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"Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable - and illegal - to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation."

"ABSTRACTThis article discusses clientelism practice as a political machine to mobilise supports for the candidates of district head who were trapped in a corruption case. This research especially intended to answer the question why the incumbent candidate of district head who had become the suspect of cases of corruption, still got relatively significant votes. Although the incumbent failed to win in the pilkada (the election of the district head), the votes that they got became the reason to uncover the redistribution and infrastructure strategy that was used to muffle the image of the incumbent as a corrupt politician. The findings of this research indicated that supporting political parties used the corruption case as a momentum to change the pattern of clientelism, by transforming the personal loyalty to the party loyalty. The political party institutionally took a role as a patron, so that the personal dependency to the elites decreased, but also was directed to a wider variation of the use of public resources for the sake of mobilising support. By using this strategy the coalition of political party in tim sukses maintained their solidarity as well as redeveloped the patron structure that was weakened by corruption cases. The strategy change used by tim sukses in framing the corruption issues indicated the work of clientelism networking tojustgy the new construction about corruption cases done by the incumbents, so that the incumbents remained able to get votes although they had been considered as the suspects in those cases."

"Written on the basis of extensive fieldwork and survey research, Democracy for Sale shows how Indonesian politics is built around the exchange of cash, goods and favors, and organized through informal relationships and networks rather than parties and formal institutions"

"ABSTRAKPenelitian ini menjelaskan pengaruh klientelisme terhadap kebijakan publik. Suatu kebijakantidak dapat dipisahkan dari proses strategi politik masa kampanye pemilu, hal tersebutmenjadi konsekuensi atas transaksi yang dilakukan antara kandidat dan voters. Dalam risetini menjelaskan hubungan klientelisme Anies Baswedan dan PKL Jatibaru Raya yangdihubungkan Haji Lulung serta pengaruhnya terhadap kebijakan penataan kawasan TanahAbang. Keluarnya Instruksi Gubernur Nomor 17 Tahun 2018 tentang kebijakan penataankawasan Tanah Abang merupakan manifestasi atas transaksi politik saat pilkada, kebijakantersebut berupa menata PKL dengan menutup dan memfasilitasi pedagang kaki lima (PKL)berjualan di badan Jalan Jatibaru Raya. Konsep demikian merupakan usul dari Haji Lulungsebagai tokoh masyarakat Tanah Abang pada saat Anies Baswedan baru saja duduk di kursijabatan gubernur pada Oktober 2017. Kebijakan ini terdapat beberapa mal administrasi danberjalan parsial, serta identik dengan bias partisan. Dalam pemenangan pilkada Haji Lulungmemiliki peran menggerakkan jaringan organisasi PPM sebagai mesin politik pemenanganAnies Baswedan di kawasan Jatibaru Tanah Abang. Organisasi PPM ini melakukansosialisasi dari PKL Jatibaru dan warga ke warga untuk memenangkan Anies. Penelitian inimengungkapkan bahwa klientelisme dapat bersifat abu-abu karena transaksi yang dilakukantermanifestasi dalam program dan tidak selalu ditunaikan dalam masa kampanye, dalamkebijakan ini pula sumber daya yang di diberikan adalah kesempatan berdagang yaitu denganmemfasilitasi pedagang kaki lima (PKL) berjualan di badan jalan. Penelitian inimenggunakan metode kualitatif dengan teknik wawancara mendalam.

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ABSTRACTThis research explains about the influence of clientelism on public policy. A public policycannot be separated from political strategy during the election campaign, it becomes aconsequence of transaction during election between candidate and voters. This researchexplains about clientelism relationship between Anies Baswedan and PKL Jatibaru, also HajiLulung as a broker also its implication on the arrangement of Jatibaru Tanah Abang. InstruksiGubernur Nomor 17 Tahun 2018 is manifestation of political transactions during theelections, the policy is about arranged street vendors (PKL) on the Jatibaru Raya street byclosed it from vehicles. This concept of public policy proposed by Haji Lulung as a TanahAbangs public figure community leader when Anies Baswedan in office October 2017. Thispolicy has some maladministration, partial and partisan bias. At campaign phase, Haji lulunghas mobilize his network, such as PPM Organization as the political machine to winningAnies Baswedan in the Jatibaru area of Tanah Abang. this research reveals that clientelismcan be on the grey spectrum because transaction carried out is manifested in the program andnot always executed during the campaign period, in this policy, also the resource for thevoters by providing street vendors (PKL) opportunities for trade in Jatibaru Raya street. Thisstudy uses qualitative methods with in-depth interview techniques"

"ABSTRAKPenelitian ini membahas perkembangan fenomena politik keluarga di Lamongan melalui pemilihan kepala daerah secara langsung (Pilkada) dan sistem pemilu proporsional dengan suara terbanyak yang telah memberikan kesempatan lebih besar kepada keluarga politik untuk memperoleh dan memperbesar kekuasaannya. Fokus penelitian ini adalah melihat kemunculan keluarga Fadeli yang berkontestasi politik di Lamongan dengan temuan penelitian yang menunjukan bahwa keluarga dapat memanfaatkan kekuatan politik formal maupun informal melalui cara strategi klientelisme, sehingga dapat memperluas dan semakin menguatkan politik keluarga Fadeli di Lamongan. Sumber daya yang dimiliki keluarga politik tersebut merupakan unsur penting dalam memaknai politik keluarga dari Garzon dan Park dan strategi klientelisme dari Aspinall dan Berenschot. Strategi klientelisme tersebut dipergunakan setelah Fadeli menjabat sebagai Bupati Kabupaten Lamongan selama 2 periode sejak tahun 2010 dan menjadikan kekuasaan tersebut untuk menggerakan strategi seperti politisasi birokrasi, program kesejahteraan, barang bersama dan dana pembangunan.

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ABSTRACTThis study discusses the development of family political phenomena in Lamongan through direct elections of regional chiefs (Pilkada) and a proportional electoral system with the most votes have provided grater opportunities for political families to obtain and increase is increasing. The focus of this research is to look at the emergence of Fadeli family who has political contestation in Lamongan with research findings that show that families can utilize formal and informal political forces through clientelism strategies, so as to expand and further strengthen Fadeli's family politics in Lamongan. The resources of the political family are an important element in interpreting the family politics of Garzon and Park and the clientelism strategy of Aspinall and Berenschot. The clientelism strategy was used after Fadeli served as Regent of Lamongan Regency for 2 periods since 2010 and made the power to move strategies such as politicization of the bureaucracy, welfare programs, club goods, and development funds."

"ABSTRACTClientelism or clientelist practices is still a part of Indonesia's democracy, especially regarding electoral and local practices. Seeing clientelism as a corruptive behavior goes deep into its meaning, which is a two-way transaction, therefore in need of two-sided elucidation: supply and demand part. In this context, the demand that is continuously found in democratic practices is a logical consequence of the capacity lack of voters or citizen to control their representative and political figures. Especially to ensure that their welfare is a part of the political agenda. Specifically, there are two factors identified that make clientelism a logical consequence, which is unfulfilled rights as a citizen and the malfunctioning of political representation. Therefore, to respond to these corruptive and distortive phenomena, there are at least four strategies to implement. First, tighten and have more rigorous post-election programs implementation. Second, provide a local and socially-rooted mechanism and platform to control political figures. Third, reforming regulations on the patron-client relationship, especially in political/electoral momentum. Lastly, tighten the supervision of recess activities. "

"Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan praktik politik transaksional pada pemilihan kepala desa Patengteng Kabupaten Bangkalan Madura tahun 2021. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian kualitatif dengan memadukan data primer dan data sekunder diperoleh melalui literatur, pemberitaan, dan dokumentasi yang menunjang penelitian ini. Pandangan Susan C. Stokes mengenai politik transaksional dipilih sebagai upaya penulis untuk melihat lebih lanjut bentuk dan operasi politik transaksional. Didukung oleh pandangan Frederick Charles Schaffer mengenai politik transaksional untuk melihat perspektif transaksi politik dari sudut pandang kandidat dan pemilih. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa pemilihan kepala desa Patengteng Kabupaten Bangkalan Madura Tahun 2021 marak terjadi politik transaksional. Baik yang dilakukan oleh kandidat petahana maupun yang dilakukan oleh kandidat non Petahana. Baik yang bentuknya adalah bantuan maupun yang bentuknya jual beli suara. Politik yang dilakukan oleh petahana merupakan bentuk politik transaksional bias partisan. Artinya kandidat akan melakukan program pembangunan hanya pada daerah konstituennya dengan memanfaatkan anggaran yang ada. Sedangkan bentuk politik transaksional yang dilakukan oleh kandidat non petahana adalah klientelism. Artinya kandidat akan memberikan materi sesuai kebutuhan pemilih yang ditukarkan dengan suara. Hal ini dibuktikan dengan cara MH. Rohim melakukan transaksi politiknya di pos-pos penting di desa Patengteng seperi masjid, madrasah, makam ulama. Sang kandidat dapat mengambil hati para pemilih dengan memberi bantuan pada rumah ibadah, pendidikan dan ulama. Selain itu dalam melakukan transaksi politiknya MH. Rohim berperan sebagai problem solver atas persoalan yang ada di masyarakat Patengteng. Masyarakat melihat distribusi bantuan tersebut sebagai penghormatan dan hadiah.

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This study aims to explain the practice of transactional politics in the 2021 election for the village head of Patengteng, Bangkalan Madura Regency. This research is qualitative research by combining primary data and secondary data obtained through literature, news, and documentation that support this research. Susan C. Stokes' view of transactional politics was chosen as the author's attempt to look further at the forms and operations of transactional politics. Supported by Frederick Charles Schaffer's views on transactional politics to see the perspective of political transactions from the perspective of candidates and voters. The results of this study indicate that the election for the head of Patengteng Village, Bangkalan Madura Regency, in 2021 is rife with transactional politics. Both those carried out by incumbent candidates and those carried out by non-incumbent candidates. Both in the form of aid and in the form of buying and selling votes. Politics carried out by incumbents is a form of partisan bias transactional politics. This means that candidates will carry out development programs only in their constituent areas by utilizing the existing budget. Meanwhile, the form of transactional politics carried out by non-incumbent candidates is clientelism. This means that the candidate will provide material according to the needs of voters in exchange for votes. This is evidenced by the way MH. Rohim carried out his political transactions at important posts in Patengteng village such as mosques, madrasas, and the graves of scholars. The candidate can win the hearts of voters by assisting houses of worship, education, and clergy. Apart from that, in carrying out his political transactions, MH. Rohim acts as a problem solver for problems in the Patengteng community. The community saw the distribution of the aid as an honor and a gift."

"ABSTRACTThis paper examines the patterns of campaign funding in the Indonesian 2019 Concurrent Election by focusing on the dimensions of revenue and expenditure both in the presidential and legislative elections. This article also discusses the nature of the political regime as a consequence of the patterns. In doing so, the analysis is based on campaign finance theory supported by the concept of clientelism and programmatic politics. By relying on secondary data, this paper argues that the way the candidates manage their campaign funding shows the strengthening of political clientelism on one side and the waning of programmatic politics on the others side. Consequently, patronage democracy will also strengthen in Indonesia after the 2019 Election."

"ABSTRACTIn recent years, Western scholars who study the experience of the transition of young democratic countries have found that the traditional clientelism has not disappeared during the process of democratization, but rather it has changed form or even consolidated in some young democratic countries. The independence of the bureaucracies, the way political parties and the state system integrating special interests, and the party election strategy or competition among parties all may affect the articulation of the special interest within clientelism. This article examines the incumbent experience of several heads of the DPP in more than 20-year reign of the Tainan city (county) through the public resources to draw on supporters and attract voters, and then to infer the development patterns and potential problems of Taiwan's grassroots democratic transition. Roughly speaking, Tainan city (county) has different DPP heads in reign for more than 20 years, and they had gradually developed more delicate clientelistic linkages with supporters and grassroots voters, from Tainan County magistrate Chen Tangshan starting to coopt Kuomintang traditional factions through the ruling resources and then building clientelist relationship, later on different heads of counties and cities absorbing political support through the ruling resources, but also through a number of clientelist policies to stabilize the linkage with the voters, so that the DPP electorate in Tainan city (county) is becoming more and more stable. This paper examines the experiences of Taiwan's local clientelist transformation through a case study, and makes some generalizations about the possible problems occurred within the process."