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"Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji secara empiris pengaruh struktur kepemilikan terhadap praktik aggressiveness of transfer pricing, baik bentuk kepemilikan keluarga, asing dan pemerintah, dan pengaruh good governance baik corporate governance maupun government governance terhadap hubungan struktur kepemilikan dan praktik aggressiveness of transfer pricing di beberapa negara ASEAN-4. Sampel penelitian terdiri dari 264 perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Saham negara-negara ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand dan Philipina) dengan kurun waktu 2012-2015. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa kepemilikan keluarga dan kepemilikan pemerintah berhubungan negatif dengan aggressiveness of transfer pricing, sedangkan kepemilikan asing berhubungan positif dengan aggressiveness of transfer pricing. Kualitas good governance, baik corporate governance maupun government governance memperkuat hubungan negatif antara antara struktur kepemilikan keluarga dan kepemilikan pemerintah dengan aggressiveness of transfer pricing. Sebaliknya good governance, baik corporate governance maupun government governance mempu memperlemah hubungan positif kepemilikan asing dengan aggressiveness of transfer pricing. Penelitian ini melengkapi studi tentang penggunaan metode pengukuran profit level indicator (PLI) sebagai salah satu acuan dalam menentukan praktik aggressiveness of transfer pricing. Penelitian ini memiliki Implikasi terhadap pentingnya kebijakan anti abuse of transfer pricing yang lebih spesifik dalam rangka mengurangi kerugian negara akibat praktik abuse of transfer pricing.

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This study aims to empirically examine the effect of ownership structure on the aggressiveness of transfer pricing practices in family, foreign and government ownership forms, as well as the effect of good governance in both corporate and government governance in several ASEAN countries for four years. The research sample consisted of 264 manufacturing companies, listed on the ASEAN-Stock Exchange (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines) in the period of 2012-2015. This study found out that family and government ownership were negatively related to aggressiveness of transfer pricing, while foreign ownership was positively related to aggressiveness of transfer pricing. The quality of good governance, both in corporate and government governance, strengthens the negative relationship between family and government ownership and aggressiveness of transfer pricing. Conversely, good governance, both in corporate and government governance can weaken the positive relationship between foreign ownership and aggressiveness of transfer pricing. This study applies the use of the profit level indicator (PLI) method as one of the references in determining the practice of aggressiveness of transfer pricing. This study is beneficial for a specifically anti-abusive transfer pricing policy in order to reduce state losses (due to the practice of abusive transfer pricing)."

"Dalam rangka menjaga kualitas jasa Akuntan Publik untuk menyediakan informasi keuangan berkualitas, Pemerintah Indonesia menambahkan sanksi pidana sebagai salah satu alat pencegahan pada UU No 5/2011 tentang Akuntan Publik. Di lain pihak, profesi akuntan melihat ini sebagai ancaman yang dapat menurunkan minat menjadi Akuntan Publik. Tujuan utama studi ini adalah menginvestigasi peran UU No. 5/2011 dalam pencegahan perilaku kecurangan Akuntan Publik dalam perspektif Teori Pencegahan Umum. Model formal dibangun dengan menggunakan kombinasi Teori Segiempat Kecurangan (Wolfe dan Hermanson, 2004), Teori Perilaku Terencana (Ajzen, 1991), dan Teori Opsi Riil dalam perilaku kriminal (Engelen, 2004). Eksperimen menggunakan desain riset 2x2x2 yang dilakukan dengan 2 variabel pertama,yaitu hukuman dan probabilitas terdeteksinya kecurangan oleh inspeksi, sebagai alat pencegahan UU No. 5/2011, dan variabel opsi durasi digunakan untuk mengoperasionalkan Teori Opsi Riil.. Data dikumpulkan dari 127 Akuntan Publik sebagai responden. Model final adalah sebuah structural equation model dan diolah menggunakan AMOS. Hasil eksperimen menunjukkan bahwa salah satu alat pencegahan kecurangan pada UU No. 5/2011, yaitu probabilitas terdeteksinya kecurangan oleh inspeksi, terbukti efektif untuk mencegah perilaku kecurangan Akuntan Publik, namun data belum mendukung efektifitas penerapan sanksi pidana sebagai alat pencegahan perilaku kecurangan, dengan hasil tidak ada efek signifikan dari penambahan ketentuan sanksi pidana (menyertai sanksi administratif yang sudah berlaku) terhadap pencegahan kecurangan. Selain itu, studi ini juga menemukan bahwa biaya atas peluang, ketidakpastian pendapatan dan opsi durasi terbukti merupakan determinan yang meningkatkan perilaku kecurangan Akuntan Publik.

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In order to maintain the service quality of Public Accountants in providing high quality financial information, the Indonesian Government adds criminal sanction as one of deterrent tools in Law No. 5/2001 on Public Accountant in order to deter fraud behavior. On the other hand, the accounting profession sees the Law as a threat to the profession and will reduce the interest of becoming Public Accountants. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the role of Law No. 5/2011 in deterring Public Accountant to commit fraud based on General Deterrence Theory perspective. Formal models are developed using combination of Fraud Diamond Theory (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004), Planned Behavior Theory (Ajzen, 1991) and Real Option Theory in criminal behavior (Engelen, 2004). The experiment using 2x2x2 research design was conducted with the first two variables (criminal sanctions and probability of fraud detection by regulatory inspection) served as deterrent tools of Law No. 5/2011, and the duration option variable, employed to operationalize Real Option Theory. The data were collected from 127 Public Accountants as respondents. The empirical model is a structural equation model which is solved using AMOS. The experiment results show that one of Law No. 5/2011 deterrent tool, probability of fraud detection by regulatory inspection, is found to be effective to deter Public Accountant’s fraud behavior, but the data did not yet support the effectiveness of criminal sanction implementation as a deterrent tool, because there is no significant effect of extra criminal sanction provisions (accompanying administrative sanction in force preciously) on fraud deterrent. Finally, this study finds that opportunity cost, income volatility and duration option are among determinant factors that positively affect Public Accountant’s fraud behavior."