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ABSTRAKTujuan utama dari penelitian ini adalah menguji hubungan simultan antara nilai
perusahaan, praktek corporate govenance, dan struktur kepemilikan dengan 114
perusahaan yang terbuka di Bursa Efek Jakarta pada tahun 2003. Variabel struktur
kepemilikan adalah Cash flow rights, wedge (control rights - cash flow rights),
persentase kepemilikan blockholders oleh pihak asing namun diduga sebenarnya
orang Indonesia (atau disingkat Asing Tapi Indonesia, (ASTINDO)). Nilai perusahaan
akan diukur dengan proksi Tobin?s Q dan praktek corporate governance diukur
dengan corporate governance index (CGI) yang dikembangkan oleh Arsjah (2005).
Karena hubungan endogen antar variabel, metode two stage least squares dipakai.
Hasil menunjukkan bahwa praktek corporate governance tidak berpengaruh
signifikan kepada nilai perusahaan, tetapi nilai perusahaan menjadi prediktor positif
untuk praktek corporate governance. Hasil ini menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan yang
mempunyai nilai perusahaan yang tinggi memilih praktek corporate governance yang
baik untuk meningkatkan nilai perusahaan. Namun, perusahaan belum tentu dapat
memberi signal tentang kualitas perusahaan dengan menerapkan praktek corporate
governance yang baik. Hasil ini mungkin terjadi karena implementasi praktek
corporate governance merupakan hal yang baru di indonesia dan karena pasar masih
sulit mencerminkan pengaruh praktek corporate governance kepada nilai perusahaan
sebab kekurangan informasi yang memadai tentang praktek corporate governance.
Ketika wedge perusahaan tinggi, pengaruh praktek corporate governance kepada
nilai perusahaan melemah. 'Wedge adalah variabel yang mengukur insentif pemegang
saham mayoritas akhir untuk mengekspropriasi pemegang saham minoritas. Dengan
demikian dapat disimpulkan bahwa efektivitas praktek corporate governance
dipengaruhi oleh insentif untuk melakukan ekspropriasi dari pemegang saham
pengendali akhir.
Struktur kepemilikan dan nilai perusahaan tidak mempunyai hubungan sistematik.
Hasil ini mendukung bahwa struktur kepemilikan ditentukan secara endogen,
sehingga struktur kepemilikan tersebar maupun terkonsentrasi masing-masing
membawa masalah keagenan, tetapi sekaligus memberikan kuntungan yang dapat
menjadi kompensasi masalah keagenan masing-masing.
ASTINDO dalam struktur kepemilikan perusahaan ternyata tidak mengurangi
nilai perusahaan atau tidak mengekspropriasi kekayaan pemegang saham minoritas.
Tetapi persentase kepemilikan ASTINDO berpengaruh negatif kepada praktek
corporate governance. Tidak terdapat perbedaan pengaruh dari kepemilikan
ASTINDO dan kepemilikan blockholders benar-benar asing (BLOCKA) kepada nilai
perusahaan dan praktek corporate goverance. Dengan asumsi ASTINDO diukur dengan benar, hasil tersebut meragukan argumen bahwa kepemilikan BLOCKA berpengaruh positif kepada kinerja perusahaan dan praktek corporate governance.
AbstractThe primary objective of this study is to test simultaneous relationships among the
value of the firm, the practice of corporate govemanee, and the ownership structure on
a sample of 114 companies quoted in the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) for the year 2003. The ovmership structure variables include cash flow rights, wedge (control
rights - cash-flow rights), and percent of ownership by foreign bloclcholders that presumably are Indonesian blockholders (FBIB). The value of the firm is measured by
proxy of Tobin's Q and the practice of corporate governance is measured by corporate
govemance index (CGI) developed by Arsjah (2005). Because of the endogeneity among the variables, the two stage least squares are employed.
The study finds that practice of corporate govemance fails to affect value of the
firm, but value of the firm is a positive predictor of practice of corporate governance.
These results suggest that highly valued firms adopt the practice of the good corporate
govemance because they believe that the practice of the good corporate governance
will further raise fimr value. However, adopting the practice of good corporate governance may not translate to higher fimi value. This may due to the fact that
implementation of the practice of the corporate govemance is something new in Indonesia and that market may have difficulty in reflecting the effects of the practice of
thecorporategovemanceonthevalueofthefirmbecauseofthelackofproper information.
Further, the influence ofthe practice ofthe corporate governance on the value ofthe firm becomes less, when the wedge of the firm becomes higher. Wedge is the variable that estimates incentives of ultimate majority shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Therefore, I conclude that effectiveness of the practice of the corporate govemance is influenced by the expropriation incentives of the ultimate majority shareholders.
Ownership structure and the value of the firm have no systematic relation. This result supports that the ownership structure of a firm is the endogenous outcome of decisions. In other words, ownership structure is chosen so as to maximize the value of
the firm, and that greater diffuseness in ownership, although it makes the agency
problemmoresevere,conveyscompensatingadvantagesonfirmsthatchoosetorelyon a difiiise ownership structure.
FBIB does not extract private benefits for themselves or do not expropriate the
wealth of the minority shareholders. But, percent of ownership by FBIB has negative effectsonthepracticeofthecorporategovernance.Thereisno differencebetweenthe
influence of percent of ownership by foreign bloekholders and of percent of ownership by PBIB on the value of the firm and the practice of the corporate governance.
Assuming that percent of ownership by FBIB are accurately measured, this result casts some doubt on the argument that ownership by foreign bloclcholders has positive effects on the performance and the practice of the corporate governance."
