Employment regulation, game theory and weak employee voice in liberal economies / Tony Dobbins, Niall Cullinane, Eugene Hickland, Jimmy Donaghey
Tony Dobbins;
Niall Cullinane; Eugene Hickland; Jimmy Donaghey
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2017)
|
ABSTRACT This article analyses the impact of information and consultation regulations specifically the European Information and Consultation Directive on worker participation or employee voice in liberal market economies (LMEs), providing both empirical and theoretical insights to complement existing research on the Directive. Using game theory and the prisoners dilemma framework, and empirical data from 16 case studies, the authors explain why national legislation implementing the Directive is largely ineffective in diffusing mutual gains cooperation in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Three theoretical explanatory propositions advance understanding of the policy impact of information and consultation regulations in LMEs. |
No. Panggil : | 331 ILR 156:3-4 (2017) |
Entri utama-Nama orang : | |
Entri tambahan-Nama orang : | |
Subjek : | |
Penerbitan : | Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017 |
Sumber Pengatalogan : | LibUI eng rda |
ISSN : | 00207780 |
Majalah/Jurnal : | International Labour Review |
Volume : | Vol. 156, No. 3-4, December 2017: Hal. 395-422 |
Tipe Konten : | text |
Tipe Media : | unmediated |
Tipe Carrier : | volume |
Akses Elektronik : | |
Institusi Pemilik : | Universitas Indonesia |
Lokasi : | Perpustakaan UI, Lantai 4, R. Koleksi Jurnal |
No. Panggil | No. Barkod | Ketersediaan |
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331 ILR 156:3-4 (2017) | 03-18-955012773 | TERSEDIA |
Ulasan: |
Tidak ada ulasan pada koleksi ini: 20479533 |