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"Perilaku moral hazard tertanggung merupakan permasalahan serius industri perasuransian. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui apakah ada perbedaan tingkat moral hazard pada tertanggung asuransi syariah dan asuransi konvensional. Penelitian ini juga mengevaluasi penerapan hukum syariah dalam kaitannya terhadap tingkat moral hazard tertanggung asuransi. Data yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah laporan bulanan penolakan klaim pada divisi roda dua PT. Asuransi XYZ. dari Januari 2008 hingga Desember 2008. Uji hipotesis menggunakan metode compare mean independen samples ttest.Dari hasil penelitian dan analisis ditemukan bahwa dengan pendekatan laporan klaim, ditemukan perbedaan hasil perhitungan tingkat moral hazard pada kelompok tertanggung asuransi syariah dan konvensional. Sedangkan dengan pendekatan polis aktif dari hasil uji hipotesis tidak terdapat perbedaan hasil perhitungan tingkat moral hazard pada kedua kelompok tertanggung. Lebih jauh lagi konsep asuransi syariah dapat dijadikan solusi bagi problematika moral hazard tertanggung.

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Moral hazard behaviour of consumer is a serious problem in insurance industry. This research aims to test the differences between moral hazard proportion in consumer of sharia insurance and modern insurance. This research also evaluates wheather the sharia law application is able to reduce moral hazard behaviour of insurance consumer. Data used in this research are monthly report of rejected claim in two wheeler division PT Asuransi XYZ from January 2008 to December 2008. Compare mean independent samples t-test method is used in testing hypothesis.The analytical result of this research show that there is significant difference in the moral hazard proportion calculation using first method where the reported claim as a divider factor. In other method, there is no difference in the moral hazard proportion using live policy as a divider factor. Furthermore, sharia insurance concept could be a solution for moral hazard of insurance consumer."

"There are two purposes that want to be assessed in this paper. The first purpose is to indicate whether the moral hazard problems are occurred in the Indonesian Sharia Bank (The moral hazard in this paper is the Indirect Moral Hazard which is the negligence of bank in the financing process influencing the moral hazard problems of the debtor in the other side. The second purpose is to assess whether the financing policies in the Sharia Banking are influenced by profit sharing system. The data for assessing this paper are acquired from the monthly financial reports published by Sharia Banks such as BSM and BM] from January 2001 to December 2004. The research based on the Error Correction Model in the long term shows that the increasing of allocation ratio of Murabahah to Musyarakah and Mudharabah results the increasing of non performing financing ratio. It indicates that the moral hazard problems are occurred in BM]. The moral hazard indication demonstrates that bank is both less careful in financing and less incentive in monitoring process. It also demonstrates the weakness of the Sharia bank ?s operational system in countering the debtor's moral hazard. The Granger Causality Test proves that profit sharing ratio (nisbah) between bank and debtor influences return ratio, however it does not ?influence financing allocation). On the other hand, financing allocation ratio influences nisbah ratio, furthermore in BSM case, return ratio influences nisbah ratio. This description shows that nisbah ratio is not only an instrument for calculating revenue/return distribution but also an instrument for Sharia bank in synchronizing profit sharing level with the interest rate in conventional bank."

"ABSTRAKTesis ini mempelajari dan membahas bagaimana penerapan prinsip kehati-hatian memiliki peran yang penting dalam manajemen pembiayaan mudarabah oleh lembaga keuangan mikro syariah dalam mengantisipasi kemungkinan terjadinya moral hazard. Penelitian ini bersifat kualitatif dengan membandingkan antara dua lembaga keuangan mikro syariah yaitu BMT Baitul Karim di Bekasi dan BT Tamzis Bina Utama cabang Ahmad Dahlan Yogyakarta. Hasil penelitian ini ditujukan untuk memperoleh gambaran yang menyeluruh langkah-langkah antisipatif yang harus dilakukan oleh manajemen lembaga keuangan mikro syariah dalam mengantisipasi timbulnya kerugian usaha lembaga keuangan mikro syariah khususnya yang bersumber dari pembiayaan berbasis mudarabah.

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ABSTRACTThis thesis examines and discusses how important the application of prudential principles in mudaraba financing management by Islamic microfinance institutions in accordance with anticipating the possibility of moral hazard. This research using qualitative method by comparing between two micro finance institutions of sharia namely BMT Baitul Karim in Bekasi and BT Tamzis Bina Utama Ahmad Dahlan Branch Yogyakarta. The results of this study is to obtain a comprehensive view of anticipatory steps that must be done by the management of sharia micro finance institutions in anticipation of the occurrence of losses on Islamic microfinance institutions particularly those originating from mudaraba based financing."

"ABSTRACTIt is widely believed that fire alarm oversight (i.e., reactive oversight that responds to the complaints of interest groups) rather than police patrol oversight (i.e., precautionary congressional surveillance), better promotes the performance of government agencies by efficiently reducing bureaucratic moral hazard. However, fire alarm oversight can lead to bureaucrats being falsely accused by interest groups who provide biased information to members of Congress of failure to properly implement a policy, thereby causing an unnecessary administrative delay in public management. This article suggests a formal model that compares fire alarm and police patrol oversight and examines the development of congressional oversight mechanisms in the United States. "

"The banking crises over the last two decades around the world has renewed the interest in market disipline in banking systems. This interest is not merely academic but it also apparent in recent policy initiatives such as the latest capital proposal by the Basel Commitee on Banking Supervision . The new basel capital accord has 3 pillars. Pillars 3 is disclosure requirement to enhance market discipline. Market discipline has the potential to reinforce pillar 1 ( minimum capital standar) and 2 pillars (supervisory review process) and promote safety and soundness in banks and financial systems. The first objective of this paper is to explain bank regulatory and the important of market discipline to complement bank regulatory. The second objective to explain the framework of market discipline theory and ask some issue : what is market discipline , why the call for market discipline , how market discipline relates to agency conflict in finance theory and how is the framework of market discipline in banking. The third objective is to review some empirical research in market discipline."

"Penelitian ini akan menguji secara empiris keberadaan ex ante moral hazard di pasar asuransi kesehatan di Indonesia terhadap pilihan gaya hidup seperti merokok dan obesitas. Tantangan utama dalam memahami masalah moral hazard adalah endogenitas. Keputusan tentang memiliki asuransi dan pilihan gaya hidup adalah berurutan, bukan serentak. Untuk mengatasi masalah ini, penelitian ini menggunakan analisis multivariate probit. Penelitian ini menggunakan tiga seri dari IFLS (Indonesian Family Life Survey) tahun 2000, 2007, dan 2014, karena ketiga seri ini memiliki informasi tentang perilaku merokok dan kondisi obesitas.Penelitian ini menemukan bukti keberadaan ex ante moral hazard di asuransi kesehatan untuk obesitas di tingkat kepala keluarga, tapi tidak untuk perilaku merokok. Regresi dari multivariate probit menunjukkan bahwa memiliki asuransi kesehatan meningkatkan kecenderungan untuk obeitas. Dengan menggunakan sampel yang lebih luas, termasuk semua anggota keluarga, tidak ditemukan bukti keberadaan ex ante moral hazard baik untuk perilaku merokok maupun untuk obesitas.

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This paper will empirically examine the existence of ex ante moral hazard in health insurance in Indonesia with respect to lifestyle choices such as smoking and obesity. A key challenge in understanding the moral hazard problem is endogeneity. Decisions regarding having insurance and lifestyle choices are arguably sequential, not simultaneous. To address this problem, this paper uses a multivariate probit analysis. This paper uses three waves from the IFLS (Indonesian Family Life Survey) over 2000, 2007, and 2014, as these have information about insurance status, smoking behaviour, and obesity condition.

This paper finds evidence of the existence of ex ante moral hazard in health insurance for obesity of the head of household, but not for smoking. The multivariate probit regression shows that having health insurance increases the propensity of being obese. Using a wider sample, including all members of households, there is not sufficient evidence of the existence of ex ante moral hazard for either smoking or obesity."

"ABSTRAKTesis ini membahas tentang kemampuan Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan dalammenghadapi potensi risiko moral hazard terutama yang berhubungan denganpenyaluran kredit perbankan. Keberadaan suatu institusi penjaminan simpanandimanapun akan selalu diiringi oleh risiko moral hazard bank-bank anggotapenjaminan. Penelitian ini dibatasi hanya meneliti bank-bank perkreditan rakyatkarena menimbang selama berdiri hingga saat ini, (2005-2012) paparan terbesar LPSadalah disaat melikuidasi BPR. Risiko moral hazard tidak akan dapat dihilangkan,namun dapat ditekan. Salah satu parameter yang sangat berpengaruh dalam menjagatingkat risiko moral hazard agar tetap rendah dan berada pada batas toleransi yaitunilai maksimum simpanan yang dijamin (coverage limit). Tesis ini juga berusahameneliti parameter lain yang berpengaruh dengan memasukkan variabel-variabelmakroekonomi seperti pertumbuhan PDB, laju inflasi, suku bunga acuan BankIndonesia, suku bunga yang dijamin oleh LPS, dan perkembangan penyaluran danakredit pada BPR. Dalam perkembangan penyusunan tesis ini, dilakukan jugapengujian dalam mengukur risiko moral hazard yang berhubungan dengan kreditBPR secara kuantitatif dengan mengadopsi metode dalam pengukuran pencadanganklaim LPS yaitu pendekatan perhitungan value at risk CreditRisk+ dengan input databerasal dari data non performing loan (NPL) BPR selama tahun 2011 yang masihberada dalam proses maupun yang telah selesai proses likuidasinya oleh LPS.

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AbstractThis research is to determine Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC) abilityin order to encounter the impact of moral hazard risk in correlation with bank creditdisbursement. The existences of a deposit insurer institution everywhere will alwaysbe followed by the moral hazard risk of bank members. This study limited toscrutinize only rural banks because since the establishment (2005-2012) the IDIClargest exposure was when it liquidated rural banks. The risk of moral hazard cannotbe eliminated, but it can be suppressed. One of the robust parameter that veryimportant in maintaining the level of moral hazard risk in order to remain low and onthe threshold of tolerance is the maximum deposit coverage limit. This research alsoattempted to examine the other parameters that affect by asserted the macroeconomicvariables such as GDP growth, inflation rate, BI rate, deposit insurance rate, and thedevelopment of rural banks credit disbursement. Furthermore, this study also try tomeasured moral hazard risk in associated with rural banks credit failure quantitativelyby adopting the IDIC?s provision cover claim method using banking credit riskmeasurement approach (internal rating based). After further consideration,CreditRisk+ value at risk approach was chosen using input data from liquidated ruralbanks non performing loan (NPL) during 2011"

"Penelitian ini memberikan kontribusi berupa studi empiris ex ante moral hazard pada Sistem Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) di Indonesia dengan melakukan analisis apakah kepemilikan Program JKN membuat individu menjadi tidak terlalu menjaga kondisi kesehatannya yang kemudian mendorong individu melakukan perilaku kesehatan berisiko. Penelitian ini mengestimasi hubungan antara kepemilikan Program JKN dan perilaku kesehatan berisiko dengan mengutilisasi data longitudinal IFLS4 dan IFLS5 sebanyak 14.767 observasi. Kami menemukan bahwa kepemilikan Program JKN memiliki hubungan negatif dengan aktivitas fisik dan hubungan positif dengan pengeluran rokok individu. Selanjutnya dengan menghitung efek marginal kami mendapatkan bahwa Program JKN mengurangi probabilitas individu untuk melakukan aktivitas fisik sebesar 2.7% dan juga mengurangi intensitas melakukan aktivitas fisik. Program JKN juga ditemukan meningkatkan pengeluran rokok individu yang perupakan perokok. Hasil analisis menyatakan bahwa terdapat indikasi terjadinya ex ante moral hazard pada Program JKN karena kepemilikan JKN meningkatkan probabilitas individu melakukan perilaku kesehatan berisiko. Hasil penelitian ini mengimplikasikan bahwa mungkin diperlukan mitigasi untuk mengatasi isu ini karena dapat mengurangi dampak positif dari Program JKN di Indonesia.

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This paper contributes to the empirical evidence of ex ante moral hazard on the National Health Insurance System (NHIS) in Indonesia. It analyses whether participating in Indonesia National Health Insurance System (NHIS) called Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) lead individual to a less healthy lifestyle decisions and therefore encourage risky health behaviors. This paper estimate the relationship between individual JKN participation and risky health behavior by utilizing longitudinal data from IFLS4 and IFLS5 with 14,767 observations. We find that JKN participation has a negative relationship with physical activity and positive relationship with smoking spending. Furthermore, by calculating marginal effect we obtained that JKN participation reduce the probability of physical activity by 2.7% and also reduce the intensity of individual physical activity. For the smoker, JKN Participation is expected increase in their spending for smoking. The result indicate that there is an evidence of ex ante moral hazard from JKN participation since JKN participation lead individual to have a risky health behaviors. Our result provide implication that there is need to mitigate this issue since it might hamper the positive impact of JKN participation in the future."

"LPS adalah Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan di Indonesia yang menjamin Simpanan nasabah. LPS rate merupakan bagian dari skema penjaminan yang digunakan LPS untuk menentukan jumlah simpanan yang layak bayar. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji pengaruh suku bunga penjaminan simpanan yang dikombinasikan dengan nominal maksimum simpanan yang dijamin terhadap stabilitas perbankan dan seberapa berpotensi mengurangi moral hazard baik pada periode normal maupun krisis. Menggunakan data panel dari 94 bank umum di Indonesia dari tahun 2017 hingga 2022 serta tahun 2020 hingga 2021 dianggap sebagai periode krisis. Hasil kami menunjukkan hubungan negatif yang signifikan antara peningkatan persentase simpanan yang dijamin dan stabilitas bank dalam periode normal atau krisis. Sementara untuk moral hazard pada kondisi normal terdapat hubungan positif yang signifikan, namun pada saat krisis tidak menjadi variabel yang secara signifikan mempengaruhi bank untuk menaikkan suku bunga.

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LPS is a deposit insurance Corporation in Indonesia that guarantees bank depositors. The LPS rate is part of the guarantee scheme used by the LPS to determine the number of guaranteed deposits that are eligible to be paid. This research aims to assess the influence of deposit insurance rates combined with the maximum nominal deposit guaranteed on banking stability and how potentially reduces moral hazard both in normal periods and crises. Using data panel of 94 commercial banks in Indonesia from 2017 to 2022. where 2020 to 2021 is considered a crisis period. Our results suggest a significant negative relationship between the increase in the percentage of guaranteed deposits and bank stability in normal periods or crises. Related to moral hazard where under normal conditions there is a significant positive relationship, but during a crisis, it does not become a variable that significantly influences banks to raise interest rates."

"Kehadiran moral hazard dan adverse selection dalam asuransi kesehatan dapat mengubah kebiasaan pencegahan diri pada individu, yang mengarah pada praktik keuangan yang tidak berkelanjutan bagi perusahaan asuransi. Tesis ini meneliti pengeluaran untuk pengobatan mandiri sebagai indikator hadirnya moral hazard dalam kebijakan Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) yang diperkenalkan pada tahun 2014. Menggunakan data panel dua periode dari Indonesia Family Life Survey dan metode difference-in-differences (DID) untuk memperkirakan dampak kausal dari program JKN, studi ini juga menggabungkan propensity score matching (PSM) untuk mengurangi potensi efek adverse selection dalam pendaftaran JKN yang tidak acak. Analisis menunjukkan bahwa hasil awal DID mengindikasikan adanya moral hazard, yang terlihat dari berkurangnya pengeluaran untuk pengobatan mandiri. Namun, analisis PSM-DID tidak mendukung adanya moral hazard, hal ini menunjukkan bahwa temuan awal dipengaruhi oleh adverse selection. Hasil ini memberikan kontribusi pada literatur empiris mengenai tantangan moral hazard dan adverse selection dalam sistem asuransi kesehatan public, khususnya di Indonesia.

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The presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in health insurance can undermine individuals’ self-preventive measures, leading to unsustainable financial practice. This thesis investigates self-medication spending as an indicator of moral hazard within Indonesia’s public health insurance policy (JKN) introduced in 2014. Utilizing two-period panel data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey and employing difference-in-differences (DID) method to estimate causal effect of the JKN program, this study also incorporates propensity score matching (PSM) to mitigate the potential adverse selection effect in non-randomized JKN enrollment. The analysis revealed that initial DID results suggest the presence of moral hazard, evidenced by a crowding out of self-medication spending. However, post-matching DID analysis does not support the existence of moral hazard, indicating that the initial findings were influenced by adverse selection. These results contribute to the empirical literature on the challenges of moral hazard and adverse selection in Indonesia’s public health insurance system."