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Abstrak :
Despite its shortcomings, many industrial economists believe that coxentration index is a powerful tool to use in order to analyze the level of competition within a market. This is due to the fact that concentration index influences greatly market performance. Nonetheless, there are two opposing views on how does concentration index actually influences the market (Donsimoni, 1984). On one hand, the relationship between competition and market performance, and perfect competition with market performance on the other hand, have been discussed since the 18th century, however, a common ground between those two opposing theories have relatively been left untouched by analysis (Bothwell, 1984). Even so, in the last three decades, many researches have been done based on those two opposing theories. Through the use of panel regression in this research, the degree of collusion in the Indonesian manufacturing industry can be found. Although the degree of collusion is small, nevertheless, there exists a positive relationship between the degree of collusion and the level of concentration. This proves that the first theory, Market Power Theory, applies in this case. By knowing that this is the theory which applies in the manufacturing industry in Indonesia, the policy implemented must be adjusted accordingly. Policy implemented by the government for the manufacturing industry should take into account the possibility that collusion exists within certain industries which contain a small amount oflarge firms that control the majority ofthe market share.

Abstrak :
Akta yang dibuat oleh PPAT kerap kali menyebabkan terjadinya suatu sengketa atau konflik dalam pertanahan, sehingga tidak sedikit PPAT yang terjerat perkara di Pengadilan yang salah satunya adalah karena pembuatan akta yang tidak sesuai dengan prosedur. Pokok permasalahan yang akan dibahas dalam penelitian ini ialah bagaimana bentuk pelanggaran berat pembuatan akta jual beli oleh PPAT dalam kasus di Putusan Pengadilan No. 1146 K / PDT / 2020 serta bagaimana pertanggungjawaban PPAT atas pelanggaran berat yang telah dilakukan tersebut. Adapun penelitian ini menggunakan metode yuridis normatif dan bentuk penelitiannya adalah Eksplanatoris. Hasil dari penelitian ini menyimpulkan pelanggaran berat yang dilakukan ialah pembantuan dalam permufakatan jahat yang mengakibatkan sengketa pertanahan dan membuatkan akta yang telah terbukti PPAT mengetahui para pihak yang berwenang melakukan perbuatan hukum atau kuasanya tidak hadir dihadap nya sehingga melanggar ketentuan 10 Ayat 3 Huruf a Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 24 Tahun 2016. Akta Jual Beli yang dinyatakan batal demi hukum menjadikan peristiwa hukum akibat lahirnya akta jual beli tersebut dianggap tidak pernah ada turut menjadi tidak sah dan tidak mempunyai kekuatan hukum mengikat antara para pihak. Maka berdasarkan ketentuan pasal 62 PP No. 24 Tahun 1997 jo. pasal 55 Peraturan KaBPN No. 1 Tahun 2006, PPAT VNR dapat dikenakan penjatuhan sanksi administratif berupa pemberhentian dengan tidak hormat dan ganti rugi. Hasil tesis ini juga menyarankan bahwa sebaiknya PPAT selaku pejabat yang memberikan pelayanan harus memeriksa kewenangan penghadap sehingga dapat menghasilkan akta berkekuatan pembuktian sempurna. ......Deed that had been made by land deed officical often cause conflict or dispute over land, hence there are many land deed official that trap in court because of it which sometimes happens because not following the procedure when making deeds. The subject matter that will be discussed are how the deed against the law by land deed official in the case of the court verdict No. 1146 K / PDT / 2020 in the framework of the creation of the buy and sell deed and how the legal consequences of cancellation of the buy and sell deed are acts against the law by land deed official. As for this research using normative juridical methods and its research form is an explanatory. The form of serious conducted by VNR is aiding as a malicious agreement that resulted in a land dispute and create a deed where he knows the authorities whom doing legal acts or their proxies are not present before him which is violate the provisions of verse 10 section a PP 24year 2016 The sale and purchase deed, which is null and void, makes the legal event due to the birth of the deed is deemed to have never. According to chapter 62 PP No. 24 year 1997 jo. Chapter 55 Peraturan KaBPN No. 1 year 2006, PPAT VNR can be punished by dismissal with disrespect and compensation. This thesis also advice that as PPAT who give public service must research about the authority of the party that make the deed, so the deed can have the perfect evidentiary

Abstrak :
Studi ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui apakah terdapat indikasi awal terhadap potensi terjadinya kolusi dalam penentuan Jakarta Interbank Offered Rate (JIBOR). Selain itu, studi ini juga bertujuan untuk mengidentifikasi faktor-faktor yang mendukung munculnya sebuah kolusi dalam penentuan JIBOR. Dengan menggunakan metode analisis Benford’s Law terhadap distribusi digit kedua, ditemukan bahwa distribusi digit kedua dalam data JIBOR dengan tenor overnight memiliki perbedaan yang signfikan dengan distribusi milik Benford sepanjang tahun 2009 hingga 2018 dan deviasi yang tertinggi terjadi pada periode Desember 2012 – Mei 2013. Pada periode yang sama terjadi perubahan pola pergerakan serta peningkatan marjin antara rata-rata JIBOR dengan tenor yang pendek dengan tenor yang panjang. Motif terjadinya kolusi dalam penentuan JIBOR diduga untuk menegaskan perbedaan antara JIBOR jangka pendek dan jangka panjang, serta mengurangi biaya pinjaman antarbank akibat rendahnya JIBOR overnight dalam rangka peningkatan keuntungan dalam pemberian kredit. Sementara untuk faktor pendukung kolusi, berdasarkan hasil regresi ditemukan bahwa tingkat konsentrasi, kondisi profitabilitas, rasio likuidasi, dan volume transaksi dari Fasilitas Simpanan Bank Indonesia (FASBI) signifikan berpengaruh terhadap penentuan JIBOR, khususnya tenor overnight. Faktor lain seperti regulasi yang menjadi batasan masuk dan kemudahan dalam memperoleh data kuotasi individual JIBOR turut mendukung jalannya kolusi dalam penentuan JIBOR.

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This study aims to find preliminary indications of collusion allegation in Jakarta Interbank Offered Rate (JIBOR) fixing. Also, this study aims to identify the factors that facilitate collusion in JIBOR fixing. Using an analysis based on Benford’s Law for Second Digit distribution, this study found that the second digit distribution of JIBOR with overnight maturity from 2009 to 2018, differ from Benford’s and the highest deviation occurred in December 2012 – May 2013. Moreover, a shift in pattern and an increase of margins between averaged JIBOR with short-term maturity and long-term maturity occurred in the same period.  The assumed motives for collusion in JIBOR fixing are to differentiate JIBOR with short-term maturity and long-term maturity, also to reduce the cost of interbank borrowing, to increase the profit from consumer credit lending. As for the factors that facilitate collusion: concentration ratio, profitability, liquidity ratio, and reserves facilitation from Bank Indonesia (FASBI) significantly affect the JIBOR fixing, especially the overnight maturity. Other factors such as regulation as a barrier to entry and easy access of JIBOR daily individual quotations help ease the collusion in JIBOR fixing.

Abstrak :
The regulatory authority of the telecomunications sector in Korea has typically employed explicit or implicit administrative guidance as a means of effective competition....

Abstrak :
ABSTRAK
Dalam mewujudkan persaingan usaha yang sehat Undang-Undang Nomor 5 Tahun 1999 melarang beberapa kegiatan anti persiangan yang salah satunya adalah persekongkolan tender. Para pelaku usaha yang terbukti bersekongkol akan diberikan hukuman sesuai dengan ketentuan Pasal 47 UU No. 5 Tahun 1999 dimana salah satu sanksinya adalah denda minimum Rp.1.000.000.000,- dan maksimum Rp.25.000.000.000,-. Penelitian ini melakukan studi kasus terhadap dua putusan yaitu Putusan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 118K/PDT.SUS-KPPU/2013 Dan Putusan KPPU Perkara Nomor 03/KPPU-L/2013. Dalam dua putusan tersebut masing-masing pelaku usaha yang telah terbukti bersekongkol diberikan sanksi untuk membayar denda yang jumlahnya kurang dari Rp.1.000.000.000,-. Dengan melakukan studi kasus terhadap dua putusan tersebut, kenyataannya sanksi administratif dalam bentuk denda dengan nominal tersebut sudah tidak relevan dengan keadaan persaingan usaha pada saat ini dengan mempertimbangkan beberapa faktor. Diusulkan dalam penelitian ini, untuk mengubah metode pemberian denda kedalam sebuah bentuk nilai persentase minimum sampai maksimum.

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ABSTRACT
In realizing fair trade competition UU No. 5 Tahun 1999 prohibits some anti-merchant activities which one of them is tender collusion. Business actors proven collusion will be punished in accordance with the provisions of Article 47 of UU No. 5 Tahun 1999 in which one of the sanctions is a minimum fine of Rp.1.000.000.000, - and a maximum of Rp.25.000.000.000, -. This study conducted a case study of two verdicts: Supreme Court verdict Number 118K / PDT.SUS-KPPU / 2013 And KPPU verdict Case Number 03 / KPPU-L / 2013. In the two verdicts each merchant who has been proven conspired to be given a sanction to pay a fine of less than Rp.1.000.000.000, -. By conducting a case study of these two verdict, the fact that administrative sanctions in the form of fines with the nominal value is not relevant to the current state of business competition by considering several factors. It is proposed in this study, to change the method of fine filling into a form of minimum to maximum percentage value

Abstrak :
This article explains the main competition rules in European Community in general. The basic norm of competition rule in European Community (EC) is determined in article 3 (g) EC Treaty. Article 3 (g) provide that "the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted". To ensure workable competition in EC were set out in article 81 and 82 EC Treaty the Competition rule. Article 81 (1) prohibits as incompatible with common market, collusion between undertakings that may affect trade member states and has the object or effect of restricting competition within the common market. But not all agreements that perceptibly restrict competition and may effect inter-state trade are prohibited. Some forms of collaboration restrictive of competition may have beneficial effects and are capable exemption by the Commission. By virtue of article 81 (3) the prohibition in article 81 (1) may be declared inapplicable to any agreements or category of agreements provided that they have certain characteristics. This article will elaborate the prohibition of article 81 (1) and the exemption of article 81 (3) and as well the abuse of dominant position of article 82 EC Treaty.