

LAMPIRAN I.

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Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The heads of State of the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan,

Attaching great value to the positive role of the Shanghai Five over the five years of its existence in promoting and intensifying relations of good-neighbourliness, mutual trust and friendship among the member States, strengthening peace and stability in the region and facilitating joint development,

Unanimously believing that the establishment and development of the Shanghai Five was in keeping with the needs of mankind and the historic trend towards peace and development in the conditions which prevailed after the end of the cold war and opened out enormous potential for good-neighbourliness, unity and cooperation through mutual respect and mutual trust among States belonging to different civilizations and having different cultural traditions,

Particularly noting that the agreements on confidence-building in the military field and on the mutual reduction of armed forces in the border area signed in Shanghai and Moscow in 1996 and 1997 respectively by the heads of the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan, and also the final documents signed during the meetings at Alma Ata (1998), Bishkek (1999) and Dushanbe (2000), made an important contribution to the maintenance of peace, security and stability in the region and

throughout the world, significantly enriched the practice of modern diplomacy and regional cooperation and had a broad and positive influence on the international community,

Being firmly convinced that in the context of the dynamic development of the processes of political multipolarity and of globalization in the economic and information spheres in the twenty-first century, the progression of the Shanghai Five mechanism to a higher level of cooperation will help in making more effective joint use of the possibilities which are opening out and in withstanding new challenges and threats,

Solemnly declare the following:

1. The People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan hereby establish the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
2. The goals of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are: to strengthen mutual trust, friendship and good-neighbourliness between the member States; to encourage effective cooperation between them in the political, trade and economic, scientific and technical, cultural, educational, energy, transport, environmental and other spheres; and to undertake joint efforts for the maintenance of peace, security and stability in the region, and the building of a new, democratic, just and rational international political and economic order.
3. Within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, annual official meetings of the heads of State and regular meetings of the heads of Government of the member States shall be held alternately in each of the member States. In order to expand and intensify cooperation in all spheres, new mechanisms may be established, as necessary, in addition to the existing mechanisms for meetings of the heads of the relevant departments, and also permanent and temporary expert working groups may be convened to study plans and proposals on the further development of cooperation.
4. The "Shanghai spirit" formed in the process of the development of the Shanghai Five, characterized by mutual trust, mutual advantage, equality, joint consultations, respect for cultural diversity and the desire for joint development, is an invaluable asset gained by the countries of the region over the years of

cooperation. It will grow, and in the new century will become the norm in relations among the States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

5. The States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization firmly adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, equal rights and mutual advantage, resolution of all issues through joint consultations, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use or threat of use of military force, and renunciation of unilateral military advantage in contiguous areas.
6. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has been established on the basis of the agreements on confidence-building in the military field and on the mutual reduction of armed forces in the border area signed in Shanghai and Moscow in 1996 and 1997 respectively. Cooperation within its framework is already under way in political, trade and economic, cultural, scientific and technical and other spheres. The principles embodied in the aforementioned agreements define the basis for relations between the States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
7. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is not an alliance directed against other States and regions and it adheres to the principle of openness. It declares its willingness to develop dialogue, contacts and cooperation of all kinds with other States and appropriate international and regional organizations and, on the basis of consensus, to admit as new members States which share the objectives and goals of cooperation within the framework of the organization and the principles set forth in paragraph 6 and also other provisions of this Declaration and whose admission may help achieve that cooperation.
8. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization attaches priority to regional security and shall make all necessary efforts to maintain it. The member States shall engage in close cooperation with a view to the implementation of the Shanghai Convention on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism, including the establishment of a regional anti-terrorist structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with headquarters in Bishkek. In addition, appropriate multilateral documents shall be drawn up on cooperation in curbing illicit trafficking in arms and narcotic drugs, illegal migration and other types of criminal activity.
9. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has enormous potential and broad possibilities for mutually advantageous cooperation of the member States in the

trade and economic sphere and shall make efforts to promote the further development and diversification of cooperation among member States at the bilateral and multilateral levels. To this end, within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a negotiating process shall be undertaken on the establishment of favourable conditions for trade and investments, a long-term programme of multilateral trade and economic cooperation shall be drawn up, and also the relevant documents shall be signed.

10. The States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization shall strengthen the consultation mechanism and coordinate action on regional issues and international problems, provide mutual support and develop close cooperation on major international and regional issues, and jointly facilitate the consolidation of peace and stability in the region and throughout the world, believing that the preservation of global strategic balance and stability in the current international situation is of particular importance.

11. In order to coordinate cooperation and organize interaction between the competent ministries and departments of the States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a council of national coordinators of the member States of this organization is hereby established.

The activities of this council shall be determined by the provisional statute approved by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the member States.

The council of national coordinators shall be instructed, on the basis of this Declaration and the documents adopted earlier by the heads of State in the framework of the Shanghai Five, to formulate a draft Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which shall contain a clear set of provisions on the goals, object, objectives and directions of future cooperation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the principles and procedure for the admission of new members, the legal force of the decisions adopted by it and means of cooperation with other international organizations, and shall submit it for signature during the meeting of heads of State in 2002.

In analysing the experience of the past and assessing future prospects, the heads of the member States firmly believe that the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization marks the beginning of a new stage in the development of cooperation among the member States and is in keeping with the trends of the modern era, the

realities of this region, and the fundamental interests of the peoples of all the member States.

June 15, 2001. Shanghai

Jiang Zemin
President of the People's Republic of China

N. A. Nazarbaev
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

A. A. Akayev
President of the Kyrgyz Republic

V. V. Putin
President of the Russian Federation

E. S. Rakhmonov
President of the Republic of Tajikistan

I. Karimov
President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

LAMPIRAN II.

Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism

The Republic of Kazakhstan, the People`s Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan (hereinafter referred to as "the Parties"), guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning primarily the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of friendly relations and cooperation among States;

aware of the fact that terrorism, separatism and extremism constitute a threat to international peace and security, the promotion of friendly relations among States asism, separatism and extremism, as defined in this Convention, regardless their motives, cannot be justified under any circumstances, and that the perpetrators of such acts should be prosecuted under the law;

believing that joint efforts by the Parties within the framework of this Convention are an effective form of combating terrorism, separatism and extremism,

have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. For the purposes of this Convention, the terms used in it shall have the following meaning:

- 1) "terrorism" means: any act recognized as an offence in one of the treaties listed in the Annex to this Convention (hereinafter referred to as "the Annex") and as defined in this Treaty;
other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict or to cause major damage to any material facility, as well as to organize, plan, aid and abet such act, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, violate public security or to compel public authorities or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, and prosecuted in accordance with the national laws of the Parties;

- 2) "separatism" means any act intended to violate territorial integrity of a State including by annexation of any part of its territory or to disintegrate a State, committed in a violent manner, as well as planning and preparing, and abetting such act, and subject to criminal prosecuting in accordance with the national laws of the Parties;
- 3) "Extremism" is an act aimed at seizing or keeping power through the use of violence or changing violently the constitutional regime of a State, as well as a violent encroachment upon public security, including organization, for the above purposes, of illegal armed formations and participation in them, criminally prosecuted in conformity with the national laws of the Parties.

2. This Article shall not affect any international treaty or any national law of the Parties, provides or may provide for a broader application of the terms used in this Article.

Article 2

1. The Parties, in accordance with this Convention and other international obligations and with due regard for their national legislations, shall cooperate in the area of prevention, identification and suppression of acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention.
2. In their mutual relations, the Parties shall consider acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention as extraditable offences.
3. In the course of implementation of this Convention with regard to issues concerning extradition and legal assistance in criminal cases, the Parties shall cooperate in conformity with international treaties to which they are parties and national laws of the Parties.

Article 3

The Parties shall take such measures as can prove necessary, including, as appropriate, in the field of their domestic legislation, in order to ensure that in no circumstances acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention should be subject to acquittal based upon exclusively political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other similar considerations and that they should entail punishment proportionate to their gravity.

Article 4

1. Within 60 days after the Depositary has been notified about the completion of internal procedures necessary for the entry into force of this Convention, a Party shall provide to the Depositary, through diplomatic channels, in writing a list of

its central competent authorities responsible for the implementation of this Convention, and the Depositary shall transmit the above list to other Parties.

2. Neutral competent authorities of the Parties in charge of issues relating to implementation of the provisions of this Convention shall directly communicate and interact with each other.
3. In case of any amendments to the list of central competent authorities of a Party, that Party shall send an appropriate notification to the Depositary who shall inform the other Parties accordingly.

Article 5

Upon mutual consent, the Parties can hold consultations, exchange views and coordinate their positions on issues of combating acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention, including within International organizations and at International forums.

Article 6

In accordance with this Convention, the central competent authorities of the Parties shall cooperate and assist each other through:

- 1) Exchange of information;
- 2) Execution of requests concerning operational search actions;
- 3) Development and implementation of agreed measures to prevent, identify and suppress acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention, as well as mutual information on the results of their implementation;
- 4) Implementation of measures to prevent, identify and suppress, in their territories, acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention, that are aimed against other Parties;
- 5) Implementation of measures to prevent, identify and suppress financing, supplies of weapons and ammunition or any other forms of assistance to any person and/or organization for the purpose of committing acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention;
- 6) Implementation of measures to prevent, identify, suppress, prohibit or put an end to the activities aimed at training individuals for the purpose of committing acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention;
- 7) Exchange of regulatory legal acts and information concerning practical implementation thereof;
- 8) Exchange of experience in the field of prevention, identification or suppression of acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention;
- 9) Various forms of training, retraining or upgrading of their experts;

10) Conclusion, upon mutual consent of the Parties, of agreements on other forms of cooperation, including, as appropriate, practical assistance in suppressing acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention and mitigating consequences thereof. Such agreements shall be formalized in appropriate protocols that shall form an integral part of this Convention.

Article 7

The central competent authorities of the Parties shall exchange information of mutual interest, inter alia, on:

- 1) Planned and committed acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention, as well as identified and suppressed attempts to commit them;
- 2) Preparations to commit acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention, aimed against heads of state or other statesmen, personnel of diplomatic missions, consular services and international organizations, as well as other persons under international protection and participants in governmental visits, international and governmental political, sports and other events;
- 3) Organizations, groups and individuals preparing and/or committing acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention or otherwise participating in those acts, including their purposes, objectives, ties and other information;
- 4) Illicit manufacturing, procurement, storage, transfer, movement, sales or use of strong toxic, and poisonous substances, explosives, radioactive materials, weapons, explosive devices, firearms, ammunition, nuclear, chemical, biological or other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as materials and equipment which can be used for their production, for the purpose of committing acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention;
- 5) Identified or suspected sources of financing of acts indicated in Article 1 (1) of this Convention;
- 6) Forms, methods and means of committing acts indicated in Article 1 (1) of this Convention.

Article 8

1. Cooperation among central competent authorities of the Parties within the framework of this Convention shall be carried out in a bilateral or multilateral format on the basis of a request for assistance as well as by way of providing information upon the initiative of the central competent authority of a Party.
2. Requests or information shall be forwarded in writing. In case of urgency, the requests or information can be transmitted orally but within 72 hours thereafter they should be confirmed in writing and with the use of technical means of text transmission, as necessary.

If there are any doubts about the authenticity of a request or information or the contents thereof additional confirmation or clarification of the above documents can be requested.

3. The request should contain the following:
 - the name of the requesting and requested central competent authorities;
 - purposes of and grounds for the request;
 - description of the contents of the assistance required;
 - any other information which could be useful for a timely and appropriate execution of the request;
 - degree of confidentiality, as necessary.
4. Requests or information transmitted in writing shall be signed by the head of the requesting central competent authority or his or her deputies or shall be certified by the official seal of that central competent authority.
5. Requests and documents transmitted therein, as well as information shall be provided by the central competent authority in one of the working languages mentioned in Article 15 of this Convention.

Article 9

1. The requested central competent authority shall take all necessary measures to ensure a prompt and most complete execution of the request and, within the shortest possible time, shall provide information on the results of its consideration.
2. The requesting central competent authority shall be notified, without delay, about the circumstances that prevent or significantly hamper the execution of a request.
3. If the execution of a request is outside the competence of the requested central competent authority that authority shall transmit the request to another central competent authority of its State, which has the competence to execute it and shall without delay notify the requesting central competent authority accordingly.
4. The requested central competent authority can request additional information which it considers necessary for the execution of the request.
5. Requests shall be executed on the basis of the legislation of the requested Party. Upon request by the requesting central competent authority, the legislation of the requesting Party may be applied if this does not contradict fundamental legal principles or international obligations of the requested Party.
6. Execution of a request can be postponed or denied completely or in part in case the requested central competent authority considers that its execution could prejudice the sovereignty, security, public order or other substantial interests of

its State or that it contradicts the legislation or international obligations of the requested Party.

7. Execution of a request can be denied if the act in connection with which the request was made does not constitute an offence under the legislation of the requested Party.
8. If, in accordance with paragraph 6 or 7 of this Article, the execution of a request is denied in full or in part or if it is postponed, the requesting central competent authority shall be notified accordingly in writing.

Article 10

The Parties will conclude a separate agreement and will adopt other necessary documents in order to establish and provide for functioning of a Parties Regional Counter-terrorist Structure with the headquarters in Bishkek, the purpose of which would be to effectively combat the acts referred to in Article 1 (1) of this Convention.

Article 11

1. For the purposes of implementation of this Convention, central competent authorities of the Parties may establish emergency lines of communication and hold regular and extraordinary meetings.
2. For the purposes of implementation of the provisions of this Convention, the Parties may, as necessary, provide technical and material assistance to each other.
3. Materials, special means, facilities and technical equipment received by a Party on the basis of this Convention from another Party shall not be subject to transfer without a prior written consent of the providing Party.
4. Information about methods of conducting operational search activities, specifications of special forces and means and supporting materials used by central competent authorities of the Parties in order to provide assistance within the framework of this Convention, shall not be subject to disclosure.

Article 12

The central competent authorities of the Parties may conclude specific agreements among them governing modalities for the implementation of this Convention.

Article 13

1. Each Party shall assure the confidential nature of the information and documents received if they are sensitive or if the providing Party considers their disclosure undesirable. The degree of sensitiveness of such information and documents shall be determined by the providing Party.

2. Without a written consent of the providing Party, the information or response to the request received pursuant to this Convention, may not be used for purposes other than those for which they were requested or provided.
3. The information and documents received by a Party pursuant to this Convention from another Party shall not be transmitted without a prior written consent of the providing Party.

Article 14

Each Party shall bear independently the costs of the implementation of this Convention, unless otherwise agreed.

Article 15

The working languages to be used by the central competent authorities of the Parties in their cooperation within the framework of this Convention shall be Chinese and Russian.

Article 16

This Convention shall not limit the right of the Parties to conclude other international treaties on matters that constitute the subject of this Convention and do not contradict its purposes and object, nor shall it affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under other international treaties to which they are Parties.

Article 17

Any disputes, concerning interpretation or application of this Convention shall be settled through consultation and negotiation between the interested Parties.

Article 18

1. This Convention shall be deposited with the People`s Republic of China. Official copies of this Convention shall be sent by the Depositary to other Parties in the course of 15 days after its signing.
2. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the receipt by the Depositary the last notification in writing from the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People`s Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, or the Republic of Uzbekistan informing it of the completion of national procedures necessary for this Convention to enter into force.

Article 19

1. Following the entry into force of this Convention other States may, subject to the consent of all the Parties, accede to it.
2. This Convention shall enter into force for each acceding State on the thirtieth day following the receipt by the Depositary of a notification in writing informing it of the completion of national procedures necessary for this Convention to enter into force. On this date, the acceding State shall become Party to this Convention.

Article 20

1. Amendments and additions may, subject to the consent of all Parties, be made to the text of this Convention, which shall be effected by Protocols being an integral part of this Convention.
2. Any Party may withdraw from this Convention by notifying in writing the Depositary of the decision 12 months prior to the date of anticipated withdrawal. The Depositary shall inform the other Parties of this intention within a 30-day period following the receipt of the notification of withdrawal.

Article 21

1. When forwarding to the Depositary its notification of the completion of internal procedures necessary for this Convention to enter into force, a Party which does not participate in one of the treaties enumerated in the Annex may declare that this Convention shall be applied to the Party with that treaty regarded as not included in the Annex. Such declaration shall cease to be effective after notifying the Depositary of the entry of that treaty into force for the Party.
2. When one of the treaties listed in the Annex ceases to be effective for a Party, the latter shall make a declaration as provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. The Annex may be supplemented by treaties that meet the following conditions:
they are open for signature to all States;
they entered into force; and
they were ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to by at least three Parties to this Convention.
4. After the entry into force of this Convention, any Party may propose an amendment to the Annex. The proposal for amending the Annex shall be forwarded to the Depositary in written form. The Depositary shall notify all the proposals that meet the requirements of paragraph 3 of this Article to the other Parties and seek their views on whether the proposed amendment should be adopted.

5. The proposed amendment shall be considered adopted and shall come into force for all the Parties 180 days after the Depositary has circulated the proposed amendment, except when one-third of the Parties to this Convention inform in writing the Depositary of their objections to it.

Done at Shanghai, this 15th of June, 2001, in one original copy in the Chinese and Russian languages, both texts having equal validity.

June 15, 2001. Shanghai



(Signed) Jiang Zemin
President of the People's Republic of China

(Signed) N. A. Nazarbaev
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

(Signed) A. A. Akayev
President of the Kyrgyz Republic


(Signed) V. V. Putin
President of the Russian Federation

(Signed) E. S. Rakhmonov
President of the Republic of Tajikistan

(Signed) I. Karimov
President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

LAMPIRAN IV.

PETA NEGARA-NEGARA ANGGOTA DAN PENINJAU
SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION



LAMPIRAN V.

TREATY ON A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL ASIA

The Parties to this Treaty,

Guided by the Almaty Declaration of the Heads of State of the Central Asian States adopted on 28 February 1997; the Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the five States of the region adopted at Tashkent on 15 September 1997; the United Nations General Assembly resolutions and decisions 52/38 S of 9 December 1997, 53/77 A of 4 December 1998, 55/33 W of 20 December 2000, 57/69 of 22 November 2002, 58/518 of 8 December 2003, 59/513 of 3 December 2004 and 60/516 of 8 December 2005, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia", and the Communiqué of the Consultative Meeting of Experts of the Central Asian Countries, the Nuclear-Weapon States and the United Nations adopted at Bishkek on 9 July 1998,

Stressing the need for continued systematic and consistent efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and *convinced* that all states are obliged to contribute to that end,

Convinced that a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone will constitute an important step toward strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, promoting cooperation in the environmental rehabilitation of territories affected by radioactive contamination, and enhancing regional and international peace and security,

Believing that a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone will help to promote the security of Central Asian States, particularly if the five Nuclear-Weapon States, as recognized under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the NPT) adhere to the accompanying Protocol on security assurances,

Recognizing that a number of regions, including Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, South-East Asia and Africa, have created nuclear-weapon-free zones, in which the possession, production, development, production, introduction, and deployment as well as use of

threat of use, are prohibited, and *striving* to broaden such regime throughout the planet for the good of all living things.

Reaffirming the obligations set out in the NPT, the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, as well as the principles and objectives set out in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty of 1996 (hereafter referred to as the CTBT).

Have decided to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and *have agreed* as follows:

Article 1
Definitions and Usage of Terms

For the purposes of this Treaty and its Protocol:

- (a) The "Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone" includes: the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan;
- (b) "Nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device" means any weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the military or civilian purpose for which the weapon or device could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled or partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it;
- (c) "Stationing" means implantation, emplacement, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment;
- (d) "Nuclear material" means any source material or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the IAEA), as amended from time to time by the IAEA;
- (e) "Radioactive waste" means any radioactive material, i.e. any substance containing radionuclides, that will be or has already been removed and is no longer utilized, at activities and activity concentrations, of radionuclides

greater than the exemption levels established in international standards issued by the IAEA.

(f) "Facility" means:

(i) a reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or

(ii) any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used.

Article 2

Application of the Treaty

a) The scope of application of a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone is defined exclusively for the purposes of this Treaty as the land territory, all waters (harbors, lakes, rivers and streams) and the air space above them, which belong to the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan;

b) Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights of any Central Asian States in any dispute concerning the ownership of or sovereignty over lands or waters that may or may not be included within this zone

Article 3

Basic Obligations

1. Each Party undertakes:

(a) Not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere;

(b) Not to seek or receive any assistance in research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession or obtaining control over any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device.

(c) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the conduct of research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition or possession of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device;

(d) Not to allow in its territory:

(i) The production, acquisition, stationing, storage or use, of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device;

(ii) The receipt, storage, stockpiling, installation or other form of possession of or control over any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device;

(iii) Any actions, by anyone, to assist or encourage the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, possession of or control over any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device

2. Each Party undertakes not to allow the disposal in its territory of radioactive waste of other States.

Article 4

Foreign Ships, Aircraft, and Ground Transportation

Without prejudice to the purposes and objectives of this Treaty, each Party, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, is free to resolve issues related to transit through its territory by air, land or water, including visits by foreign ships to its ports and landing of foreign aircraft at its airfields.

Article 5

Prohibition of Testing of Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the CTBT:

(a) Not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion;

(b) To prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

(c) To refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion

Article 6 Environmental Security

Each Party undertakes to assist any efforts toward the environmental rehabilitation of territories contaminated as a result of past activities related to the development, production or storage of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in particular uranium tailings storage sites and nuclear test sites.

Article 7 Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes

No provision of this Treaty shall prejudice the rights of the Parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Article 8 IAEA Safeguards

Each Party undertakes:

(a) To use for exclusively peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere;

(b) To conclude with the IAEA and bring into force, if it has not already done so, an agreement for the application of safeguards in accordance with the NPT (INFCIRC 153 (Corr.)), and an Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540 (Corr.)) not later than 18 months after the entry into force of this Treaty.

(c) Not to provide (i) source or special fissionable material or (ii) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State, unless that State has concluded with the IAEA a comprehensive safeguards agreement and its Additional Protocol referred to in paragraph (b) of this article

Article 9
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Equipment

Each Party undertakes to maintain effective standards of physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment to prevent its unauthorized use or handling or theft. To that end, each Party undertakes to apply measures of physical protection to nuclear material in domestic use, transport and storage, to nuclear material in international transport, and to nuclear facilities within its territory at least as effective as those called for by the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 1987 and by the recommendations and guidelines developed by the IAEA for physical protection.

Article 10
Consultative Meetings

The Parties agree to hold annual meetings of their representatives, on a rotating basis, as well as extraordinary meetings, at the request of any Party, in order to review compliance with this Treaty or other matters related to its implementation.

Article 11
Settlement of Disputes

Disputes between the Parties involving the interpretation or application of this Treaty shall be settled through negotiations or by other means as may be deemed necessary by the Parties.

Article 12
Other Agreements

This Treaty does not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under other international treaties which they may have concluded prior to the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.

The Parties shall take all necessary measures for effective implementation of the purposes and objectives of this Treaty in accordance with the main principles contained therein.

Article 13
Reservations

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 14
Signature and Ratification

- (a) This Treaty shall be open for signature at Semipalatinsk, the Republic of Kazakhstan, by all States of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone: the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan.
- (b) This Treaty shall be subject to ratification.

Article 15
Entry into Force and Duration

- (a) This Treaty shall enter into force 30 days after the date of the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification.
- (b) This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 16
Withdrawal from the Treaty

- (a) Any Party may, by written notification addressed to the Depository, withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized its supreme national interests. Such notification shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme national interests.
- (b) Withdrawal shall take effect 12 months after the date of receipt of the notification by the Depository, who shall circulate such notification to all Parties to the Treaty and to the signatories of the Protocol.

Article 17
Amendments

- (a) Any amendment to this Treaty, proposed by a Party, shall be circulated by it to all Parties and submitted to the Consultative Meeting at least 90 days before the Meeting.
- (b) Decisions on the adoption of such an amendment shall be taken by consensus of the Parties.
- (c) An amendment so adopted shall enter into force for all Parties after receipt by the Depositary of the instrument of ratification of this amendment from all Parties.

Article 18
Depositary

- (a) This Treaty shall be deposited with the Kyrgyz Republic, which is hereby designated as Depositary of this Treaty.
- (b) The Depositary shall, *inter alia*
 - (i) Provide an opportunity to sign this Treaty and its Protocol and receive instruments of ratification of this Treaty and its Protocol.
 - (ii) Register this Treaty and its Protocol pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations;
 - (iii) Transmit certified copies of this Treaty and its Protocol to all Parties and to all Parties to its Protocol, and notify them of signatures and ratifications of this Treaty and its Protocol.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Treaty

Done at Semipolatsk, the Republic of Kazakhstan, this eighth day of September, two thousand six, in one copy in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

PROTOCOL

The Parties to this Protocol:

Recalling the Almaty Declaration of the Heads of State of the Central Asian States adopted on 28 February 1997; the Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the five States of the region adopted at Tashkent on 15 September 1997; the United Nations General Assembly resolutions and decisions 52/38 S of 9 December 1997, 53/77 A of 4 December 1998, 55/33 W of 20 December 2000, 57/69 of 22 November 2002, 58/518 of 8 December 2003, 59/513 of 3 December 2004 and 60/516 of 8 December 2005, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia"; and the Communiqué of the Consultative Meeting of Experts of the Central Asian Countries, the Nuclear-Weapon States and the United Nations adopted at Bishkek on 9 July 1998.

Convinced of the need to take all steps in achieving the ultimate goal of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons and that all States are obliged to contribute to that end.

Striving therefore to support the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia.

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1 Negative Security Assurances

Each Party to this Protocol undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device against any Party to the Treaty.

Article 2 Not Contributing to Violations

Each Party to this Protocol undertakes not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol by Parties to them.

Article 3
Effect of Treaty Amendments

Each Party to this Protocol undertakes, by written notification to the Depositary, to indicate its acceptance or otherwise of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol that may be brought about by the entry into force of amendments to the Treaty pursuant to Article 17 of the Treaty.

Article 4
Signature

This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

Article 5
Ratification


This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

Article 6
Duration of and Withdrawal from the Protocol

- a) This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely.
- b) Any Party to this Protocol may, by written notification addressed to the Depositary, withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme national interests. Such notification shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme national interests.
- c) Withdrawal shall take effect 12 months after the date of receipt of the notification by the Depositary, who shall enclose such notification to all Parties to the Treaty and to the signatories of this Protocol.

Article 7
Entry into Force

This Protocol shall enter into force for each Party to this Protocol on the date of its deposit with the Depositary of its instrument of ratification or on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later.



**RULES OF PROCEDURE TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 10 OF THE
TREATY ON A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE
IN CENTRAL ASIA**

**CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY
ON A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE
IN CENTRAL ASIA**

1. Consultative Meetings

Pursuant to Article 10 of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia the Parties shall hold annual meetings or extraordinary meetings in order to review compliance with the Treaty or other matters related to its implementation.

2. First Consultative Meeting

2.1 The first annual consultative meeting shall take place no later than 2 months after the entry into force of the Treaty.

2.2 The first annual consultative meeting will take place in Dushanbe, the Republic of Tajikistan.

2.3 At the end of the first annual meeting, the Parties shall decide on the venue and date of the next annual meeting.

3. Extraordinary Consultative Meeting


3.1 Extraordinary consultative meetings shall be convened, at the request of any Party to the Treaty, whenever that motion is seconded by two other Parties.

3.2 The motion to convene an extraordinary consultative meeting shall be transmitted through diplomatic channels, by the initiating Party to the Party acting as Host at that time, with an explanation of the need to convene it.

3.3 The Host Party clears the holding of the meeting with all other Parties within 10 days since the receipt of the motion to convene such a meeting.

Article 7
Entry into Force

This Protocol shall enter into force for each Party to this Protocol on the date of its deposit with the Depositary of its instrument of ratification or on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later.



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
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3.2 The motion to convene an extraordinary consultative meeting shall be transmitted through diplomatic channels, by the initiating Party to the Party acting as Host at that time, with an explanation of the need to convene it.

3.3 The Host Party clears the holding of the meeting with all other Parties and disseminates the receipt of the motion to convene such a meeting.


LAMPIRAN VI.

Primary Russian Oil and Gas Pipelines to Europe



Source:

ration placed the establishment of the NAFZ in the context of the environmental challenges faced by all five Central Asian States



On 8 October, 2002, the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs organized the first consultative meeting between the five NWS and the five Central Asian states on the CANWFZ Treaty in New York. The purpose of the meeting was to facilitate the agreement by the NWS on the Protocol annexed to the Treaty regarding negative security assurances.

Samarκανd Meeting: On 27 September, 2002, at the UN-sponsored Expert Group meeting held in Samarκανd, Uzbekistan, diplomats from the five Central Asian states agreed on the text of the Treaty and concluded five years of talks that began in 1997.

The 2002 NPT PrepCom: At the 2002 NPT PrepCom, the five Central Asian States submitted a Working Paper calling on the Preparatory Committee to reflect in its report the progress made in the process of drawing up and agreeing on a draft treaty on the establishment of a CANWFZ. The Working Paper also noted the support provided to the Central Asian States by the UN, in particular the Secretary-General, the Department for Disarmament Affairs, the UN Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in drafting the document. This progress was acknowledged in the 2002 NPT PrepCom Chairman's Summary, which states that "support was expressed for the efforts among the Central Asian countries to establish a NWFZ in their region."

The 2000 UN Resolution: On 20 November, 2000, the 55th UNGA session adopted Resolution 55/28W on the establishment of a NWFZ in Central Asia. In the resolution, the UN Member States expressed their conviction that the establishment of a NWFZ was conducive to the achievement of general and complete disarmament and welcomed the desire of all five Central Asian States to finalize work on the establishment of the regional NWFZ and the concrete steps that they had taken to prepare the legal groundwork for the initiative. The resolution called upon all five Central Asian States to continue their dialogue with the five NWS on the establishment of the regional NWFZ. Prior to this resolution, the UNGA had adopted by consensus Resolutions 52/388 (1997) and 53/57A (1998) in support of the CANWFZ initiative. The initiative was also endorsed in the Final Document of the 1997 NPT Review Conference.

Sapporo Meeting: From 2-6 October, 1997, and from 1-6 April, 1998, the UN Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and the Japanese government sponsored expert group meetings held in Sapporo, Japan to further formulate and negotiate the draft text of the CANWFZ.

Bishkek Communiqué: An expert working group meeting, held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan from 9-10 July 1998, and attended by representatives from the five Central Asian States, the five NWS, the UN and IAEA, issued the Bishkek Communiqué. The Communiqué, issued at the conclusion of the meeting, recognized that the Central Asian States had made some progress in drafting the legal document on a NWFZ and that working consultations on basic elements of the future NWFZ were necessary. The five Central Asian States submitted a document entitled "Basic elements of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia." At the meeting, the participants exchanged opinions on the document and considered further steps towards establishing a NWFZ in Central Asia. The Central Asian States also acknowledged that continued consultations of experts from the NWS on the establishment of a NWFZ would be very useful.

Tashkent Statement: An international conference on "Central Asia—A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone" was held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, from 14-16 September, 1997. The Tashkent conference, arranged by the five Central Asian States and attended by experts from the four existing NWFZs, considered lessons learned during the creation of these zones, which may be useful for the drafting of a CANWFZ treaty. Following the meeting, the Foreign Ministers of the five Central Asian States issued the Tashkent Statement, reaffirming their commitment to the establishment of a NWFZ and requested that the specialized agencies of the UN establish a group of experts, with the participation of experts from the region, to elaborate the forms and elements of preparation and implementation of an agreement on the establishment of a NWFZ in Central Asia.

Working Group: At the April 1997 session of the NPT Preparatory Committee, five Central Asian States (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) agreed to form a working group of foreign ministry officials to coordinate activities related to creating a CANWFZ. The group has held meetings in Almaty, Bishkek, Geneva, New York, Sapporo, and Tashkent. These meetings resulted in preparation of a draft text of the Treaty for a NWFZ in Central Asia.

Almaty Declaration: On 27 February, 1997, the Presidents of the five Central Asian States issued the Almaty Declaration endorsing the creation of a CANWFZ. They agreed to call on all States concerned, on the eve of the 1997 anniversary of the former Soviet Union nuclear weapons test site in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, to support the idea of proclaiming Central Asia a nuclear-free zone. The declara-

Developments:

2008: On 19 April the Tajikistan State News Agency reported that Tajikistan has ratified the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

2007: On 22 March Kyrgyzstan deposited the first instrument of ratification for the CANWFZ. Just weeks later, Uzbekistan deposited the second instrument of ratification necessary for entry into force of the CANWFZ on 2 April.

2006: The treaty establishing the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone was signed by the five states on 8 September 2006 in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan. Foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan and foreign ministry officials from Tajikistan and Turkmenistan attended the ceremony in the city of Semipalatinsk near the former Soviet nuclear weapons test site with the same name. The United States, Great Britain, and France objected to the signing of the treaty because of concerns that previous security agreements may take precedence over the provisions of the CANWFZ treaty. In particular, the P-3 are concerned that, under the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, Russia will still be able to transport nuclear weapons through Central Asia or deploy them in the region in the future. The Kazakh foreign minister commented that the issue remained open to interpretation. On 1 September 2006, the C-5 sent a note to the NNWS indicating their willingness to continue the consultations. The Protocol to the treaty has not yet been opened for signature by the P-3.

The United Nations was represented by the UN resident coordinator in Kazakhstan who delivered a statement on behalf of the secretary-general. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs was represented by the director of the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, Mr Tsingun.

On 30 October 2006, the UNGA First Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.54 Rev.1 on the establishment of an NWFZ in Central Asia. The resolution welcomes the establishment of the CANWFZ and recognizes it as an important step toward strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in the environmental rehabilitation of territories affected by radioactive contamination, and enhancing regional and international peace and security. It also urges that the establishment of the zone is an effective contribution to confirming international treaties and preventing nuclear weapons from spreading nuclear materials and technologies. The resolution notes the readiness of the Central Asian states

to continue consultations with NNWS on a number of provisions of the treaty. It does not, however, note the readiness of the P-3 to continue consultations, nor does it call on the NNWS to sign and ratify the protocol and provide negative security assurances. Due to the controversy surrounding the treaty, the draft resolution was adopted by a vote rather than consensus (128 in favor, 3 against, and 36 abstentions).

The Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in Tlatelolco, Mexico, took place April 26-28, 2006. At this general meeting, which is intended for all states of all nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Central Asian states were commended in their effort to agree upon and sign the treaty. Uzbekistan issued a statement discussing the significance of the agreement, emphasizing the fact that member state Kazakhstan once possessed the fourth-largest nuclear arsenal in the world.

Tashkent Meeting: On 7-9 February 2006, the group met in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, where they adopted the text of a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The treaty will be opened for signature in Kazakhstan. A signature date has not been finalized, but may take place as early as July. The depositary selected will be located in Kyrgyzstan. The countries will gather for their first official meeting in Tajikistan after the treaty opens for signature.

The final draft of the text is almost identical to the text agreed upon at the Samarkand Meeting, containing only a few minor changes. Included in the text is an additional clause to allow the transportation of low- to medium-level radioactive waste in accordance with IAEA guidelines. In addition, a clause allowing for the extension of the treaty to neighboring states was removed. There was no change to the text to answer the criticism that this NWFZ might conflict with treaties already enacted between the member states and other states.

The 2002 UN Resolution: On 25 October 2002, the 57th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted Resolution A/RES/57/69 by consensus welcoming the decision by all five Central Asian States to sign the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty as soon as possible. It also urges all five Central Asian States to continue negotiating with the non-nuclear-weapon states in the draft treaty and its protocol for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

THE CENTRAL ASIAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE (CANWFZ)

Opened for signature: 8 September 2006

Entered into force: The treaty has not yet entered into force. It will enter into force 30 days after the date of the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification.

Number of signatories: 5 (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)

Number of ratifications: 3 (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan)

Duration: Unlimited

Depositary: Kyrgyzstan

Organs: None

Background: The idea of a CANWFZ dates back to the 1992 initiative by Mongolia declaring itself a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ), in which Mongolia also called for a regional NWFZ. The first formal CANWFZ proposal was made by Uzbek President Islam Karimov at the 48th session of the UN General Assembly in 1993. Additional proposals by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan followed in 1994-1996 but none made any headway owing to a lack of regional consensus on the issue. However, the crucial step was taken on 27 February 1997, when the five presidents of the Central Asian states issued the Almaty Declaration endorsing the creation of a CANWFZ.

Experts from all five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) agreed on the text of a treaty establishing a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone (CANWFZ) at a meeting held in Samarkand in Uzbekistan from 25-27 September 2002. The agreement concluded five years of talks that began in 1997. On 8 February 2006, the five Central Asian states adopted a final draft of the treaty text at a meeting in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Basic Provisions: Under the treaty, Central Asian states undertake not to research, develop, manufacture, produce, acquire, possess, or have any control over any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, nor to seek or receive assistance in any of the above activities or exchange such systems. The export, storage, recycling, transportation, or other form of possession of such nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices on the territory of the member states is not allowed. Each party is obliged to abstain

from nuclear weapon tests or any other nuclear explosion and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its control. Member states undertake to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and bring into force a Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol within 18 months after the treaty's entry into force. Parties must also introduce export controls under which they will not provide source or any special fissionable material or related equipment to any non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) that has not concluded an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol. Further, the states undertake to maintain standards of physical protection of nuclear material, facilities, and equipment that are at least as effective as those outlined in the IAEA recommendations and guidelines and called for by the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). The treaty does not affect rights and obligations of the parties under other international treaties concluded prior to the entry into force of the CANWFZ. This clause has become a point of contention between the Central Asian states and some of the nuclear weapon states (NWS). The treaty may be amended by consensus.

Verification and Compliance: The terms of the Treaty itself address the nonproliferation regime as they oblige the Central Asian States to accept enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on their nuclear material, and require them to meet international standards securing nuclear facilities. The CANWFZ draft Treaty does not provide for the establishment of an organization commission to oversee implementation and compliance verification as do Bangkok, Pelindaba, and Tlatelolco Treaties which establish NWFZs or 'control systems' as in the case of the Bangkok, Rarotonga and Tlatelolco Treaties. It does, however, provide for annual consultative meetings to review compliance, but no direct linkage exists between this function and IAEA safeguards. The agreement between the Central Asian states is also the first of the NWFZ treaties to require a member to comply with the

4. Duration of Consultative Meetings

The duration of consultative meetings shall be normally no more than 3 days unless the Parties decide otherwise.

5. Composition of Delegations

5.1 An official delegation of the Party shall consist of the head of the delegation (or an authorized official) and his/her advisors.

5.2 The names of the members of the official delegation and the accompanying officials are communicated by the Parties to the Host Party through diplomatic channels, normally no later than 10 days before the start of the meeting.

5.3 The composition of official delegations sent to attend consultative meetings shall not exceed the "1-3" formula.

6. The Host Party's functions and responsibilities as Chair

6.1 The Host Party, through its representative, chairs annual and extraordinary consultative meetings.

6.2 The Host Party acts as Chair until the next annual meeting.

6.3 Throughout that period, the designated Depository of the Treaty is responsible for any communications related to the implementation of Article 10 of the Treaty.

7. Decision Making

7.1 Each Party shall have one vote.

7.2 Decisions of consultative meetings shall be taken by consensus.

7.3 Decisions adopted by the Parties are reflected in the outcome documents signed by the heads of official delegations or the Parties' or authorized officials. Documents adopted at consultative meetings constitute an integral part of the outcome documents.

7.4 The outcome documents are prepared in the Russian and, if needed, in the English languages

8. Observers

With the consent of the Parties to the Treaty, the five Nuclear-Weapon States, as recognized under the NPT, as well as representatives of relevant international organization may be invited to attend annual as well as extraordinary consultative meetings as observers.

9. Working languages

English and Russian will be the working languages of annual meetings or extraordinary meetings

10. Reporting

At the conclusion of the Consultative Meeting, the Host Country prepares a record in the Russian and, if needed, in the English languages. With the consent of all Parties to the Treaty, the record may be transmitted to all interested international organizations as well as to the observers attending the meeting

11. Cost Sharing

The cost of holding of annual or extraordinary meetings, except transportation and accommodation, shall be borne by the Host Country.