The European Defence Policy and the "Human Security Operations"

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Abstract

Aspek utama dari pendekatan baru dalam proses penyatuan Eropa adalah Peace Support Operations. Tulisan ini dimaksudkan untuk menyampaikan suatu doktrin baru yang didasarkan kemerdekaan individu dari ketidakamanan mendasar (basic insecurities) yang disebabkan oleh pelanggaran hak asasi manusia (HAM). Doktrin tentang keamanan manusia dapat menjadi suatu feasible strategy bagi Uni Eropa, khususnya dalam pengembangan kebijakan luar negeri dan pertahanan. Doktrin yang menggunakan pendekatan yang menyeluruh (comprehensive approach) ini pada akhirnya juga akan sangat bermanfaat bagi segala bentuk keterlibatan Uni Eropa yang lebih mendalam pada krisis dan konflik yang terjadi di berbagai belahan dunia.

Keywords: human security, military, European Union, democracy

The autonomous capacity to undertake an EU-led military operation represents a cornerstone in order to understand the development of the European foreign and security policy. The Helsinki Final Act (1999) established a Rapid Reaction Force, with 50,000-60,000 troops, as a part of a broader political and military structure within the Union.

Many efforts have been made in these years to strengthen the Common

Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). According to the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) the best ways to make stronger security for the EU are related with the aims persuaded by multilateral organizations as UN: preserving peace, promoting international cooperation, developing human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy. Moreover, in conformity with article 11(2) of the Treaty: "The Member States shall support

the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity (...) They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations".

So that it is possible to stress a clear identity that the EU wants to spread in the global scenario. A sort of "civilian power" that gives a crucial role to non-military features: from diplomatic efforts to international cooperation. The respect of norms, laws and supranational structures had guaranteed many years of peace in Europe, after the tragedy of World War I and II. Therefore the EU would like to extend this "peace area" through new means in international relations: the rules that represent the core of Europe as a normative power have to be the foundation for its foreign and defence policy.

Naturally it is very difficult, especially in these years, to talk about norms and "civilian power" regarding international policy. After the end of the Cold War we have seen many deep changes in the use of force, in military operations, even in the concept of war. Nowadays there is a huge debate about the new type of bellicosity in this unipolare/multipolar world¹. On one hand there has been a vigorous

On the other hand, the history of violence and military conflicts did not end after the fall of Berlin Wall. International conflicts became rare, but intra-national conflicts developed into a constant in some areas like Central Africa or South East Asia. Someone talks about "post-modern war" in order to describe these events, thought as strictly connected with globalization2. Moreover, the so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA)3 added the immense power of the information technologies to new weapons and military systems. New challenges and threats appear in international relations: the attacks of 9/11 and the US "war on terror"

deployment of peacekeeping operations in order to solve regional crisis. The United Nations have shown a new activism after a season of contrasts and vetoes in Security Council between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, many of these operations, from Somalia to Bosnia, were dramatic failures, due to the scarce impact of the military presence, the weak rules of engagements (ROE) and the fragile political support behind interventions.

² Duffield (2003)

For a brief literature on this topic: Arquilla, John and David F. Ronfeldt (1997), Biddle, Stephen (1998), Krepinevich, Andrew (1997), Gongora, Thierry and Harald von Riekhoff (2000), Owens, Admiral William A. Jr. (1996), Shapiro, Jeremy (1999).

There are many books that are now. classical text as Mary Kaldor's "The New Wars" [2000] or Martin Van Crevald's "The Transformation of War" [1991]

represents the main aspects of this new bellicosity.

In this context, can Europe acts as a civilian power? What are the most important features of its foreign and defence policy? What is the whole strategy persuaded by Bruxelles to face new fears and to spread its values?

A document that can help us to answer to these questions is unquestionably the Solana's European Security Strategy (2003). The respect of the United Nations decisions, a multilateral approach and the need to attend in crisis before they became tragedies (as Rwanda) are key concepts of the official essay. Facing a terrible threat as terrorism, that has already hit Europe in Madrid and London, a deep cooperation between policies, armed forces intelligence and also diplomacy, international cooperation, is probably the best way to follow for the UE. According to that document we have to solve not only security problems but especially the deep roots of terrorism and conflicts.

So that, the determination to combine a new activism in international affairs with a different 5 We are referring at the work Hanns Maull identity respect to a classical and offensive imagine of great power, brings to the idea of a Zivilmacht, a "civilian power". I'm using a German

There is a huge literature about new strategies on the European foreign policy according to the idea of Zivilmacht5. I would like to stress on of the most brilliant and innovative analysis of last years regarding this topic. A real and practical suggestion to Solana and to all the EU's decisionmakers. I'm talking about "The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities" 7. The document was presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy at the end of 2004. The most known members of the study group were Ulrich Albrecht, Anthony Giddens and Mary Kaldor (as the Convenor).

The wide debate that followed this policy paper can show the influence of that approach in academic, political and military fields. It is very important to stress the alternative solutions for an empirical application of theories and ideas related to the

word because I'm thinking at the foreign policy of that country, which was based, after the end of the World War II, on multilateralism and "pacific aims" of its armed forces5.

For an interesting overview: Joseph Nye (2004)

A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities. September, the 15th 2004.

A very recent example is John Kotsopoulos (2006)

A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy. December, the 12th, 2004.

In this case we will find a very detailed description of moral principles, legal frameworks and military forces that could become the cornerstone of the European Defence Policy. In this paper I'll try to stress the main elements of the Barcelona Report in order to understand the possible development for the European Union in crisis and conflicts across the world.

A Human Security Doctrine for Europe

The aim of the Report is to spread a new doctrine based on freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by human rights violations. A Human Security Doctrine that could represents a new strategy for the Foreign Minister of Europe, appointed under the Constitution agreed in June 2004.

There are three main guidelines of this approach: a set of values for operations in crisis and insecurity, a Human Security Response Force (composed of 15,000 civilians and soldiers) and a brand new legal framework to govern both the decision to intervene and operations on the ground.

The introduction of the Report is an historical and political analysis about the European needs to become more active for a better global security, especially in front of threats as regional conflicts, failed states, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, and organised crime. The

authors stress the features of the contemporary conflicts: law-lessness, impoverishment, exclusivist ideologies and the daily use of violence. Due to these elements, which represent a perfect ground for terrorism and criminality, it is impossible for every nation state to be sure within its borders. This is awfully true also for Europe. "To be secuтe, in today's world, Europeans need to make a contribution to global security. Europe needs military forces but they need to be configured and used in quite new ways. They need to be able to prevent and contain violence in different parts of the world in ways that are quite different from classic defence and war-fighting". 9 The way suggested by the authors is strictly related to the deployment of a new type of force: army and police, but also human rights monitors, aid specialists. These elements should be the necessary tools in order to realize what has been conceived by the European Security Strategy (ESS): a preventive engagement for an effective multilateralism and for the spread of the international law. A different type of power, but, at the same time, more capable and active in the today's world10.

⁹ A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, pp. 2.

For alternative visions (or explanations) about Europe as different power and the political hegemony in the new century: Kupchan (2002) and Kagan (2003).

In a deeply changed global context, according to the ESS, the main threats are terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states, and organised crime. These global and interlinked menaces can easily show the difficulty in the use of traditional forms of military power. With the "new wars" the distinctions between civilians and combatants, internal and external causes, local and international actors, public and private, war and post-war phases, disappeared. For the Report the technology is not able to solve these dilemmas, as we can see in Afghanistan and Iraq. Preventing ethnic cleansing or protecting civilians are very hard tasks for traditional or technological armed forces. Therefore it is suggested to adopt a new security policy based on human security and not only on state security. This type of approach should be focused not only in the defence of the Union's borders but also in the safety of individual freedom from basic insecurities. The Study Group draws up a list of three main reasons to justify human security concept: morality, legality and self-interest. The last one is related to the impossibility for Europe to be secure while others, in failing states or conflict areas the world live in severe insecurity. The exportation of criminal economy or terrorism represents a risk also in this global world. "The only real response to such threats is to address the security needs of people in situations of severe insecurity. This will not deliver perfect security to Europeans, but it is the most credible way to address the causes of insecurity at source."11

The Peace Support Operations (PSO) managed in situations of severe insecurity (according to "Petersberg tasks": peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance, humanitarian and rescue tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management") has tended to sacrifice human rights for peace due to ill-equipment and weak rules of engagement (ROE) or to forget human rights in order to achieve a quick victory.

For the Barcelona Report the history of the last military interventions in regional crisis makes clear the difficulty in the restoration of public security and in the protection of civilians for these "humanitarian intervention". But this term implies in most cases only a military approach. What we should do in multidimensioned situations, from state-building to post-conflict reconstruction, is to adopt a whole approach, which is capable to cover different types of institutions and different phases of war.

Also for European Union there is an evident gap between will (not always present indeed!) and

A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, pp. 5

capabilities. Therefore the Report suggests a rational pragmatism to prioritise certain situations over others. The urgency of a situation and its gravity, the risks of a mission and its practicality, the historic and geopolitical responsibility, the public concern and the role of public pressure are all important elements when occurs a decision on a possible foreign military intervention.

As we have seen, with the Helsinki meeting in December 2001 member states have made available up to 50,000-60,000 troops under the Headline Goals. Therefore the European Security Defence Policy (ESPD) is entered in a new phase, especially with the creation of first "battle groups". Many Peace Support Operations were undertaken in these years, from the borders of Europe to Africa, involving civilian and military capabilities. The Operation "Artemis" in Ituri (Democratic Republic of Congo) shows the development made by EU: for the first time the UN Security Council approved an EU mission.12

According to these fundamental steps for Europe's defence policy, the Barcelona Report wants to explain a set of principles as guidelines for the actions of EU policymakers.

The first of them, the "primacy of human rights", distinguishes the traditional state-based approach to this new doctrine. The management of the mission is as important as the final aims persuaded. The protection of civilians from gross human rights violation is, indeed, the ultimate goal of human security operations.

The purpose of the interventions has to be established by a legitimate political authority. This is related to the second principle: "a clear political authority" over the command and control of the mission. The clear linkage between troops and policymakers wants to put together the political and operational level, as the history of strategy suggests from the very beginning¹³. However the problems of accountability are not so investigated by the authors, but they remained as a crucial point for a European command structure.

Obviously, the local consent and support is one the preliminary steps in order to evaluate the deployment of troops in a crisis. A multilateral approach (the third principle) is the general frame for these operations, solving problems with cooperation, working with international institutions, avoiding duplication and promoting coordination between foreign policy, intelligence, trade and security issues.

The most important principle stressed by the Report is certainly the bottom up approach. The effectiveness of the mission is strictly related to the

¹² UN Security Council Resolution, 31 May 2003.

¹³ This is one of the main lessons that we can find in the whole work of Clausewitz.

basic need of the people involved in crisis. "A continuous process of communication, consultation, dialogue and partnership can provide a form of early warning and a guide to what strategies are most likely to be effective as well as feedback and evaluation for ongoing missions."

The authors stress the importance of a huge effort toward dialogue and communication with local people. If we think at the current situation in Iraq or Afghanistan we can easily understand the relevance of this analysis: the success of an institution-building depends on the degree of involvement of local population.

The fifth principle is the regional focus. Nowadays conflicts usually affect neighbouring states and their stability, as we have seen in the Balkans. Therefore the Barcelona Report suggests an approach that takes into account a whole area and its problems: refugees, displaced persons, and fragile boundaries for criminal and terrorist networks.

The two last principles are related to the ways in which Peace Support Operations should be managed. First of all it concerns a shift, through the assisting in law-enforcement (from police to civil authorities), from the traditional use of military force to legal instruments. On the other hand, the appropriate use of force it is considered essential for a "moral" and also successful operation. In order to

satisfy the final aim of human security mission, which is indeed protect people and minimise casualties, the use of minimal and precise force plays a crucial role.

After this detailed description of principles, the Report puts its attention on the possible implementation of them. A Human Security Response force is the first answer for new integrated civil-military capabilities for Europe. Tasks like humanitarian aid, reconstruction, disarmament, and institution-building required specialised and coordinated skills. Therefore only a force with a double component can efficiently face this situation. But the current balance of military-civil elements should be changed: "Any deployment needs to include a very substantial contingent of civilians, who would co-determine the nature and culture of the operation. It is very important that civil-military integration applies at planning level as well as the operational level"15.

For this reason the Report suggests a new Human Security Response Force, composed of both military and civilians, approximately with the size of a division, 15.000 personnel. One-third of them should be police and civilian specialists. The existing headquarters in Bruxelles, a clear and well-defined political authority (also at the operational level), a rapid deployable military-civil team, a

¹⁴ A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, pp. 11

¹⁵ A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, pp. 15

voluntary human security tasks force, are the core elements of this innovative proposal. NGOs should play a very active role, due to their impact on the ground and their huge experience in the relationship with civil society and local population¹⁶.

Many of that features are based on existing capabilities in the EU, from Rapid Reaction force to Civil Peace Corps. But a such integrated vision, modelled in order to face the multidimension problems of a "new war", can give a stronger support for entering in another phase in European Foreign and Defence Policy. For this reason, a crucial step is represented by the promotion of a new legal framework governing pace support operation. A key-instrument to contribute for the enhancing of a coherent body of international law regarding this complex and debated topic: how and when to intervene. According to the authors, the domestic law of the member states, the rules of engagement (ROE), international criminal law, human rights law, and international humanitarian law are all the basic sources for this legal framework. A detailed analysis about financing, democratic control, institution embedding is the last part of the Barcelona Report.

These aspects are obviously a bit problematic due to the structure in intinere of the European Union, especially after the huge stop of constitutional referendum failure. However, some elements, like the new Foreign Minister's cabinet as the natural home for the Human Security Response Force, are already adequate for this ambitious project.

Conclusions

The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities proposes a new "human security doctrine". The European Security Defence Policy (ESPD) has to face, on one hand, the new threats in international relations, on the others the problems related to the future of the EU. The two aspects are strictly related if we wonder what is the future contribute to global security by a new global power as Europe. Moreover, the type of defence and foreign policy approach of that power will define also its identity, as traditional "superpower", peer competitor for the United States or growing China, or Zivilmacht, "civil power". The other possibility is, at the moment, a broad set of national policies. If the EU wants to give another chance to its historical project (and dream), a "human security doctrine" is a feasible way to follow. According to the Study Group: "there is an open door for discussing proposals like this in Europe right now. At the individual level of citizens, a conviction is growing

For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between NGOs and military forces after the end of the Cold War, we can see: Rieff (2002), and Mayer (2005)

that Europe may have an independent role to play in global security, and support for proposals like the Rapid Reaction Force is strong. At the institutional level too, the European Union is, for the first time, considering a global security role. The most appropriate role for Europe in the twenty-first century would be to promote human security" 17.

The vision spread in the Report is sometimes optimistic, both on the political side related to the decisional structure behind the new force, both on theory regarding international relations and the role of law and cooperation. Concerning security problems, as we have seen evidently after 9/11 in Baghdad or Afghanistan, the "conventional thinking" as geopolitical assets, raw materials or weapons are still crucial. But, beside these elements, security of lives of human being, development cooperation, ethical values, are vital in the same way for a different power as Europe. This is true also at the operational level, because the EU has the capability, the experience and the know-how to contribute to global human security and to the security of the Europeans, in a world interlinked without clear border.

The Barcelona Report does not

suggest to replace current national forces but to add a new one, due to the current features of the EU. The idea to constitute a Human Security Response Force, composed of both military and civilians, is innovative and, I suppose, very actual. The tasks related to the management of a crisis that required a Peace Support Operation, are too multidimensional and complex for a traditional military force. This Human Security Force is well-designed, especially at the operational level.

As we have seen in these last days of July, the idea of a European interposition force between Lebanon and Israel is required from everywhere. But, unfortunately, it is not still present and deployable. An existing contingent like that should strengthen the political and diplomatic efforts. Not only the global role of the EU will be enhanced but also the contribute to peace and stability. The dramatic events of these days shows the importance of such solution and the nature of the current conflicts in the world, not so "new" according to the words pronounced by the Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora during the Rome Meeting: "They have create a desert and they named it peace"18. [

¹⁷ A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, pp. 22

^{18 (}Tacito, Agricola XXX)

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