Errors in public management and congressional oversight
Jongkon Lee;
(Seoul National University, 2019)
|
ABSTRACTIt is widely believed that fire alarm oversight (i.e., reactive oversight that responds to the complaints of interest groups) rather than police patrol oversight (i.e., precautionary congressional surveillance), better promotes the performance of government agencies by efficiently reducing bureaucratic moral hazard. However, fire alarm oversight can lead to bureaucrats being falsely accused by interest groups who provide biased information to members of Congress of failure to properly implement a policy, thereby causing an unnecessary administrative delay in public management. This article suggests a formal model that compares fire alarm and police patrol oversight and examines the development of congressional oversight mechanisms in the United States. |
No. Panggil : | 370 KJPS 34:2 (2019) |
Entri utama-Nama orang : | |
Subjek : | |
Penerbitan : | Seoul: Seoul National University, 2019 |
Sumber Pengatalogan : | LibUI eng rda |
ISSN : | 12255017 |
Majalah/Jurnal : | The Korean Journal of Policy Studies |
Volume : | Vol. 34, Agus 2019: Hal. 29-50 |
Tipe Konten : | text |
Tipe Media : | unmediated |
Tipe Carrier : | volume |
Akses Elektronik : | |
Institusi Pemilik : | Universitas Indonesia |
Lokasi : | Perpustakaan UI, lantai 4, R. Koleksi Jurnal |
No. Panggil | No. Barkod | Ketersediaan |
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370 KJPS 34:2 (2019) | 03-20-183384876 | TERSEDIA |
Ulasan: |
Tidak ada ulasan pada koleksi ini: 20502735 |