the historic 'two-nation theory', which postulates that India's Hindus and Muslims were two different 'nations', each deserving their own state.[26] This idea was the brainchild of Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the national poet of Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, formulated it in the creation of Pakistan under the banner of the Muslim League. Maniruzzaman analysed the growth and development of Indian Muslim groups and organisations during the British colonial period, especially the Muslim League, and related Pakistan's subsequent political development with them. After independence in 1947, Pakistan even failed to frame a Constitution until 1956, because, according to Maniruzzaman, the country's elite group failed to come to a political and intellectual consensus: the framework for social, economic and political programmes for building the future state. The Muslim League played an instrumental role in the creation of Pakistan. However, the Muslim leadership and Muslim intellectuals did not pay much attention to forging a political consensus in Pakistan's polity consisting of people with diverse social,

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[25] Maniruzzaman 1971
[26] Cohen 2004

political, historical, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds to build the new nation, soon after independence.[27]

However, Maniruzzaman, in his subsequent discussions, argued that the political leadership consciously sought a national political and ideological consensus and resolution to the ethnic and cultural problems in Pakistan in its formative years, especially up to 1954. The author then discussed West Pakistan's one-unit formula in 1955 and the framing of the national constitution in 1956. He considered the period 1954 to 1956 as "the most creative one" revealing a successful effort for, what he calls, "an integrative nation-building". He opined that the political leadership, during this time, created a broader national consensus on rights and interests among the diverse regional and ideological groups, which paved the way for the making of the Constitution of 1956, "a solid foundation of Pakistani nationhood". The author thus argued that by creating such significant consensus within the polity, Pakistan was rightly and effectively heading to 'the self-sustaining stage of political development.'[28]

Maniruzzaman's study covered only the first decade of Pakistan before the military intervention in the state. Even as he wrote, Maniruzzaman was watching the final decay of the Pakistani nationhood and political development he was writing about in his 15-year-old history, outside his window.[29] Pakistan has always been plagued by the political and economic hegemony of its civil, military and industrial bureaucratic elites. In April 1953, Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad dismissed the Nazimuddin cabinet, and it was in October 1954 that he dissolved the first Constituent Assembly,[30] since the Assembly had tried to curb the unbridled powers of the Governor-General.[31] The Governor-General also dismissed the East Pakistan's provincial government (United Front),

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[27] Maniruzzaman 1971
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Sayeed 1954, 1959
[31] Sayeed 1955

within a few months of its inauguration after democratic elections in 1954.[32]

Between 1954 and 1956, Pakistani politics was dominated by three powerful men: Ghulam Muhammad, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, and Iskander Mirza. They were all retired civil servants. Although Pakistan had been able to frame a Constitution in 1956, the Constitution left most of the major problems of the country unresolved.[33] The political leadership also failed to shape a democratic political culture for Pakistan by strengthening democratic and representative institutions in contrast to the unbridled powers of a permanent executive. Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad was more interested in the authoritarian than any democratic system of governance. After dissolving the Constituent Assembly in 1954, he had even asked General Ayub Khan several times to take over the country, which the latter himself exposed.[34] Thus, the early years of Pakistan, what Maniruzzaman called 'most creative' and an example of 'integrative nation-building'[35] efforts, can instead be identified as merely 'chaos' marked by the struggle of some leaders for personal power, political bickering, violence, corruption, party feuds, and unmitigated petty factionalism[36] and a solid marker of the collapse of parliamentary democracy[37] rather than a solid foundation of the nationhood.

However, the subsequent chapters of the book dealing with the role of the elite groups—parties, civil and military bureaucracy—in politics and administration, all contradict the author's earlier argument. They conceded that the Pakistani political elites (almost all were retired bureaucrats), civil and military-bureaucratic elites were the real political decision-makers ruling Pakistan, with authoritarian attitudes and principles. These chapters also outlined the emergence of the regionally-

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[32] Sayeed 1954, 1959; Nair 1990
[33] Sayeed 1959
[34] Sayeed 1959; Khan 1967
[35] Maniruzzaman 1971
[36] Maron 1955; Singhal 1972
[37] Sayeed 1959

based two-party system (Awami League and Muslim League), which continued till the last days of united Pakistan. East Pakistan-based Awami League and West Pakistan-based Muslim League (later the Pakistan People's Party replaced the Muslim League) dominated Pakistani politics. However, neither the Muslim League nor the Awami League could become a truly national party, which set the stage for the break-up of Pakistan.

What is significant to note from Maniruzzaman's arguments in this book is that he aptly viewed the machinations of an anti-democratic elite, which precluded Pakistan from developing a truly-democratic political process. Military intervention in politics could have been prevented by a working democratic system but the government could not even hold general elections in 1958, leading General Ayub to believe that there was no workable alternative to military rule. The bottom line is that after a decade of independence, Pakistan joined a long list of other new nations in experiencing "a breakdown in modernisation",[38] and appeared to become yet another case of "political decay",[39] instead of "political development". The breakdown culminated in an authoritarian military regime and a new political order to replace democracy.

Maniruzzaman also delved into the study of left-wing politics in East Pakistan.[40] His book *Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh*, which earlier appeared as a book chapter in *Radical Politics in South Asia*, edited by Paul Brass and Marcus Franda and published by MIT Press in 1973, dealt with this inquiry. The East Pakistan Communist Party (EPCP) was the main representative of left-wing politics in East Pakistan. It worked in the shadow of the Awami League and Maulana Bhashani's National Awami Party (NAP). The left-wing parties always hoped to establish a socialist state through revolutionary activities. They actively engaged in East Pakistan politics right from the creation of Pakistan in 1947. In the mid-1960s, the EPCP, however, split into several

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[38] Eisenstadt 1964
[39] Huntington 1965; Tepper 1972
[40] Maniruzzaman 1975a

communist parties—one pro-Moscow and several pro-Beijing. Maniruzzaman explained the inner political dynamics and roles of these multi-factional left-wing parties in East Pakistan politics and eventually the emergence of Bangladesh.[41] Some factions of left-wing Parties other than Bangladesh Awami League played a significant role, although not a leading role, in Bangladesh's war of liberation in 1971. However, their romantic goal of establishing a socialist Bangladesh through this revolution was never reached, and they thus considered the revolution unfinished.

Maniruzzaman's *The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath* is perhaps the most widely-read book covering the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation and almost a decade of its independent existence.[42] He studied the political antecedents and the events in East Pakistan, which eventually led to a successful armed struggle and the creation of an independent Bangladesh. These included the Bengali nationalist movement and their demand for regional autonomy, triggered mainly by the internal colonisation of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and cultural hegemony and economic exploitation of the ruling elite of Pakistan, East Pakistan's regional and radical politics, student politics and mass upheaval, the Bangladesh's war of independence and the role of the radical political groups in it, and as well as the role of India in the liberation war in 1971. Maniruzzaman regarded the Bangladesh war of liberation as a revolution. His central thesis was that:

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[41] Ibid.
[42] Maniruzzaman 1980

> The formation of Bangladesh was the outcome of a national revolution, which had been in the making since Pakistan was born in 1947. The Bangladesh revolution of 1971 was rather more than a nationalist revolution. Although it stopped short of a social revolution, it marked a turning point by its stimulation of extremely radical ideas and opportunities.[43]

Scholars of revolution studies have suggested many typologies of revolution. Greek philosopher Aristotle used the term 'revolution' as a general term and referred it to as merely a change of government or a complete change from one constitution to another or even amendment or modification of an existing constitution.[44] Tocqueville suggested that there are three kinds of revolution: the political revolution that brings changes to governing processes and political institutions; sudden and violent revolution that seeks not only to institute a new political system, but to transform an entire society; and slow but sweeping revolution that involves a slow and sweeping transformation of an entire society. Such a sweeping revolution may take some generations to fully play out.[45] The main thrust of the Marxist theory of revolution is the overthrow of the existing social and political systems by violence.[46] Tilly distinguished revolution from coup d'état, civil war, and revolt, and defines it as the transformation of economic and social structures as well as political institutions.[47]

Professor Maniruzzaman appropriately considered the liberation war of Bangladesh as a political revolution[48] that made changes in governance and political institutions rather than a social revolution that, in the Tocquevillian sense, involved fundamental changes or some far-

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[43] Maniruzzaman 1980: p. 1
[44] Barker 1962
[45] Tocqueville 1856
[46] Schaff 1973
[47] Tilly 1996
[48] Maniruzzaman 1980

reaching social transformation.[49] Bangladesh's revolution in 1971 was not equal with what Tocqueville called "sudden or slow revolutions"[50] or with what Tilly considered "great revolutions"[51] such as the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 1917, or the Islamic Revolution of Iran of 1979, all of which ensured social and economic structural changes and comprehensive social and political transformations to the society. Bangladesh's social, economic and political structures could hardly be distinguished from those of pre-1971 Pakistan, what Baxter called 'a new nation in an old setting.'[52] Some scholars of Bangladeshi studies, such as Lifschultz who observed Bangladesh for almost a decade, called the Bangladesh's revolution an unfinished one.[53] Bangladesh's left revolutionary Parties, which actively joined the 1971 liberation war for Bangladesh, unanimously agreed that the war for independence left the revolution unfinished.[54] East Pakistan, throughout undivided Pakistan, vigorously moved for political freedom and equality and broadly the restoration of democracy and pluralism in Pakistan.[55] Bangladesh, within its first decade of independence, sacrificed its long-cherished democracy and pluralism and instead established civil and military authoritarianism, largely ignoring and disrespecting the fundamental political ideology of its revolution.[56]

Maniruzzaman's argument regarding the participation and role of the Indian Army in the Bangladesh revolution was significant. Bangladesh's war of liberation began on March 26, 1971, as an immediate response to the indiscriminate killing of the Bengali civilians by the Pakistani military.[57] The *Muktibahini* (Bangladesh's guerrilla forces,

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[49] Boesche 2006
[50] Tocqueville 1856
[51] Tilly 1996
[52] Baxter 1984
[53] Lifschultz 1979
[54] Maniruzzaman 1975b
[55] Jahan 1994; Islam and Islam 2020
[56] Ahmed 1983; Ziring 1992; Islam and Islam 2018a
[57] D'Costa 2011

consisting of the Bangladesh military, paramilitary, and civilians), with the assistance of the Indian Army, liberated Bangladesh on December 16, 1971.[58] However, the Indian Army joined the *Muktibahini* only in the first week of December 1971.[59] Could Bangladesh have gained independence without Indian military intervention, given only two weeks more time to do so? Maniruzzaman, outlining the theoretical underpinnings of the guerrilla warfare and comparing them with the case of Bangladesh's war of independence, concluded that the *Muktibahini* could have freed the country 'even if Indian forces had not intervened.'[60] He also asserted that the Indian Army stepped in when Bangladesh liberation forces had already won the war. Indeed, India's intervention in the war expedited the pace of Bangladesh's victory. D'Costa also argued similarly in this context:

> Indian sanctuary and assistance played a key role in the creation of Bangladesh. Had India not joined forces with the Muktibahini, it would have taken Bangladesh several more years to emerge as a sovereign nation-state. However, India's military intervention also robbed the Bengalis of their exclusive role in their own nationalist struggle.[61]

Kissinger, a former Harvard political science professor and US secretary of state and more importantly, a crucial international figure during Bangladesh's liberation war with Pakistan, in his memoir, also asserted that 'an independent Bengali state was certain to emerge, even without Indian intervention. The only question was *how* the change would come about.'[62]

These viewpoints, however, have not been uncontested by Indian scholars and policy-makers.[63] Not only did Indian intervention, as

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[58] Salik 1977; Haider 2009
[59] Marwah 1979; Cordera 2015
[60] Maniruzzaman 1980: p. 123
[61] D'Costa 2011: p. 96
[62] Kissinger 1979: p. 853
[63] Chakrabarty 1982

Maniruzzaman also pointed out, lead to a faster termination of the liberation war, it also had a long-standing impact on the internal politics of post-liberation Bangladesh.[64] This assertion is equally significant for and relevant to contemporary Bangladesh politics: the India factor remains, and will not cease to be, a powerful political dynamic in Bangladesh's internal politics.

Maniruzzaman presented the anatomy of both the Mujib and Zia regimes in post-liberation Bangladesh. He argued that the revolution generated radical ideas, which not only influenced Bangladesh politics but also penetrated the armed forces. He stated that this was "unprecedented in South Asia".[65] From 1972 until the beginning of 1975, the radical groups, especially the Sarbohara Party, shook the foundation of the Mujib regime by plundering many police stations and killing thousands of ruling Party leaders and activists.[66] In December 1973, the President declared an emergency as the country faced a severe threat from the radical Marxists. Maniruzzaman argued that the economic crisis, people's disillusionment with the corruption-ridden and excessively pro-Indian Sheikh Mujib government and the environment of lawlessness were the main causes of the emergency.[67] Yet these were aggravated by a political crisis triggered mainly by the actions of the radical revolutionary parties and by factionalism within the government and ruling party. The revolutionary activities of the left-wing parties, during the Mujib regime, brought Mujib to the conclusion that only a one-party system under his leadership (*BAKSAL—Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League*), what he called the "second revolution",[68] could stabilise the nation. Mujib's self-proclaimed 'second revolution' created a Bangladesh which was a one-party dictatorship, ultimately leading to its failure.

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[64] Maniruzzaman 1980
[65] Ibid.
[66] Amin 1986
[67] Maniruzzaman 1980
[68] Anderson 1976; Maniruzzaman 1976

Unlike their Pakistani counterparts, Bangladesh's military rulers hastened to try to give their regimes a democratic and civilian legitimacy. Analysing the Zia regime, Maniruzzaman argued that Zia hastened to build a civilian regime primarily because of the absence of cohesiveness of the armed forces: the officers were divided between freedom fighters, who had taken part in the liberation war, and non-freedom fighters, many of whom had served in the Pakistan Army during the liberation war and were repatriates from Pakistan. There was also a great ideological divide between the rank-and-file and the senior officers. Factions and divisions within the armed forces along ideological and personal lines resulted in coups and attempted coups in Bangladesh's formative phase. Many officers had been executed in the midst of the political imbroglio. The extremist groups in the armed forces prevented the regime from developing political stability and forced the martial law administrator to build a civilian power base.[69] Maniruzzaman credited the Zia regime for its civilianisation and stability.[70] He could not, however, have predicted the tragic assassination of President Zia in June 1980, when the latter seemed to have brought a measure of stability to Bangladesh politics. The inherent weakness of Maniruzzaman's analysis of the Zia regime lied in the fatal gap between his belief in the democratic spirit of the 1971 revolution and the flawed reality of political engineering and administrative management of the unsuccessful civilian or martial law administrators.[71]

In his *Group Interests and Political Changes*, Maniruzzaman provided an insightful discussion of the theory and practice of interest groups, a core political science issue, drawing experiences from erstwhile Pakistan and from newly-independent Bangladesh.[72] Most chapters of this volume had earlier been published as journal articles, and some overlapped with his other publications. Maniruzzaman points out different groups, such as social classes in Marxian terms, like the bourgeoisie, the

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[69] Maniruzzaman 1980
[70] Ibid.
[71] Gupta 1983
[72] Maniruzzaman 1982a

middle-class landlords, industrial workers, the rural proletariat and the like, or organisations like the army, bureaucracy, legislatures, political executives and corporate groups. Factions and cliques within these organisations can also constitute groups, or groups can be formulated by primordial identities, such as language, culture, ethnicity, and geographical region. He argued that the failure of Pakistan's nation-building lay mainly in the ethnocentrism of the West Pakistani, particularly the Punjabi civilian and military-bureaucratic elites and landed aristocrats, who prevented Pakistan from being a democratic polity. These ethnocentric West Pakistani elites attempted to deprive the Bengalis of power-sharing in the central administration from the onset of the journey of Pakistan.[73]

Mohammad Ali Jinnah was no exception in his insistence on imposing Urdu as the only state language of Pakistan. Jinnah's adoption of Urdu as a national cause was a 'dog whistle' to the Punjabi elites that he identified with them through their language and his successors followed his example. Thus, he unified West Pakistan but drove a wedge between West and East. Maniruzzaman thus aptly commented:

> Possibly the history of Pakistan would have been different if Jinnah had taken a more statesmen-like attitude to the problem of State language, had demonstrated a democratic respect for the people, or had adopted a more constructive strategy of nation-building which would have allowed the Bengali genius to play its full part in building Pakistan.[74]

West Pakistani Islamist leaders, who did not generally support Jinnah politically, such as Maulana Mawdudi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, a leading Islamist party in Pakistan, joined with Jinnah on Urdu as the only official language. Mawdudi's publication *Tarjuman al-Qur'an* opposed recognising Bengali as a national language because Bengalis would never

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[73] Ibid.
[74] Maniruzzaman 1982a: pp. 6-7

learn Urdu that way. That, in turn, would lead to their Hinduisation.[75] Mawdudi's British-Indian upper-class Muslim social background led him to this line of peculiar parochial and elitist argument.

The West Pakistani power elites' ethnocentrism also derived from their self-styled assertion of their being the superior race in Pakistan. They believed that they were the descendants of the Muslim conquerors, who first ruled India and became a martial race of pure blood and pure Islamic religion. They compared the "short-built" Bengalis, with no history of war and conquests behind them, carrying the blood of inferior races and an impure level of Islam to themselves in derogatory terms.[76] The West Pakistani ruling Punjabi coterie, from Jinnah to Ayub and Bhutto, had demonstrated this racism against East Pakistan and Bengali leaders all through the history of united Pakistan. Thus, we can see Bangladesh's revolution of 1971 as a natural defensive reaction to Punjabi racism in the united Pakistan.

Maniruzzaman states that Jinnah's contempt for *Sher-e-Bangla* ("Tiger of Bengal") A. K. Fazlul Haque, the longstanding Muslim League Chief Minister of Bengal and East Pakistan, was well-known. Jinnah did not hesitate to call the patriotism of 1948 State Language Movement leaders into question.[77] Iskander Mirza raised questions about Bengali breeding and publicly expressed his wish to shoot Maulana Bhashani.[78] Ayub Khan openly voiced his disdain for Sher-e-Bangla and Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, Pakistan's Prime Minister and popular Bengali leader, in print. Ayub also said he could not but pity East Bengalis, who comprised the majority of the population (of Pakistan), as they were likely to have descended from the original Indian races.[79]

After the 1970 elections, when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League won a majority in the electorate and Parliament of Pakistan almost

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[75] Islam 2015: p. 193; Islam 2021: p. 320

[76] Sayeed 1972

[77] Maniruzzaman 1982a

[78] Also quoted by Deane 1955; Renyon 1958

[79] Khan 1967

only with Bengali bloc votes, this Punjabi racism came to an unignorable head. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People's Party, which had won the majority of West Pakistan's votes refused to work under Mujib, leader of Awami League, even though Mujib was able to negotiate on the question of East Pakistan's long-cherished autonomy.[80] Bhutto was convinced by the Punjabi Pakistani Army generals that 'the Bengali nationalists would quickly collapse, then tamely conform after one violent military assault.'[81] This self-deceiving ethnocentrism of the West Pakistani power elite groups eventually led to the disintegration of Pakistan.[82]

Maniruzzaman's study of *Military Withdrawal from Politics* brought widespread international exposure and intellectual celebrity status.[83] He authored this book while Bangladesh, in the late 1980s, was suffering from military dictatorship at its peak. Until then, there had been numerous studies on military intervention: until the late 1980s, over half of the Third World countries had already experienced military rule at least once since gaining independence.[84] However, there had been little academic attention from scholars to military disengagement. According to Pateman, it was Maniruzzaman who first attempted a systematic, comparative study of military withdrawal from politics in the Third World countries.[85]

Maniruzzaman comprehensively examined 61 coup-affected countries and presents detailed explanations and at least a dozen hypotheses about 71 cases of military withdrawal from politics. His scope of study covered five continents and includes West European, communist, and Third World systems. At that time, it was an ambitious project which aimed to explore the nature, methods, and duration of military exit from power.[86] Maniruzaman seemed to have been less interested in military

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[80] Ahmed 1979
[81] Sayeed 1972: p. 396
[82] Maniruzzaman 1982a
[83] Maniruzzaman 1987
[84] Clapham 1985; Smith 1996
[85] Pateman 1989
[86] Maniruzzaman 1987

intervention and more interested in military withdrawal. Therefore, although his book began with a discussion of military intervention, throughout its analysis, he frequently jumped to his central thesis, which was that military regimes had proved to be incapable of accelerating the pace of development in any country. There were multiple variables, according to Maniruzzaman, which affect different forms of withdrawal and the duration of post-military civilian regimes. These include professionalism, military and civilian leadership, alternative defence strategies, social revolution, uncompleted and pseudo-revolutions, and international factors. He emphasised social revolutions brought about by a hegemonic class or coalition of classes rather than any outside pressures for a long-term military disengagement in a Third World State.[87] Foreign intervention can help the withdrawal process only if it is already underway inside the country; democracy cannot be enforced from abroad.[88]

Maniruzzaman presented a dichotomy of professional and non-professional armies. Professionalism includes 'only politically-neutral characteristics: specialised skill in warfare, career service, a system of internal administration (centralised and hierarchical command), a behavioural code and standards of performance, strong group identity, and esprit de corps.'[89] Analysing the cases of Syria, Iraq, and Benin, Maniruzzaman argued that non-professional militaries are susceptible to ethnic and sectarian conflicts and an "abrupt withdrawal from politics" is the pattern of such militaries. Explaining the cases of Turkey, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, he proposes that professional militaries are strongly organised and disciplined experts in warfare and a "planned withdrawal from politics'" is the pattern of such militaries.[90] However, the cases of the Greek military exit following its debacle over Cyprus in the

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[87] Maniruzzaman 1987
[88] Pion-Berlin 1990
[89] Maniruzzaman 1987: p. 31
[90] Maniruzzaman 1987

1970s[91] and the Argentine military withdrawal after its defeat in the Falklands War in the early 1980s[92] disprove this proposition.

Maniruzzaman divided the professional armies, with their scope of intervention into four different types:

1. *the arbiter/moderator type* intervenes only to remove obstacles to the proper functioning of the civilian political system and withdraws to the barracks soon after the limited goal is accomplished;

2. *the partial moderator type* intervenes to prevent the rise to power of a political party which is perceived by them as their institutional enemy, and returns to the barracks only when it is satisfied that the enemy has been neutralised to the extent that it cannot harm the military;

3. *the guardian/corrective type* intervenes only when it finds that the civilian ruling elite is committing blatant violations of sacred state principles and withdraws to the barracks after taking several corrective measures, which, the army conceive, will prevent future civilian deviations; and

4. *the ruler type* intends to play a meaningful role in society and intervenes to rule, not to withdraw.[93]

Maniruzzaman argued for the abolition of the standing army and the adoption of a defence strategy based on the concept of 'nation-in-arms' or 'citizen army' for self-sustaining defence and nation-building of the Third World States. This is the model of Switzerland or, to a lesser degree, Costa Rica. He stresses that this strategy would eliminate the possibility of frequent coups d'état. He stated that this is also a strong defensive tactic as the invaders would accept that they would have to wreck the country, fighting literally house by house, to conquer it, leaving little to reward their efforts. Analysing the cases of both developed and developing countries,

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[91] Veremis 1998
[92] Hedges 2011
[93] Maniruzzaman 1987

such as Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Israel, and Singapore, Maniruzzaman asserted that a nation-in-arms is the only strategy to safeguard a state's independence without the standing army as an anti-democratic entity. He reminds us of the fact that independence certainly has a price. The price is resistance and blood. Some states have paid that price and have stayed free.[94]

Maniruzzaman pursued this study more than three decades ago, when most new nations of the Third World had been suffering military intervention in politics, what Emerson called "not yet nations in being, but only nations in hope".[95] This study remains relevant to Third World politicians who desire to control military power. For this, they need to develop a professional, apolitical army drawn from all ethnic, linguistic, religious, regional and cultural groups[96] or, as Maniruzzaman said, no army at all and an armed citizenry.[97]

Maniruzzaman also worked on Third World small states' security.[98] His book *Security of Small States in the Third World* was first published in 1982 by the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. The volume was relatively small, with less than a hundred pages, and it examined the strengths and weaknesses of the security of Third World States from the mid-1940s to early-1980s. Presenting a systematic and comparative analysis of these small States' security problems, Maniruzzaman argued that, in terms of war capability, the prospects for the survival of these States are problematic. He advised such states to concentrate more on effective diplomacy and political rather than traditional military strategy. Maniruzzaman himself stated that, when he undertook this research, there had already been some excellent

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[94] Ibid.
[95] Emerson 1960
[96] Pateman 1989
[97] Maniruzzaman 1982b
[98] Ibid.

comparative studies on the security of European small States.[99] However, the security of the Third World's small states had not yet been a major subject of systematic comparative analysis. Thus, Maniruzzaman's attempt was noble and suitable as a political science scholar from a Third World country.

Defining small states seems complicated, as different scholars understand it differently in different contexts. For example, East defined small states in the context of their foreign policy behaviour: small states' foreign policy is marked by highly-conflictual, non-verbal action; a high propensity for risk-taking; relatively-high levels of commitment and inflexibility; and a penchant for multilateral diplomacy and action through international organisations.[100] Small and Singer distinguished between large and small states based on their rank in the international status order, assessed by the number and class of diplomats that each state receives at its capital.[101] Maniruzzaman defined small states in the context of security: defence and war capability measured by gross national product and military budget: a small state refers to a state which has a meagre conventional war capability, not only in absolute global comparative terms but also *vis-à-vis* the enormous powers in its region.[102]

Like the term 'small states', the concept of 'security' also means different things to different people.[103] The understanding of Great Powers' security differs from that of the small states' security. Maniruzzaman defined security as 'the protection and preservation of the minimum core values of any nation: political independence and territorial integrity.'[104] He opined that a small state does not pursue power, but acts to preserve the little power it possesses. The problems of small states are how to avoid,

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[99] See Rothstein 1968; Fox 1969; Keohane 1969; Mathisen 1971; Schou and Brundtland 1971; Holst 1972; De Raeymaeker et al. 1974
[100] East 1973
[101] Small and Singer 1973
[102] Maniruzzaman 1982b: p. 14
[103] Wolfers 1962
[104] Maniruzzaman 1982b: p. 15

mitigate or postpone conflicts, and how to resist superior power in a state of conflict. Maniruzzaman emphasised that, as small states lack an adequate traditional war capability, they need to adopt several effective policies and play goal-oriented useful roles in the international arena to preserve their security. These include the demonstration of an adroit political leadership and high-quality diplomacy; the adoption of the policy of neutrality, neutralisation, and non-alignment; the maintenance of the balance of power and participation in a collective security system; and the building of national resistance as a defence and military strategy: one way is to build a 'citizen army.'[105] Maniruzzaman also strongly suggested citizen army/nation-in-arms for safeguarding small powers' independence in his other book *Military Withdrawal from Politics*.[106]

Maniruzzaman, in footnotes, clarified that a large number of small island states, what he called 'mini-states', emerged as independent nations in the 1970s so were excluded from the scope of this study. He also noted that his analysis did not include the small states' defence strategy against any possible nuclear aggression.[107]

These limitations deserve criticism: at least in his later life, a scholar of his stature could have provided a valuable discussion on these two major issues associated with small states security, and thus could enlarge the volume to a reasonable extent. Nonetheless, this study is still beneficial for today's statesmen and foreign policy-makers, particularly of the Third World's small states.

Maniruzzaman worked as a research fellow (Japan Foundation Fellow) at the Institute of International Relations, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan, from October 1995 to November 1996. This work culminated in a short book entitled *Japan's Security Policy for the Twenty-First Century*. In it, he discussed the contemporary debate on Japan's security policy in the context of both internal and external political and

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[105] Maniruzzaman 1982b
[106] Maniruzzaman 1987
[107] Maniruzzaman 1982b

security dynamics of Japan. Article 9, the so-called 'Peace Article' of the Japanese Constitution of 1947, framed under the strong influence of the Occupation Forces, especially the United States (US), was enacted after Japan's defeat in World War II, when the state renounced war and military armament. Since then, Japan has been under the US nuclear umbrella to safeguard its security and territorial integrity. Nevertheless, Japan gradually developed its Self Defence Forces and nuclear energy programmes for its survival. Japan's security lies mostly in its strong economic power. Even if the US withdraws its nuclear umbrella over Japan, Maniruzzaman argued, Japan had the technology and, if they needed to, they could build nuclear weapons themselves.[108]

In his *Politics and Security of Bangladesh*, Maniruzzaman critically discussed several contentious political and security issues of Bangladesh, which included secular and Islamic political trends; the turbulent political history of the 1970s marked by coups and counter-coups; civilian succession and the 1981 presidential election; the military dictatorship of the 1980s; the nexus between arms transfers, military coups and military rule in developing States; the fall of Ershad's decade-long military regime and prospects for civilian rule in the early 1990s; and alternative security strategy for Bangladesh.[109] He argued that Bangladesh borrowed the idea of secularism from India's experience: "secularism in Bangladesh did not reflect Bangladesh's societal spirit and history. It arose as a utilitarian expediency in the political field."[110] Secularism in Bangladesh was imposed from the above but drawn from the consensus of the people.[111] He, however, asserted that Bangladesh's secularism differs from the Western model, which rejects religion in the public sphere. Sheikh Mujib's secularism did not mean the absence of religion, rather the equal recognition of religions, what he called 'multi-theocracy'.[112]

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[108] Maniruzzaman 2000
[109] Maniruzzaman 1994
[110] Maniruzzaman 1994: p. 8
[111] Islam and Islam 2018b
[112] Maniruzzaman 1994

Maniruzzaman also argued that Mujib's secularism backfired and, sensing the political backlash, Mujib himself, towards the end of his rule, 'Islamised' his speeches by using most common Islamic terms and idioms, such as *Allah* (the Almighty God), *inshah Allah* (if Allah wishes), *bismillah* (in the name of Allah), *tawba* (penitence), and *iman* (faith). As days passed on, Mujib even dropped his usual valedictory phrase *joy Bangla* ('Bengali victory') and ended his speeches with *khuda hafez* (may God protect you; a Persian expression). Subsequent Bangladeshi rulers have also made these efforts at symbol manipulation. The preponderance of Islam in Bangladesh society even forced the leftist secular Parties and groups to invoke religious references. For example, Maulana Bhasani, a pro-Beijing popular leftist leader, frequently used to refer to his ideology as 'Islamic socialism.' Professor Muzaffar Ahmad, pro-Moscow Communist leader, made his Party (NAP) slogan *'dharma, karma, samajtantra, NAP er tin mantra'* (religion, hard work, and socialism—the three principles of NAP).[113] These trends are still underway in Bangladesh's political field.[114]

Maniruzzaman was the first Bangladeshi political scientist who initiated a discussion of the citizen army for national security of Bangladesh. He suggested the strategy of nation-in-arms as an alternative to the currently-followed strategy of keeping a standing army. He explained the theory of the citizen army earlier in his other books. Now, analysing the geopolitical and economic situation of Bangladesh, he advocated the nation-in arms as a valid defence policy and as a viable strategy for building a civil society for Bangladesh.[115]

Factionalism has always been a remarkable feature of Bangladesh politics. Archer K. Blood, a perceptive observer of Bangladesh, humorously noted that "if three Bengalis are stranded on a desert island, their first action would be to establish four political parties".[116] Who are the contributors to this factionalism? Maniruzzaman's observation is worth

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[113] Maniruzzaman 1994; also see Maniruzzaman 1990
[114] Islam and Islam 2020
[115] Maniruzzaman 1994
[116] Blood 2002: p. 3

noting: "Bangladesh's political troubles do not come from the people in general. They are caused mainly by Westernized elites with their proclivity for intense personalistic factionalism."[117] Marcus Franda, a noted political expert on South Asia, also made a similar observation:

> Bangladesh does not have innumerable linguistic, religious and caste divisions found in India, but personalistic conflicts— between repatriates and freedom-fighters, West Bengalis and East Bengalis, Muslim fundamentalists and modernists, leftists, rightists and innumerable others—have often proven to be far more intractable than straight-out ethnic divisions that pit different races, religions and castes against one another.[118]

Personalistic factionalism has been destroying the social fabric and political vitality of Bangladesh. It has also been a significant threat to the political stability of the country. It would not be an exaggeration to say that factionalism has now become the order of the day in Bangladesh. Politics is ubiquitous in Bangladesh, so as factionalism. In family, state, society, culture, education, wherever there is an organisation, there is factionalism (at leastin Bangladesh). When the organisation is more significant, factionalism becomes greater.[119] Not only in social and political institutions, but also in educational institutions, factionalism has been impeding Bangladesh's advancement.

## Conclusion

Talukder Maniruzzaman made an enormous contribution to laying a solid foundation for political science studies in Bangladesh. He was one of the first scholars who introduced Bangladesh's political science research to an international audience, and his research attracted much attention from political scientists of international repute. Marcus Franda, an accomplished

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[117] Maniruzzaman 1994: p. 66
[118] Franda 1982b: p. 332
[119] Kochanek 2000

political scientist, specialising in South Asian affairs, dedicated one of his seminal books to Maniruzzaman. Maniruzzaman conducted close participant observation of the critical political events of both Pakistan and Bangladesh, which enabled him to present a logical and pragmatic political analysis. He was a quiet researcher who continued to avoid publicity until his death. He was not interested in any lucrative administrative posts, a virtue which the Bangladeshi intellectuals seldom demonstrate. He was often offered high academic positions, which he humbly declined.

However, he did not keep himself aloof from the political crisis of the nation. In his obituary, read at Dhaka Press Club in January 2020, a political scientist said that during the height of the military rule and the extreme political turmoil in Bangladesh in the 1980s, Maniruzzaman had invited Dr. Kamal Hossain and Dr. Badruddoza Chowdhury, two senior leaders from Bangladesh Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party, respectively, to his private residence. They discussed finding a solution to the problem of the military regime and restoring democracy. Maniruzzaman had deep insights on military politics and suggested a social revolution for the effective withdrawal of the military. The collapse of General Ershad's decade-long military regime in the early-1990s was the outcome of such a social revolution based on a national consensus.

An ardent champion of liberal democracy, Maniruzzaman always believed that Bangladesh must opt for democracy for its social, economic and political development. When General Zia started civilianising his regime and restored multi-party democracy, he supported Zia's efforts. Even though he concluded that the military did not succeed, he supported the attempt.[120] Maniruzzaman appreciated Zia's philosophy of Bangladeshi nationalism as a viable solution to the nation's identity crisis. Now the protagonists of Bengali nationalism have recognised Bangladeshi nationalism by amending the Constitution. Maniruzzaman's suggestion for the adoption of the concept of the citizen army for national security is unique in Bangladesh and should receive more serious consideration.

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[120] Maniruzzaman 1982a

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