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Abstrak :
ABSTRAK
Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis tingkat masalah keagenan, melalui besarnya peran surplus arus kas bebasterhadap praktik maajemen laba income increasing di Indonesia, khususnya pada perusahaan nonkeuanganyang terdaftar di IDX tahun 2013-2015. Penelitian ini juga menganalisis peran efektivitas tata kelola; melalui dewan komisaris dan komite audit, dalam mereduksi masalah keagenan. Menggunakan metode regresi berganda univariat, penelitian ini tidak menemukan adanya pengaruh dari surplus arus kas bebas terhadap manajemen laba income increasing.Hal ini mengindikasikan tingkat masalah keagenan yang mulai tereduksi. Namun, penelitian ini menemukan adanya peran subsitutif dari organ tata kelola dalam mereduksi manajemen laba income increasing.

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ABSTRACT
This research analyzes level of agency problem in Indonesia through impact of surplus free cash flow on income increasing earnings management practices in Indonesia, spesifically on non financial companies listed in IDX from 2013 to 2015. Also analyzed is the role of corporate governance effectiveness in reducing agency problems. Using univariate multiple regression, Findings did not see any impact surplus free cash flow to the practice of income increasing earnings management. This indicates an already low degree of agency problem in Indonesia. It is also found that corporate governance institutions had substitutive role in reducing of income increasing earnings management.

Abstrak :
This study examines whether low growth companies with free cash flow (HFLG) will use income increasing discretionary accruals to offset the low or negative earnings that inevitably accompany investment with negative net presents values (NPVs). Using 413 manufacturing company yearobservations over the period 2001-2005, the results show that there is a significantly association between HFLG and increasing discretionary accruals. This study also examines the role of monitoring by auditors, creditors, and independent commissioners in mitigating the relation of HFLG and income-increasing discretionary accruals. The results show that (1) monitoring by high-quality auditors and high-proportion of independent commisioner are effective in mitigating the association of HFLG and income-increasing discretionary accruals, which suggest that both their monitoring are more pronounced for HFLG firms and (2) monitoring by high-debt creditors are effective in reducing income-increasing discretionary accruals, but their monitoring are not found to be more pronounced in HFLG firm. This result suggests that the vigilance of creditors are more likely to increase when debt increase.