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"Qualcomm melakukan praktik predatory pricing dengan menjual 3 (tiga) jenis baseband chipset kepada Huawei dan ZTE yang merupakan 2 (dua) pelanggan penting dalam pasar baseband chipset UMTS dengan tujuan untuk mengeliminasi Icera yang merupakan pesaing utamanya. Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan tujuan untuk mengetahui ketepatan penerapan hukum persaingan usaha di Uni Eropa dalam memutus tindakan predatory pricing oleh Qualcomm dan penerapan hukum persaingan usaha di Indonesia jika kasus predatory pricing serupa dengan yang dilakukan oleh Qualcomm terjadi di Indonesia. Bentuk penelitian yang digunakan dalam melakukan penelitian karya tulis ini adalah Yuridis-Normatif dengan meninjau putusan European Commission Case AT.39711 dan peraturan perundang-undangan mengenai hukum persaingan usaha di Indonesia dan Uni Eropa. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa European Commission telah tepat dalam menggunakan hukum persaingan usaha di Uni Eropa untuk memutus kasus predatory pricing oleh Qualcomm yang terbukti melakukan praktik predatory pricing untuk 3 (tiga) jenis baseband chipset-nya pada periode Juli 2009-Juni 2011 dan jika kasus tersebut terjadi di Indonesia, maka termasuk ke dalam praktik predatory pricing serta terdapat perbedaan pengenaan denda antara hukum persaingan usaha di Indonesia dan Uni Eropa. Saran yang dapat diberikan adalah lebih diawasinya proses kegiatan usaha, ditaatinya prinsip persaingan usaha, serta Indonesia dapat memberikan opsi price-cost test lainnya agar dapat dicapai hasil yang lebih akurat dan diterapkannya denda dengan mempertimbangkan jumlah keuntungan pelaku usaha.

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Qualcomm practices predatory pricing by selling 3 (three) types of baseband chipset to Huawei and ZTE which are 2 (two) important customers in the UMTS baseband chipset market, with the aim of eliminating Icera, which is Qualcomm's main competitor. This study was conducted with the aim of knowing the exactness of the application of European Union's competition law in deciding predatory pricing practice by Qualcomm and the application of Indonesia competition law if predatory pricing cases similar to those carried out by Qualcomm occur in Indonesia. The form of research used in conducting this research paper is juridical-normative by reviewing the decision of European Commission Case AT.39711 and the regulation regarding Indonesia and European Union competition law. The results show that European Commission has been right in using the European Union competition law to decide on the predatory pricing case by Qualcomm which was proven to have practiced predatory pricing for the 3 (three) types of baseband chipset in the period of July 2009-June 2011 and if the case is occured in Indonesia, it is included in the practice of predatory pricing but only for one type baseband chipset in the period of July 2010-March 2011 and there is a difference in the imposition of fines between Indonesia and European Union competition law. Suggestions that can be given are more supervised of business processes, adherence to the competition principle, and Indonesia can provide other price-cost test options in order to achieve more accurate results and fines taking by considering the amount of profit earned by undertaking."

"The book reviews the EU treaties provisions governing relations between the EU and member state territories, such as the Netherlands Antilles, the UK Channel Islands and the French Overseas Departments. The book includes an overview of each of the relevant territories, including their present constitutional relations with their Member State and their legal relations with the EU. Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the over-arching Treaty provision for this relationship was Article 299 of the EC Treaty. Having traced the development of Article 299 from 1957 to the present Lisbon framework, the book identifies many inconsistencies and issues with this current framework and proposes a new model framework, one that is more concise and up-to-date and which is adaptable to possible future developments. "

"Hukum persaingan usaha adalah salah satu instrumen yang wajib ada di dunia global ini. Keberadaan hukum persaingan usaha mengharuskan adanya lembaga yang menjalankan fungsi penegakan hukum persaingan usaha tersebut. Kewenangan yang dimiliki oleh institusi penegak hukum persaingan usaha berdampak besar terhadap efektifitas penegakan hukum persaingan usaha. UU No. 5 Tahun 1999 mengamanatkan penegakan hukum persaingan usaha di Indonesia untuk dilaksanakan oleh Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha (KPPU). Amerika Serikat adalah Negara yang sudah sejak dulu menegakkan hukum persaingan usaha, Federal Trade Commission Act melahirkan Federal Trade Commission (FTC), yaitu institusi penegak hukum persaingan usaha di Amerika Serikat. Kewenangan yang dimiliki FTC sangat besar. Perbandingan kewenangan antara FTC dan KPPU akan melihat celah perbedaan antar kewenangan yang dimiliki masing-masing lembaga.

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Competition is a compulsory instrument of the global world. The existence of competition law requires an institution for the enforcement of the law. Authority of competition law enforcer has a big effect to the effectiveness of the enforcement of competition law. Law No. 5 Year 1999 mandated KPPU to enforce competition law in Indonesia. United States of America has been enforcing antitrust law from very long ago. Federal Trade Commission Act create a competition law enforcement agency named The Federal Trade Commission. Federal Trade Commission has a very broad scope of enforcement authority. By comparing KPPU's and FTC's law enforcement authority, the difference from each agency can be revealed. "

"Tulisan ini menganalisis bagaimana kewenenangan lembaga pengawas persaingan usaha di Uni Eropa meninjau dugaan penyalagunaan posisi dominan oleh pelaku usaha yang melaksanakan non reportable transactions berdasarkan hukum persaingan usaha di Uni Eropa dan perbandingannya dengan hukum persaingan usaha Indonesia. Tulisan ini disusun dengan menggunakan metode penulisan yuridis normatif. Transaksi merger antara badan usaha yang memenuhi threshold harus dinotifikasikan kepada lembaga pengawas persaingan usaha. Sementara itu, transaksi yang tidak memenuhi threshold (non-reportable transactions) bebas dari kewajiban notifikasi. Terdapat 2 (dua) jenis sistem notifikasi, yaitu ex-ante dimana notifikasi dilaksanakan sebelum transaksi berlaku efektif, dan ex-post dimana notifikasi dilaksanakan setelah transaksi berlaku efektif secara yuridis. Pada 2023, European Union Court of Justice (ECJ) mengeluarkan preliminary ruling dalam Putusan ECJ Case C-449/21. Pada putusan tersebut terdapat indikasi penyalahgunaan posisi dominan di pasar penyiaran televisi Prancis ketika suatu badan usaha bernama TDF melakukan non-reportable transaction berupa merger dengan kompetitornya yaitu Itas. Kompetitor TDF, yaitu Towercast, mengajukan gugatan menyatakan transaksi tersebut adalah penyalahgunaan posisi dominan dan seharusnya ditinjau kembali. Putusan ECJ menyatakan bahwa non-reportable transactions dapat ditinjau kembali oleh lembaga pengawas persaingan usaha secara ex-post. Putusan tersebut memberi kesadaran bahwa ada kekosongan hukum di hukum persaingan usaha mengenai potensi penyalahgunaan posisi dominan pada non-reportable transactions.

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This paper analyzes the authority of business competition authorities in the European Union (EU) reviews allegations of abuse of dominant position by business actors through non-reportable transactions and its comparison with competition law in Indonesia. This paper was written using the normative juridical method. Mergers that meet thresholds must be notified to the business competition authorities. Transactions that do not meet the thresholds and are thus free from notification obligations are referred to as non-reportable transactions. There are two types of notification systems, namely ex-ante, where notification is carried out prior to a transaction becoming legally effective, and ex-post where the notification is carried out after the transaction becomes effective. In 2023, the EU Court of Justice (ECJ) issued a preliminary ruling in the decision of ECJ Case C-449/21. A company named TDF conducted a non-reportable transaction as it merged with its competitor in the television broadcasting market, named Itas. Its other competitor, Towercast, reported the transaction as an abuse of dominant position and therefore must be re-assessed. The results of the preliminary ruling states that non-reportable transactions can be reviewed ex-post by business competition authorities. The ruling raises awareness that an abuse of a dominant position can potentially be conducted through non-reportable transactions."