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"Disertasi ini mengkaji perubahan desain institusional melalui amandemen konstitusi dengan fokus pada pertarungan kepentingan dan kekuasaan atas perubahan kekuasaan presiden dalam konteks demokrasi presidensial. Penelitian ini menjelaskan pertanyaan berikut: 1) Bagaimana interaksi kepentingan dalam proses pembahasan dan perdebatan tentang perubahan kekuasaan Presiden dalam amandemen UUD 1945? 2) Bagaimana sistem presidensial Indonesia yang terbentuk berdasarkan hasil perubahan kekuasaan presiden dalam amandemen UUD 1945?, 3) Faktor-faktor apa saja yang membuat sistem presidensial Indonesia dapat berjalan dan berbeda dibandingkan dengan sistem presidensial di negara-negara lain? Studi ini menguji tiga teori utama: 1) teori kepentingan dari John Elster, 2) teori konsensus demokrasi dari Arent Lijphart dan Maswadi Rauf, dan 3) teori Scott Mainwaring tentang problematik sistem presidensial digabungkan dengan sistem multipartai. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan teknik wawancara dan penelusuran dokumen atau kepustakaan (library research) untuk memperoleh data. Hasil Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa proses pembahasan amandemen konstitusi terutama berkaitan dengan kekuasaan presiden diwarnai pertarungan kepentingan yang menghasilkan system presidensial yang tidak menegaskan fungsi masing-masing cabang pemerintahan. Temuan penelitian ini menunjukkan proses pembahasan amandemen konstitusi terkait kekuasaan presiden diwarnai oleh tarik-menarik dua kepentingan yaitu kepentingan kelompok (partai) dan kepentingan institusional (eksekutif dan legislatif). Pertarungan kepentingan tersebut mencapai konsensus dengan melahirkan sistem presidensial model Indonesia yang berbeda dengan negara-negara lain dengan ciri utama ketelibatan presiden dalam proses pembahsan rancangan undang-undang bersama DPR. Temuan penting penelitian adalah faktor konstruksi konstitusi yang dapat mengatasi deadlock antara eksekutif dan legislatif dengan mekanisme saling bypassing antara presiden dan DPR dalam proses pengambilan keputusan. Implikasi teoritis penelitian ini, menunjukkan bahwa teori kepentingan dari John Eslter tentang tiga tipe kepentingan ( kepentingan personal, kepentingan kelompok /partai politik, dan kepentingan institusional) tidak sepenuhnya berlaku. Dalam proses pembahasaan amandemen konstitusi lebih banyak terjadi pertarungan kepentingan kelompok (partai politik) dan kepentingan institusional. Sementara kepentingan personal kurang memainkan perannya. Studi ini mengkofirmasi teori konsensus demokrasi yang dikemukakan oleh Arend Lijphart dan Maswadi Rauf dimana pertarungan kepentingan para aktor bermuara pada konsensus sebagai bagian kesepakatan untuk lebih mengedepankan musyawarah ketimbang voting dalam pengambilan keputusan dan kekuatan fraksi-fraksi di MPR dalam proses pembahasana mandemen konstitusi relatif setara. Studi ini menunjukkan bahwa asumsi yang dibangun oleh Scott Mainwaring bahwa kombinasi presidensialisme dan multipartai dapat memungkinkan terjadinya deadlock yang berpotensi mengakibatkan kelumpuhan yang mengganggu kestabilan demokrasi tidak terbukti. Studi ini membuktikan sistem presidensial multipartai dapat berjalan di Indonesia dengan mengatasi masalah dalam hubungan eksekutif dan legislatif dengan konstruksi konstitusi yang, terutama, menciptakan mekanisme saling bypassing antara presiden dan DPR dalam pembahasan dan persetujuan undang-undang.

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This study discusses the shift in institutional design resulting from a constitutional amandment that is centered on a conflict of interest and power over the change in presidential power in a presidential democracy. It aims to elaborate these three questions: first, the interaction of interests during the discussion and debate process concerning the change in the presidential power in the 1945 constitutional amendment; second, the presidential system that formed through the change in presidential power in the 1945 constitutional amendment; and third, the factors that allows Indonesia's presidential system to run and what distinguishes it with presidential systems in other countries.

This study aims to corroborate three main theories: first, John Elster's theory of interest; second, Arent Lijphart's and Maswadi Rauf's theory of democratic consensus; and third, Scott Mainwaring's theory concerning problems that arise when a presidential system merges with a multiparty system. This research uses a qualitative approach, an in-depth interview with the elites of the House of Representatives regarding the issue, and library research to acquire data.

This research concludes that the process of amending the constitution, specifically with regards to the presidential power, is highlighted with a conflict of interest, resulting in a presidential system that does not accentuate each of the governmental branches' function. The principal finding of this research reveals that in the process of amending the constitution, specifically the presidential power, there is a conflict of interest between the parties' interest and the institutional (executive and legislative) interest. One paramount finding of this research is the factors of constitutional construction that can overcome a deadlock between the executive and legislative using a bypassing mechanism between the president and the House of Representatives when making decisions.

The theoretical implication of this research shows that John Elster's theory of interest on the three types of interest (personal, political party, and institutional) does not fully apply. The reason is that the conflict of interest between the political party and the institutional interest is dominant, while there is only a fraction of personal interest. This study confirms Arend Lijphart's and Maswadi Rauf's democratic consensus theory, where the conflict of interest of the actors amounts to the consensus of all the parties, instead of using a voting system when making decisions. This study reveals that Mainwaring's assumption that combining a presidential and multiparty system could result in a deadlock that may disrupt the democratic stability is not applicable. The reason is that Indonesia adopts such system, but has never faced a deadlock."

"International law in its basic concept is intended to serve aslegal framework jar society of States. International lawprescribe what is right and what if wrong; it also prescribeshow State behaves toward one another and it providesanctions. However, the above description is international isas understood in class room. In reality, international law isfrequently used as a political instrument by States. It can be aninstrument to exert pressure, instrument for intervening onother States domestic affairs without considered as violationand it can also be used to justify States actions. The presentarticle will describe how States how used international imv onindonesia as political instrument and how indonesia has usedinternational law to further its national policy"

"The province of East Kalimantan has the largest tropicalforests in indonesia. Throughout the era of the NewOrder government under President Soeharto the naturalresources especially tropical forests were .systematicallyexploited without any serious effort on the part of thegovernment and private companies to take care of thesocial and environmental aspect of such exploitation. Asa result, severe environmental degradation tool: placeand the local people in the country side lost theirsources of livelihood in the midst of the presence ofmultinational corporations and private forestconcessionaires ironically there were enclaves ofpoverty. in this era of regional autonomy there is muchdoubt that the situation could get better as localgovernment authorities tend to repeat past mistakes andthey are unable to control the extensive practice ofillegal logging. This writing will propose some pottysuggestions that might be helpful for promoting theprinciples of sustainable development and putting an endto the phenomenon of "the tragedy of the commons"."

"Apu yang dapat kita saksikan sekarang OrdeBaru relah memanfaatkan produk-produk hukum yang dihasilkan dari keadaan darurat.Mereka telah menempuh jalur hukum berda-sarkan prinsip-prinsip yang masih disesuaikandengan keadaan darurat atau zaman kolonial.Dengan begitulah Orde Baru mempertahankandelik-delik politik di Indonesia. Selama ini taktak ada upaya mereka untuk menyempurnakanatau mengubahnya. KUHP sepenuhnya masihsebagai warisan kolonial. Artikel ini membahasdan menyoroti berbagai segi dari kejahatan po-lilik di Indonesia, baik segi yuridis maupun se-gi-segi non yuridis."