

## Making Euro-Asian Soft Power in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Concepts, Constraints, and Consequences \*

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### Abstrak

Setelah berdiri satu dekade ASEM, ia menjadi forum yang memiliki muatan berbagai bidang. ASEM telah mengikat kedua kawasan sehingga menjadi satu kekuatan baru yang sangat berpengaruh baik di kawasan regional maupun internasional. Para state-actors dari Asia dan Eropa memiliki kapabilitas untuk berkembang menjadi sebuah soft power di abad 21 ini. Sementara itu kekuatan yang dibentuk oleh kedua kawasan ini juga ditakutkan dapat menjadi sebuah proses pembentukan terjadinya suatu Fortress Asia. Peran Asia Eropa sebagai sebuah soft power sangat dipengaruhi oleh adanya politik diplomasi dari Amerika-Eropa yang seringkali bertentangan (vis-à-vis) dengan Cina. Disinilah ASEM akan kembali digodok untuk menjadi sebuah forum netral yang dapat mendemonstrasikan kekuatan diplomasinya baik di level inter maupun intraregional.

*Keywords:* interregional, cooperation, international politic, regionalism, diplomacy

### Introduction

More than a decade after European and Asian state actors had decided to reframe their relations in response to the end of the cold war the inter-

national context has changed dramatically. East Asian regionalism is no more an idea but is rapidly developing with Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian stakeholders cooperating in a plethora of policy fields. Yet, though European state actors and the European Union have been instrumental in providing the

\* This article has been presented at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia, Jakarta, 27<sup>th</sup> July 2006

rationale for such a development the consequences of East Asian community building for the development of a new international world order are largely unknown. So are the involved concepts and constraints.

Relating to fears that an exclusive East Asian regionalism is being established Joseph Nye has recently urged the US administration "to pay more attention to the balancing of [Chinese] soft power in Asia"<sup>1</sup>. As I am going to argue this identified need is a function of the US administration's reluctance to engage with East Asian countries, and foremost China, in an interregional institution. The US approach to China's and Asia's rise in the 21<sup>st</sup> century thus constitutes a constraint to the making of Asian soft power.

The approach of the European Union to East Asia does not result in this constraint.<sup>2</sup> To the contrary, by way of interregional cooperation within the overall framework of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process the European Union and its member states projects European soft power to East Asia.<sup>3</sup> By doing so the EU has facilitated and impacted on processes of East Asian region building thereby facilitating not only the increase of Chinese soft power in East Asia but also the coming into existence of Asian soft power.

At the same time the ASEM process constitutes a Euro-Asian soft power approach to global governance.<sup>4</sup>

European and Asian actors project their concepts of soft power, i.e. their respective models of intra-regional cooperation, and commonly define the norms, principles and rules of how to cooperate in a multilateral institution that furthers the formation of a regional actor on the Asian side (ASEAN+3) and an interregional regime (ASEM).

ASEAN countries have successfully coaxed China into processes of East Asian region and community building through engaging China in East Asia. Thereby all Asian ASEM participants and their European partners have the opportunity to "balance the influence of Chinese soft power" as Nye asks for. Yet, this general assessment needs to be qualified.

On the one hand it would be misleading to analyse the EU strategy vis-à-vis the PRC in mere balance of power categories. Instead of focussing on relative gains the European actors rather think in terms of absolute gains and follow a multilevel engagement policy towards China and the Asian region. Institution building—even when informal in nature and modelled after the so called Asian way, as it is the case with ASEM—is the main characteristic of this concept. European actors believe that a soft power approach is a necessary component of regional stability.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand the ASEM process generates Euro-Asian soft power. Euro-Asian soft power has an internal

and an external dimension. Its internal dimension relates to the interaction between the ASEM participants. The external dimension of Euro-Asian soft power relates to the systemic implications of the ASEM process.

According to Joseph Nye soft power will be defined as the "ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment"<sup>6</sup>. In international affairs "the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the example it sets by its internal practices and policies, and the way it handles its relations with others"<sup>7</sup>. In the interregional context of Euro-Asian relations—the management of interdependence and the application of the principles of multilateralism and regionalism shall be the operational definition of Euro-Asian soft power. Its final objective is to shape the context for future policy choices.

In the following I shall discuss four main questions:

- Why have European and Asian state-actors started to develop common soft power capabilities?
- What are the concepts and interests that guide the projection of European and Asian soft power?
- What are the structural and ideational constraints to Euro-Asian soft power?
- What are the consequences of this approach for the involved actors,

including the USA?

The making (and use) of Euro-Asian soft power is a decisive political issue. This is for mainly three reasons:

- (1) China successfully uses soft power as a tool of its foreign policy.
- (2) Via the ASEM process the EU has been instrumental in enhancing Chinese soft power in East Asia.
- (3) The EU and the US do not agree on the use of soft power by China.

As I have just mentioned, Nye urged the US administration „to pay more attention to the balancing of [Chinese] soft power in Asia."<sup>8</sup> He argues that because of China's ability to increasingly make use of culture, political values and diplomacy as sources of soft power the US runs the risk of losing influence in Asia. According to him one indicator of this process has been Washington's absence from the East Asia Summit in December last year. As a consequence of China's engagement of Asia fears of a rising China are alleviated and "the likelihood for other countries allying to balance the rising power of China" is reduced.

Nye's assessment refers to the institutionalization of an East Asian regionalism and the response to it by the rest of the world and in particular by the USA. The ascendance of China is reshaping politics in East Asia and leaders in the region have only begun to acknowledge the scope, the challenges and opportunities of the regional transformation processes

involved.<sup>9</sup> In this strategic context the United States will remain the "stability linchpin"<sup>10</sup> for Asia while the alliance between the US and Japan serves as the "cornerstone"<sup>11</sup> of the US security strategy in the region. Furthermore, "the general trend in Asia", as Wang Jisi argues, "is conducive to China's aspiration to integrate itself more extensively into the region and the world, and it would be difficult for the United States to reverse this direction".<sup>12</sup> Against this background the impact of European and Asian soft power on regional and global governance shall be analysed by focusing on the foreign policy-dimension of soft power.<sup>13</sup>

#### **Concepts of Asian and EU soft power approach to regional and global governance**

China holds the key for regional cooperation and integration in East Asia. This is not to say that Japan, South Korea or the ASEAN are less important as partners for the EU. Yet, without the increasing dynamic interaction between East Asian and Chinese stakeholders the trend of regionalization in East Asia would not be in place. This trend has been building up since the Asian financial crisis. It is the strongest indicator for the increase of Chinese soft power in East Asia.<sup>14</sup> The signing in 2002 of a framework agreement of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area that has been targeted to come into force by 2010 is

one important indicator for this ongoing paradigm shift of the international system.

The policy of the EU towards the East Asian region and China is a multilevel engagement policy. Furthermore, it is a mixture of bilateral and multilateral approaches. Besides meetings on the bilateral level the EU and its member states meet their Asian counterparts in fora like the ASEAN Regional Forum or through the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process. Thereby it is a central aim of the actors to increase international cooperation not only bilaterally but also multilaterally.

A specific element of the EU's approach to East Asia is the interregional one and the Asia-Europe Meeting.<sup>15</sup> In contrast to other interregional cooperation processes in which the European Union is involved (e.g. EU-ASEAN, EU-Mercosur) the ASEM process developed an extensive approach to the challenges and perils of our times. The following map visualizes the membership of the ASEM process (maps).

The politics of interregional relations as we can observe them in the ASEM process are based on two fundamental principles: (1) multilateralism, (2) regionalism. During the ten years of its development the cooperation between the ASEM participants has become more intense than anybody could have expected in the middle of the 1990s. Thereby a regime is

unfolding that shapes the context for policy choices and strengthens multilateralism as an organizing principle of the international system through interregionalism.<sup>16</sup>

Its interregional setting enables the ASEM actors to develop, coordinate and implement policies in a multilateral framework. Yet, not solely. It is necessary to conceptualize the ASEM process as taking place on the level of state-to-state interaction and on the level of region-to-region interaction. The following typology differentiates between those levels (see table).

When analysing the reasons for the founding of the ASEM process it is important to also take soft power factors under consideration. Apart from the desire to intensify the economic cooperation, which Europeans and Asians have shared from the very beginning, actors of both regions had at least two additional and region-specific motives to start a cooperative venture that put the impetus on the cooperation between regions. On the one side, the Asian participants intended to use the ASEM process as a diplomatic mechanism that enables the Asian actors to cooperate (bilaterally) on a country-to-country formula with the member states of the EU.

Furthermore, especially the ASEAN countries hoped that the participation of the PR China would strengthen their position when

dealing with the Europeans. On the other side, European actors and especially the European Commission intended to further strengthen a common European approach towards the Asian region.<sup>17</sup> Therefore the ASEM process from its very beginning onwards has been confronted with a conflict between two different perceptions of interregional cooperation, which materializes in the form of an institutional asymmetry. The Asian side thought of interregionalism as an intergovernmental modus that promotes and renders possible the cooperation between both regions on a country-to-country basis, whereas the European side intended ASEM to be a cooperation mechanism that enhances the development of two collective actors: one European and one Asian. This is why in the case of ASEM the heterogeneity and the difference between the participants is, *inter alia*, related to different forms of intraregional cooperation and regionalization. Member states of the EU agreed to a loss of sovereignty and created supranational institutions and political actors like the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Council or the European Parliament. Because there was –in contrast to the European side– no functional equivalent, no institutionalised regional actor on the Asian side, an institutional asymmetry existed between the ASEM actors. Yet, the

institutional asymmetry is dynamic and in flux.

Within this overall framework proactive engagement within the ASEM process can facilitate to strategize relations with East Asian countries by developing multilevel and multi-dimensional Asia strategies that aim at increasing the capacity for interdependence management. Specifically smaller EU member states can benefit from the EU's interregional approach to international relations as it offers the institutional framework to coordinate their interests with other member states.<sup>18</sup> In this context the accession to the EU offers the opportunity to a given EU member state to multilateralize relations with individual Asian countries by investing resources into multilateral fora like ASEM. Within the ASEM process an individual member state can take the lead by providing practical input on the policy level and vision with regard to the normative and institutional level.

#### *The Internal Dimension of Euro-Asian Soft Power: Strategic Implications*

A strategic implication of the EU's soft power policy vis-à-vis the East Asian region and its actors is the strategic partnership between the People's Republic of China and the EU. This partnership is not strategic in the military sense. Yet, the issue of the

lifting of the European arms embargo against China shows that hard security issues have entered EU-East Asia affairs.

According to the European Commission's China policy paper "it is in the clear interest of the EU and China to work as strategic partners on the international scene". This long term plan of action is in line with the 'European Security Strategy'. According to the EU's High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP) Javier Solana, the EU should focus on developing a strategic partnership with China.<sup>19</sup> In this context the Premier of the State Council of the PR China, Wen Jiabao, has coined the term 'comprehensive strategic partnership'. Wen defines the term in the following way: "By "comprehensive", it means that the cooperation should be all-dimensional, wide-ranging and multi-layered. It covers economic, scientific, technological, political and cultural fields, contains both bilateral and multilateral levels, and is conducted by both governments and non-governmental groups. By "strategic", it means that the cooperation should be long-term and stable, bearing on the larger picture of China-EU relations. It transcends the differences in ideology and social system and is not subjected to the impacts of individual events that occur from time to time. By "partnership", it means that the

cooperation should be equal-footed, mutually beneficial and win-win. The two sides should base themselves on mutual respect and mutual trust, endeavour to expand converging interests and seek common ground on the major issues while shelving differences on the minor ones."<sup>20</sup>

The European strategy of institution building (on the interregional level) and the EU's engagement approach to China and East Asia needs to be explained within the new systemic context that is emerging after the end of the cold war.

#### *The external dimension of Euro-Asian soft power: systemic implications*

In this context the assumption that institution building on the intra-regional and interregional level will facilitate shaping the context for future policy choices when interacting with East Asian actors and especially China is an inherent element of the EU's approach.

At this point the US and the EU approach to the Asian region differ fundamentally as the US approach does not make use of the principles of regionalism and multilateralism in an interregional context.<sup>21</sup>

US-China relations are mainly a function of the current US foreign policy towards China, which doesn't take into account that an engagement policy towards China needs to be paralleled by an engagement policy

towards the East Asian region. A functional equivalent of the EU's soft power and its approach of bilateral and multilateral engagement of East Asian actors is a missing element in US-China relations.<sup>22</sup> In this context the USA faces the opportunity to make use of the EU's soft power approach as a reference for a new policy towards China and East Asia that emphasizes the need to facilitate regionalization processes in East Asia.<sup>23</sup>

US observers who criticize that the US administration has put its geopolitical focus too strongly on the Middle East which enabled China to become the "power broker" in Asia warn against the increasing influence of China in Asia at America's expense. To them the increasing level of intraregional cooperation in East Asia and the proactive role that Beijing plays within it is part of a Chinese strategy to expand its influence within Asia.<sup>24</sup> In that respect the Chinese support of the concept of an East Asian community and the inaugural meeting of the East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur has raised suspicion on the US side. US politicians and experts question the direction of such a process and call it a "test of China's intentions (...) whether its growing capacity will be used to seek to exclude America from Asia or whether it will be part of a cooperative effort".<sup>25</sup> US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick stated: "The United States

respects China's interests in the region, and recognizes the useful role of multilateral diplomacy in Asia. But concerns will grow if China seeks to manoeuvre toward predominance of power".<sup>26</sup> Recently US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld has provided an interesting qualification while speaking on the topic "The United States and Asia's Emerging Architecture". During the last Shangri-La meeting in Singapore (International Institute for Strategic Studies) he stated that -quote- "inclusive, multi-national institutions and activities (...) [like] the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) are leading the way" —unquote. Yet, during the Q&A session Rumsfeld was "evasive" in addressing questions that dealt with the US's attitudes towards Asian multilateral institutions (such as ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization).<sup>27</sup>

#### Constraints to Euro-Asian Soft Power

In this context a think tanker in Washington argues that "China as the core of an East Asian regionalism raises the question whether this grouping will be exclusive or inclusive. If an East Asian regionalism is exclusive it will be bad for Europe. China will become a super power. China will have enormous influence on Europe. But if a Chinese-led East Asian grouping includes the US it will not challenge the current world order.

The fundamental dynamics and architecture of security in Asia haven't changed. There is no alternative to the US security structure in Asia. China takes an indirect approach by quietly developing economic and political leverages. This is a long-term challenge."<sup>28</sup> Thus, the US must counterbalance China in East Asia.

Yet, as long as the USA doesn't develop a regional Asia policy, that encompasses an approach to China and —at the same time— to East Asia the US policy towards China is destined to swing between engagement and containment or a mixture of both. Such a policy of hedged engagement, i.e. engagement that consists of political and economic enmeshment of China, hedged by political and military power balancing characterizes current US-China relations. It hinders the development of Euro-Asian soft power.

#### Consequences: a 'Fortress Asia' in the Making?

It is a consequence of this policy that the Asian region "would like China's meteoric rise to be balanced by a sustained US commitment to defence of the region" but it does not "want to be asked to choose between supporting one superpower over the other"<sup>29</sup>. The resulting dilemma for Washington D.C. lies in the consequentiality of its current policy of hedged engagement: The more



institutionalized an East Asian regionalism becomes with an ever more assertive China driving the process the more political and military power balancing is needed – not only vis-à-vis China but also vis-à-vis East Asia. In the end US foreign policy could be forced to develop a hedged engagement policy for East Asia. That would raise the crucial question of how to develop a policy mix in order to be capable of engaging and containing a future East Asian regionalism. It is the inherent danger of the current US China policy that the missing regional component in US-China relations could facilitate the formation of a 'fortress Asia'.<sup>30</sup>

Therefore, it is the decisive conceptual question of US-Sino relations how US foreign policy will address the challenge of regionalization processes in East Asia and the increasing role that China plays within them. After having failed to conceptualize and operationalize the potential and strength of multilateral institution building on the regional level in Asia<sup>31</sup> the US administration is challenged to adjust to two different but interrelated developments: the rise of China and the rise of an East Asian regionalism.<sup>32</sup>

Within this evolving new systemic context the EU's interregional relations with Asia and especially the ASEM process offer examples of how the EU and its member states can take part in the moulding of the international system. The ASEM process

created an interregional playing level field that allows for the making and use of soft power. Thereby Europe develops the means to exert soft power in the Asian region by co-defining the norms and rules that facilitate the integration of the increasingly assertive Asian power China into a new world order in which regional communities and unions are seeking to become actors in their own rights. The EU's approach is based on the principles of regionalism and multilateralism and the hypothesis that institution building on the intra-regional and inter-regional level will facilitate shaping the context for future policy choices when interacting with East Asian state actors. This is the added value of the EU's approach East Asia.

#### **Conclusion: A role for Euro-Asian soft power in the 21<sup>st</sup> century**

It is imperative for the EU and the US to coordinate their policies vis-à-vis East Asia. Especially the US's China policy needs to encompass Europe's soft power by co-projecting the principles of multilateralism and regionalism to East Asia. If European and US diplomacy vis-à-vis China shall not run the risk of facilitating a fortress Asia China needs to be engaged in interregional institutions. Such a development, if managed well, can have an impact on regional and global governance through the management of interdependence.

US diplomacy should open up to a US-ASEAN+3 dialogue that complements the EU's and East Asia's approach to global governance issues.<sup>33</sup> The US needs to 'aggregate' its relations with China vis-à-vis East Asia, i.e. the US administration should not only interact with single East Asian countries but with the East Asian region. A global consensus on the advantages of region-building processes is needed. This must be complemented by a proactive diplomatic policy. Otherwise the USA will react to East Asian community building processes via the logic of balance of power politics.

In order to manage this ongoing paradigm shift within the international system the EU and its member states need to continue to engage China bilaterally and multilaterally. Institutions create "multiple channels of contact" that render possible the management of the increasing interdependencies between Asian and European stakeholders. They serve as agents for global governance. The ASEM regime has the capacity to serve that function on the interregional level while facilitating intra-regional governance in East Asia. It has done so for the last 10 years. But it is a regime and doesn't have the capacity to act in its own right. In order to live up to the increasing responsibility of the involved actors in a plethora of policy fields ASEM needs thus to be further institutionalized.

o what extent the EU and its model of intraregional cooperation and integration can influence the objective and trajectory of Asian regionalism will demonstrate partly the extent of Europe's soft power in the international system.<sup>34</sup> Yet, the extent of Europe's soft power in the international system will be also a function of the future US foreign policy vis-à-vis East Asia and the related question to which extent the EU and its model of interregional cooperation can influence the foreign policy dimension of US soft power. In the end the impact of Euro-Asian soft power on regional and global governance will depend on the question whether the US takes an active interest in complementing it or opposing it.

Against this background the EU should intensify its policy of exporting the European model of intra-regional cooperation and integration. This process has strengthened and supported the forces in East Asia that favor a deepening of intraregional cooperation as the inaugural meeting of the East Asia Summit in December 2005 has demonstrated. Facilitating the projection of the EU's soft power to East Asia could become a priority for the new EU member states.

During a recent conference in London an official of the Council of the European Union stated that the EU is not striving for multipolarity but multilateralism.<sup>35</sup> At this point it is

important to differentiate: multilateralism is an organizing principle of the international system whereas multipolarity is a concept that describes the distribution of power in the international system. What we will see is a world in which regional unions and communities, actors like the EU and ASEAN, as well as nation states like the USA, China or India will have an ever more defining impact on the international system. The overall question though is to which extent the principle of multilateralism will guide these developments.

The ASEM process and the making of Euro-Asian soft power demonstrates the demand for governance on the inter-and-intraregional level.

Against this background multipolarity is the dominant structural shaping factor for the international system in the 21 century. It is in the interest of the EU, its member states, of East Asian state actors as well as of ASEAN to develop their relations in ways that allow multipolarity and multilateralism to enforce each other and to become mutually dependent. □

1 Joseph S. Nye, 'The Rise of China's Soft Power', *The Wall Street Journal Asia*, 29.12.05.

2 The European track record of supporting institution building in East Asia is vast. The EC has been the first dialogue partner of the ASEAN. Only after having started to engage China through the ASEM process in the middle of the 1990s did the three Northeast Asian countries China, Japan and the Republic of Korea and the then seven ASEAN members agree to cooperate in an institutional mechanism and started to formulate common "Asian" positions. This process has strengthened and supported the forces in East Asia that favour a deepening of intraregional cooperation as the inaugural meeting of the East Asia Summit in December 2005 has demonstrated.

3 See also Hettne and Soederbaum who argue that "civilian power may have the most relevance in the case of ASEM whereas soft imperialism describes EU's foreign policy relationships towards Africa". Bjoern Hettne / Frederik Soederbaum, 'Civilian Power or Soft

Imperialism? The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism', *European Foreign Affairs* 10: 535-552, 2005, p. 550.

4 Global governance being defined as a form of the institutionalization of globalization through regimes and organizations. See Ulrich Menzel, *Zwischen Idealismus und Realismus. Die Lehre von den internationalen Beziehungen*, Frankfurt am Main 2001, p. 233.

5 See also Bjoern Hettne, 'Regional Governance and World Order', in: Sophie Boisseau du Rocher / Bertrand Fort (eds.), *Paths to Regionalisation. Comparing Experiences in East Asia and Europe*, Marshall Cavendish International: Singapore 2005, pp. 104-127.

6 Joseph S. Nye, 'Soft Power: the Means to Succeed in World Politics', New York 2004, p. X. I will make use of the liberal-institutional paradigm of International Relations theory.

7 Joseph S. Nye, *ibid.*, p. 8.

8 Joseph S. Nye, 'The Rise of China's Soft Power', *The Wall Street Journal Asia*, 29.12.05.

9 (Pollack 2005)

- 10 Heinrich Kreft, "Die USA - Stabilitätsanker für Asien?" [The United States - The Stability Linchpin for Asia], *Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen*, no. 148 (2004/2), p. 36.
- 11 (Cossa 2005: 64)
- 12 Jisi Wang, "China's Changing Role in Asia", *Internationale Politik* (Transatlantic Edition), vol. 4 (3/2003), p. 73.
- 13 Nye differentiates between three sources of soft power, i.e. culture, political values, and foreign policies, Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power: the Means to Succeed in World Politics", New York 2004, p. 10.
- 14 For China's engagement policy towards Asia see David Shambaugh, *China Engages Asia*, *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 64-99.
- 15 Hettne and Soederbaum even argue that "(...) interregionalism (of course apart from enlargement) is the most typically European way of relating with the outside world", *ibid.*, p. 540.
- 16 See: Sebastian Bersick, *Auf dem Weg in eine neue Weltordnung? Zur Politik der interregionalen Beziehungen am Beispiel des ASEM-Prozesses [Towards a New World Order? On the Politics of Interregional Relations: The Example of the ASEM process]* Baden-Baden 2004.
- 17 According to the EU-Asia Strategy, the main reason for closer political relations with Asia (being defined as consisting of 26 different countries in East-, Southeast- and Southasia) is the task of developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy. See: *Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat. Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Asien-Strategie. KOM(94) 314 endg./2*, Brüssel 27.07.1994.
- 18 Yet, a common European position is what the process often lacks.
- 19 "In the next years we should focus particularly on developing strategic partnerships with [...] China. These partners play an increasingly important role in their respective regions and beyond." (*European Security Strategy* 2003: 15).
- 20 "Vigorously Promoting Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between China and the European Union", Speech by H.E. Wen Jiabao Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China At the China-EU Investment and Trade Forum, Brussels, 6 May 2004.
- 21 For the following see Bersick, *Asia-Europe Journal*, April 2006, forthcoming.
- 22 Therefore a deterrent of security in the Pacific region will result from the ability of the USA to regionalize its policy vis-à-vis China.
- 23 According to Chinese experts on Asia a majority of Chinese policy advisors hold the view that few if any Asian powers would join a US-led coalition to contain China. Though China's regional concerns still focus strongly on the USA this is why a strategic encirclement of China is only feared by few Chinese strategists. See Wang Jisi, 'China's Changing Role in Asia', in: Kokobun Ryosei/Wang Jisi (eds.), *The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order*, Tokyo 2004, p. 16 pp.
- 24 See: Jane Perles, *The New York Times*, 'Chinese Move to Eclipse U.S. Appeal in South Asia', 18.11.2004, p. 5.
- 25 Henry Kissinger, 'Conflict is not an option', *IHT*, 09.06.05, p. 9.
- 26 Robert B. Zoellick "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?", *Remarks to National Committee on U.S-China Relations*, 21.09.05, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm>. download 22.09.05. In May he has been quoted saying: "(...) the United States is intent to deepening economic and political ties with Southeast Asia but not by trying to contain China's rising influence in the region". Zoellick: *Policy to contain China's influence 'foolish'*, *Agencies*, updated 11.05.05, [www.chinadaily.com.cn/english](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english), download: 11.05.05.
- 27 Ralf Cossa, *Demystifying China*, *PacNet Newsletter* 24, June 5, 2006.
- 28 Interview of the author with Derek Mitchell: 08.03.2005 in Washington D.C.
- 29 Michael Vatikiotis, *U.S. sights are back on China*, *IHT*, 07.06.05, p. 6.
- 30 See also Gill and Huang who, with regard to Chinese soft power, argue that a US

“neo-containment policy to prevent China’s rise is not realistic, and – in the light of Beijing’s continued and nuanced use of its hard and soft power – is unlikely to be acceptable to many in the region and beyond”. Bates Gill / Yanzhong Huang, ‘Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power’’, *Survival*, vol. 48, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 17-36, p. 31.

31 See: Francis Fukuyama, ‘Re-Envisioning Asia’, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 1, pp. 75-87; Wang Jisi, ‘China’s Search for Stability with America’, in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 5, pp. 39-48; Francis Fukuyama, *The Neoconservative Moment*, *The National Interest*, Summer 2004.

32 Because of Europe’s experience in the politics of interregional relations this issue area should become part of the EU-US Strategic Dialogue on East Asia. Whichever policy on East Asia the US chooses China will hold the key to East Asian regionalism.

33 The ongoing re-warming of US-China military ties, after their suspension in 2001 because of the P3 incident, when a Chinese

fighter jet and an American surveillance airplane collided, with the vice-chairman of the Central Military Committee (General Guo Boxiong) visiting Washington DC, with a high level delegation on the invitation of US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld thus needs to be paralleled by the establishment of an ASEAN+3 – US security dialogue on the ministerial level. See for the visit: Eugene Low / Chua Chin Hin, ‘China’s military brass on visit to Washington’ in: *The Straits Time*, 19.07.2006, p. 22.

34 Since Beijing holds the key to Asian regionalism China should be the main target of European soft power in Asia by projecting the principles of regionalism and multilateralism to Asia.

35 This statement indicates a detachment from earlier statements of e.g. the Commission. The former President of the EU Commission Romano Prodi stated: “Both of us want a multipolar world in which we have many active protagonists. This is a Chinese priority and it is a European interest”. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 6 May 2004, p. 30.

