Global Terror: A Threat of Globalized Dimension
The Need for A New Security Approach

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Abstract

In an increasingly globalized world, terrorism can no longer be viewed as an isolated threat. Therefore, as argued in this article, realists' understanding is no longer sufficient in addressing the threats which terrorism poses to the international community. A new framework of security analysis needs to be built, one which reflects the continuous development of security in the international system. By re-examining the construction of terrorism in the study of security and elaborating it in accordance with the ongoing process of globalization, the authors offer different approach in addressing terrorism more effectively.

Security studies persist to provide a framework to comprehend security problems in the international system, which will be useful to conduct the appropriate policy response. Basic things in the security studies are the conception of security itself and perceived threats that follow. Since realism has dominated the study of international relations over the years, national security and threats to national security are the main focus of security studies. Terrorism is one phenomenon in security studies which is posed as a threat to national security. Scholars have tried to make a conception on terrorism in order to respond to the threat. Yet until now there has not been any internationally accepted definition on terrorism regarding to the changes of terrorist activities in general, a new framework of security analysis needs to be built, one which reflects the continuous development of security in the international system.

As the world becomes more globalized, the issues in security studies have also widened . The emergence of globalized security issues has created an interconnected threat which has moved beyond separate national security interest of each state and had the impact on the international system as a whole, known as a phenomenon of transnational threat. Being included as one of transnational threats, terrorism shows a new scale of significance, especially after the 9/11 (September 11th, 2001) tragedy. Terrorism is no longer an isolated threat, the international system is now posed with the issue of global terror, and states together with other transnational actors are trying to find the most effective policy in countering terrorism. It is necessary to re-examine the construction of terrorism itself in the study of security, and so this paper is trying to elaborate the phenomenon of terrorism in accordance with the rise of a globalized world. Furthermore, in understanding the

on-going terrorism conception, we offer different approach in security studies followed with possible policy changes.

TERRORISM : A SYMBOL OF LARGER TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY THREAT

The global campaign against terrorism, defined by Campbell[1] as the "globalization's first war", symbolizes a much larger trend: the emerging tendency of nation-states to turn their attention to deal with transnational security threats. This new tendency has important implications for international relations theory as well as for the conduct of foreign and defense policy. One immediate implication is the common perception that an alternative framework for thinking about security that encompasses the transnational agenda is required. Another implication is that a transformation of the policymaking process is needed in order to deal with this complex issue.

International Relations as an academic discipline has been dominated by Realism. This paradigm argues that conflicts among states can be contained by maintaining the balance of power, believed as a concept that can ensure stability and mutual security in the international system. Thus, the methods of securing or restoring the balance such as the formation of alliances, sphere influence, intervention, diplomatic bargaining, (dis)armament, war itself, and legal and peaceful settlement of disputes, are recognized as the prominent strategies to create peace. In this context, peace is defined as order marked by the existence of stability in the international system.

We argue that the Realist's characterization of world politics is too narrowly conceived to encompass and make sense of the transnational challenge to global security. A new class of transnational threats is emerging which is stretching the boundaries of the Realist's conventional thinking about security. In an effort to characterize the nature of the post-realist world, it is important to point out that one dependent variable, for example, the uncontrolled proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, global terrorism, widespread regional instability caused by the collapse of many nation-states, or Huntington's prophecy of a global clash of civilization, will not sufficiently shape the nature of global politics. The threats and crises in the years ahead are much more likely to be diverse in source, nature, and scale. The same goes to the case of terrorism. Terrorism is no longer an isolated threat, therefore it requires major structural changes to remove the underlying causes of terrorism.

These threats stem from demographic pressures, resource depletion, global warming, unregulated population movements, transnational crime, virulent new strains of infectious diseases, and a host of other issues not previously associated with international security (Dupont, 2001, 239-243).[2] Some possible future threats are rooted in conditions related to the increasing insecurities of long-established authoritarian regimes that have little experience in handling the complexities of a multi-ethnic society, pluralistic politics, and market economics.

Realism's concentrations on a state-centric and power-deterministic world allow

limited scope for considering the new salience of non-state actors and the multi-dimensional nature of security. Today, the state-centric world is no longer predominant. A complex multi-centric world has emerged. Complex, interconnected and multidimensional transnational issues are moving from the periphery to the center of the security concerns of states. This multi-centric world consists of various non-state actors such as multinational corporations, ethnic minorities, sub national governments, professional societies, social movements, non-governmental organizations, political parties, and individual actors. The proliferation of actors in world politics has not pushed states to the edge of the global arena; they are simply no longer the only key actors.

One conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the Realists' limitation is that a new concept of security is required; one that embraces the transnational agenda. This new concept is usually referred to as *comprehensive security*. The reason for creating this concept is because its conceptual boundaries stretch beyond the traditionally accepted causes of war to include non-military threats to survival and the de-establishing activities of non-state actors. However, comprehensive security accepts the Realists' proposition that territorial integrity, political sovereignty, and international stability are the key measures of security.

A comprehensive security approach also recognizes that tomorrow's wars will not likely resemble yesterday's. Just as the recent war in Afghanistan looked very little like the 1991 Gulf War or the conflict over Kosovo, future wars will likely pose new challenges and require new operational concepts and capabilities. In the face of overwhelming state(s) conventional superiority, adaptive adversaries will almost certainly employ asymmetric approaches, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, information warfare, maritime mines, and other means to undermine state(s) strengths and exploit state(s) vulnerabilities. They will also threaten citizens and infrastructure at homeland, thus requiring state(s) to fight in fundamentally new ways.

The centrality of new warfare is prompting militaries to reconsider how they are organized. Today, the military tends to be platform-centric: the Air Force is built around aircraft; the Navy, around ships; and the Army is organized around artillery and armor. The emergence of terrorism on a transnational threat favors a network-centric military, which is shaped by the search for operations derived from a unified picture of the battles place.

Another conclusion is that the emerging transnational threat has elicited more interest than ever before in the idea to transform the international system. One concept that widely discussed to address this transformation is globalization.

Globalization Leads to Global Terror

Francis Fukuyama in his essay "The End of History"[3] argues that a single force – globalization- was revolutionizing international relations and laying the foundations for a more peaceful and prosperous world. A scholarly definition of

globalization in its current usage has been offered by Keohane and Nye. They make a distinction between globalism, globalization, and de-globalization. Globalism is "a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multi-continental distances... through flows and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, and people and forces, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances."[4] Globalization and de-globalization represent an increase and decrease in globalism, respectively.

Fukuyama has outlined three ways in which globalization was supposed to bring an end to traditional conflicts. First, the global spread of consumer culture was supposed to be narrowing the differences of values between cultures. Second, based on the liberal theory of democratic peace, the global spread of democracy was supposed to be proliferating less-warlike governments. Third, the unification of the world into a single global economy made countries more interdependent and would erode the ability of states to control their economics and political fortunes.

Although the wave of globalization offers opportunities for global integration, a closer look at the wave reveals a more mixed picture for the developing world. This paper will present a pessimistic view of globalization. Globalization forces are powerful, and they can be powerful for good. However, we will argue that globalization can yield deteriorating outcomes.

In the first place, the revolution in international communications would not lead to one global culture, instead, it would deliver a different set of virtues: a vibrant local indentity, retribalization, and solidarity among kinsmen and countrymen. Stewart (et.al.) (2001a), for example, tries to establish correlation between internal wars with global cultural forces. He argues that struggles for self-determination (as the main motive of most internal wars) are associated with differing perceptions of identity among participants that might result in a national crisis of identity. We confirm Stewart's argument by adding that this identity crisis has two dangerous consequences. First, it encourages the rise of ethnic identities and racial factionalism, to replace missing sense of national community. Second, the rise of these identities could make the state a hostage of ancient hatreds. Ethnic and cultural conflict in many developing countries are the inevitable result of ancient hatreds that can take very malign forms, as in genocinde war between the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda.

Another problem of globalization is that democratization (as one the Fukuyama's methods for spreading globalization) in most of the Third World countries might stimulate anomic violence. For most of the third world countries, democracy is a new concept adopted from centuries of political evolution in Western society. The success and stability enjoyed by Western political systems encourage them to initiate democratization in the early process of nation-state building. In this stage, most of the third world countries do not have sufficient political infrastructures to deal with emerging social problems caused by a sudden increase of participation in political affairs. As a result, democratization is more

closely associated with instability and conflict rather than with peace.

The force of globalization will less likely mitigate this instability since globalization does not co-exist with a decreased number of states. We tried to calculate the number of new states in several historical periods and discovered that the future of having one 'global village' is deteriorating since we still see the proliferation of new states (Table 1). This proliferation co-existed with 'the clash of globalization' that represented the constant friction between the fragmentation of states and the progress of a global economic, cultural, and political integration.[5]

Table 1. Proliferation of States

1800 The Westphalian System	30
1810-1849 The Bolivar War	17
1850-1914 The Emergence of Central Europe	12
1915-1939 The Great War	13
1945-1989 Decolonialization	77
1990 forward The Post Cold War	17

Another challenge for Fukuyama's optimism is that the global spread of market capitalism could become a disruptive force. It co-exists with the widening gap between the have and the have-not. Using the World Development Report 2000, Scott shows that real per capita incomes for the richest one-third of countries rose by an annual 1.9 percent between 1970 and 1995, whereas the bottom third showed no increase at all.[6] He also shows that the rich countries account for about 60 percent of world GDP but only 15 percent of world population.

This deep polarization of wealth has been identified as one of the major threats to global peace. The poorest countries in the world are incapable of projecting power and authority within their own borders, leaving their territories governmentally empty. Susan Willet[7] confirms this statement by arguing that globalization is undermining the legitimacy of third world countries. Her main concern is that since the regulative power of such states is declining, warlords, mafias, and mercenary groups are filling the gap.

In 2000, of the 34 poorest countries in the world, nine were engaged in conflict (Angola, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia), while twelve (Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Haiti, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, and Yemen) are currently undergoing the fragile process of transition from conflict to peace. The proliferation of weak states in the developing world has diminished the optimist perspective that sees the acceleration of globalization will lead the post-cold war world entering a new era of peace and stability. A research conducted by Wallensteen and Sollenberg,[8] for example, shows that from 110 major conflicts occurred between 1990-1999, only seven conflicts fall under the category of inter-state war; the rest of 103 conflicts are internal wars. When we crossed Wallensteen and Sollenberg's data with

Sivard's finding (1996), the result is 16 out of 103 internal wars could plausibly be considered clashes of civilization. The examples of these are Philippines government versus Abu Sayaff, Chadian civil war, Tamils versus Sinhala in Srilanka, and Russia versus Chechens.

It is interesting to see that globalization is considered as one of the dependent variables that can be used to explain the rising number of internal wars in the post-Cold War era. One contributing factor to the intensity of internal conflicts around the world is the existence of a globalized weapons system, which increases availability of weapons, particularly small and light weapons. Based on the existence of a globalized weapons system, Duffield argues that globalization has transformed most internal wars to a network war that reflects the contested integration of stratified markets and population into the global economy.[9] According to SIPRI Arms Transfers Project, in 1997 worldwide military spending amounted to $740bn, making arms officially the biggest manufacturing industrial sector worldwide. The export-driven proliferation of conventional weapons systems is accompanied by the transfer of technological capability, the development of domestic defense industries and the integration of private companies in the global arms market.

Globalization has restructured the armaments industry in ways which decrease national security of under-developed countries. Firstly, resources devoted to arms acquisition are diverted from other areas of the public sector. Second, the majority weapons imported into Third World states are used for repressing domestic opposition groups. Third, production is now controlled by international companies rather than by national states. Fourth, an arms race driven by market is replacing one driven by Cold War politics. Lastly, there is increasing uncertainty regarding the final destination of weapons supplies, which are frequently out of the control of suppliers.

The detrimental effect of decreasing capabilities of controlling arms supply is that many terrorist organizations have direct access to global arms market.[10] The immediate consequence is that threats once considered of low military significance such as non-state terrorism will become important factors in security planning. The worst case scenario is that with the expansion of a globalized weapons system, terrorist groups may have access to, for example, hundreds of ton of highly carcinogenic plutonium and enriched uranium stand unguarded in Russia. From 1993 to 2000, the UN International Atomic Energy Agency documented 153 confirmed cases of theft of nuclear materials. Some of this material could be obtained by terrorist to make "dirty bombs"[11] Globalization does make the possibilities for nuclear terrorism seem endless.

This disturbing fact is anticipated by Buzan and Herring by proposing a global disarmament program for all weapons systems (WMD, Heavy Armored Weaponry, Small and Light Weapons) that will be targeted for all non-state actors.[12] However, the applicability of this program will depend on the ability of state actors to strengthen the existed arms control regimes

and especially to establish an arms control regime for small and light weapons.

Failed States & Terrorism

The most disturbing cases for the deep polarization of wealth are shown by eight "failed states" (Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan). This failed states phenomenon will continue to present serious threats for the prospect to increase global integration. We modified the database of " Consolidated State Failure Events, 1955-2001"[13] and discovered that from 1955-2001 there were 116 cases of state failure events in 74 developing countries. These states share the following characteristics: a loss of institutional control over their borders; declining levels of GDP per capita; rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities; environmental degradation; and a rise in criminal and political violence. Failed states have come to be feared as breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder, as well as reservoirs and exporters of terror.

Terrorist networks can utilize failed states in four ways.[14] First, failed states provide the opportunity to acquire territory on a sufficient scale enough to accommodate training complexes, arms depots, and communication facilities. Second, failed states have weak law-enforcement capabilities permitting terrorist groups to engage in transnational crimes activities in order to raise funds for operations. Third, failed states create pools of recruits and supporters for terrorist groups. Fourth, failed states retain the outward sign of

sovereignty that tends to reject intervention actions to eliminate terrorist networks.

The expansion of terrorist network in the last two decades reinforces the connection between the rise of globalization and the growth of terrorism. A global connected world has enable terrorist groups to establish a multilayered network embedded in countries but linked between and across country. Al-Qaeda's network, for example, are now established in more than 60 countries. This transnationalization of terror is made possible by the vast array of communication tools provided by globalization and also fueled by unjust economic globalization.

REORIENTING CONCEPT OF SECURITY & POLICY-MAKING

If we want to actively address the complex interplay of globalization, traditional styles of policymaking have to change. Before we discuss the transformation, it will be useful if we outline our perception of the policymaking process.

We characterize the policymaking process as a series of concentric circles. At the center is the president, surrounded by his political advisors. The inner circle of advisors usually includes the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Minister of Internal Affairs, the National Security Adviser, the Director of State Intelligence, the Chairman of Armed Forces Headquarters, and the Chairman of National Police. Beyond this circle lie the relevant departments of the executive branch and various independent agencies and commissions. Farther still from the

center is the congressional ring with the organizations of the legislative branch. The outer circle consists of the public arena: the media, interest groups, and the general public.

In a realist world, a policymaking is best characterized as highly centralized bureaucracies in which security policy decisions are made and priorities mainly at the inner circle. This becomes a dominant feature because traditionally security is regarded as a high politics agenda that has immediate impact on national survival. This policy-making feature will make it difficult for any state agencies to handle transnational threats such as terrorism.

Many of the challenges confronting transnational security threats could be reduced if we were to reorient our thinking and operations and decentralize decision-making process. This reorientation can be conducted by using four methods.

Firstly, we should continue to define security as a multidimensional concept that requires a firm interagency cooperation. A case in point is the debate about possible engagement of military troops to address transnational threats. Proponents for military deployment argue that transnational security threats are the major security challenges to the nation-state in the next decades, thus, it is appropriate to call upon military forces to address them. On the other hand, there are those who argue that military forces should not become involved in these types of operations. The military involvement would detract the military from its fundamental role of defending the nation from external attack. Military involvement in non-military

matters will detract from operational readiness and it will create a financial drain to military budgets. If the concept of comprehensive security is used as the guiding framework, then the point of agreement of this debate could be a call for the government to designate a particular division of its military forces to deal specifically with transnational security threats, or the government could create units within civilian agencies that might even have military training to acquire specific skill to deal with transnational threats.

Secondly, military campaigns to deal with transnational threats must be seen as a part of a more comprehensive conflict resolution effort. There are a multitude of societal conditions, ranging from political and socio-economic disparities, foreign occupation of a territory, radical religious militancy, or even criminal motivations that give rise to transnational threats. In this comprehensive approach, resolving transnational threats requires a much more comprehensive response than the narrower military or law enforcement orientations of counter-terrorist operations.

The third method is decentralization. Although the inner circle will continue to design the national security strategy, the responsibility for their conduct could be decentralized. The inner circle could concentrate their attention on major potential crises that pose direct and immediate threats to global and national security. Direct attacks on the state territory, interstate aggression, a regional arms race, and humanitarian crises are examples of issues that would be the areas for inner circle concern. Lower bureaucratic

levels then could both undertake early warning tasks and overseeing preventive responses in local and regional arenas. In this context, the Department of Foreign Affairs, for example, must create a new type of diplomacy that would train and empower local and middle-level officials (such as ambassadors and country directors) to undertake preventive actions.

The last method is that globalization gives rise to the possibility of establishing a global security community. To establish this community, we have to utilize the existence of institutions and processes for the settlement of disputes and the existence of a high degree of political and economic integration.

This community can be initiated by proposing the creation of a global preventive regime. A preventive regime can be created by developing specific preventive procedures. These procedures consist of governmental and non-governmental actions, policies, and institutions that are taken deliberately to keep particular states or organized groups within them from threatening or using organized violence, armed force, or related forms of coercion such as repression as the means to settle interstate or national political disputes, especially in situations where the existing means cannot peacefully manage the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change

This regime must have a multi-layered structure consisting of the United Nations system, regional organizations, and Non-governmental Preventive Network.[15] We should develop a sustainable method to provide resources to multilateral organizations and NGOs on the front lines of prevention, providing diplomatic support behind particular preventive efforts, and providing experienced individual representatives to mediate incipient disputes under multilateral auspices. We need this multilateralism since a unilateral military strategy for managing the escalated transnational threats is increasingly expensive, dangerous to implement, and politically unpopular. John Gersham, for example, argues that a greater military involvement in combating terrorism will not help matters in general and could well make local conditions much worse, by strengthening local armed forces that have committed serious human right abuses and remain impervious to effective civilian control.[16]

However, there will be a domestic constraint on states' involvement in this preventive regime. Budget constraints, economic recessions, and politically weak coalitions will limit states flexibility to engage. Since most political agendas are driven by domestic politics, the government should launch an extensive public diplomacy strategy that tries to foster better understanding of its citizens on how the world has became a global village. This strategy also has to explain that a unilateral military strategy for managing the escalated transnational threats is increasingly expensive, dangerous to implement, and politically unpopular. Since there would be a multilateral pool of resources in the global preventive regime, a multilateral effort to counter transnational threats would be

much less demanding on each participating country's resources and political energies.

CONCLUSION

The realist school has dominated International Relations studies over the years. Its way of thinking about the international system as the 'state of war' has much effected the general concept of security which later shapes the policymaking process to deal with the security threat exists. Realists perceive power as an important aspect of state interaction whom distribution determines the prospect of war and peace. Balance of power is a pragmatic policy implemented to create peace which is defined as order marked by the existence of stability in the international system.

Terrorism has come to the world's attention since it is perceived as a significant threat to the stability of the international system. Terrorism actually symbolizes larger trend: the emerging of transnational security threat. This transnational threat has stretched out from the conventional thinking of security realist held. The relevance of this school of thought is now put into question in dealing with these transnational agenda. The rise of multidimensional issues along with the emerging of a multi-centric world requires a broadening concept of security from the conventional one that realist has. A new approach to the concept of security is required for states to address these threats. The transformation of the international system caused by these transnational threats is nowadays widely discussed intertwined with the rise of globalization.

Globalization rises together with its critics. These critics unveil the deteriorating effects of globalization which is believed to have led the world to the threat of global terror. Counter-arguments to three points of Fukuyama's optimistic view on globalization have shown us how globalization has driven phenomena such as a fraction of culture, instability of the 3rd world, proliferation of new states, fragility of poor countries and globalized weapon system, which have destabilized the security of the international system in a multidimensional way. Therefore, it becomes quintessential to re-consider approaches in security related to policy-making process in countering the rising challenge of terrorism on transnational threat.

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