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"ABSTRAKThe government system running in Indonesia is a combination of presidential systems and parliamentary systems. Based on the 1945 Constitution, Indonesia adheres to a presidential system, but Indonesia, in implementing there are many parts of the parliamentary system that are included in the Indonesian presidential system. The strengthen presidential system effort is still carried out, one of which is the rule of threshold number in Article 222 of Law Number 7 of 2017 about General Elections. However, the presidential threshold is assumed that it will strengthen the presidential system in the Indonesian government system and experience anomalies, irrational and irrelevant. With the presidential threshold, political parties can nominate the presidents and the vice by the provision of the political party or joint political party having 20 percent of seats or 25 percent of nationally legitimate votes in the previous legislative elections. With the existence of the presidential threshold, it will give a positive value, namely First, directing political parties to the coalition with other parties. Secondly, political parties after the general election will form two shafts. Those are the bearer axis and the opposition axis. Third, the presidential threshold comes up with a new understanding that is political parties only bearers, so in the 2019 simultaneous elections, there will be elected strong president and vice figures regardless of the small voice of the party that carries them. This paper uses critical discourse analysis toward the opportunities and realization problem challenges of the threshold presidential in Indonesia. The purpose of this writing is the first, how the threshold presidential relevance in Indonesia is, second, how to create an ideal government system thought of the threshold presidential system to reduce parliamentary in the Indonesian presidential system."

"ABSTRAKPenelitian ini dilatarbelakangi oleh adanya produk UU Pemilu yang dihasilkan oleh DPR RI dan pemerintah. Sebagai landasan hukum Pemilu tahun 2014 DPR-RI telah mengesahkan Rancangan Undang-Undang (RUU) Pemilu yang merupakan perubahan terhadap UU No.10 Tahun 2008 menjadi UU No. 8 Tahun 2012.Ada empat isu krusial yang muncul dalam pembahasan UU Pemilu ini yaitu:Pertama, Besaran daerah pemilihan, mengingat beberapa partai politik ingin memperkecil angkanya;Kedua, formula alokasi kursi partai politik;Ketiga, formula penetapan calon terpilih;Keempat, ambang batas perwakilan atau Parliamentary Threshold (PT).Setelah melewati proses argumentasi dalam rapat-rapat yang diadakan oleh Tim Pansus UU Pemilu, fraksi-fraksi belum menemukan titik temu kesepakatan tentang empat poin krusial pada RUU Undang-undang No. 10 Tahun 2008. Akhirnya proses pengesahan dilakukan melalui voting sesuai dengan mekanisme pengambilan keputusan di DPR-RI. Melalui proses voting dalam Rapat Paripurna, DPR RI akhirnya menyepakati empat poin krusial dalam Undang-undang No. 8 Tahun 2012 salah satunya adalah peningkatan angka Ambang Batas Parlemen PT (Parliementary Threshold) dari 2,5 % menjadi 3,5 % yang berlaku secara nasional. Khusus untuk kenaikan Ambang batas parlemen, voting dilakukan setelah sebelumnya terjadi loby antar fraksi-fraksi setelah sebelumnya terjadi perbedaan konfigurasi prosentasi kenaikan angka Ambang batas parelemen ini dari 2,5 % - 5%.Oleh karena itu penelitian ini dilakukan untuk mencari jawaban mengapa terjadi kenaikan terhadap ambang batas parlemen dan juga ingin mengetahui dan menganalisa kebijakan PT (Parliamentary Threshold) sebagai bagian dari sistem pemilu. Sebagai pijakan teoritis, penelitian ini menggunakan teori partai politik Alan Ware, teori pemilu Arendt Lijphart, teori parlementarian Arend Lijphart dan teori analisa kebijakan publik William N.Dun. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif, sedangkan teknik analisis data menggunakan deskriptif analitis. Teknik pengumpulan data dilakukan dengan mengumpulkan data-data administratif dan wawancara mendalam dengan pihakpihak yang terkait. Temuan dilapangan menunjukkan bahwa proses formulasi kebijakan ini masih mencerminkan proses demokrasi yang semu dan pragmatisme fraksi-fraksi dari partai politik yang ada di parlemen. Kenaikan PT harusnya dilakukan melalui proses pengkajian akademis secara mendalam dengan melibatkan para pihak yang kompeten dan lebih visioner sehingga proses demokrasi di Indonesia terus berjalan ke arah yang lebih baik.

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ABSTRACT

This research is motivated by the Election Law products that produced by the House of Representatives and the government. As the legal basis for election in 2014 the House of Representatives has passed the Bill which is an amendment to the Electoral Act No.

10 of 2008 into Act No. 8 Year of 2012.

There are four crucial issues that emerged in the discussion of the election law :

First, the magnitude of electoral districts, remember some political parties want to reduce the numbers;

Second, political party seat allocation formula;

Third, the formula determining the candidate elected;

Fourth, the threshold representation or Parliamentary Threshold (PT). After passing the arguments in meetings held by the Special Committee of the Election Law, the factions have not found common ground on a four-point agreement on the crucial Bill Law No. 10 of 2008.

Finally the ratification process through voting conducted in accordance with the decision-making mechanism in the House of Representatives. Through the process of voting in the plenary session, the House of Representatives finally agreed on four crucial points in the Law No. 8 In 2012, one of which is the increasing number of Parliamentary Threshold PT (Parliamentary Threshold) from 2.5% to 3.5% which applies nationally. Specifically to increase the parliamentary threshold, after the voting is done before going on lobbying between the factions after previously occurred configuration differences percentage rise in the parelemen threshold of 2.5% - 5%.

This study was therefore conducted to seek answers as to why there is an increase of the threshold of parliament and also wanted to know and analyze the policy PT (Parliamentary Threshold) as part of the electoral system. As a theoretical foundation, this study uses the theory of Alan Ware political parties, election theory Arendt Lijphart, Arend Lijphart parlementarian theory and the theory of public policy analysis William N.Dun. This study used qualitative methods, while data analysis using descriptive analysis. Data was collected by collecting administrative data and in-depth interviews with relevant parties. Field findings indicate that the process of policy formulation is still reflecting the democratic process and the apparent pragmatism fractions of political parties in the parliament. The increase in PT should be done through a process of academic study in depth with the parties involved is more visionary and competent so that the democratic process in Indonesia continued to walk towards the better."

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Reformasi birokrasi dalam hal kelembagaan telah mendorong adanya Lembaga Non Struktural (LNS) yang beragam, namun masih terdapat diferensiasi pengaturan LNS. Kantor Staf Presiden (KSP) merupakan LNS yang berdiri berdasarkan Peraturan Presiden Nomor 83 Tahun 2019 tentang Kantor Staf Presiden. Tugas KSP adalah membantu Presiden dan Wakil Presiden dalam hal mendukung teknis jalannya pemerintahan. Untuk itu, KSP perlu melakukan hubungan hukum dengan pihak lain. Penelitian ini bermaksud menganalisis kedudukan LNS dalam pemerintahan, hubungan hukum KSP dengan lembaga lain, dan pengaturan terhadap LNS di masa depan. Metodologi yang digunakan adalah yuridis normatif dengan teknik pengumpulan data kualitatif. Hasil penelitian menemukan bahwa LNS masih memiliki beberapa permasalahan, seperti pengawasan yang belum ideal. KSP hanya menunjang pemerintahan terkait program prioritas nasional maupun isu strategis. Sehingga, KSP juga melakukan hubungan hukum dengan Kementerian/Lembaga terkait dalam menjalankan tugasnya maupun menjalankan hubungan hukum dengan masyarakat sebagai penerapan good governance. Tidak adanya unifikasi aturan juga membuat berbagai implikasi masalah terhadap LNS. Sebagai saran, diperlukan perbaikan sistem tata kelola LNS yang diberlakukan bagi semua LNS, seperti untuk pengawasan. Untuk hubungan hukum KSP dapat dibatasi dengan pengaturan agar kewenangan KSP tetap sesuai sebagai LNS. Untuk mengatur LNS, diperlukan unifikasi peraturan mengenai LNS di Indonesia di masa yang akan datang.

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Bureaucratic reform in terms of institutions has encouraged the existence of various Non-Structural Institutions (NSI), but there is still differentiation of NSI arrangements. The Executive Office of the President (EOP) is an NSI established based on Presidential Regulation Number 83 of 2019 concerning Executive Office of the President. The EOP’s task is to assist the President and Vice President in technical support for the running of the government. EOP needs to have a legal relationship with other parties. This research intends to analyze the position of NSI in government, the legal relations between EOP and other institutions, and the regulation of NSI in the future. The methodology used is normative juridical with qualitative data collection techniques. The results of the research found that NSI still had several problems, such as inadequate supervision. EOP only supports the government related to national priority programs and strategic issues. Thus, the EOP also carries out legal relations with related Ministries / Institutions in carrying out its duties and carrying out legal relations with the community as the implementation of good governance. The differentiation of regulation also has implications for problems for NSI. As a suggestion, it is necessary to improve the NSI governance system that is applied to all NSI, such as for control. For the EOP legal relationship, it can be limited by the regulation so that the EOP’s authority still suitable as an NSI. It is also necessary to unify regulations regarding NSI in Indonesia in the future.

 

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"Tesis ini membahas mengenai Mewujudkan Pemerintahan Presidensiil Efektif Dikaitkan Dengan Sistem Multipartai Di Indonesia, Sistem presidensial yang dimurnikan dalam perubahan UUD 1945 dipraktekkan di tengah kondisi nyata sistem multipartai dalam komposisi politik di DPR. Kondisi ini yang menyebabkan pemerintahan Presiden Yudhoyono dalam kerangka sistem presidesial tidak berjalan dengan efektif sesuai dengan karakteristik sistem presidensial dalam konsepsi umum walaupun koalisi antarpartai di DPR sudah digalang secara signifikan oleh Presiden Yudhoyono untuk mendukung pemerintahannya. Indikasi ketidakefektifan sistem presidensial dalam pemerintahan Presiden Yudhoyono tersebut dapat dilihat dari tiga point, sebagai berikut. Tereduksinya hak prerogatif, Terhambatnya proses legislasi, terhambatnya kebijakan non-legislasi. Penelitian ini adalah penelitian Kualitatif dengan desain Preskriptif, yaitu memberikan solusi/gagasan berdasarkan teori hukum, dimana suatu masalah dapat menjadi suatu gagasan. Hasil penelitian menyarankan Pertama, presiden harus memiliki legitimasi politik yang tinggi, karena dipilih melalui pemilihan umum, tidak hanya berdasarkan mayoritas suara, tetapi juga sebaran dukungan daerah, Kedua, keterlibatan penuh presiden dalam setiap pembahasan RUU yang menyangkut anggaran dan non anggaran. Ketiga,dengan adanya dukungan mayoritas dari anggota DPR, Keempat, Kepemimpinan politik dan administrasi, Kelima, Pejabat politik yang ditunjuk dalam jumlah yang memadai dan yang keenam yaitu, hadirnya Partai oposisi yang efektif.dan yang terakhir yaitu Pelembagaan kalender penyelenggaraan berbagai jenis pemilu merupakan desain sistem pemilu yang paling strategis untuk mewujudkan pemerintahan presidensiil yang efektif tersebut.

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This thesis discusses Making Effective the Presidential government associated With a multiparty system in Indonesia, which was purified presidential system in the 1945 change was practiced in the real conditions of a multiparty system in the political composition of Parliament. This condition causes the government of President Yudhoyono in the framework presidential system is not operating effectively in accordance with the characteristics of a presidential system in general, although the conception of inter-party coalition in the Parliament have raised significantly by President Yudhoyono to support his government. Indication of the ineffectiveness of the presidential system in the government of President Yudhoyono can be seen from three points, as follows. reduced prerogative, inhibition of the legislative process, inhibition of non-legislative policy.

The study was a qualitative research design with prescriptive, that provide solutions / ideas based on theories of law, where a problem may be an idea. The results suggest first, the president must have a high political legitimacy, as chosen through elections, not only by a majority vote, but also the distribution of regional support, Second, the full involvement of the president in any discussion concerning the draft budget and non budget. Third, with the support of a majority of the members of the Parliament, Fourth, political and administrative leadership, Fifth, political officials appointed in sufficient number and a sixth, namely, the presence of opposition parties that last effective.and the Institutionalization of the election calendar is organizing various kinds of design the most strategic electoral system to make effective the presidential government."

"ABSTRAKOne of the agendas and results of the I until IV Amendment to the 1945 Constitution is to strengthen the Presidential system. Strengthening the presidential system synergized with reforming the party and election system must be carried out in order to achieve the objectives of governance and institutions in the framework of Indonesia 2045. The 2019 elections are simultaneously legislative and presidential elections as stipulated in Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections. The purpose of this article, the first simultaneous election should be legislative, presidential and regional head elections simultaneously. Secondly, there are 4 objectives 1. Effectiveness and efficiency, 2. Righteous democracy, 3. creating a solid and effective government, 4. period that is more organized. Using the optics of constitutional law studies, and socio legal, strengthened and enriched historical studies of presidential, party and election systems in Indonesia and comparisons with the United States, Brazil, Argentina. There are seven recommended strategies offered in the article 1. Synergizing the Presidential Election, Legislative Elections and Regional Head Elections simultaneously in 2029, 2. Preparing the Draft Law for Regional Head Election Courts, 3. Making a blueprint of the Presidential Institution Bill, 4. Simplify party systems with an electoral threshold, 5. Simplify the number of parties in parliament with parliamentary threshold, 6. Implement a threshold presidential order to create balance in a multi party presidential system, 7. Make changes to the Election Law and Evaluate the Proposal Election system with the Sainte Lague calculation method."

"The book discusses how the use of some election rules embedded in the U.S. Constitution and in the presidential succession Act may cause skewed or weird election outcomes and election stalemates. The book argues that the act may not cover some rare though possible situations which the twentieth amendment authorizes congress to address. Also, the book questions the constitutionality of the national popular vote plan to introduce a direct popular presidential election de facto, without amending the constitution, and addresses the plan?s ?achilles? heel.? In particular, the book shows that the plan may violate the equal protection clause from the fourteenth amendment of the constitution. Numerical examples are provided to show that the counterintuitive claims of the NPV originators and proponents that the plan will encourage presidential candidates to ?chase? every vote in every state do not have any grounds. Finally, the book proposes a plan for improving the election system by combining at the national level the ?one state, one vote? principle, embedded in the constitution, and the ?one person, one vote? principle. "

"ABSTRAKTesis ini membahas mengenai tarik ulur antara sistem pemerintahan presidensial dan parlementer dalam sistem ketatanegaraan Indonesia masa Orde Baru dan pascaamandemen UUD 1945 ditinjau dari hubungan antara eksekutif dengan legislatif. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian hukum normatif, yang mengolah data dengan pendekatan kualitatif. Berdasarkan hasil penelitian, UUD 1945 ataupun UUD NRI 1945 sama-sama belum memberikan gambaran yang utuh mengenai sistem pemerintahan yang dianut oleh Indonesia sehingga menimbulkan tarik ulur antara sistem pemerintahan presidensial dan parlementer, khususnya dalam masa Orde Baru dan pascaamandemen UUD 1945. Namun, sudah terdapat perbaikan dalam sistem ketatanegaraan Indonesia, yang mengandung karakteristik sistem pemerintahan yang sesuai untuk diterapkan di Indonesia saat ini.

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ABSTRACTThe thesis discusses the trade-off between presidential and parliamentary governmental system in constitutional system of Indonesia that had been applied in New Order Era and post-amendment of the 1945 Constitution, which is reviewed in terms of the relationship between executive and legislative. This research is a normative law research, which uses qualitative approach in its data processing. According to the result of research, both UUD 1945 and UUD NRI 1945 have not yet provided a complete picture of governmental system of Indonesia, therefore, it has been creating a trade-off between presidential and parliamentary governmental system, especially in New Order Era and post-amendment of the 1945 Constitution. However, there are some particular improvements in constitutional system of Indonesia that encompasses characteristic of governmental system, which could be suitably applied in recent times."

"Disertasi ini mengkaji perubahan desain institusional melalui amandemen konstitusi dengan fokus pada pertarungan kepentingan dan kekuasaan atas perubahan kekuasaan presiden dalam konteks demokrasi presidensial. Penelitian ini menjelaskan pertanyaan berikut: 1) Bagaimana interaksi kepentingan dalam proses pembahasan dan perdebatan tentang perubahan kekuasaan Presiden dalam amandemen UUD 1945? 2) Bagaimana sistem presidensial Indonesia yang terbentuk berdasarkan hasil perubahan kekuasaan presiden dalam amandemen UUD 1945?, 3) Faktor-faktor apa saja yang membuat sistem presidensial Indonesia dapat berjalan dan berbeda dibandingkan dengan sistem presidensial di negara-negara lain? Studi ini menguji tiga teori utama: 1) teori kepentingan dari John Elster, 2) teori konsensus demokrasi dari Arent Lijphart dan Maswadi Rauf, dan 3) teori Scott Mainwaring tentang problematik sistem presidensial digabungkan dengan sistem multipartai. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan teknik wawancara dan penelusuran dokumen atau kepustakaan (library research) untuk memperoleh data. Hasil Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa proses pembahasan amandemen konstitusi terutama berkaitan dengan kekuasaan presiden diwarnai pertarungan kepentingan yang menghasilkan system presidensial yang tidak menegaskan fungsi masing-masing cabang pemerintahan. Temuan penelitian ini menunjukkan proses pembahasan amandemen konstitusi terkait kekuasaan presiden diwarnai oleh tarik-menarik dua kepentingan yaitu kepentingan kelompok (partai) dan kepentingan institusional (eksekutif dan legislatif). Pertarungan kepentingan tersebut mencapai konsensus dengan melahirkan sistem presidensial model Indonesia yang berbeda dengan negara-negara lain dengan ciri utama ketelibatan presiden dalam proses pembahsan rancangan undang-undang bersama DPR. Temuan penting penelitian adalah faktor konstruksi konstitusi yang dapat mengatasi deadlock antara eksekutif dan legislatif dengan mekanisme saling bypassing antara presiden dan DPR dalam proses pengambilan keputusan. Implikasi teoritis penelitian ini, menunjukkan bahwa teori kepentingan dari John Eslter tentang tiga tipe kepentingan ( kepentingan personal, kepentingan kelompok /partai politik, dan kepentingan institusional) tidak sepenuhnya berlaku. Dalam proses pembahasaan amandemen konstitusi lebih banyak terjadi pertarungan kepentingan kelompok (partai politik) dan kepentingan institusional. Sementara kepentingan personal kurang memainkan perannya. Studi ini mengkofirmasi teori konsensus demokrasi yang dikemukakan oleh Arend Lijphart dan Maswadi Rauf dimana pertarungan kepentingan para aktor bermuara pada konsensus sebagai bagian kesepakatan untuk lebih mengedepankan musyawarah ketimbang voting dalam pengambilan keputusan dan kekuatan fraksi-fraksi di MPR dalam proses pembahasana mandemen konstitusi relatif setara. Studi ini menunjukkan bahwa asumsi yang dibangun oleh Scott Mainwaring bahwa kombinasi presidensialisme dan multipartai dapat memungkinkan terjadinya deadlock yang berpotensi mengakibatkan kelumpuhan yang mengganggu kestabilan demokrasi tidak terbukti. Studi ini membuktikan sistem presidensial multipartai dapat berjalan di Indonesia dengan mengatasi masalah dalam hubungan eksekutif dan legislatif dengan konstruksi konstitusi yang, terutama, menciptakan mekanisme saling bypassing antara presiden dan DPR dalam pembahasan dan persetujuan undang-undang.

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This study discusses the shift in institutional design resulting from a constitutional amandment that is centered on a conflict of interest and power over the change in presidential power in a presidential democracy. It aims to elaborate these three questions: first, the interaction of interests during the discussion and debate process concerning the change in the presidential power in the 1945 constitutional amendment; second, the presidential system that formed through the change in presidential power in the 1945 constitutional amendment; and third, the factors that allows Indonesia's presidential system to run and what distinguishes it with presidential systems in other countries.

This study aims to corroborate three main theories: first, John Elster's theory of interest; second, Arent Lijphart's and Maswadi Rauf's theory of democratic consensus; and third, Scott Mainwaring's theory concerning problems that arise when a presidential system merges with a multiparty system. This research uses a qualitative approach, an in-depth interview with the elites of the House of Representatives regarding the issue, and library research to acquire data.

This research concludes that the process of amending the constitution, specifically with regards to the presidential power, is highlighted with a conflict of interest, resulting in a presidential system that does not accentuate each of the governmental branches' function. The principal finding of this research reveals that in the process of amending the constitution, specifically the presidential power, there is a conflict of interest between the parties' interest and the institutional (executive and legislative) interest. One paramount finding of this research is the factors of constitutional construction that can overcome a deadlock between the executive and legislative using a bypassing mechanism between the president and the House of Representatives when making decisions.

The theoretical implication of this research shows that John Elster's theory of interest on the three types of interest (personal, political party, and institutional) does not fully apply. The reason is that the conflict of interest between the political party and the institutional interest is dominant, while there is only a fraction of personal interest. This study confirms Arend Lijphart's and Maswadi Rauf's democratic consensus theory, where the conflict of interest of the actors amounts to the consensus of all the parties, instead of using a voting system when making decisions. This study reveals that Mainwaring's assumption that combining a presidential and multiparty system could result in a deadlock that may disrupt the democratic stability is not applicable. The reason is that Indonesia adopts such system, but has never faced a deadlock."

"HASIL-hasil pemilihan umum memperlihatkan bahwa multipartai di Indonesia telah menghasilkan parlemen yang terfragmentasi tinggi, komposisi dukungan eksekutif yang lemah di parlemen (minority president) dan bentukan koalisi yang rentan perubahan. Situasi ini sejajar dengan skenario instabilitas sistem presidensial yang membuat pemerintahan terjebak dalam situasi divided government. Hasil pemilu serentak diharapkan menghasilkan ukuran komposisi parlemen yang sejajar dengan komposisi politik di eksekutif, sehingga dapat lebih efektif menjalankan pemerintahan. Namun, pelaksanaan pemilu serentak digabungkan dengan sistem pemilihan presiden dua putaran (majority run off) menyimpan masalah yang dapat menjadi ancaman gagalnya pencapaian tujuan pemilu serentak. Hal demikian akan membuat partai-partai politik masuk ke pemilihan umum dengan memiliki calon presidennya masing-masing karena menganggap pemenang pemilihan presiden tidak akan didapat di putaran pertama. Putaran pertama digunakan oleh partai-partai untuk mendapatkan coattail effect yang diharapkan memperbesar peluang partai politik untuk dapat mendudukkan sebanyak mungkin wakilnya di parlemen. Jika hal itu yang terjadi, kemungkinannya adalah terbentuk parlemen yang terfragmentasi tinggi, tidak ada kekuatan mayoritas dan memperbesar potensi terjadinya minority president. Ambang batas pencalonan presiden (presidential threshold) merupakan jalan yang efektif dapat terukur untuk mengatasi masalah tersebut. Melalui presidential threshold dipastikan calon presiden akan terbatas jumlahnya. Dalam kondisi calon presiden terbatas diharapkan kebaikan-kebaikan pemilu serentak dapat dinikmati"

"THE result of the general elections demonstrates that multi-political parties in Indonesia has produced a highly fragmented parliament, poor composition in the parliameut to supporting the executive (minority presMent) and coalition formations prone to change. This situation is parallel with the unstable scenario of the presidential system getting the government trapped in a situation of divided governme!Jf.

The result of the simultaneous general elections is expected to produce a size of composition in the parliament which is parallel with the political composition in the executive, in order for the executive to pe1j'orm government effectively. Nevertheless, the peJ.formance of the simultaneous general elections combined with a mqjority run off of the preside11tial election system belies matters wljich can be a threat to the successful achievement of the objective of the simultaneous general elections. Such condition will lead the political parties into general elections by having their respective candidate presidents, because they deem the winner of the presidential election will not be achieved at tliefirst round.

The political parties use the first round to achieve a 'coattail ~!feet' which they expect would enlarge their chance to place as many as possible representatives in the parliament. If that does nOt happen, there is the possibility that a highly ji·agmellfed parliament will be fanned, resulting in the absence of a majority power, and enlarging the potential to having a minority president. The threshold of presidential candidacy is an effective measured way to overcome that problem. A limited number of presidential candidates can be assured through a threshold of presidential candidacy, We may expect the . benefits of the simultaneous general elections in a constellation of limited nuniber of presidential candidates."