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"Penelitian ini mengangkat topik tentang independensi jurnalis dan konstruksi jurnalisme profesional dalam konteks pers industrial di Indonesia pasca-Orde Baru. Keterkaitan antara ketiganya dibingkai melalui fenomena politisasi media pada momen Pemilu 2014 melalui studi kasus Media Indonesia dan Koran Sindo. Penelitian ini difokuskan pada independensi jurnalis sebagai fokus analisis. Berdasarkan temuan penelitian, konstruksi pers industrial membatasi independensi jurnalis. Keterbatasan ini didasari oleh posisi jurnalis sebagai kelas pekerja yang berkonsekuensi pada posisi tawar yang lemah dan dorongan pragmatisme jurnalis. Posisi kelas tersebut terbentuk dengan dilatari oleh adanya perubahan konstruksi jurnalisme di dalam konstruksi pers industrial. Pada akhirnya, independensi jurnalis dibatasi dengan sendirinya oleh konstruksi jurnalisme profesional.

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This study discussed about journalist independence and journalism professional within industrial press context in post-Orde Baru Indonesia. These three points are framed within the phenomenon of politicized of the media in Indonesia national election 2014 with case study of Media Indonesia and Koran Sindo. Specifically, this study focused on the independence of journalist within the framework of analysis. Based on research findings, it can be explained that within the press industry, the journalist independence are limited, if not possible. This limitations are based on journalist?s positions as working class which have consequences to their weak bargaining positions and structured a pragmatism tendency. The class position are formed by the changing of journalism construction within the industrial press? logic. In the end, journalist?s independence are restricted by itself by the journalism professional construction."

"Keberadaan penyelenggara Pemilu yang baik sangat penting untuk memastikan penyelenggaraan Pemilu berjalan sesuai dengan amanat Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. Menurut Undang-Undang Nomor 15 Tahun 2011 tentang Penyelenggara Pemilu, penyelenggara Pemilu adalah Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) dan Badan Pengawas Pemilu (Bawaslu). Dalam menjalankan tugasnya, KPU dan Bawaslu harus independen, netral, dan taat kepada undang-undang dan Kode Etik Penyelenggara Pemilu. Sesuai Undang-Undang Nomor 15 Tahun 2011, Dewan Kehormatan Penyelenggara Pemilu (DKPP) diberikan amanat untuk menjaga independensi KPU dan Bawaslu dan memastikan penegakan etika oleh keduanya. Skripsi ini membahas sejauh mana peran dan wewenang DKPP dalam penegakan etika oleh penyelenggara Pemilu di Indonesia, mulai dari menerima laporan hingga menindaklanjuti pelanggaran kode etik yang dilakukan oleh pimpinan maupun anggota KPU dan Bawaslu, serta petugas penyelenggara Pemilu, baik yang tetap maupun yang tidak tetap.

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The presence of a good election management body is critical to ensure election implementation is in accordance with mandate of the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia. According to Law Number 15 of 2011 governing Election Management Body, election management body consists of General Election Commission (KPU) and Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu). In carrying out their duties, both KPU and Bawaslu must be independent, neutral, and complying with laws and Code of Ethics of Election Management Body. According to Law Number 15 of 2011, the Honorary Council of Election Management Body (DKPP) is given a mandate to keep KPU and Bawaslu's independence and to ensure ethics enforcement done by these bodies. This essay discusses the scope of DKPP's roles and authority in ethics enforcement by Election Management Body in Indonesia, starting from receiving a report to taking action against ethics code violations done by heads or members of KPU and Bawaslu, and officers of Election Management Body, either permanent or temporary officers."

"Perusahaan dengan struktur kepemilikan terkonsentrasi umumnya ditemukan di Asia Tenggara. Di Indonesia, kendali terbesar perusahaan berasal dari keluarga. Kepemilikan terkonsentrasi dapat menyebabkan masalah keagenan antara pemegang saham pengendali dan pemegang saham non-pengendali di mana, pemegang saham pengendali bersama-sama dengan manajemen, dapat membuat keputusan yang membawa keuntungan pribadi dengan mengorbankan pemegang saham non-pengendali misalnya dengan berinvestasi pada proyek-proyek dengan risiko tinggi atau dikenal sebagai overinvestment. Penelitian ini menjelaskan pengaruh kehadiran direksi dan komisaris independen pada hubungan antara kepemilikan keluarga dan investasi berlebihan. Menggunakan perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia dari 2011 hingga 2017 sebagai sampel penelitian, kehadiran direktur independen berhubungan negatif dengan overinvestment. Dari hasil regresi, hanya direksi independen yang ditemukan memiliki efek moderasi dalam melemahkan hubungan positif antara kepemilikan keluarga dan overinvestment. Efek ini terlihat lebih jelas jika kepemilikan keluarga di perusahaan rendah. Hal ini disebabkan apabila kepemilikan keluarga di perusahaan rendah, proses pemilihan dewan direksi dapat lebih objektif sehingga kemungkinan sejumlah direktur independen duduk di dewan direksi jauh lebih besar. Dengan demikian efek moderasi oleh direksi independen akan lebih besar di perusahaan dengan kepemilikan keluarga yang lebih rendah.

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Firms with concentrated ownership structures are commonly found in Southeast Asia. In Indonesia, the biggest control of the firm comes from the family. Concentrated ownership can lead to agency problem between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders where, controlling shareholders together with management, can make decisions which bring personal benefit at the expense of non-controlling shareholders for example by investing on projects with negative NPV or known as overinvestment. This study explains the effect of the presence of directors and independent commissioners on relationship between family ownership and overinvestment. Using firms listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2017 as research samples, the presence of independent director is negatively related to overinvestment. From the regression results, only independent directors were found to have a moderating effect in weakening the positive relationship between family ownership and overinvestment. This effect is seen more clearly if family ownership in the company is low. This is because if family ownership in the company is low the process of selecting a board of directors can be more objective so that the possibility of a number of independent directors sitting on the board of directors is much greater. Thus the effect of moderation by independent directors will be greater in companies with lower family ownership."

"ABSTRAK

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk melihat pengaruh struktur kepemilikan perusahaan dan independensi Dewan Komisaris terhadap tingkat pengungkapan tanggung jawab sosial. Teori-teori utama yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah teori tata kelola perusahaan (Corporate Governance), teori kepemilikan (Ownership Theory), dan teori pemangku kepentingan (Stakeholder Theory). Sampel yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah delapan belas (18) perusahaan yang bergerak di sektor pertambangan dan terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) selama rentang waktu 2010 hingga 2012. Hasil uji statistik menggunakan metode Pooled Least Square menunjukkan bahwa struktur kepemilikan memberikan pengaruh yang berbeda-beda terhadap tingkat pengungkapan tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan.

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ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to observe the effect of corporate ownership structure and board independence on the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure. The main theories used in this study are corporate governance theory, ownership theory, and stakeholder theory. Samples taken for this study are eighteen mining companies which are listed on Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) period 2010 to 2012. The result of statistic test using Pooled Least Square shows us that ownership structure affect the level of CSR disclosure in a different way.

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"[Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui hubungan antara financial distress, independensi dewan komisaris, dan agresivitas pajak. Penelitian ini menggunakan 93 perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar pada Bursa Efek Indonesia pada periode 2010 ? 2013 sebagai sampel sehingga terdapat 372 observasi. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa financial distress dan independensi dewan komisaris tidak terbukti berpengaruh signifikan terhadap agresivitas pajak. Penelitian ini juga membuktikan bahwa financial distress tidak memiliki efek moderasi dalam pengaruh independensi dewan komisaris terhadap agresivitas pajak.;This research aims to examine the correlation between financial distress, independence of board of commissioners, and tax aggressiveness. This research is using 93 manufacture firms which are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2010 - 2013 as sample, thus resuting 372 observations in total. This research shows that financial distress and independence of board of comissioners have no significant correlation with tax aggressiveness. This research also proves that financial distress has no moderating effect on the effect of independence of board of commissioners on tax aggressiveness.;This research aims to examine the correlation between financial distress, independence of board of commissioners, and tax aggressiveness. This research is using 93 manufacture firms which are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2010 - 2013 as sample, thus resuting 372 observations in total. This research shows that financial distress and independence of board of comissioners have no significant correlation with tax aggressiveness. This research also proves that financial distress has no moderating effect on the effect of independence of board of commissioners on tax aggressiveness., This research aims to examine the correlation between financial distress, independence of board of commissioners, and tax aggressiveness. This research is using 93 manufacture firms which are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2010 - 2013 as sample, thus resuting 372 observations in total. This research shows that financial distress and independence of board of comissioners have no significant correlation with tax aggressiveness. This research also proves that financial distress has no moderating effect on the effect of independence of board of commissioners on tax aggressiveness.]"

"ABSTRAKPenelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh kepemilikan institusional,independensi dewan komisaris, dan keberadaan komite pemantau manajemenrisiko terhadap tingkat risiko dan kinerja perusahaan di masa depan. Sampel yangdigunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahaan non-keuangan yang terdaftar diBursa Efek Indonesia periode 2011-2015 berdasarkan metode purposivesampling. Penelitian ini tidak menemukan adanya pengaruh dari kepemilikaninstitusional terhadap risiko dan kinerja perusahaan di Indonesia. Namun,penelitian ini menemukan adanya pengaruh positif dari independensi dewankomisaris terhadap risiko dan kinerja perusahaan. Penelitian ini juga berhasilmembuktikan adanya pengaruh negatif terhadap risiko dan pengaruh positifterhadap kinerja perusahaan atas keberadaan komite pemantau manajemen risiko.

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ABSTRACTThe purpose of this study is to examine the effect of institutional ownership,independence of board commissioner, and risk management committee on riskand future performance of Indonesia?s company. The sample used in this studyare non-financial companies which are listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange from2011 to 2015. The result of this study shows that institutional ownership has nosignificant relationship with firm?s risk and future performance. On other hand,this study shows that independence of board commissioner has positiverelationship with firm?s risk and future performance. This study also prove thatrisk management committee has negative relationship with firm?s risk andpositive relationship with firm?s future performance."