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"[ABSTRAK Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh family business, corporate governance, related party transactions dan competition terhadap biaya utang. Variabel family business dibagi menjadi tiga model penelitian dengan masing- masing metode sebagai berikut: ditentukan berdasarkan persentase kepemilikan keluarga, menggunakan hubungan non-linear kepemilikan keluarga, menggunakan dummy variable pemegang saham keluarga di atas 20% yang terlibat dalam manajemen. Variabel corporate governance menggunakan skor yang dikeluarkan oleh The Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship, related party transactions menggunakan dummy variable transaksi berelasi pinjaman dan competition menggunakan 1-Herfindahl Index. Penelitian menggunakan sampel 111 perusahaan tahun 2005, 2008, dan 2011. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan persentase kepemilikan keluarga, hubungan non-linear kepemilikan keluarga, dan pemegang saham keluarga di atas 20% yang terlibat dalam manajemen tidak terbukti berpengaruh terhadap biaya utang. Sebagai variabel moderasi, persentase kepemilikan keluarga dan kepemilikan keluarga di atas 20% yang terlibat dalam manajemen tidak terbukti mempengaruhi hubungan corporate governance dan biaya utang, namun kepemilikan keluarga di atas 50% terbukti memperlemah hubungan corporate governance dan biaya utang. Penelitian ini juga membuktikan corporate governance dan related party transactions tidak berpengaruh terhadap biaya utang namun competition terbukti berpengaruh signifikan terhadap biaya utang.

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ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of family business, corporate governance, related party transactions and competition to cost of debt. Family business is divided into three models which each methods are: percentage of family ownership, non-linear relationships of family ownership, dummy variable of family ownership more than 20% involved in management. This study employs scorecard which is issued by The Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship, dummy variable of related loan transactions and 1-Herfindahl Index as a proxy for corporate governance, related party transactions and competition. This study employs 111 samples in 2005, 2008, and 2011. This study proves that family ownership, non-linear relationships of family ownership, and family ownership more than 20% involved in management have no impact to cost of debt. As moderating variables, family ownership and family ownership more than 20% involved in management do not influence relationship between corporate governance and cost of debt, but this study proves that family ownership more than 50% made relationship between corporate governance and cost of debt is weak. This study also proves that corporate governance and related party transactions have no impact to cost of debt but competition has a significant impact to cost of debt.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of family business, corporate governance, related party transactions and competition to cost of debt. Family business is divided into three models which each methods are: percentage of family ownership, non-linear relationships of family ownership, dummy variable of family ownership more than 20% involved in management. This study employs scorecard which is issued by The Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship, dummy variable of related loan transactions and 1-Herfindahl Index as a proxy for corporate governance, related party transactions and competition. This study employs 111 samples in 2005, 2008, and 2011. This study proves that family ownership, non-linear relationships of family ownership, and family ownership more than 20% involved in management have no impact to cost of debt. As moderating variables, family ownership and family ownership more than 20% involved in management do not influence relationship between corporate governance and cost of debt, but this study proves that family ownership more than 50% made relationship between corporate governance and cost of debt is weak. This study also proves that corporate governance and related party transactions have no impact to cost of debt but competition has a significant impact to cost of debt.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of family business, corporate governance, related party transactions and competition to cost of debt. Family business is divided into three models which each methods are: percentage of family ownership, non-linear relationships of family ownership, dummy variable of family ownership more than 20% involved in management. This study employs scorecard which is issued by The Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship, dummy variable of related loan transactions and 1-Herfindahl Index as a proxy for corporate governance, related party transactions and competition. This study employs 111 samples in 2005, 2008, and 2011. This study proves that family ownership, non-linear relationships of family ownership, and family ownership more than 20% involved in management have no impact to cost of debt. As moderating variables, family ownership and family ownership more than 20% involved in management do not influence relationship between corporate governance and cost of debt, but this study proves that family ownership more than 50% made relationship between corporate governance and cost of debt is weak. This study also proves that corporate governance and related party transactions have no impact to cost of debt but competition has a significant impact to cost of debt., The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of family business, corporate governance, related party transactions and competition to cost of debt. Family business is divided into three models which each methods are: percentage of family ownership, non-linear relationships of family ownership, dummy variable of family ownership more than 20% involved in management. This study employs scorecard which is issued by The Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship, dummy variable of related loan transactions and 1-Herfindahl Index as a proxy for corporate governance, related party transactions and competition. This study employs 111 samples in 2005, 2008, and 2011. This study proves that family ownership, non-linear relationships of family ownership, and family ownership more than 20% involved in management have no impact to cost of debt. As moderating variables, family ownership and family ownership more than 20% involved in management do not influence relationship between corporate governance and cost of debt, but this study proves that family ownership more than 50% made relationship between corporate governance and cost of debt is weak. This study also proves that corporate governance and related party transactions have no impact to cost of debt but competition has a significant impact to cost of debt.]"

"[ABSTRAK Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mempelajari pengaruh political connections, corporate governance, dan blockholders ownership terhadap corporate cash holdings sebagai proxy dari agency problem. Penelitian dilakukan menggunakan data panel dari 141 data observasi pada periode 2005, 2008 dan 2011 di Indonesia. Political connections diukur menggunakan variabel dummy. Perusahaan diidentifikasi memiliki political connections apabila terdapat setidaknya satu pemegang saham besar atau top officers yang menjadi anggota parlemen, menteri, atau menjalin hubungan dekat dengan politikus terkemuka atau partai. Corporate governance diukur menggunakan Corporate Governance Index dari Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship. Blockholders ownership diukur menggunakan variabel continuous berupa jumlah kepemilikan saham serta menggunakan variabel dummy yang merupakan pengelompokan untuk kepemilikan blockholders rendah, moderat, dan tinggi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa political connections dan corporate governance terbukti berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap corporate cash holdings. Keberadaan hubungan politis pada perusahaan dapat meminimalkan agency problem karena para politisi yang terlibat dalam perusahaan memanfaatkan jabatan dan kekuatan politiknya untuk keuntungan perusahaan. Penelitian ini juga memperkuat argumen bahwa implementasi corporate governance yang baik dapat meminimalkan agency problem dalam perusahaan. Blockholders ownership tidak terbukti signifikan berpengaruh terhadap corporate cash holdings baik secara linier maupun non linier. Hal ini dapat terjadi karena definisi blockholders yang kurang mencerminkan kepemilikan yang spesifik.

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ABSTRACTThe purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm’s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm’s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm’s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven., The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm’s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm’s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm’s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.]"

"[ABSTRAKTesis ini ingin memperlihatkan scoring strategi pemilihan saham yang manakeputusan investasi yang baik berbasis pada perbandingan Price to Book Value,Return of Equity, Cost of Equity dan Corporate Governance. Dimana padahasilnya saham yang terpilih adalah saham-saham yang tidak terlalu populernamun berprospek menurut hasil penelitian ini. Adapun penambahan studiempiris dalam penelitian ingin menunjukkan pengaruh praktek tata kelolaperusahaan serta dummy perusahaan keluarga terhadap nilai perusahaan. Datayang digunakan berasal dari BEI, ICMD, Datastream, Bloomberg, laporantahunan serta data Corporate Governance Scorecard yang didapatkan darioutsourcing tim Hibah Kompetensi yang mana diketuai oleh Prof. SiddhartaUtama. Hasil regresi dengan data panel fixed effect model menunjukkan bahwaterdapat tidak terdapat pengaruh antara praktek tata kelola perusahaan dengannilai perusahaan. Hasil penelitian lainnya menunjukkan terdapat pengaruh positifantara dummy variabel perusahaan keluarga dengan nilai perusahaan. Hasilregresi menggunakan tingkat konsentrasi dengan 5%.

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ABSTRACTThe focus of this research is to show that stock selection strategies scoring wheregood investment decisions based on a comparison of Price to Book Value, Returnon Equity, Cost of Equity and Corporate Governance. Where the result is selectedstocks are stocks that are not too popular yet prospected by the results of thisstudy. The addition of empirical studies are find the influence of corporategovernance practices as well as dummy family company to value of the firm. Thedata used came from BEI, ICMD, Datastream, Bloomberg, annual reports, andCorporate Governance Scorecard as well as data obtained from outsourcing teamCompetence Grant which is chaired by Prof. Siddharta Utama. Results ofregression with panel data fixed effect models indicate that there is no effectbetween corporate governance practices with the value of the company. And theresults show there is a positive influence between the dummy variable familycompany to value of the firm. Regression results using the confidence level of5%., The focus of this research is to show that stock selection strategies scoring wheregood investment decisions based on a comparison of Price to Book Value, Returnon Equity, Cost of Equity and Corporate Governance. Where the result is selectedstocks are stocks that are not too popular yet prospected by the results of thisstudy. The addition of empirical studies are find the influence of corporategovernance practices as well as dummy family company to value of the firm. Thedata used came from BEI, ICMD, Datastream, Bloomberg, annual reports, andCorporate Governance Scorecard as well as data obtained from outsourcing teamCompetence Grant which is chaired by Prof. Siddharta Utama. Results ofregression with panel data fixed effect models indicate that there is no effectbetween corporate governance practices with the value of the company. And theresults show there is a positive influence between the dummy variable familycompany to value of the firm. Regression results using the confidence level of5%.]"

"[Penelitian bertujuan untuk memberikan bukti empiris mengenai pengaruh kepemilikan terkonsentrasi dan analyst following terhadap likuiditas saham, khususnya mengenai adanya risiko ekspropriasi terhadap pemegang sahamminoritas. Selain itu penelitian ini juga meneliti peran moderasi ukuran perusahaan terhadap hubungan struktur kepemilikan terkonsentrasi dan analyst following terhadap likuiditas saham. Kepemilikan saham diukur menggunakanselisih antara control right dan cash-flow right dari pemegang saham terbesar. Likuiditas diukur dengan adjusted Amihud Illiquidity. Sampel penelitian adalah perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia selama periode penelitian tahun 2010-2014. Hasil penelitian menemukan bahwa analyst following berhubungan positif dengan likuiditas. Semakin besar ukuran perusahaan,pengaruh positif tersebut semakin menurun.

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The study aims to provide empirical evidence about the effect of concentrated ownership and analyst following on the liquidity of the stock, particularly regarding the risk of expropriation of the minority shareholders. In

addition, this study also examines the role of size as moderating variable on the association concentrated ownership structure and analyst following on the liquidity of the stock. Share ownership is measured using the difference between control right and cash-flow rights of the largest shareholders. Liquidity is measured by adjusted Amihud Illiquidity. The samples were companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the study period 2010-2014. The study found that analyst following positively related to liquidity. The larger the size of

the company, the positive effect decreases.;The study aims to provide empirical evidence about the effect of

concentrated ownership and analyst following on the liquidity of the stock,

particularly regarding the risk of expropriation of the minority shareholders. In

addition, this study also examines the role of size as moderating variable on the

association concentrated ownership structure and analyst following on the

liquidity of the stock. Share ownership is measured using the difference between

control right and cash-flow rights of the largest shareholders. Liquidity is

measured by adjusted Amihud Illiquidity. The samples were companies listed on

the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the study period 2010-2014. The study

found that analyst following positively related to liquidity. The larger the size of

the company, the positive effect decreases., The study aims to provide empirical evidence about the effect of

concentrated ownership and analyst following on the liquidity of the stock,

particularly regarding the risk of expropriation of the minority shareholders. In

addition, this study also examines the role of size as moderating variable on the

association concentrated ownership structure and analyst following on the

liquidity of the stock. Share ownership is measured using the difference between

control right and cash-flow rights of the largest shareholders. Liquidity is

measured by adjusted Amihud Illiquidity. The samples were companies listed on

the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the study period 2010-2014. The study

found that analyst following positively related to liquidity. The larger the size of

the company, the positive effect decreases.]"

"ABSTRAKPenelitian ini dilakukan untuk menginvestigasi reaksi pasar di Bursa Efek Indonesia terhadap 20 peristiwa peledakan bom yang terjadi di Indonesia dalam rentang tahun 2000 s.d. 2011 dan menguji pengaruh sektor industri, proporsi kepemilikan asing, likuiditas, leverage dan operating leverage terhadap reaksi tersebut. Hasil uji event study menunjukkan bahwa pasar bereaksi negatif signifikan terhadap berita peledakan bom, namun, dampak yang ditimbulkan hanya bersifat sementara. Lebih lanjut, hasil analisis regresi menunjukkan bahwa berita peledakan bom bereaksi negatif pada seluruh jenis industri, sehingga reaksi pasar modal pada industri pariwisata dan industri asuransi tidak terbukti akan lebih negatif dibandingkan dengan industri lainnya. Proporsi kepemilikan saham asing terbukti berpengaruh negatif terhadap reaksi pasar modal, sementara faktor fundamental perusahaan tidak terbukti mempengaruhi reaksi pasar modal akibat berita peledakan bom.

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ABSTRACTThis study investigates the market reaction of Indonesia Stock Exchange to 20 bomb attacks in Indonesia from the period of 2000 to 2011 and whether the market reaction of Indonesia Stock Exchange is affected by type of industry, proportion of foreign ownership, liquidity, leverage and operating leverage. Results from an event study shows that Indonesia capital market reacts negatively significant to bomb attack news, however, the impact is temporary. Further, the multiple regression analysis shows that bomb attacks news has negative impact to all of the type of industry, so that the results of tourism and insurance industry are not more negative than other industries. Proportion of foreign ownership has negative impact while corporate fundamental factors does not influence the Indonesia stock market reaction in response to bomb attack news."

"Penelitian tentang faktor yang mempengaruhi pengungkapan sukarela telah banyak diteliti diantaranya karakteristik perusahaan, mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan dan struktur kepemilikan. Peningkatan keberadaan wanita dalam jajaran manajemen puncak di beberapa negara mendorong OECD untuk memberikan rekomendasi dengan mempertimbangkan keseimbangan komposisi gender dalam pengambilan keputusan. Penelitian ini menguji komposisi wanita dalam jajaran manajemen puncak terhadap tingkat pengungkapan sukarela dengan menggunakan perusahaan yang terdaftar di bursa efek indonesia pada tahun 2014 - 2015. Tingkat pengungkapan sukarela diukur dengan menggunakan indeks pengungkapan Botosan 1997 yang terdiri dari empat komponen pengungkapan yaitu non-keuangan, proyeksi informasi, analisis dan pembahasan manajemen dan ikhtisar keuangan lima tahun terakhir. Hasil penelitian ini menemukan bahwa tidak ada pengaruh wanita dalam jajaran manajemen puncak terhadap tingkat pengungkapan. Komposisi wanita dalam jajaran manajemen puncak di perusahaan manufaktur Indonesia masih relatif kecil.

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Previous study has examined the determinants of voluntary disclosure such as firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanism and ownership structure. Increasing women 39 s representation on board and level of voluntary disclosure by using data set of Indonesia listed firm for the year 2014 2015. Level of voluntary disclosure are measured by voluntary disclosure index of Botosan 1997. The disclosure instrument provides four components of disclosure non financial, projected information, management and discussion analysis and summary of five year performance. This study finds no relationship between woman on board and level of voluntary disclosure. The proportion woman on board in manufacturing firms in Indonesia are relatively small."

"ABSTRAKPenelitian ini menganalisis pengaruh dividend policy terhadap cost of debt dengan pemoderasi Indonesia rsquo;s 100 Top Business Groups. Sampel penelitian sebanyak 1.193 unbalanced panel data observation pada perusahaan non-keuangan yang terdaftar di BEI tahun 2010-2014 dan 449 observasi diantaranya terafiliasi dengan business groups. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan dividend policy, business group, dan profitability berpengaruh negatif terhadap cost of debt. Namun keberadaan business group tidak terbukti memperkuat pengaruh negatif dividend policy terhadap cost of debt. Selain itu, bankruptcy risk berpengaruh positif terhadap cost of debt, sedangkan Tangibility tidak berpengaruh terhadap cost of debt. Hasil penelitian ini mendukung the information content effect dalam the signalling hypothesis theory.

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ABSTRACTThis thesis analyzes the effect of dividend policy to cost of debt with Indonesia 39 s 100 Top Business Groups as moderating variable. Our sampel are 1,193 unbalanced panel data observation of non financial company listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2010 2014 those are including 449 observations affiliated with business groups. Our research shows that dividend payout, business group, and profitability negatively affect the cost of debt. But the existence of the business group is not proven to strengthen the negative effect of dividend policy on cost of debt. While bankruptcy risk affect the cost of debt positively, but Tangibility doesn rsquo t affect the cost of debt. These results support the information content effect and the signaling hypothesis theory. "

"Menurut Faulkender, pemicu utama dari utang adalah pertumbuhan. Perusahaan berutang untuk dapat bertumbuh dan menciptakan shareholder value. Pertanyaannya, sejauh mana perusahaan harus berutang sebelum resiko yang ditanggung terlalu besar? Dikatakan oleh Titman dan Wessels bahwa perusahaan dengan resiko operasional yang tinggi tidak akan membahayakan dirinya dengan utang yang tinggi. Oleh karena itu, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk melihat pengaruh dari resiko operasional dan pengalaman manajemen terhadap utang, serta interaksi dari kedua resiko tersebut. Resiko operasional dihitung dari tingkat keunikan produk dengan menggunakan selling expenses to sales sebagai ukuran penilaian sementara pengalaman manajemen dihitung dari pengalaman CEO dengan menghitung lama kerja CEO di perusahaan x selama y tahun, selama CEO tersebut menjabat posisi manajerial. Penemuan dari penelitian ini berhasil menjelaskan hampir 90 dari variabilitas utang serta menemukan bahwa sifat risk averse perusahaan yang disebabkan oleh resiko operasional diperlemah oleh pengalaman CEO.

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It is stated by Faulkender that the primary driver of debt is growth corporations borrow in order to grow and create shareholder value. The question is, how far should corporation plunge into debt before they put too much at stake According to Titman and Wessels, corporations with high operational risk will not jeopardize itself by high level of leverage. Therefore, we aim to find the causality between operational risk and managerial risk towards leverage ratio. We measure operational risk with product uniqueness which is defined by selling expenses per sales.

Managerial risk is measured by CEO experience, defined by the length of service of a CEO in x company for y years, as long as the CEO holds managerial role. Our findings explains almost 90 of the variability of leverage and we found out that corporations rsquo risk averseness, which is derived from operational risk, is weakened with experienced CEO."

"Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menguji hubungan antara struktur kepemilikan keluarga dan leverage dan juga kekuatan kehadiran komisaris independen dan direktur independen dalam mempengaruhi hubungan struktur kepemilikan keluarga terhadap leverage. Penelitian ini menggunakan teknik purposive sampling yang menghasilkan 22 perusahaan publik manufaktur Indonesia yang beroperasi pada periode 2010-2018 sebagai sampel. Data panel dikumpulkan dari Thomson Reuters dan data kepemilikan keluarga dikumpulkan secara manual dari laporan tahunan perusahaan. Penelitian ini menggunakan analisis regresi berganda dengan empat model.Hasilnya menyatakan bahwa struktur kepemilikan keluarga berpengaruh negatif dan signifikan terhadap leverage. Interaksi dari direktur independen terbukti memperkuat hubungan strukur kepemilikan keluarga terhadap leverage namun komisaris independen tidak terbukti dapat memperkuat hubungan struktur kepemilikan keluarga terhadap leverage. Hasil penelitian ini dapat membantu perusahaan untuk membuat keputusan pembiayaan dan mengurangi masalah keagenan.

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The purpose of this research is to examine the relation between family ownership structure and leverage and also the indirect impact of independent commissioner and independent director on the relationship of the family ownership structure and leverage. This research applied a purposive sampling technique that resulted 22 Indonesian manufacturing public firms operated in the period 2010-2018 as the sample. The panel data was collected from Thomson Reuters and family ownership data is manually collected from the company annual report. This research using multiple regression analysis with four models.

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The result provides that family ownership structure is negatively significant to leverage. Independent director is proved strengthen the negative relationship of family ownership and leverage yet the independent commissionaire is insignificantly related to the relationship between family ownership and leverage. The result of this research could help the company to make a financing decision and mitigate the agency problem."